EFTA00289782

11,05107 la 002/003 MON 10:05 FAX 305 530 a440 EXECUTIVE OFT, CE gaMm, 10002 fi ileitea\ Department of Justice United Stow Attontey Southern District of Florida 99 N.G. 4th Soca Miami, FL 33132-V11 (305) 961.9299 Futuinurk: (305)530-6414 November 5.2007 DELIVERYIX FSCS2411.1j Jay P. Lefkowitz, Esq. Kirkland & Ellis UP Citigroup Center 153 East 53rd Street New Yodc, New York 10022,-4675 Re: Jeffrey lipstein Dear Jay: Several things have come to my attention by his obligations under the Non-Prosecuti that seem contrary to your client inte nding to abide on Agreement. As you know, that Office to inform you of potential breaches agreement requires our to give you and your client the opportu before an indictment is filed. At this nity to respond time, I do however, I have sufficient concerns that need not believe that the agreement has been breached; to be addressed. First, T understand that private inve stigators working for Mr. Epstein have to ask them whether any detectives or FBI contacted victims agents have discussed a financial settl On one occasion, the private investigators told ement with them. the parent of a victim that she for her daughter and she should do so should get an attorney right away. These actions are trou agents legally arc required to advise blesome because the P131 the victims of the resolution of the mat informing them that, as pan of the ter, which includes resolution, that Mr. Epstein has agre circumstances. Furthermore, Mr. Epstein ed to pay damages in some well knows that we are in the proc attorney to represent the victims and ess of selecting an , but for the inordinate amount of time Addendum, that attorney would already spen t negotiating the have been selected. Paragraph 7 of Agreement explicitly provides the Nun-Prosecution that contact with the victims shall Accordingly, please canine' that ther .be through that counsel. e will be no further efforts to contact any Davis selects the attorney representative victims until fudge and that, thereafter, contact will counsel. be made only through that Second, the Non-Prosecution Agreement requires Mr. Epstein Muse his guilty plea and to be sentenced not his best efforts to enter later than October 26, 2007. Despite Office agreed that Mr. Epstein coul this obligation. the d postpone this deadline to November, but reiterated that Mr. EFTA00289782 003/003 11 /05 /V MON 10:00 FAX 305 530 5440 ere:cirri v8 OFFICE rdloo3 JAY P. I.Encowrtz. Esc, Neveniast 5.2007 Pace 2 OF 2 Epstein had to begin his term of inca rceration not later than January 4, 2008. I have November hearing has been removed from learned that the the calendar and the next case disposit not been set until January 7.2008. This dela ion conference has y is unacceptable, and, pursuant to you Office requests that you confer with the State r obligations, the Attorney's Office to try to find a date in when the judge is available toconduct a November simultaneous plea and sentencing. If you a date. please provide documentation cannot find such of your efforts to abide by the term Agreement. s of the Non-Prosecution Third, there have been several press reports that Mr. Epstein no longer inte guilty plea. Normally I would not pay any atten nds to enter a tion to Such reports, but your recent correspo attempting to restrict our Office from ndei we communicating with the State Attorney allusion to the Imposition of sentences 's Office and the that dearly fall outside die terms of Agreement raises concern. Please confirm the Non-Prosecution that Mr. Epstein intends to abide by plead guilty to the specified char his agreement to ges and to make a binding recommendation a sentence of 18 months of continuous that the Court impose confinement in the county jail. Finally, MeNon-Prosecution Agreentaatrequ all proposed agreements with the Stat ims that you provide the Office with copi e Attorney's Office before Mr. Eps es of agreements. To date, no such agreements tein signs any such havebeen received. Please provide Inc with and all agreements with the State Attorney copies of any 's Office for our review. The Office also have someone present at the change ofplea would like to and sentencing to monitorMr. Epstein's com the terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreem pliance with ent, so please keep me informed of location of the hearing. the date, time, and Please provide me with a written response, adopted by Mr. Epstein, concerns and reiterating Mr. 13pstein 'a inte addressing these ntion to comply with the terms or Agreement by November 8, 2007. the Non-Prosecution Sincerely, It, Alexander ACO5Ut cc: It. Alexander ttomey By: a stant United States Attorney EFTA00289783 05/16/2008 11:18 FAX "Ina • 05/16/08 FRI 11:08 FAx UNITED STATES DEPARTME Criminal Divisio Child Exploitation and Obsc L 1400 New York Avenue, NW Suite 600 bq Washington, DC 20530-0001 2000 5 TO: .R- Alexander Acosta, Esq. Jay I.e£kowitz, Esq. Okt-ICE NUMBER: FAX NUMBER: FROM: e>er lalb DATEIIIME May 16, 2008 OFFICE NUMBER: NUMBER OF PAGES. EXCLUDING THIS SHEET: 5 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: EFTA00289784 . 06/16/2008 11:16 FAX Q002/006 ' 06/16/08 FRI II:08 FAX ej002 U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Division Andrew G. Oosterbaan, Chief CUM aoloitenion and OfraunkySentan 14014m Yak Angus. NW Suite 600 Warldift0m. DC20130 P02)514-5780 FAX: (207)1/4.1793 May 15, 2008 Jay Lefkowitz, Esq. Kirkland & Ellis LLP Citigroup Center 153 E. 53111St. New York, NY 10022-4611 Re: Investigation of Epstein Dear Mr. Lefkowitz: Pursuant to your request and the request of independently evaluated certain issues rais U.S. Attorney R. Alexander Acosta, we hav ed in the investigation of Jeffrey Epstein e whether a decision to prosecute Mr. Epstein to determine for federal criminal violations would criminal enforcement policy interests, As contradict part of our evaluation, we have reviewe written on behalf of Mr. Epstein on Feb d letters ruary 1, 2007, June 25, 2007, July 6, 2007, 2008, April 8, 2008, April 28, 2008, and May March 28, 14, 2008, with their attachments. We hav reviewed memos prepared by the U.S. e also Attorney's Office. As you will recall, we and other representatives of Mr. Epstein to furt met with you her discuss your views on the prop federal prosecution. We have discussed the riety of a factual and legal issues you raise with Division's Appellate Section, and we the Criminal consulted with the Office of Enforcement concerning the petite policy. Operations We are examining the narrow question as to whether there is a legitimate basi U.S. Attorney's Office to proceed with a s for the federal prosecution of Mr. Epstein. prosecutorial decision making authority Ultimately, the within a U.S. Attorney's Office lies Attorney. Therefore, to borrow a phra with the U.S. se from the case law, the question we was whether U.S. Anorncy Acosta wou sought to answer ld abuse his discretion if he authoriz case. ed prosecution in this As you know, our review of this case is looked at the entire universe of facts limited, both fketually and legally. We in this case. It is not the role of the have not conduct a complete factual inquiry from Criminal Division to re- scratch. Furthermore, we did not concerning prosecution under federal analyze any issues statutes that do not pertain to child exp money laundering statutes. loitation, such as the EFTA00289785 05/16/2008 11:16 FAX g)003/006 05/18/08 PRI 11:08 FAX e 003 As was made clear at the outset, we did not review the facts, circumstances, or terms included in the plea offer, nor any allegations that individuals involved in the investigation engaged in misconduct. Despite that agreement, we note that your letters of April 8, April 28, and May 14 focus in large part on accusations of inve stigative or prosecutorial misconduct. Not only do allegations of prosecutorial miscond uct fall outside the boundary of our agreed they also fall outside the authority of the Criminal review, Division in the first instance. Simply, the Criminal Division does not investigate or reso lve allegations of professional misconduct federal prosecutors. For these reasons, we do by not respond to the portion of those lette discuss alleged misconduct. rs that Based on our review of all of these materials, and we conclude that U.S. Attorney Acosta coul after careful consideration of the issues, d properly use his discretion to authorize pros in this case. We will briefly address each of, the ecution issues that you have raised. Knowledge ofage. Federal child exploita tion statutes differ as to whether there mus proof that the defendant was aware that the chil t be dren were under the age of 18. How For those statutes where knowledge of age is ever, even an element of the offense, it is possible that element with proof that the defendant was to satisfy deliberately ignorant of facts which would that the person was a minor, For that reas suggest on, the fact that some of the individuals alle to Mr. Epstein about their age is not dispositi ged ly lied ve of the issue. While there may be an issue as to Mr. Epstein's knowledge, we cann open factual ot say that it would be impossible to prove knowledge of age for any such charges whi ch require it. Therefore, Mr. Acosta coul righ conclude that this factual issue is best reso d tfully lved by a jury. Travelfor the ptripose. in the materials you prepared, you suggest that Mr. Epstein should not be charged with violating 18 U.S .C. § 2423(b) because his dominant purp to Florida was not to engage in illegal sexu ose in going al activity, but rather to return to one While we fully understand your argumen of his residenecs. t, we also find that the U.S. Attorney's faith basis fully to develop the facts on this office has a good issue and brief the law to permit a cour whether the law properly reaches such t to decide conduct. Mr. Acosta would not be abusing his if he decided to pursue such a course of discretion action. Intent to engage In the conduct at the time this ease, we respectfidly disagree that of travel. Based on our review of the fact there is no evidence concerning Mr. s of he traveled, and when that intent was form Epstein's intent when ed. Should Mr. Acosta elect to let the that a jury can resolve this factual issue, case proceed so he would be within his discretion to do so. Use of a facility or means of interstate or have prepared and much of the meeting we foreign commerce. Much of the mat erials you had focused on 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), contention that Mr. Epstein did not use specifically your the phone to coerce anyone to engage activity. We understand the issue in illegal sexual you raise concerning the statutory however, we cannot agree that ther interpretation. As before, e is no evidence that would support a 2422(b), nor can we agree that there charge under Section is no argument in support of the applica this case. Finally, our assessment is that the tion of that statute to application of that statute to these facts would not be 2 EFTA00289786 06/16/2008 11:16 FAI bliOS/006 06/18/08 FRI 11:09 FAX 1:9004 so novel as to implicate the so-called "clear statement rule," the Ex Post Facto clause, or the Due Process clause. As with the other legal issues, Mr. Acosta may elect to proceed with the case. Absence of coercion. With respect to 18 U.S.C. § 1591, the allege d absence of the use of force, fraud, or coercion is of no moment. The statute does not require the use of force, fraud, and coercion against minors. Because of their age, a degree or coercion is presumed. In your materials, you note that the statute requires that the minors must be "caus ed" to engage in a commercial sex act, further arguing that the word "cause" sugge sts that a certain amount of undue influence was used. We reject that interpretation, as it would read back into the offense an element-coercion-that Congress has expressly excluded We have successfblly prosecuted defendants for the commercial sexual exploitation of minors, even when the minors testified that not only did they voluntarily engage in Ihe commercial sex acts, it was their idea to do so. As such, Mr. Acosta could properly decide to pursue charges under Sectio n 1591 even if there is no evidence of coercion. More broadly, a defendant's criminal liability does not hinge on his victim having suffered at his bands. Therefore, a prosecution could proce identifying as ed, should Mr. Acosta decide to do so, even though some of the young women allegedly have said that they do not view themselves as victims. Witness credibility. As all prosecutors know, them are no perfect witnesses. Particularly in cases involving exploited children, as one member of your defen se team, Ms. Thacker, surely knows from her work at acts, it is not uncommon for victim -witnesses to give conflicting statements. The prosecutors are in the best position to assess the witness's credibility. Often, the prosecutor may decide that the best approach is to present the witne ss, let defense counsel explore the credibilityprobleras on cross-examination, and let the jury resolve the issue. Mr. Acosta would be within his authority to select that approach, espec ially when here there arc multiple, mutually-corroborating witnesses. Contradictions and omissions in the search warrant applic ation. We have carefully reviewed the factual issues you raise concerning the search warrant application. For a search warrant to be suppressed, however, the factual errors must be material, and the officers must not have proceeded in good faith. Despite the numerous factual errors you describe, the U.S. Attorney's Office could still plausibly argue that the mista kes—whether inadvertent or intentional—were not material to the determination that probable cause existed for a search, and that the search was in good faith in any event. As such, Mr. Acost a could properly elect to defend the search warrant in court rather than forego prosecution. Petite Policy: After reviewing the petite policy and consulting with the Office of Enforcement Operations MEG", we conclude that the petite policy does not prohibit federal prosecution in this case. According to the U.S. Attorney's Manual, the petite policy "applies whenever there has been a prior state or federal prose cution resulting in an, acquittal, a conviction, including one resulting from a plea agreement, or a dismissal or other termination of 3 EFTA00289787 06/16/2008 11:17 FAX 0005/006 c0005 06/16/08 FRI li:00 FAX the case on the merits after jeopardy has attached." USAM 9-2.031(C). Our understanding is that the state case is still pending. As such, the procedural posture of the state case does not implicate the petite policy. We recognize that the petite policy could be triggered if the state case conclu ded after a federal indictment was issued but prior to the commencement of any federa l trial. Id. However, the policy "does not apply ... where the (state) prosecution involved only a minor part of the contemplated federal charges." USAM 9-2.031(13). Based on our understanding of the possible federal charges and existing state charges, we do not think the petite policy would be an issue should federal proceedings take place. Federalism and Prosecutorial Discretion. All of the above issues essentially ask whether a federal prosecution can proceed. We understand, however, that you also ask whether a federal prosecution should proceed, even in the event that all of the elements of a federal offense could be proven. On this issue, you raised two arguments: that the condu ct at issue here is traditionally a state concern because the activity is entirely local, and that the typica l prosecution under federal child exploitation statutes have different facts than the ones implicated here. You have essentially asked us to look into whether a prosecution would so violate federal prosecutorial policy that a United States Attorney's Office should not pursue a prosecution. We do not think that is the case here for the following reasons. Simply, the commercial sexual exploitation of children is a federal the conduct is local, and regardless of whether the defendant concern, even when provided the child (the "pimp") or paid for the child (the "John"). In your materials, you refer to a letter sent by the Department of Justice to Congress in which the Department expresses conce rn over the expansion of federal laws to reach almost all instances of prostitution. In that portio n of the letter, the Department was expressly referring to a proposed federal law that reach adult prostitution where no force, fraud, or coercion was used. Indeed, the point being made in that letter is that the Department's efforts are properly focused on the commercial sexual explo itation of children and the exploitation of adults through the use of force, fraud, or coercion. As such, there is no inconsistency between the position taken in that letter and the federal prosecution of wholly local instances of the commercial sexual exploitation of childr en. If Congress wanted to limit the reach of federal statutes only to those who profit from the commercial sexual exploitation of children, or only to those who actually traffic children across state lines, it could have done so. It did not. Finally, that a prosecution of Mr. Epstein might not look precisely like the cases that came before it is not dispo sitive. We can say with confidence that this case is consistent in principle with other federa l prosecutions nationwide. As such, Mr. Acosta can soundly exercise his authority to decide to pursue a prosecution even though it might involve a novel application of a federal statute. Conclusion. After carefully considering all the factua the arguments concerning the general propriety of l and legal issues raised, as well as a federal case against Mr. Epstein on these 4 EFTA00289788 05/36/08 FRI 11:10 FAX facts, we conclude that federal prosecution in this case would net be improper or inappropriate. While you raise many compelling arguments, we do not sec anything that says to us categorically that a federal case should not be brought. Mr. Acosta would not be abusing his prosecutorial discretion should he authorize federal prosecution of Mr.;Ostci Since(ivv au co: AAG tam DAAG U.S. Attorney R. Alexander Acosta EFTA00289789 U.S. Department of Justice United States Attorney Southern District of Florida 5001 Australian Ave, Ste 400 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 (561)820-8711 Facsimile: (561) 820.8777 December 13, 2007 DELIVERY BY ELECTRONIC MAIL Jay P. Lefkowitz, Esq. Kirkland & Ellis LLP Citigroup Center 153 East 53rd Street New York, New York 100224675 Re: Jeffrey Epstein Dear Jay: I am writing not to respond to your asserted "policy concerns" regarding Mr. Epstein's Non- Prosecution Agreement, which will be addressed by the United States Attorney, but the time has come for me to respond to the ever-increasing attacks on my role in the investigation and negotiations. It is an understatement to say that I am surprised by your allegations regarding my role because I thought that we had worked very well together in resolving this dispute. I also am surprised because I feel that I bent over backwards to keep in mind the effect that the agreement would have on Mr. Epstein and to make sure that you (and he) understood the repercussions of the agreement. For example, I brought to your attention that one potential plea could result in no gain time for your client; I corrected one of your calculations of the Sentencing Guidelines that would have resulted in Mr. Epstein spending far more time in prison than you projected; I contacted the Bureau of Prisons to see whether Mr. Epstein would be eligible for the prison camp that you desired; and I told you my suspicions about the source of the press "leak" and suggested ways to avoid the press. Importantly, I continued to work with you in a professional manner even after l learned that you had been proceeding in bad faith for several weeks — thinking that I had incorrectly concluded that solicitation of minors to engage in prostitution was a registrable offense and that you would "fool" our Office into letting Mr. Epstein plead to a non-registrable offense. Even now, when it is clear that neither you nor your client ever intended to abide by the terms of the agreement that he signed, 1 have never alleged misconduct on your part. The first allegation that you raise is that I "assiduously" hid from you the fact that Bert Ocariz is a friend of my boyfriend and that I have a "longstanding relationship" with Mr. Ocariz. EFTA00289790 • LAY P. LEFKOWITZ, ESQ. DECEMBER 13,2007 PACE 2 OF 5 I informed you that I selected Mr. Ocariz because he was a friend and classmate of two people whom I respected, and that I had never met or spoken with Mr. Ocariz prior to contacting him about thil case. All of those facts are true. I still have never met Mr. Ocariz, and, at the time that he and I spoke about this case, he did not know about my relationship with his friend. You suggest that I should have explicitly informed you that one of the referrals came from my "boyfriend" rather than simply a "friend," which is the term I used, but it is not my nature to discuss my personal relationships with opposing counsel. Your attacks on me and on the victims establish why I wanted to find someone whom I could trust with safeguarding the victims' best interests in the face of intense pressure from an unlimited number of highly skilled and well paid attorneys. Mr. Ocariz was that person. One of your letters suggests a business relationship between Mr. Ocariz and my boyfriend. This is patently untrue and neither my boyfriend nor I would have received any financial benefit from Mr. Ocariz's appointment. Furthermore, after Mr. Ocariz learned more about Mr. Epstein's actions (as described below), he expressed a willingness to handle the case pro ban°, with no financial benefit even to himself. Furthermore, you were given several other options to choose from, including the Podhurst firm, which was later selected by Judge Davis. You rejected those other """ options. You also allege that I improperly disclosed information about the case to Mr. Ocariz. I provided Mr. Ocariz with a bare bones summary of the agreement's terms related to his appointment to help him decide whether the case was something he and his firm would be willing to undertake. I did not provide Mr. Ocariz with facts related to the investigation because they were confidential and instead recommended that he "Google" Mr. Epstein's name for background information. When Mr. Ocariz asked for additional information to assist his firm in addressing conflicts issues, I forwarded those questions to you, and you raised objections for the first time. I did not share any further information about Mr. Epstein or the case. Since Mr. Ocariz had been told that you concurred in his selection, out of professional courtesy, I informed Mr. Ocariz of the Office's decision to use a Special Master to make the selection and told him that the Office had made contact with Judge Davis. We have had no further contact since then and I have never had contact with Judge Davis. I understand from you that Mr. Ocariz contacted Judge Davis. You criticize his decision to do so, yet you feel that you and your co-counsel were entitled to contact Judge Davis to try to "lobby" him to select someone to your liking, despite the fact that the Non-Prosecution Agreement vested the Office with the exclusive right to select the attorney representative. Another reason for my surprise about your allegations regarding misconduct related to the Section 2255 litigation is your earlier desire to have me perform the role of"facilitator" to convince the victims that the lawyer representative was selected by the Office to represent their interests alone and that the out-of-court settlement of their claims was in their best interests. You now state that doing the same things that you had asked me to do earlier is improper meddling in civil litigation. Much of your letter reiterates the challenges to Detective Recarey's investigation that have EFTA00289791 JAY RLEFKOATIZ, ESQ. DECEMBER 13, 2007 PAGE 3 OF 5 already been submitted to the Office on several occasions and you suggest that I have kept that information from those who reviewed the proposed indictment package. Contrary to your suggestion, those submissions were attached to and incorporated in the proposed indictment package, so your suggestion that I tried to hide something from the reviewers is false. I also take issue with the duplicity of stating that we must accept as true those parts of the Recarey reports and witness statements that you like and we must accept as false those parts that you do not like. You and your co-counsel also impressed upon me from the beginning the need to undertake an independent investigation. It seems inappropriate now to complain because our independent investigation uncovered facts that are unfavorable to your client. You complain that I "forced" your client and the State Attorney's Office to proceed on charges that they do not believe in, yet you do not want our Office to inform the State Attorney's Office of facts that support the additional charge nor do you want any of the victims of that charge to contact Ms. Belohlavek orate Court. Ms. Belohlavek's opinion may change if she knows the full scope of your client's actions: You and I spent several weeks trying to identify and put together a plea to federal charges that your client was willing to accept Yet your letter now accuses me of "manufacturing" charges of obstruction of justice., making obscene phone calls, and violating child privacy laws. When Mr. Lourie told you that those charges would "embarrass the Office," he meant that the Office was unwilling to bend the facts to satisfy Mr. Epstein's desired prison sentence — a statement with which I agree. I hope that you understand how your accusations that I imposed "ultimatums" and "forced" you and your client to agree to unconscionable contract terms cannot square with the true facts of this case. As explained in letters from Messrs. Acosta and Sloman, the indictment was postponed for more than five months to allow you and Mr. Epstein's other attorneys to make presentations to the Office to convince the Office not to prosecute. Those presentations were unsuccessful. As you mention in your letter, I -a simple line AUSA — handled the primary negotiations for the Office, and conducted those negotiations with you, Ms. Sanchez, Mr. Lewis, and a host of other highly skilled and experienced practitioners. As you put it, your group has a "combined 250 years experience" to my fourteen. The agreement itself was signed by Mr. Epstein, Ms. Sanchez, and Mr. Lefcourt, whose experience speaks for itself. You and I spent hours negotiating the terms, including when to use "a" versus "the" and other minutiae. When you and I could not reach agreement, you repeatedly went over my head, involving Messrs. Laurie, Menchel, Siemer), and Acosta in the negotiations at various times. In any and all plea negotiations the defendant understands that his options are to plead or to continue with the investigation and proceed to trial. Those were the same options that were proposed to Mr. Epstein, and they are not "persecution or intimidation tactics." Mr. Epstein chose to sign the agreement with the advice of a multitude of extremely noteworthy counsel. You also make much of the fact that the names of the victims were not released to Mr. Epstein prior to signing the Agreement. You never asked for such a term. During an earlier meeting, where Mr. Black was present, he raised the concern that you now voice. Mr. Black and I did not have a chance to discuss the issue, but I had already conceived of a way to resolve that EFTA00289792 JAY P. LEFICOWITZ, ESQ. DECEMBER 13, 2007 PAGE 4 OF 5 issue if it were raised during negotiations. AS I stated, it was not, leading me to believe that it was not a matter of concern to the defense. Since the signing of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, the agents and I have vetted the list of victims more than once. In one instance, we decided to remove a name because, althoughthe minor victim was touched inappropriately by Mr. Epstein, we decided that the link to a payment was insufficient to call it "prostitution." I have always remained open to a challenge to the list, so your suggestion that Mr. Epstein was forced to write a blank check is simply unfounded. Your last set of allegations relates to the investigation of the matter. For instance, you claim that some of the victims were informed of their right to collect damages prior to a thorough investigation of their allegations against Mr. Epstein. This also is false. None of the victims was informed of the right to sue under Section 2255 prior to the investigation of the claims. Three victims were notified shortly after the signing of the Non-Prosecution Agreement of the general terms of that Agreement. You raised objections to any victim notification, and no further notifications were done. Throughout this process you have seen that I have prepared this case as though it would proceed to trial. Notifying the witnesses of the possibility of damages claims prior to concluding the matter by plea or trial would only undermine my case. If my reassurances are insufficient, the fact that not a single victim has threatened to sue Mr. Epstein should assure you of the integrity of the investigation.' 'There are numerous other unfounded allegations in your letter about document demands, the money laundering investigation, contacting potential witnesses, speaking with the press, and the like. For the most part, these allegations have been raised and disproven earlier and need not be readdressed. However, with respect to the subpoena served upon the private investigator, contrary to your assertion, and as your co-counsel has already been told, I sad consult with the Justice Department prior to issuing the subpoena and I was told that because I was not subpoenaing an attorney's office or an office physically located within an attorney's office, and because the business did private investigation work for individuals (rather than working exclusively for Mr. Black), I could issue a grand jury subpoena in the normal course, which is what I did. I also did not "threaten" the State Attorney's Office with a grand jury subpoena, as the correspondence with their grand jury coordinator makes perfectly clear. With regard to your allegation of my filing the Palm Beach Police Department's probable cause affidavit "with the court knowing that the public could access it," I do not know to what you afrafating: Attlocumen —Mr"—e-13.2a to the *gnitiftijitic elal,1143- • •• the Palm Beach Police Department's probable cause affidavit has never been filed with the Court. If, in fact, you are referring to the Ex Parts Declaration of Joseph Recarey that was filed in response to the motion to quash the grand jury subpoena, it was filed both under seal and exports, so no one should hat access to it except the Court and myself. Those documents are still in the Court file only because you have violated one of the terms of the Agreement by failing to "withdraw (Epstein's] pending motion to intervene and to quash certain grand jury subpoenas." EFTA00289793 JAY P. LEFKOWITZ, ESQ. DECEMBER 13, 2007 PAGE S OF 5 With respect to NM, I contacted her attorney — who was paid for by Mr. Epstein and was directed b counsel for Mr. Epstein to demand immunity — and asked only whether he still represented and if he wanted me to send the victim notification letter to him. He asked what the letter would say and I told him that the letter would be fort co .ing in about a week and that I could not provide him with the terms. With respect to status as a victim, you again want us to accept as true onl facts that are beneficial to your client and to reject tis false anything detrimental to him. made a number of statements that are contradicted by doctunentary evidence and a review o her recorded statement shows her ibility with respect to a number of statements. Based upon all of the evidence coil is classified as a victim as defined by statute. Of course, that does not mean that considers herself a victim or that she would seek damages from Mr. Epstein. I believe that a number of the identified victims will not seek damages, but that does not negate their legal status as victims. I hope that you now understand that your accusations against myself and the agents are unfounded. In the fixture, I recommend that you address your accusations to me so that I can correct any misunderstandings before you make false allegations to others in the Department I hope that we can move forward with a professional resolution of this matter, whether that be by your client's adherence to the contract that he signed, or by virtue of a trial. Sincerely, IC Alexander Acosta United States Attorney By: Assistant United States Attorney cc: It. Alexander Acosta, U.S. Attorney First Assistant U.S. Attorney You also accuse me of "broaden[ing] the scope of the investigation without any foundation for doing so by adding charges of money laundering and violations of a money transmitting business to the investigation." Again, I consulted with the Justice Department's Money Laundering Section about my analysis before expanding that scope. The duty attorney agreed with my analysis. EFTA00289794 11/0$/07 MON 10:05 FAX 30$ $30 e440 upoe2/oos EXECuTIVE OFFICE eon U.S. Department of Justice United S?atos Atrontoy Southern District of Florida 99 ME. 4. Street Mrom4 61 331324Ill (3af) 961.9299 Facsimile: (305)3304444 November 5, 2007 DELIVERY UY FakCSIMTEX Jay P. Leibowitz, Esq. Kirkland R Ellis LIP Citigroup Center 153 East 53rd Street New York, New York 10022-4675 Ito: Isfftty_frengeb Dear Jay: Several thingshave come to my attention that seem contrary to your client intendin by his obligations under the Non-Prosecution g to abide Agreement. AS youknow, that agreeme Office to inform you of potential breaches to nt requires our give you and your client the opportunity before an indictment is filed. At this time, I to respond do not believe that the agreement has however, I have sufficient concerns that been breached; need to be addressed. Pint,I understand that private investiga tors working for Mr. Epstein have con to ask them whether any detectives or FBI tacted victims agents have discussed a financial settlem On one occasion, the private investigators told ent with them. the parent ofa victim that she for her daughter and she should do so righ sho uld get an attorney t away. These actions are troubles agents legally aro required to advise the ome because the FBI victims of the resolution of the matter, informing them that, as pan of the reso which includes lution, that Mr. Epstein has agreed circumstances. Fur-then-note, Mr. Epstein to pay damages in some well knows that we are in the proc attorney to represent the victims and ess of selecting an , but for the inordinate amount of time Addendum, that attorney would alre spent negotiating the ady have been selected. Paragraph 7 Agreement explicitly provides that of the Nun-Prosecution contact with the victims shall.be Accordingly, please confirm that ther through that counsel e will be no further efforts to contact any Davis selects the attorney representative victims until Judge. and that, thereafter, contact will counsel. be made only through that Second. theNon-Prosecution Agreement his guilty plea and to be sentenced not requires Mr. Epstein to use his best later than October 26, 2007. Despite efforts to enter Office agreed that Mr. Epstein could pos this obligation. the tpone this deadline to November, but reiterated that Mr. EFTA00289795 • ileos,07 M0N 10:06 FAX 305 330 6440 l 003/003 etECt7IVE OFFICE 003 JAY I'. LEPKOWITZ, ESQ. Novemana 5,2007 PA0e 2 OF 2 Epstein had to begin his terra of incarcer ation not later than January 4.20 November hearing has been removed 08. T have learned that the from the calendar and the next case not been set until January 7. 2008. This dela disposition conference has y is unacceptable, and, pursuant to you Office requests that you confer with r obligations, the the State Attorney's Office to try to find when the judge is available to conduct a a date in November simultaneous plea and sentencing. If you a date, please provide documentation of cannot find such your efforts to abide by the terms of Agreement. the Non-Prosecution Thud, there have been several press reports that Mr. Epstein no longer inte guiltyplea. Normally I would not pay a ny atte nds to enter a ntion to such reports, but your recent attempting to restrict our Office from eorrespondentn communicating with the State Attorney allusion to the imposition of sentences that 's Office and the clearly fall outside the terms of the Agroetrent raises concern. Please conf Non-Prosecution irm that Mr. Epstein intends to abide plead guilty to the specified charges and by his agreement to to make a binding recommendation that a sentence of 18 months of evotinuous the Court impose confinement in the county jail. Finally, the Ton-Prosecution Agreementr all proposed agreements with the Stat equires that you provide the Office with e Attorney's Office before Mr. copies of atonements. To date, no such agreements hav Epstein signs any such e been received. Please provide and all agreements with the State Atto ate with copies of any rney's Office for our review. The OtTice have someone present at the thangeofplea also would like to and the terms of the Non -Prosecution Agreem sentencingto monitorMr. Epstein's compliancewith ent, so please keep me informed of location of the hearing. the date, time, and Please provide me with a written response, adopted by Mr. Epstein, concerns and reiterating Mr. Epstein's inte addressing these ntion to comply with the tetras ora Agreement by November S, 2007. te Non-Prosecution Sincerely, R. Alexander Acosta 13y First Assistant trailed States Atto rney cc: R. Al • • itorney EFTA00289796 05/16/2008 11:16 FAL 05/16/08 FRI 21:08FAX UNITED STATES DEPARTIVIE. Criminal Divisio Child Exploitation and Obsc . . L 1 1400 New York. Avenue, NW Suite 600 b Washington, DC 20530-0001 • 20005 TO: •R. Alexander Acosta, Esq . aay Le£kawita, Esq . OFFICE NUMBER: FAX NUMBER: FROM: Alexandra Gelber. DAT2 !TIME May 16, 2008 OFFICE NUMBER: NUMBER OF PAGES, EXCLUDING Tu ts SI•IEET, 5. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: EFTA00289797 06/16/2008 11:16 PAS @002/006 06/16/08 FRI 11:08 FAX (6002 XJ.S. Department of Justice Criminal Division Andrew G. Oosterbsan, Chief add &pie/mien end Otownity Section 1400 New YOck Avenue. NW &die 600 Washington, DC20530 O02)514-5780 FAX: n07)5/44793 May 15, 2008 Jay Lefkowitz, Esq. Kirkland & Ellis LLP Citigroup Center 153 E. 53i4 St. New York, NT 10022-4611 Re: Investigation cildrery Epstein Dear Mr. Lefkowitz: Pursuant to your request and the request of independently evaluated certain issues raise U.S. Attorney IL Alexander Acosta, we have d in the investigation of Jeffrey Epstein to whether a decision to prosecute Mr. Epstein determine for federal criminal violations would con criminal enforcement policy interests. tradict As part of our evaluation, we have revi written on behalf of Mr. Epstein on Februar ewed letters y 1, 2007, June 25, 2007, July 6, 2007, 2008, April 8, 2008, April 28, 2008, and March 28, May 14, 2008, with their attachments. We reviewed memos prepared by the U.S. have also Attorney's Office. As you will recall, we and other representatives of Mr. Epstein to met with you further discuss your views on the federal prosecution. We have discusse propriety of a d the factual and legal issues you raise Division's Appellate Section, and we with the Criminal consulted with the Office of Enforcemen concerning the petite policy. t Operations We are examining the narrow question as to whether there is a legitimate basis U.S. Attorney's Office to proceed with a for the federal prosecution of Mr. Epstein. prosecutorial decision making authority Ultimately, the within a U.S. Attorney's Office lies Attorney. Therefore, to borrow a phrase from with the U.S. the case law, the question we sought was whether U.S. Anorney Acosta wou to answer ld abuse his discretion if he authorized case. prosecution in this As you know, our review of this case looked at the entire universe of fact is limited, both factually and legally. We s in this case, ft is not the role of the have not conduct a complete factual inquiry from Criminal Division to re- scratch. Furthermore, we did not concerning prosecution under federal stat analyze any issues utes that do not pertain to child exploita money laundering statutes. tion, such as the EFTA00289798 05/16/2008 11:16 FAX 11003/006 05/16/08 FRI 11:08 FAX rizi003 As was made clear at the outset, we did not review the facts, circumstances, or terms included in the plea offer, nor any allegations that individuals involv ed in the investigation engaged in misconduct. Despite that agreement, we note that your letters of April 8, April 28, and May 14 focus in large part on accusations of investigativ e or prosecutorial misconduct. Not only do allegations of prosecutorial misconduct fall outsid e the boundary of our agreed review, they also fall outside the authority of the Criminal Division in the first instance. Simply, the Criminal Division does not investigate or resolve allegations of professional misconduct by federal prosecutors. For these reasons, we do not respon d to the portion of those letters that discuss alleged misconduct. Based on our review of all of these materials, and after carefu l consideration of the issues, we conclude that U.S. Attorney Acosta could properly use his discretion to authorize prosecution in this case. We will briefly address each of the issues that you have raised. Knowledge ofage. Federal child exploitation statutes differ as to whether there must be proof that the defendant was aware that the children were under the age of 18. However, even For those statutes where knowledge of age is an element of the offense, it is possible to satisfy that element with proof that the defendant was deliberately ignorant of facts which would suggest that the person was a minor. For that reason, the fact that some of the individuals allegedly lied to Mr. Epstein about their age is not dispositivc of the issue. While there may be an open factual issue as to Mr. Epstein's knowledge, we cannot say that it would be impossible to prove knowledge of age for any such charges which requir e it. Therefore, Mr. Acosta could rightfully conclude that this factual issue is best resolved by a jury. Travelfor the purpose. In the materials you prepared, you sugge st that Mr. Epstein should not be charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423( 6) because his dominant purpose in going to Florida was not to engage in illegal sexual activi ty, but rather to return to one of his residences. While we fully understand your argument, we also find that the U.S. Attorney's office has a good faith basis fully to develop the facts on this issue and brief the law to permit a court to decide whether the law properly reaches such conduct. Mr. Acosta would not be abusing his discretion if he decided to pursue such a course of action. Intent to engage In the conduct at the time of travel . Based on our review of the facts of this case, we respectfully disagree that there is no evidence concerning Mr. Epstein's intent when he traveled, and when that intent was formed. Should Mr. Acosta elect to let the case proceed so that a jury can resolve this factual issue, he would be within his discretion to do so. Use of a facility or means of interstate orforeig n commerce. Much of the materials you have prepared and much of the meeting we had focused on 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), specifically your contention that Mr. Epstein did not use the phone to coerce anyone to engage in illegal sexual activity. We understand the issue you raise concerning the statutory interpretation. As however, we cannot agree that there is no before. evidence that would support a charge under 2422(b), nor can we agree that there is no argum Section ent in support of the application of that statute this case. Finally, our assessment is that the to application of that statute to these facts would not be 2 EFTA00289799 05/16/2008 11:16 FAX a004/006 O004 05/16708 FRI 11:09 FAX so novel as to implicate the so-called "clear statement rule," the Kr Post Facto clause, or the Due Process clause. As with the other legal issues, Mr. Acosta may elect to proceed with the case. Absence of coercion. With respect to 18 U.S.C. § 1591, the alleged absence of the use of force, fraud, or coercion is of no moment. The statute does not require the use of force, fraud, and coercion against minors. Because of their age, a degree oCcoercion is presumed. In your materials, you note that the statute requires that the minors must be "caused" to engage in a commercial sex act, further arguing that the word "cause" suggests that a certain amount of undue influence was used. We reject that interpretation, as it would read back into the offense an element-coercion-that Congress has expressly excluded. We have successfully prosecuted defendants for the commercial sexual exploitation of minors, even when the minors testified that not only did they voluntarily engage in the commercial sex acts, it was their idea to do so. As such, Mr. Acosta could properly decide to pursue charges under Section 1591 even if there is no evidence of coercion. More broadly, a defendant's criminal liability does not hinge on his victim identifying as having suffered at his hands. Therefore, a prosecution could proceed, should Mr. Acosta decide to do so, even though some of the young women allegedly have said that they do not view themselves as victims. Witness credibility. As all prosecutors know, there are no perfect witnesses. Particularly in cases involving exploited children, as one member of your defense team, Ms. Thacker, surely knows from her work at CEOS, it is not uncommon for victim-witnesses to give conflicting statements. The prosecutors are in the best position to assess the witness's credibility. Often, the prosecutor may decide that the best approach is to present the witness, let defense counsel explore the credibility problems on cross-examination, and let the jury resolve the issue. Mr. Acosta would be within his authority to select that approach, especially when here there arc multiple, mutually-corroborating witnesses. Contradictions and omissions in the search warrant application. We have carefully reviewed the factual issues you raise concerning the search warrant application. For a search warrant to be suppressed, however, the factual errors must be material, and the officers must not have proceeded in good faith. Despite the numerous factual errors you describe, the U.S. Attorney's Office could still plausibly argue that the mistakes—whether inadvertent or intentional—were not material to the determination that probable cause existed for a search, and that the search was in good faith in any event. As such, Mr. Acosta could properly elect to defend the search warrant in court rather than forego prosecution. Petite Policy: After reviewing the petite policy and consulting with the Office of Enforcement Operations ("OLEO"), we conclude that the petite policy does not prohibit federal prosecution in this case. According to the U.S. Attorney's Manual, the petite policy "applies whenever there has been a prior state or federal prosecution resulting in an acquittal, a conviction, including one resulting from a plea agreement, or a dismissal or other termination of 3 EFTA00289800 • 05/16/2008 11:17 FAX @1 005/006 05/26/08 FRI 11:09 FAX @t 005 the case on the merits after jeopardy has attached." USAM 9-2.031(C). Our understanding is that the state case is still pending. As such, the procedural postu of re the state case does not implicate the petite policy. We recognize that the petite policy could be triggered if the state case concluded after a federal indictment was issued but prior to the commencement of any federal trial. Id. However, the policy "does not apply ... where the [state] prosecution involved only a minor part of the contemplated federal charges." USAM 9-2.031(B). Based on our understanding of the possible federal charges and existing state charges, we do not think the petite policy would be an issue should federal proceedings take place. Federalism andProsecutorial Discretion. All of the above issues essentially ask whether a federal prosecution can proceed. We understand, however, that you also ask whether a federal prosecution should proceed, even in the event that all of the eleme nts of a federal offense could be proven. On this issue, you raised two arguments; that the conduct at issue here is traditionally a state concern because the activity is entirely local, and that the typical prosecution under federal child exploitation statutes have different facts than the ones implicated here. You have essentially asked us to look into whether a prosec ution would so violate federal prosecutorial policy that a United States Attorney's Office should not pursu e a prosecution. We do not think that is the ease here for the following reasons. Simply, the commercial sexual exploitation of children is a federa l concern, even when the conduct is local, and regardless of whether the defendant provided the child (the "pimp") or paid for the child (the "John"). In your materials, you refer to a letter sent by the Department of Justice to Congress in which the Department expres ses concern over the expansion of federal laws to reach almost all instances of prostitution. in that portion of the letter, the Department was expressly referring to a proposed federal law that reach adult prostitution where no force, fraud, or coercion was used. Indeed, the point being made in that letter is that the Department's efforts are properly focused on the commercial sexua l exploitation of children and the exploitation of adults through the use of force, fraud, or coercion. As such, there is no inconsistency between the position taken in that letter and the federal prosecution of wholly local instances of the commercial sexual exploitation of children. If Congress wanted to limit the reach of federal statut es only to those who profit from the commercial sexual exploitation of children, or only to those who actually traf£c children across state lines, it could have done so. It did not. Finally, that a prosecution of Mr. Epstein might not look precisely like the cases that came before it is not dispositive. We can say with confidence that this case is consistent in principle with other federal prosecutions nationwide. As such, Mr. Acosta can soundly exercise his authority to decide to pursue a prosecution even though it might involve a novel application of a federal statute. Conclusion. After carefully considering all the factual and legal issues raised, as well as the arguments concerning the general propr iety of a federal case against Mr. Epstein on these 4 EFTA00289801 • --- - -- 05/15/0:5 FRI- 11:10 FAX ®oat facts, we conclude tint federal prosecution in this case would not be improper or inappropriate. While you raise many compelling arguments, we do not see anything that says to us categorically that a federal case should not be brought. Mr. Acosta would not be abusing his prosecutorial discretion should he authorize federal prosecution of Mr. S cc: AAG Alice S. Fish DAAG U.S. Attorney R. Alexander Acosta S EFTA00289802 U.S. Department of Justice United States Attorney Southern District of Florida 500 S. Australian Ave, Ste 400 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 (561) 8204711 Facsimile: (561) 820-8777 December 13, 2007 DELIVERY BY ELECTRONIC MAIL Jay P. Lefkowitz, Esq. Kirkland & Ellis LLP Citigroup Center 153 East 53rd Street New York, New York 10022-4675 Re: Jeffrey Epstein Dear Jay: I am writing not to respond to your asserted "policy concerns" regarding Mr. Epstein's Non- Prosecution Agreement, which will be addressed by the United States Attorney, but the time has come for me to respond to the ever-increasing attacks on my role in the investigation and negotiations. It is an understatement to say that I am surprised by your allegations regarding my role because I thought that we had worked very well together in resolving this dispute. I also am surprised because I feel that I bent over backwards to keep in mind the effect that the agreement would have on Mr. Epstein and to make sure that you (and he) understood the repercussions of the agreement. For example, I brought to your attention that one potential plea could result in no gain time for your client; I corrected one of your calculations of the Sentencing Guidelines that would have resulted in Mr. Epstein spending far more time in prison than you projected; I contacted the Bureau of Prisons to see whether Mr. Epstein would be eligible for the prison camp that you desired; and I told you my suspicions about the source of the press "leak" and suggested ways to avoid the press. Importantly, I continued to work with you in a professional manner even after I learned that you had been proceeding in bad faith for several weeks — thinking that I had incorrectly concluded that solicitation of minors to engage in prostitution was a registrable offense and that you would "fool" our Office into letting Mr. Epstein plead to a non-registrable offense. Even now, when it is clear that neither you nor your client ever intended to abide by the terms of the agreement that he signed, I have never alleged misconduct on your part. The first allegation that you raise is that I "assiduously" hid from you the fact that Bert Ocariz is a friend of my boyfriend and that I have a "longstanding relationship" with Mr. Ocariz. EFTA00289803 JAY P. LEFKOWITZ, ESQ. DECENSER 13, 2007 PAGE 2 OF 5 I informed you that I selected Mr. Ocariz because he was a friend and classmate of two people whom I respected, and that I had never met or spoken with Mr. Ocariz prior to contacting him about this case. All of those facts are true. I still have never met Mr. Ocariz, and, at the time that he and I spoke about this case, he did not know about my relationship with his friend. You suggest that I should have explicitly informed you that one of the referrals came from my "boyfriend" rather than simply a "friend," which is the term I used, but it is not my nature to discuss my personal relationships with opposing counsel. Your attacks on me and on the victims establish why I wanted to find someone whom I could trust with safeguarding the victims' best interests in the face of intense pressure from an unlimited number of highly skilled and well paid attorneys. Mr. Ocariz was that person. One of your letters suggests a business relationship between Mr. Ocariz and my boyfriend. This is patently untrue and neither my boyfriend nor I would have received any financial benefit from Mr. Ocariz's appointment. Furthermore, after Mr. Ocariz learned more about Mr. Epstein's actions (as described below), he expressed a willingness to handle the case pro bono, with no financial benefit even to himself. Furthermore, you were given several other options to choose from, including the Podhurst firm, which was later selected by Judge Davis. You rejected those other options. You also allege that I improperly disclosed information about the case to Mr. Ocariz. I provided Mr. Ocariz with a bare bones summary of the agreement's terms related to his appointment to help him decide whether the case was something he and his firm would be willing to undertake. I did not provide Mr. Ocariz with facts related to the investigation because they were confidential and instead recommended that he"Google" Mr. Epstein's name for background information. When Mr. Ocariz asked for additional information to assist his firm in addressing conflicts issues, I forwarded those questions to you, and you raised objections for the first time. I did not share any further information about Mr. Epstein or the case. Since Mr. Ocariz had been told that you concurred in his selection, out of professional courtesy, I informed Mr. Ocariz of the Office's decision to use a Special Master to make the selection and told him that the Office had made contact with Judge Davis. We have had no further contact since then and I have never had contact with Judge Davis. I understand from you that Mr. Ocariz contacted Judge Davis. You criticize his decision to do so, yet you feel that you and your co-counsel were entitled to contact Judge Davis to try to "lobby" him to select someone to your liking, despite the fact that the Non-Prosecution Agreement vested the Office with the exclusive right to select the attorney representative. Another reason for my surprise about your allegations regarding misconduct related to the Section 2255 litigation is your earlier desire to have me perform the role of "facilitator" to convince the victims that the lawyer representative was selected by the Office to represent their interests alone and that the out-of-court settlement of their claims was in their best interests. You now state that doing the same things that you had asked me to do earlier is improper meddling in civil litigation. Much of your letter reiterates the challenges to Detective Recarey's investigation that have EFTA00289804 JAY P., LEFKOW/12, ESQ. DECF-MBER 13, 2007 PAGE 3 OF 5 already been submitted to the Office on several occasions and you suggest that I have kept that information from those who reviewed the proposed indictment package. Contrary to your suggestion, those submissions were attached to and incorporated in the proposed indictment package, so your suggestion that I tried to hide something from the reviewers is false. I also take issue with the duplicity of stating that we must accept as true those parts of the Recarey reports and witness statements that you like and we must accept as false those parts that you do not like. You and your co-counsel also impressed upon me from the beginning the need to undertake an independent investigation. It seems inappropriate now to complain because our independent investigation uncovered facts that are unfavorable to your client. You complain that I "forced" your client and the State Attorney's Office to proceed on charges that they do not believe in, yet you do not want our Office to inform the State Attorney's Office of facts that support the additional charge nor do you want any of the victims of that charge to contact Ms. Belohlavek or the Court. Ms. Belohlavek's opinion may change if she knows the fill scope of your client's actions: You and I spent several weeks trying to identify and put together a plea to federal charges that your client was willing to accept. Yet your letter now accuses me of "manufacturing" charges of obstruction of justice, making obscene phone calls, and violating child privacy laws. When Mr. Lourie told you that those charges would "embarrass the Office," he meant that the Office was unwilling to bend the facts to satisfy Mr. Epstein's desired prison sentence — a statement with which I agree. I hope that you understand how your accusations that I imposed "ultimatums" and "forced" you and your client to agree to unconscionable contract terms cannot square with the true facts of this case. As explained in letters from Messrs. Acosta and Sloman, the indictment was postponed for more than five months to allow you and Mr. Epstein's other attorneys to make presentations to the Office to convince the Office not to prosecute. Those presentations were unsuccessful. As you mention in your letter, I —a simple line AUSA — handled the primary negotiations for the Office, and conducted those negotiations with you, Ms. Sanchez, Mr. Lewis, and a host of other highly skilled and experienced practitioners. As you put it, your group has a "combined 250 years experience" to my fourteen. The agreement itself was signed by Mr. Epstein, Ms. Sanchez, and Mr. Lefcourt, whose experience speaks for itself. You and I spent hours negotiating the terms, including when to use "a" versus "the" and other minutiae. When you and I could not reach agreement, you repeatedly went over my head, involving Messrs. Loud; Menchel, Sloman, and Acosta in the negotiations at various times. In any and all plea negotiations the defendant understands that his options are to plead or to continue with the investigation and proceed to trial. Those were the same options that were proposed to Mr. Epstein, and they are not "persecution or intimidation tactics." Mr. Epstein chose to sign the agreement with the advice of a multitude of extremely noteworthy counsel. You also make much of the fact that the names of the victims were not released to Mr. Epstein prior to signing the Agreement. You never asked for such a term. During an earlier meeting, where Mr. Black was present, he raised the concern that you now voice. Mr: Black and I did not have a chance to discuss the issue, but I had already conceived of a way to resolve that EFTA00289805 JAY P. LEFKOWTTZ, ESQ. DECEMBER 13, 2007 PAGE 4 OF 5 issue if it were raised during negotiations. As I stated, it was not, leading me to believe that it was not a matter of concern to the defense. Since the signing of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, the agents and I have vetted the list of victims more than once. In one instance, we decided to remove a name because, although the minor victim was touched inappropriately by Mr. Epstein, we decided that the link to a payment was insufficient to call it "prostitution." I have always remained open to a challenge to the list, so your suggestion that Mr. Epstein was forced to write a blank check is simply unfounded. Your last set of allegations relates to the investigation of the matter. For instance, you claim that some of the victims were informed of their right to collect damages prior to a thorough investigation of their allegations against Mr. Epstein. This also is false. None of the victims was informed of the right to sue under Section 2255 prior to the investigation of the claims. Three victims were notified shortly after the signing of the Non-Prosecution Agreement of the general terms of that Agreement. You raised objections to any victim notification, and no further notifications were done. Throughout this process you have seen that I have prepared this case as though it would proceed to trial. Notifying the witnesses of the possibility of damages claims prior to concluding the matter by plea or trial would only undermine my case. If my reassurances are insufficient, the fact that not a single victim has threatened to sue Mr. Epstein should assure you of the integrity of the investigation.' 'There are numerous other unfounded allegations in your letter about document demands, the money laundering investigation, contacting potential witnesses, speaking with the press, and the like. For the most part, these allegations have been raised and disproven earlier and need not be readdressed. However, with respect to the subpoena served upon the private investigator, contrary to your assertion, and as your co-counsel has already been told, I Jid consult with the Justice Department prior to issuing the subpoena and I was told that because I was nal subpoenaing an attorney's office or an office physically located within an attorney's office, and because the business did private investigation work for individuals (rather than working exclusively for Mr. Black), I could issue a grand jury subpoena in the normal course, which is what I did. I also did not "threaten" the State Attorney's Office with a grand jury subpoena, as the correspondence with their grand jury coordinator makes perfectly clear. With regard to your allegation of my filing the Palm Beach Police Department's probable cause affidavit "with the court knowing that the public could access it," I do not know to what you aftlettliThigTAIrdiJcuments relataito-the graffdliify invegfitatiotitivereeraireitiiiiiiEr the Palm Beach Police Department's probable cause affidavit has never been filed with the Court. in fact, you are referring to the Ex Parse Declaration ofJoseph Recarey that was filed in response to the motion to quash the grand jury subpoena, it was filed both under seal and ex parte, so no one should have access to it except the Court and myself. Those document are still in the Court file only because IN__have violated one of the terms of the Agreement by failing to "withdraw [Epstein's] pending motion to intervene and to quash certain grand jury subpoenas." EFTA00289806 JAY P. LEFICOWITZ, ESQ. DECEMBER 13, 2007 PAGE 5 OF With respect a, I contacted her attorney — who was paid for by Mr. Epstein and was directed b cou sel for Mr. Epstein to demand immunity — and asked only whether he still represente and if he wanted me to send the victim notification letter to him. He asked what the letter would say and I told him that the letter would ' g in about a week and that I could not provide him with the terms. With respect to status as a victim, you again want us to accept as that are beneficial to your client and to reject is false anything detrimental to himamade a number of statements that are contradicted by documentary evidence and a review of her recorded statement shows her credibility with respect to a number of statements. Based upon all of the evidence colt is classified as a victim as defined by statute. Of course, that does not mean tha considers herself a victim or that she would seek damages from Mr. Epstein. I believe that a number of the identified victims will not seek damages, but that does not negate their legal status as victims. I hope that you now understand that your accusations against myself and the agents are unfounded. In the future, I recommend that you address your accusations to me so that I can correct any misunderstandings before you make false allegations to others in the Department. I hope that we can move forward with a professional resolution of this matter, whether that be by your client's adherence to the contract that he signed, or by virtue of a trial. Sincerely, IL Alexander Acosta United States Attorney By: Assistant United States Attorney cc: R. Alexander Acosta, U.S. Attorney , First Assistant U.S. Attorney You also accuse me of ubroaden[ing] the scope of the investigation without any foundation for doing so by adding charges ofmoney laundering and violations of a money transmitting business to the investigation!' Again, I consulted with the Justice Department's Money Laundering Section about my analysis before expanding that scope. The duty attorney agreed with my analysis. EFTA00289807