Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 1 .of 347
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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IN RE THE BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES,
INC. SECURITIES, DERIVATIVE, AND ERISA :
LITIGATION
This Document Relates To: . CLASS ACTION
Securities Action, 08-Civ-2793 (RWS) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
ECF CASE
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CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Faee.
GLOSSARY OF DEFINED TERMS viii
I. NATURE AND SUMMARY OF THE ACTION 2
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 5
III. PARTIES 6
A. Lead Plaintiff 6
B. Bear Stearns Defendants 7
I. The Bear Stearns Companies Inc 7
2. Officer Defendants 7
C. Auditor Defendant 9
IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS 9
A. Bear Stearns' Storied Past 9
B. The Boom in Debt Securitization 11
C. Bear Stearns' Securitization Business 13
I. Bear Stearns' Mortgage Origination and Purchasing Business 14
2. Bear Stearns' RMBS Business 17
3. Bear Stearns' CDO Business 17
D. Bear Stearns' Business Practices Amplify its Risk Exposure 18
I. Bear Stearns' Concentration in Mortgage-Backed Debt 18
2. Bear Stearns' Leveraging Practices 19
3. Bear Stearns' Backing of the Hedge Funds 20
E. Bear Stearns' Misleading Models and Inadequate Risk Management 23
I. Bear Stearns' Misleading Valuation and Risk Models 23
a. The Importance of Valuation Models 24
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b. Bear Steams' Valuation Models Were Misleading 25
c. The Importance of Value at Risk Models 27
d. Bear Steams' Value at Risk Models Were Misleading 30
2. Bear Stearns' Impoverished Risk Management Program 31
F. Bear Steams Hides its Mounting Exposure to Loss 33
1. Early Wamings 33
2. Bear Steams' Deception Begins 36
G. The Implosion of the Hedge Funds 45
H. Repercussions of the Hedge Funds' Implosion 52
I. Bear Stearns' Catastrophic Collapse 61
J. Post Class Period Events 69
K. Defendants' Fraudulent Statements Adversely Impacted Current and
Former Company Employees 71
I. The RSU Plan 71
2. The CAP Plan 72
3. Defendants' Fraud Harmed Holders of RSU and CAP Plan Units 72
L. The SEC Comment Letters 73
M. Bear Stearns' Practices Violated Accounting Standards 76
I. GAAP Overview 76
2. Fraud Risk Factors Present at Bear Steams 79
a. Fraud Risk Factors Applicable to Depository and
Lending Institutions 79
b. Risk Factors Applicable to Brokers and Dealers in
Securities 81
3. Audit Risk Alerts 82
4. Bear Stearns Falsely Represented that its Internal Controls Over
Financial Reporting Were Effective 84
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a. Risk Management 88
b. Pricing Models and VaR Systems 89
5. GAAP Violations Relating to the Company's Financial Statements 90
a. Bear Stearns Misstated Its Exposure to Loss from the
Failed Hedge Funds 90
b. Bear Stearns' Financial Statements Misrepresented its
Exposure to Decline in the Value of RIs 94
c. GAAP Violations Related to Failure to Appropriately
Determine the Fair Value of Financial Instruments 99
d. Bear Stearns Failed to Provide Adequate Disclosure
About Risk and Uncertainties 104
e. Bear Stearns Failed to Provide Reliable Disclosures to
Investors in Accordance with SEC Regulations 106
N. Bear Stearns' Practices Violated Banking Regulations 107
I. Overview of Capital Requirements 107
2. Bear Stearns Failed to Take Timely and Adequate Capital Charges 109
3. Inflation of Capital By Using Incorrect Marks 110
4. Misrepresentations to Regulators Relating to VaR
V. DEFENDANTS' SCIENTER 112
A. James E. Cayne 112
B. Alan D. Schwartz 115
C. Samuel L. Molinaro. Jr. 116
D. Warren J. Spector 120
E. Alan C. Greenberg 121
F. Michael J. Alix 123
G. Jeffrey M. Farber 124
H. Corporate Scienter 125
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VI. ADDITIONAL ALLEGATIONS SUPPORTING THE OFFICER
DEFENDANTS' SCIENTER 126
A. General Allegations of Scienter 126
B. Abnormal Profit Taking 129
VII. DELOITTE'S DEFICIENT AUDITS OF BEAR STEARNS'
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 133
A. Overview of Allegations Against Deloitte 133
B. Deloitte's Certifications 134
C. Overview of GAAS 135
D. GAAS Required Deloitte to Consider Risk Factors as Part of Audit
Planning 136
1. Fraud Risk Alerts Relevant to Deloitte's Audit of Bear Stearns 136
2. Audit Risk Alerts Relevant to Deloitte's Audit of Bear Stearns 137
3. Deloitte's Experience Auditing the Hedge Funds 138
E. Red Flags Recklessly or Deliberately Disregarded by Deloitte 139
I. Bear Stearns' Misleading Fair Value Measurements 139
2. Bear Stearns' Failures to Disclose Risks Inherent In Its Financial
Statements 142
3. Bear Stearns' Misleading Accounting Treatment of the Hedge
Fund Bailout 143
4. Bear Stearns' Failure to Disclose Critical Information Relating to
the Company's Valuation of Its Financial Instruments 144
5. Bear Stearns' Inadequate Internal Controls 146
6. Bear Stearns' Deficient Internal Audit Function 152
VIII. DEFENDANTS' MATERIALLY FALSE AND MISLEADING
STATEMENTS 154
A. Statements Relating to Fiscal Year 2006 and Fourth Quarter 2006 154
I. December 14, 2006 Press Release 154
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a. December 14. 2006 Press Release Statements
Regarding the Company's Fourth Quarter 2006
Results 155
b. Press Release Regarding Fiscal 2006 Results 156
2. Fourth Quarter 2006 Earnings Conference Call 156
3. Form 10-K for Fiscal Year 2006 158
a. The Company's Financial Results and Assets 159
b. The Company's Risk Management Practices 159
c. The Company's Exposure to Market Risk 162
d. The Company's Compliance With Banking
Regulations 162
e. The Company's Internal Controls 163
f. Deloitte's Certification 164
B. Statements Relating to Fiscal Year 2007 Results 164
I. First Quarter 2007 Results 164
a. First Quarter 2007 Press Release 164
b. First Quarter 2007 Conference Call 166
c. First Quarter 2007 Form I0-Q 168
2. Second Quarter 2007 Results 172
a. Second Quarter 2007 Press Release 172
b. Second Quarter 2007 Conference Call 173
c. June 22. 2007 Press Release 174
d. Second Quarter 2007 Form 10-Q 175
3. August 3. 2007 Press Release and Conference Call 180
4. Third Quarter 2007 Results 182
a. Third Quarter 2007 Press Release 182
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b. Third Quarter 2007 Conference Call 184
c. Third Quarter 2007 Form 10-Q 185
5. November 14, 2007 Write Downs 189
6. Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2007 190
a. Press Release 190
b. Fourth Quarter 2007 Conference Call 192
7. Fiscal Year 2007 Form 10-K 193
a. The Company's Financial Results 194
b. The Company's Risk Management Practices 195
c. The Company's Exposure to the Market Risk 197
d. Compliance With Banking Regulations 198
e. The Company's Internal Controls 199
f. Deloitte's Certification 200
C. Additional False and Misleading Statements in Calendar Year 2008 200
IX. LOSS CAUSATION 204
X. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 206
XI. PRESUMPTION OF RELIANCE 209
XII. INAPPLICABILITY OF STATUTORY SAFE HARBOR 211
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 211
COUNT I For Violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5
Promulgated Thereunder (Against All Defendants) 211
COUNT II For Violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act (Against the Officer
Defendants) 214
COUNT III For Violations of Section 20A of the Exchange Act (Against Defendants
Cayne, Schwartz, Spector, Molinaro, Greenberg, and Farber) 215
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 116
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 218
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GLOSSARY OF DEFINED TERMS
2008 OIG Report: A report entitled "SEC's Oversight of Bear Steams and Related Entities: The
Consolidated Supervised Entity Program."
AAG: AICPA Industry Audit and Accounting Guides.
AAM: AICPA's annual Audit and Accounting Manual.
ABS: Asset-backed securities.
ABS CDOs: Asset-backed collateralized debt obligations-related investments.
ABX: An index that tracked synthesized subprime mortgage performance, refinancing
opportunities, and housing price data into efficient market valuation of subprime RMBS
tranches.
Advisers Act: U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
AICPA: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
Alix: Michael J. Alix, who served as the Company's Chief Risk Officer from February 3, 2006
until the Company's demise in 2008.
Alt-A Mortgages: Mortgages made to borrowers who are considered less than prime because
they are unable to document their income and assets, have high debt-to-income ratios, and/or
have troubled credit histories.
APB: Accounting Principles Board Opinions.
ARM: Audit Risk Alerts.
ARB: AICPA Accounting Research Bulletins.
AS: Auditing Standard.
AU Sections of the Statements of Auditing Standards, which are codified by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
Basel II: Recommendations on banking laws and regulations issued in June 2004 by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, an institution created by the central bank governors of the
Group of Ten Nations.
Basel II Guidelines: Basel II.
Basel Committee: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, an international banking group that
advises national regulators, such as the SEC.
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B&D AAG: AAG that was applicable to Brokers and Dealers in Securities.
Bear Stearns: The Bear Steams Companies Inc., Bear, Steams & Co. Inc., and Bear Steams
Asset Management.
Bear Stearns Defendants: The Bear Steams Companies Inc.; James E. Cayne; Alan D. Schwartz;
Warren Spector; Samuel Molinaro; Alan C. Greenberg; Michael Alix and Jeffrey Farber.
BEARRES: Bear Steams Residential Mortgage Corporation.
Broker-Dealer Risk Assessment Program: A program requiring broker dealers that are part of a
holding company structure with at least $20 million in capital to file with the SEC certain
disaggregated information about their finances.
BSAM: Bear Stearns Asset Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of The Bear Steams
Companies Inc.
CAP: Capital Accumulation Program.
Captive Originations: mortgages originated by BEARRES and ECC that were sent directly into
the securitization process at Bear Steams.
CAO: Center for Audit Quality.
Cayne: James E. Cayne, a director, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Bear
Stearns during the Class Period.
Cioffi: Ralph Cioffi, the Bear Steams trader who started and managed the High Grade Fund, a
Managing Director of BSAM and a Director of BSC.
CDOs: Collateralized debt obligations.
CDO Report: Report issued by an employee of BSAM, on April 19, 2007, showing that the
CDOs in the Funds were worth substantially less than previously thought.
CDO Squared: A CDO backed by other CDO notes.
CES: Closed end second lien loans.
CF Division: SEC Division of Corporation Finance, charged with ensuring that investors are
provided with material information in order to make informed investment decisions.
CFO: Chief Financial Officer.
The Class: All persons and entities which, between December 14, 2006 and March 14, 2008,
inclusive, purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded common stock or other equity
securities, or call options of or guaranteed by Bear Stearns, or sold Bear Stearns put options,
either in the open market or pursuant or traceable to a registration statement, and were damaged
thereby (the "Class"). The Class shall also include all persons who received Bear Steams CAP
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Plan Units and Restricted Stock Plan Units that had fully vested, entitling them to an equivalent
number of shares of Bear Steams Stock upon settlement at the end of a deferral period, as a part
of their compensation as an employee with the Company and participation in its RSU Plan and
the CAP Plan.
Class Period: December 14, 2006 — March 14, 2008, inclusive.
Company: The Bear Steams Companies Inc.
COMs (or Offering Memoranda): Confidential Offering Memoranda.
COO: Chief Operating Officer.
COSO: Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission.
CSE: Consolidated Supervised Entity.
Deloitte: Deloitte & Touche LLP, the external auditor for Bear Steams during the Class Period.
Dimon: JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon.
D&L AAG: The AAG for Depository and Lending Institutions.
Domestic Funds: The High Grade Domestic Fund and the High Grade Enhanced Domestic Fund.
ECC: Encore Credit Corporation , which the Company purchased in early 2007.
EMC: EMC Mortgage Corporation, a Bear Steams subsidiary.
EPD: Early Payment Default, which is the failure of a borrower to make their first three
payments on a mortgage.
Equity Tranche: The most dangerous segment of a CDO which bears the first risk of loss.
Exchange Act: Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified as 15 U.S.C. §78(a).
Farber: Defendant Jeffrey M. Farber, a Senior Vice President, and the Controller and Principal
Accountant for the Company during the Class Period.
FAS: Statements of Financial Accounting Standards.
FASB: Financial Accounting Standards Board.
FASCON: FASB Concept Statements.
FIN: FASB Interpretations.
FPD: First Payment Default, the failure of a borrower to make even their first payment on a
mortgage.
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FSP: FASB Staff Opinions.
GAAP: U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
GAAS: Generally Accepted Auditing Standards.
Goldman: Goldman Sachs & Co.
Greenberg: Defendant Alan C. "Ace" Greenberg, Chairman of the Executive Committee of Bear
Stearns during the Class Period.
Hedge Funds: The High Grade Fund and the High Grade Enhanced Fund.
HELOCs: Home-equity lines of credits.
High Grade Fund: a hedge fund managed by BSAM under the supervision of defendant Spector.
The High Grade Master Fund included two entities. Bear Stearns High Grade Structured Credit
Strategies Fund, L.P. was a Delaware partnership responsible for raising money from U.S.
investors to be placed in the High Grade Master Fund. Bear Stearns High Grade Structured
Credit Strategies (Overseas) Ltd. was a Cayman Island corporation responsible for raising money
from foreign investors to be placed in the High Grade Master Fund.
High Grade Enhanced Fund: A hedge fund managed by BSAM under the supervision of
defendant Spector. The High Grade Enhanced Fund was structured similarly to the High Grade
Fund, but allowed for a much greater amount of leverage, thereby increasing potential returns.
IPO: Initial public offering.
JPMorgan: JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Lead Plaintiff: The State Treasurer of the State of Michigan, Custodian of the Michigan Public
School Employees Retirement System, State Employees' Retirement System, Michigan State
Police Retirement System, and Michigan Judges Retirement System.
Level I: Assets that are valued using the Mark-to-Market valuation technique.
Level 2: Assets that are valued using the Mark-to-Model valuation technique.
Level 3: Assets that are thinly traded or not traded at all and are given values based on valuation
techniques that require inputs that are both unobservable and significant to the overall fair value
measurement. The techniques are developed by management.
Leverage: The use of borrowed money secured by assets in order to invest in assets with a
greater rate of return than the cost of borrowing.
LTV: Loan to value ratios.
Maiden Lane: Maiden Lane LLC, the entity set up to hold $30 billion of Bear Stearns' assets in
conjunction with the takeover of Bear Stearns by JPMorgan.
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Margin Call: When a lender demands more collateral or a return of part or all of the money
loaned in response to declining collateral values.
Mark-to-Market: The valuation method for assets traded in an active market, classified as Level
1 assets.
Mark-to-Model: The valuation method for assets whose values are based on quoted prices in
inactive markets, or whose values are based on models using either directly or indirectly
observable inputs over the full term, or most of the term, of the asset or liability, classified as
Level 2 assets.
MBS: Mortgage Backed Securities.
MD&A: Management's Discussion & Analysis section of SEC filings.
Mezzanine Tranche: Lower rated tranche of a CDO which bears the greater risk of loss than the
tranches above it.
Molinaro: Defendant Samuel J. Molinaro, Jr., Chief Financial Officer and Executive Vice
President of Bear Stearns. On August 5, 2007, he was also appointed COO.
NAR: National Association of Realtors.
Net Capital Rule: Rule 15c3-1 of the Exchange Act.
No-Doc Loans: Loans that required no documentation to corroborate the borrowers' and brokers'
representations about the borrowers' income and assets.
Nonprime Mortgages: Subprime and Alt-A mortgages.
No-Ratio Loans: Loans that required less (or no) documentation to corroborate the borrowers'
and brokers' representations about the borrowers' income and assets.
OCIE: SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations.
Officer Defendants: Individual Defendants Cayne, Schwartz, Spector, Molinaro, Greenberg, Alix
and Farber.
OIG: Office of the Inspector General of the Securities Exchange Commission.
PCAOB: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.
PPP: Preliminary Performance Profiles.
Punk Ziegel: Punk Ziegel & Co.
Ratings Agencies: U.S. commercial credit rating agencies Standard & Poor's, Moody's and
Fitch.
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RMBS: Residential Mortgage Backed Securities.
Repo: Repurchase agreement. A repo allows a borrower to use a financial security as collateral
for a cash loan at a fixed rate of interest. In a repo, the borrower agrees to immediately sell a
security to a lender and also agrees to buy the same security from the lender at a fixed price at
some later date.
Retained Interests: Especially risky tranches of RMBS kept by Bear Stearns as a result of the
securitization process.
RSU: Restricted Stock Units.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Schwartz: Defendant Alan D. Schwartz, Co-President and Co-Chief Operating Officer of Bear
Stearns. He became sole President on August 5, 2007.
Scratch and Dent Loans: Risky mortgages that were already in default that were purchased by
Bear Stearns in the hopes of bringing the borrower back into compliance and securitizing the
loan.
SEC: The Securities and Exchange Commission.
Securities Act: Securities Act of 1933, codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 and 77o.
SFAS 5: Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies,
issued in March 1975 by the FASB.
SFAS 115: Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 115, Accounting for Certain
Investments in Debt and Equity, issued in December 1993 by the FASB.
SFAS 140: Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and
Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishment of Liabilities.
SFAS 157: Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, Fair Value Measurements,
issued by the FASB in September 2006.
SMRS: The State of Michigan Retirement Systems (consisting of the Michigan Public School
Employees Retirement System, State Employees' Retirement System, Michigan State Police
Retirement System, and Michigan Judges Retirement System).
SOP: AICPA Statements of Position.
SOP 94-6: AICPA's Statement of Position 94-6, Disclosure of Certain Significant Risks and
Uncertainties.
S&P: Standard & Poor's, including the Standard & Poor's Rating Service.
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Spector: Defendant Warren J. Spector, Co-President, Co-COO, and a director of Bear Steams.
On August 5, 2007, Spector resigned those positions.
Stated Income Loans: Loans that required less documentation to corroborate the borrowers' and
brokers' representations about the borrowers' income and assets.
Subprime Mortgages: Especially risky mortgages made to borrowers who have a heightened risk
of default, such as those who have a history of loan delinquency or default, those with a recorded
bankruptcy or those with limited debt experience.
Synthetic CDOs: A synthetic security that mimics or references a CDO.
Synthetic Securities: A type of derivative, namely insurance contracts where the party buying
the insurance paid a premium equivalent to the cash flow of an underlying RMBS which it was
copying, and the counterparty insured against a decline or default in the underlying RMBS
security.
TABX: An index that tracked synthesized subprime mortgage performance, refinancing
opportunities, and housing price data into efficient market valuation of Mezzanine CDO
tranches.
Tannin: Matthew M. Tannin, Chief Operating Officer of the Hedge Funds, a Managing Director
of BSAM and a Director of BSC.
TM: The SEC's Division of Trading and Markets.
VaR: Value at Risk.
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Court-appointed Lead Plaintiff, The State Treasurer of the State of Michigan, Custodian
of the Michigan Public School Employees Retirement System, State Employees' Retirement
System, Michigan State Police Retirement System, and Michigan Judges Retirement System
(collectively, the "Lead Plaintiff" or "SMRS"), individually and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated persons and entities, by its undersigned counsel, for its Consolidated Class Action
Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws asserting claims against The Bear
Stearns Companies Inc. ("Bear Stearns" or the "Company") and the other Defendants named
herein, allege the following upon personal knowledge as to itself and its own acts, and upon
information and belief as to all other matters.'
Lead Plaintiff's information and belief as to allegations concerning matters other than
itself and its own acts is based upon an investigation by its counsel which included, among other
things: (i) review and analysis of documents filed publicly by Bear Stearns with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the "SEC"); (ii) review and analysis of press releases, news articles,
and other public statements issued by or concerning Bear Stearns and other Defendants named
herein; (iii) review and analysis of research reports issued by financial analysts concerning Bear
Stearns' securities and business; (iv) the September 25, 2008 Report of the Office of Inspector
General of the SEC entitled "SEC's Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related Entities: The
Consolidated Supervised Entity Program" and "SEC's Oversight of Bear Steams and Related
Entities: Broker-Dealer Risk Assessment Program"; (v) interviews of numerous former Bear
Stearns executives and employees; (vi) review and analysis of news articles, media reports and
other publications concerning the mortgage banking and lending industries; and (vii) review and
' A glossary of certain defined terms in this Complaint and terms that are specific to Bear Stearns'
business and the mortgage banking industry appears after the table of contents.
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analysis of certain pleadings filed in other pending litigation naming Bear Steams as a defendant
or nominal defendant. Lead Plaintiff believes that substantial additional evidentiary support for
the allegations herein exists and will continue to be revealed after plaintiffs have a reasonable
opportunity for discovery.
I. NATURE AND SUMMARY OF THE ACTION
1. As more fully set forth in paragraph 803 below, Lead Plaintiff brings this federal
securities class action on behalf of itself and on behalf of a class consisting of all persons and
entities that, between December 14, 2006 and March 14, 2008, inclusive (the "Class Period"),
purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded common stock or other equity securities, or
call options of or guaranteed by Bear Stearns, or sold Bear Steams put options and were
damaged thereby (the "Class" or "Plaintiffs").
2. Since its founding in 1923, Bear Steams was widely regarded as one of the
preeminent investment banks of the world and as a shrewd manager of risk.
3. Beginning early in this decade, however, Bear Stearns embarked on a business
plan that left it extraordinarily vulnerable to volatility in the housing market. It purchased and
originated enormous numbers of unusually risky mortgages to securitizz and sell, and maintained
billions of dollars of these assets on its own books. The Company used the assets on its books as
collateral to purchase even larger quantities of debt, and to finance the ballooning costs of its
daily operations. The future of the highly-leveraged Company had come to depend on the
accuracy of its assessments of the value of these securities and the risk that their value might
decline.
4. The investing public was unaware that even before the Class Period began, the
Company had secretly abandoned any meaningful effort to manage the huge risks it faced. In
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2005 and again in 2006 the SEC privately warned the Company of crucial deficiencies in models
it used to value mortgage-backed securities and to assess risk, both critical tools for managing
the Company's exposure to market declines. The SEC regulators told the Company that the
mortgage valuation models it used failed to incorporate data about risk of default, and that its
value at risk models did not account for key factors such as changes in housing prices.
5. Instead of revising its models to accurately reflect a rapidly accelerating downturn
in the housing market, the Company bolstered the value of its stock by persisting in using its
misleading mortgage valuation and value at risk models in an effort to conceal the extent of its
exposure to loss. Indeed, throughout the Class Period, the Company reported value at risk
figures to investors that were far lower and more stable than its peers.
6. At the same time, Bear Stearns falsely represented to the public that it regularly
reviewed and updated its valuation and risk models to ensure their accuracy. Analysts,
impressed by the strength of the Company's revenues and the apparent conservatism reflected in
its risk management practices, recommended Bear Steams to investors as a sound investment.
7. The collapse of two massive hedge funds overseen by the Company in the Spring
of 2007 dramatically increased Bear Stearns' exposure to the growing housing crisis. When
Bear Stearns bailed out one of the funds, the Company effectively took onto its own books
nearly two billion dollars of the hedge funds' subprime-backed assets that were worthless within
weeks. Instead of revealing its losses on this collateral at the time of the bailout, the Company
hid the extent of the declines, and continued to offer false and misleading asset valuations and
value at risk numbers to the public, further inflating the price of its stock. The Company falsely
stressed that any issues with the hedge fund collapse "were isolated incidents and [were] by no
means an indication of broader issues at Bear Steams."
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8. By the late fall of 2007, the Company's losses had become too big to conceal and
it began to write down billions of dollars of its devalued assets. Surprised investors and analysts
became concerned that they had not been given an accurate picture of the Company's exposure
to losses. The Company's lenders, fearing that Bear Stearns might not be creditworthy, became
unwilling to lend it the vast sums necessary for its daily operations.
9. In its public statements in December of 2007 and January of 2008, the Company
continued to hide its steep slide, offering the public misleading accounts of its earnings and asset
values. However, Bear Stearns' trading partners grew increasingly suspicious that the Company
was in precarious straits.
10. On Wednesday, March 10, 2008, rumors began to circulate on Wall Street that
Bear Stearns was facing a liquidity problem. The Company issued a press release denying the
rumors and stated that its "balance sheet, liquidity and capital remain strong." On March 12,
2008, Bear Stearns' CEO Alan Schwartz appeared on CNBC to reassure investors that Bear
Stearns had ample liquidity and that he was "comfortable" that Bear Steams would turn a profit
in its fiscal first quarter and that there was no threat to the Company's liquidity. By the next
evening, Thursday, March 13, 2008, Schwartz was making frantic phone calls to the Federal
Reserve and to JPMorgan-Chase & Co. ("JPMorgan") hoping for a last minute rescue to avoid
bankruptcy the next day.
11. On the morning of Friday, March 14, 2008, it was revealed that JPMorgan would
provide short-term funding to Bear Stearns while the Company worked on alternative forms of
financing. Bear Stearns' stock plummeted on the news, falling from $57 per share to $30 per
share, a 47% one-day drop.
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12. Over the weekend of March 15 and 16, JPMorgan bankers scoured Bear Steams'
books and, with multi-billion dollar backing from the Federal Reserve, agreed to purchase Bear
Steams for $2 per share. JPMorgan's CEO Jamie Dimon told investors on a conference call on
Sunday evening, March 16, 2008, that, after examining Bear Steams' books, it had found that the
Company faced $40 billion in credit exposure, including mortgage liabilities, and a $2 per share
offer price was necessary to protect JPMorgan. JPMorgan's offer was particularly stunning in
light of the fact that the Company's Manhattan headquarters alone was worth $8 per share.
13. Indeed, Dimon later stated that, without the Federal Reserve's provision of $30
billion in funding, the deal "would have been very hard to do. Without the Fed to help mitigate
the risk, to protect us from an over concentration in some risky assets, I'm not sure it was doable
at all."
14. On March 17, 2008, upon the revelation of the Company's full exposure to loss,
Bear Steams' stock was in a free fall, closing at below $5 ($4.81) per share, an 84% drop from
its previous close. While JPMorgan would eventually increase its bid to $10 per share, the
Company's investors had already suffered historic losses.
IL JURISDICTION AND VENUE
15. The claims asserted herein arise under Sections 10(b), 20(a) and 20A of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a) and 78t-1,
and Rule 1013 5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b 5.
16. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to
Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa; and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a).
17. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to Section 22 of the Securities Act,
Section 27 of the Exchange Act, and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c). Many of the acts and
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omissions charged herein, including the preparation and dissemination to the public of materially
false and misleading information, occurred in substantial part in the Southern District of New
York. Bear Stearns maintained its corporate headquarters and principal executive offices in this
District throughout the Class Period.
18. In connection with the acts and conduct alleged herein, Defendants, directly or
indirectly, used the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including but not limited
to the United States mails, interstate telephone communications, and the facilities of national
securities exchanges and markets.
III. PARTIES
A. Lead Plaintiff
19. Lead Plaintiff SMRS serves the working and retired public servants of four SMRS
systems: the Public School Employees Retirement System; the State Employees' Retirement
System; the State Police Retirement System; and the Judges Retirement System. The
beneficiaries of the SMRS include 563,576 people and include one out of every eighteen
Michigan citizens. Within these systems, four defined benefit pension plans and two defined
contribution pension plans are administered with combined assets of nearly $64 billion, making
the SMRS the fourteenth largest public pension system in the U.S., the twentieth-largest pension
system in the U.S., and the thirty-ninth largest pension system in the world. In 2006, the SMRS
paid out $4.6 billion in pension and health benefits.
20. As set forth in the amended certification annexed hereto as Exhibit A, Lead
Plaintiff SMRS purchased Bear Stearns common stock on the open market during the Class
Period and suffered damages as a result of the misconduct alleged herein.
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B. Bear Stearns Defendants
1. The Bear Stearns Companies Inc.
21. Defendant The Bear Steams Companies Inc. is and at all relevant times was
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of
business at 383 Madison Avenue, New York, New York. At all relevant times Bear Stearns,
through its various subsidiaries, provided a broad range of financial services to clients and
customers worldwide. Bear Stearns held itself out as a leading financial services firm with core
business lines including institutional equities, fixed income, investment banking, global clearing
services, asset management, and private client services.
22. On May 30, 2008, a wholly-owned subsidiary of JPMorgan Chase & Co. merged
with, and into, Defendant Bear Stearns Companies, with Bear Stearns Companies continuing as
the surviving corporation and as a wholly-owned subsidiary of JPMorgan & Chase Co.
2. Officer Defendants
23. Defendant James E. Cayne ("Cayne") was at all relevant times a director,
Chairman of the Board, and Chief Executive Officer of Bear Stearns. Although Cayne resigned
from his position as CEO on January 8, 2008, he continued to serve as Chairman of the
Company's Board of Directors throughout the Class Period. During the Class Period, when the
price of Bear Steams' shares was artificially inflated, Cayne sold 219,036 shares for a total
realized value of $23,010,474.
24. Defendant Alan D. Schwartz ("Schwartz") was Co-President and Co-Chief
Operating Officer ("COO") of Bear Stearns from June of 2001 to August of 2007. He became
sole President on August 5, 2007, and remained in that position until January 5, 2008, when he
was named CEO of the Company. Schwartz served on the Company's Board of Directors
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throughout the Class Period. During the Class Period, when the price of Bear Stearns' shares
was artificially inflated, Schwartz sold 91,233 shares for a total realized value of $9,867,001.
25. Defendant Warren J. Spector ("Spector") was Co-President, Co-COO of the
Company from June of 2001 to August of 2007, and served as a director of Bear Stearns from
1990 until August of 2007. On August 5, 2007 Spector resigned those positions. However, he
remained an employee of the Company with the tide Senior Managing Director until December
28, 2007. During his tenure as Co-President and Co-COO, all divisions of the Company save
investment banking reported to Spector, including the two large hedge funds that were heavily
invested in mortgage-backed securities. During the Class Period, when the price of Bear
Stearns' shares was artificially inflated, Spector sold 116,255 shares for a total realized value of
$19,066,373.
26. Defendant Alan C. Greenberg ("Greenberg") was Chairman of the Executive
Committee of Bear Steams during the Class Period. During the Class Period, when the price of
Bear Stearns' shares was artificially inflated, Greenberg sold 371,986 shares for a total realized
value of $34,594,027.
27. Defendant Samuel L. Molinaro Jr. ("Molinaro") was, at all relevant times, Chief
Financial Officer ("CFO") and Executive Vice President of Bear Steams. On August 5, 2007, he
was also appointed COO. During the Class Period, when the price of Bear Steams' shares was
artificially inflated, Molinaro sold 38,552 shares for a total realized value of $4,230,828.
28. Defendant Michael Alix ("Alix") was the Senior Managing Director and Global
Head of Credit Risk Management for the Company during the Class Period.
29. Defendant Jeffrey M. Farber ("Farber") was a Senior Vice President, Controller
and Principal Accountant for the Company during the Class Period.
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30. Cayne, Schwartz, Spector, Greenberg, Molinaro, Alix and Farber are collectively
referred to as the "Officer Defendants." The Bear Steams Companies Inc. and the Officer
Defendants are collectively referred to as the "Bear Stearns Defendants."
31. The Officer Defendants, because of their positions with the Company, possessed
the power and authority to control the contents of Bear Steams' quarterly reports, press releases,
and presentations to securities analysts, money and portfolio managers, and institutional
investors. They were provided with copies of the Company's reports and press releases alleged
herein to be misleading prior to or shortly after their issuance.
C. Auditor Defendant
32. Deloitte & Touche LLP ("Deloitte") was, at all relevant times, the independent
outside auditor for Bear Steams. Deloitte provided audit, audit-related, tax and other services to
Bear Stearns during the Class Period, which included the issuance of unqualified opinions on the
Company's financial statements for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 and management's assessments
of internal controls for the same years. Deloitte consented to the incorporation by reference of
its unqualified opinions on the Company's financial statements and management's assessment of
internal controls for fiscal years 2006 and 2007.
IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS
A. Bear Stearns' Storied Past
33. Bear Stearns was the fifth largest investment bank in the world before its stunning
collapse in March 2008. For decades, Bear Stearns had been known as one of the most
conservative of the Wall Street firms due to the perception that it took a cautious approach to
risk. In fact, the Company survived the Great Depression without laying off any of its
employees and, until December 2007, had never posted a loss.
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34. As a registered broker-dealer, Bear Steams was subject to a regulatory scheme
called the "Broker-Dealer Risk Assessment Program." The program was created in 1990, when
Section 17(h) of the Exchange Act was amended to require broker dealers that are part of a
holding company structure with at least $20 million in capital to file with the SEC certain
disaggregated information about their finances.
35. The Broker Dealer Risk Assessment Program called for staff in the SEC's
division of Trading and Markets (- TM") to monitor events that might threaten broker-dealers,
customers, and the financial markets. Although TM officially tracked the filing status of 146
broker-dealers in the program, during the Class Period it only reviewed in detail the filings of the
seven most prominent firms, including Bear Stearns, that elected to participate in the SEC's
Consolidated Supervised Entity ("CSE") program. The CSE program allowed the SEC to
supervise participating broker-dealer holding companies on a consolidated basis.
36. While Bear Steams was among the smallest of the CSE firms, it experienced rapid
growth through the 1990s. By 1992, the Company's earnings had doubled to over $295 million,
the best year in its history to date. During the same year, the Company managed more than $13
billion in initial public offerings ("IPOs") for a variety of U.S. and foreign corporations.
Moreover, the Company had become a leader in clearing trades for other brokers and brokerages.
37. In 1993 Defendant Cayne succeeded Defendant Greenberg as CEO, but
Greenberg stayed on as Chairman of the Board, and then as Chairman of the Company's
Executive Committee starting in 2001. While Bear Steams under Cayne became a larger and
more profitable firm, its business model was essentially unchanged. Its time-tested businesses—
trading, mortgage underwriting, prime brokerage, and private client services— still received the
bulk of the Company's capital and management attention.
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38. At the beginning of the new century, with the economy weakening, Bear Stearns
was in an increasingly precarious position. By mid-2000, Bear Steams' stock price was in a two-
year slump. As one of Wall Street's last independent financial services firms, the Company
struggled to keep up with competitors.
B. The Boom in Debt Securitization
39. Soon after the turn of the new century, the Company's fortunes began to change.
In the first years of this decade, persistently low interest rates and technical innovations lead to a
boom in debt issuance— to back mortgages, credit card receivables, or leveraged buyouts. As a
result, the Company experienced explosive growth in one area of business—debt securitization.
40. Debt securitization involves pooling and repackaging of cash flow-producing
financial assets into securities that are sold to investors. The securities that are the outcome of
this process are termed asset-backed securities ("ABS"). When mortgages are packaged together
for securitization, they are referred to as Mortgage Backed Securities ("MBS"), and when the
mortgages are residential, those securities are referred to as Residential Mortgage Backed
Securities ("RMBS").
41. RMBS are, in turn, divided into layers based on the credit ratings of the
underlying assets. The typical structuring of an RMBS is set out in the chart below.
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42. The credit quality of asset-backed securities such as RMBS can be more volatile
than general corporate debt. If the value of the underlying assets declines, the affected securities
can experience dramatic credit deterioration and loss.
43. The "B-Pieces" of an RMBS, that is, its riskier parts, can be pooled together to
form a kind of asset-backed security called a collateralized debt obligation ("CDO"). CDOs are
then once again divided by the CDO issuer into different tranches, or layers, based on gradations
in credit quality.
44. While the top tranche of a CDO may be rated "AAA," CDOs are generally
formed from RMBS that are rated BBB or lower. Accordingly, even the best tranches of a CDO
are a very risky form of security. Lower-rated tranches of CDOs, such as the "mezzanine"
tranches, bear even greater risk of loss. The most dangerous segment of a CDO is termed the
"equity" tranche, and bears the first risk of loss.
45. Through the first part of this decade, mezzanine CDOs offered for sale
proliferated, making up more than 75% of the total CDO market by April of 2007. The
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mezzanine CDOs were stuffed with cash flows from especially risky types of residential
mortgage loans, termed "subprime" or "Alt-A."
46. Subprime loans are made to borrowers who have a heightened risk of default,
such as those who have a history of loan delinquency or default, those with a recorded
bankruptcy, or those with limited debt experience.
47. Alt-A loans, although considered less risky than subprime loans, are still more
risky than prime loans. Alt-A loans are typically made to borrowers with problems including
lack of documentation of income and assets, high debt-to-income ratios, and troubled credit
histories. Subprime and Alt-A mortgages are collectively referred to herein as "nonprime"
mortgages.
48. Between 2003 and 2007, the total proportion of risky nonprime loans wrapped
into the majority of all mezzanine CDOs increased dramatically marketwide, as set out in the
chart below.
Mezzanine CDOs: Average Collateral Composition
CDO % Assets % Assets % Assets % Assets Total
Vintage Subprime Alt-A CES Other CDOs Nonprime
2003 33.7% 7.6% 1.8% 7.0% 50.1%
2004 43.2% 10.1% 2.7% 5.9% 61.9%
2005 55.1% 9.3% 2.2% 5.9% 72.5%
2006 64.2% 6.9% 2.1% 5.5% 78.7%
2007 62.9% 5.8% 0.8% 6.9% 76.4%
Source: Standard & Pools
C. Bear Stearns' Securitization Business
49. Bear Stearns was in an ideal position to benefit from the market for CDOs backed
by higher-risk nonprime mortgages, in that it was vertically integrated in that business-it
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originated and purchased risky home loans, packaged them into RMBS, collected these RMBS to
form CDOs, then sold CDOs to investors. As a result of this process, it also acquired a large
exposure to declines in the housing and credit markets.
1. Bear Stearns' Mortgage Origination and Purchasing Business
50. Through its subsidiaries, Bear Stearns originated and purchased vast numbers of
risky residential mortgage loans during the Class Period.
51. The Company originated loans through two wholly-owned subsidiaries, the Bear
Stearns Residential Mortgage Corporation ("BEARRES") and later through Encore Credit
Corporation ("ECC"), which the Company purchased in early 2007. ECC was strictly a
"subprime" lender; it specialized in providing loans to borrowers with compromised credit.
52. BEARRES had several products available to subprime borrowers, but also made
Alt-A loans to borrowers with somewhat better, but still compromised credit. ECC began
operating under the BEARRES name in October of 2007, but still retained distinct product lines.
53. Many of the mortgages originated by BEARRES and ECC were "stated income,"
"no ratio," and "no-doc" loans that required less (or no) documentation to corroborate the
borrowers' and brokers' representations about the borrowers' income and assets.
54. Moreover, the Company actively encouraged its loan originator subsidiaries to
offer loans even to borrowers with poor credit scores and troubled credit histories. According to
Confidential Witness Number 1 ("CW 1"), an Area Sales Manager who began work for ECC in
January of 2006 and continued working at BEARRES until February of 2008, CW 1's office was
under great pressure to "dig deeper" and originate riskier loans that "cut corners" with respect to
credit scores or loan to value ("LTV") ratios.
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55. As a result of these lax standards, the Company approved the great majority of all
loan applications it received. While the national rejection rate was 29% in 2006, BEARRES
rejected only 13% of applications in the same period.
56. In 2006 alone, using these questionable lending practices, BEARRES and ECC
originated 19,715 mortgages worth $4.37 billion. Because these were "captive" originations, the
mortgages originated by BEARRES and ECC were sent directly into the securitization process at
Bear Stearns.
57. As a result of Bear Stearns' hunger for loans to securitize, it also purchased huge
numbers of risky loans originated by other companies through its EMC Mortgage Corporation
("EMC") subsidiary. From 1990 until 2007, EMC purchased over $200 billion in mortgages.
58. The loans the Company purchased by this means were often as suspect as the
loans it originated. Confidential Witness Number 2 ("CW 2"), a Quality Control and Reporting
Analyst at EMC from April 2006 through August 2007, reviewed and examined loan origination
and loan portfolio statistics on subprime loans purchased by EMC, and also created reports for
upper management at EMC. CW 2 confirmed that EMC would buy almost everything, including
extremely risky loans where the borrower's income and ability to pay could not be verified.
59. According to Confidential Witness Number 3 ("CW 3"), a former Collateral
Analyst with the Company who worked for Bear Stearns in the first half of 2007, the Company
understood that the loans it was purchasing through EMC were unusually risky. CW 3 reported
that during the latter part of 2006 and the beginning of 2007 EMC was "buying everything"
without regard for the riskiness of the loan. CW 3 explained that because of the potential for
profits from securitizing these loans Bear Steams managers looked the other way and did not
enforce basic underwriting standards.
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60. Confidential Witness Number 4 ("CW 4"), an Underwriting Supervisor and
Compliance Analyst for EMC from September 2004 until February 2007, reported that the Bear
Stearns traders responsible for buying the loans were fully aware of the weakness of the
underlying loans. According to CW 4, the traders ignored CW 4's due diligence findings that
borrowers would be unable to pay.
61. Bear Stearns also began funding and purchasing even riskier closed-end second-
lien ("CES") loans and home-equity lines of credit ("HELOCs"). Most of these loans were made
to borrowers with poor credit. Moreover, they were secured by secondary liens on the home,
meaning that, should the home go into foreclosure, Bear Steams would only be paid after the
first mortgage was satisfied and was more likely not to be paid in full if the value of the home
dropped. By the end of 2006, EMC had purchased $1.2 billion of HELOC and $6.7 billion of
second-lien loans. Once these loans were purchased, they would go directly into the
securitization process.
62. Finally, through EMC, Bear Stearns aggressively purchased exceptionally risky
mortgages that were already in default in the hopes of bringing the borrower back into
compliance and securitizing the loan along with other acquired and originated mortgages-so-
called "scratch and dent" loans. A special desk at Bear Steams was designated to securitize the
"scratch and dent" loans and sell them to investors.
63. Given the Company's poor underwriting standards and devil-may-care attitude
towards purchasing mortgages originated by other companies, the loans that it purchased to
package into RMBS and CDOs were especially vulnerable to declines in housing prices.
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2. Bear Stearns' RMBS Business
64. After Bear Stearns acquired a sufficiently large pool of risky mortgages to
securitize, it took the individual nonprime home loans and wrapped them into an RMBS. Some
RMBS it sold to investors, and others it packaged into CDOs.
65. Especially risky tranches of RMBS were kept on the Company's books as
"Retained Interests." Throughout the Class Period, the amount of these especially risky RMBS
that the Company kept as retained interests steadily grew, from $5.6 billion as of November 30,
2006 to $9.6 billion by August 31, 2007.
3. Bear Stearns' CDO Business
66. In order for the Company to assemble RMBS into CDOs, a further step was
required. Each CDO was set up as a new entity, typically an offshore limited liability entity,
with its own assets and liabilities. Further, the CDOs produced by Bear Stearns incorporated
cash flows from pools of risky subprime and "Alt-A" home mortgage loans.
67. Nearly all of the CDOs Bear Steams structured during the Class Period were
backed, in addition to RMBS, by derivatives or "synthetic securities," which were, in effect,
insurance contracts where the party buying the insurance paid a premium equivalent to the cash
flow of an underlying RMBS which it was copying, and the counterparty insured against a
decline or default in the underlying RMBS security. In other words, a synthetic security is akin
to a "side bet" on the performance of certain assets. Such CDOs are called "Synthetic CDOs."
A CDO backed by other CDO notes is called a "CDO squared."
68. One of Bear Stearns' primary functions as a CDO underwriter was determining
the marketable size of each CDO. This determination was based on three things: the supply of
collateral that would make up the assets of the CDO, the market demand for the securities issued
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by the CDO, and the risk-taking ability of the Company—that is, Bear Steams' ability to retain
unsold CDO securities and to insure the CDO against losses.
69. In order to sell CDOs that were as large as possible, the Company retained
increasing amounts of the CDOs it packaged on its books. By August of 2007, this figure had
reached $2.072 billion.
D. Bear Stearns' Business Practices .kniplify its Risk Exposure
70. During the Class Period, the Company's growing accumulation of subprime-
backed RMBS and CDOs, combined with its leveraging practices, left it extraordinarily
vulnerable to declines in the housing market. This vulnerability was only exacerbated by the
Company's management and implicit backing of two enormous hedge funds holding subprime-
backed securities.
1. Bear Stearns' Concentration in Mortgage-Backed Debt
71. According to documents privately submitted to the SEC, even before the Class
Period began, on multiple occasions the amount of mortgage securities held by the Company
exceeded its own internal limits on concentration.
72. Shortly after Bear Steams' March 2008 collapse, Senator Charles Grassley,
Ranking Member of the United States Senate Committee on Finance, issued a request that the
SEC's Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") analyze the SEC's oversight of the CSE firms,
with a special emphasis on Bear Steams.
73. To assist in this audit, the OIG retained Professor Albert Kyle of the University of
Maryland, an acclaimed expert on capital markets. Professor Kyle analyzed TM's oversight of
Bear Steams, and from information submitted to the SEC, analyzed Bear Steams' capital,
liquidity, and leverage ratios. Professor Kyle also examined the Company's access to secured
and unsecured financing, and its compliance with industry and worldwide banking guidelines.
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74. To prepare the report, the SEC relied on an extensive collection of internal
memoranda and other documents relating to TM's oversight of Bear Stearns, including non-
public correspondence between TM and the Company's top executives.
75. The OIG issued its conclusions in a September 25, 2008 Report, titled "SEC's
Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related Entities: The Consolidated Supervised Entity Program"
(the "2008 OIG Report").
76. In the report, the OIG stated that "[b]y November of 2005 the Company's ARM
business was operating in excess of allocated limits, reaching new highs with respect to the net
market value of its positions." Such a large concentration of business in this area left the
Company very exposed to declines in the riskiest part of the housing market.
2. Bear Stearns' Leveraging Practices
77. The Company's exposure to declines in the value of the loans backing its assets
was vastly magnified by its leveraging practices. In leveraging, a company takes out a loan
secured by assets in order to invest in assets with a greater rate of return than the cost of interest
for the loan. Leverage allows greater potential returns to the investor than otherwise would have
been available, but the potential for loss is also greater because if the investment becomes
worthless, the loan principal and all accrued interest on the loan still need to be repaid.
78. Indeed, as a company's leverage ratio increases, its exposure to loss increases
dramatically. As set out in the chart below, a leverage ratio of four to one increases losses by
about 15%, while a leverage ratio of 35 to one magnifies losses by more than 100%.
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Leverage Ratios at 1% Loss
0.00%
-20.00%
0 to 1 ito. A 111 2[1 31 1
-40.00%
-60.00%
-80.00%
-100.00%
-120.00%
79. During the Class Period, the Company used the assets on its books as collateral
for purchases costing many times the equity it possessed. In 2005, the Company was leveraged
by a ratio of approximately 26.5 to 1. By November of 2007, the Company had leveraged its net
equity position of $11.8 billion to purchase $395 billion in assets—a ratio of nearly 33 to 1. As a
consequence, even a small decline in the value of its assets it held could have catastrophic effects
on the Company's finances. For example, a 3% decline in asset values would wipe out 100% of
equity.
80. Because of the interest charges the Company had to pay to support its soaring
leverage ratio, the amount of cash the Company needed to finance its daily operations increased
dramatically during the Class Period. By the close of the Class Period, Bear Stearns' daily
borrowing needs exceeded $50 billion.
3. Bear Stearns' Backing of the Hedge Funds
81. Another key source of the Company's exposure to the subprime market came
through its relationship with two large hedge funds that it managed and that bore its name.
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82. In October of 2003, the Company staked a young trader named Ralph Cioffi
("Cioffi") to start the High Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund, LP (the "High Grade Fund")
which was housed in Bear Steams Asset Management. The High Grade Fund, which was under
the supervision of defendant Spector, consisted of two separate entities. The Bear Stearns High
Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund, L.P., a Delaware partnership, was responsible for
raising money from U.S. investors to be placed in the High Grade Master Fund. Bear Steams
High Grade Structured Credit Strategies (Overseas) Ltd., a Cayman Island corporation, was
responsible for raising money from foreign investors to be placed in the High Grade Master
Fund.
83. In August of 2006 Cioffi created the High Grade Structured Credit Strategies
Enhanced Leverage Fund, LP ("the High Grade Enhanced Fund") (the High Grade Master Fund
and the High Grade Enhanced Fund are collectively referred to as the "Hedge Funds"). The
High Grade Enhanced Fund was structured similarly to the High Grade Fund, but allowed for a
much greater amount of leverage, thereby increasing potential returns.
84. An important selling point for investors in the Hedge Funds was the funds'
relationship with Bear Steams. Bear Steams was known as a leader in CDOs and other exotic
securities. The Hedge Funds were marketed as safe investments because of Bear Steams'
expertise and the use of the Company's proprietary systems to identify and manage risk.
85. Moreover, Bear Steams was involved in virtually every part of the Hedge Funds'
business. Bear, Stearns Securities Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company,
served as the prime broker for the Hedge Funds, and PFPC Inc., another Bear Steams subsidiary,
was the Hedge Funds' administrator. BSAM was the investment manager for the Hedge Funds.
Defendant Spector himself was ultimately responsible for the business of both of the funds.
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86. The Hedge Funds invested according to a strategy developed by BSAM. The
Hedge Funds' objective was to provide current income and capital appreciation in excess of
LIBOR by investing primarily in High Grade structured financed securities, with an emphasis on
long positions in triple-A and double-A rated asset backed securities, such as CDOs. The High
Grade Fund increased its returns through the use of leverage: taking the CDOs it had purchased
and borrowing against them, cheaply, through repurchase or "repo" agreements with
counterparties.
87. In a repo, a borrower agrees to immediately sell a security to a lender and also
agrees to buy the same security back from the lender at a fixed price at some later date. Because
cash obtained through a repurchase agreement is secured by the collateral provided, it is a
cheaper source of financing than unsecured loans with higher interest rates.
88. The loan proceeds from the repurchase agreements were used to buy additional
CDOs, and the proceeds (in the form of interest payments) from those investments would finance
additional borrowing.
89. Fortunately for the Hedge Funds, because of BSAM's role as an asset manager,
they had in Bear Stearns a lender willing to extend large amounts of cash in exchange for
collateral drawn from the Hedge Funds' risky CDO assets. In fact, Bear Stearns was one of the
few repurchase lenders willing to take the Hedge Funds' CDOs as collateral for short term
lending facilities.
90. The Hedge Funds, through BSAM, entered into many repurchase agreements on
favorable terms with Bear Steams as the counterparty. When, in the summer of 2006, Bear
Stearns entered into a temporary moratorium on repurchase agreements between the Hedge
Funds and the Company, it briefly deprived the Hedge Funds of an important source of
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financing. In an e-mail from Cioffi to Tannin in September, 2006, Cioffi underscored the
importance of Bear Steams' role as a lender willing to take on the Hedge Funds' risky subprime-
backed collateral:
Do we have an official mandate to terminate our relationship with
Bear? This hurts our investors as it eliminates a repurchase
counterparty (reducing liquidity) and eliminates a source of trading
secondary CDOs. Bear is among the best (reducing liquidity) and
further eliminates a source for assets.
91. As a result of the Company's willingness to support the Hedge Funds by offering
cash in exchange for subprime mortgage-backed CDOs of questionable value, Bear Steams'
exposure to declines in the subprime market skyrocketed.
E. Bear Stearns' Misleading Models and Inadenuate Risk !Umlaut:mon
92. The Company's assumption of vast amounts of risk and aggressive leveraging
practices was especially reckless given that, even before the Class Period began, the Company
knew there were grave deficiencies in the models it used in valuing mortgage-backed assets and
assessing its exposure to loss. It had twice been informed by the SEC that these models failed to
incorporate key indicators of a declining housing market. Moreover, the Company failed to take
basic steps to ensure that its risk management department functioned independently and
effectively.
1. Bear Stearns' Misleading Valuation and Risk Models
93. The 2008 DIG Report identified crucial deficiencies in models that the Company
used for valuation and risk management purposes.
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a. The Importance of Valuation Models
94. The valuation of assets is governed by Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 157, Fair Value Measurements ("SFAS 157"). Although SFAS 157 took effect on
November 15, 2007, Bear Stearns opted to comply with the standard beginning January of 2007.2
95. SFAS 157 required that Bear Stearns classify its reported assets into one of three
levels depending on the degree of certainty about the asset's underlying value. Assets that were
easy to value because traded in an active market, such as shareholder's equity, were classified as
Level 1 ("mark-to-market").
96. Level 2 ("mark-to-model") assets consisted of financial assets whose values are
based on quoted prices in inactive markets, or whose values are based on models — but the inputs
to those models are observable either directly or indirectly for substantially the full term of the
asset or liability.
97. Level 3 assets, because they are thinly traded or not traded at all, have values
based on valuation techniques that require inputs that are both unobservable and significant to
the overall fair value measurement.
98. To value opaque Level 3 assets, companies rely on models developed by
management. With respect to valuing mortgage-related securities, these models should
incorporate assumptions critical to determining fair value such as the (i) interest rate
environment (including term structure or "yield curve" and volatility), (ii) market liquidity
levels, (iii) credit exposure and (iv) the economic environment including housing prices and
default rates.
2
Prior to the Company's adoption of SFAS 157, it was subject to similar provisions under SFAS
115.
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99. The information supplied by valuation models is incorporated into other models
used to assess risk and hedge investments, such as the models measuring Value at Risk ("VaR"),
described at paragraphs 115 to 117 below.
b. Bear Stearns' Valuation Models Were Misleading
100. Even before the Class Period began, the Company knew that declining housing
prices and rising default rates were not reflected in the mortgage valuation models that were
critical to the valuation of its Level 3 assets.
101. In its 2008 Report, the OIG stated that, prior to the Company's approval as a CSE
in November of 2005, "Bear Steams used outdated models that were more than ten years old to
value mortgage derivatives and had limited documentation on how the models worked."
102. As a result, during the 2005 CSE application process, TM told Bear Stearns that
"[w]e believe that it would be highly desirable for independent Model Review to carry out
detailed reviews of models in the mortgage area."
103. According to the 2008 OIG Report, these concerns were again communicated to
the Company in a December 2, 2005 memorandum from the SEC Office of Compliance
Inspections and Examinations ("OCIE") to defendant Farber, then a Senior Managing Director
and the Company's Controller and Principal Accounting Officer. Farber reported to defendant
Molinaro, CFO and Executive Vice President.
104. TM documents cited in the 2008 OIG Report reflect that nearly a year after its
admission to the CSE program, on September 20, 2006, Bear Steams' risk management
personnel gave a presentation to the TM division regarding the models that Bear Steams used to
price and hedge various financial instruments. The 2008 OIG Report stated that as a result of the
presentation, TM concluded, among other things, that Bear Steams' "model review process
lacked coverage of mortgage-backed and other asset-backed securities" and that "the sensitivities
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to various risks implied by the models did not reflect risk sensitivities consistent with price
fluctuations in the market."
105. The 2008 OIG Report also revealed that TM's discussions with risk managers in
2005 and 2006 indicated that Bear Steams' pricing models for mortgages "focused heavily on
prepayment risks" but that TM documents did not reflect "how the Company dealt with default
risks."
106. Defendant Cayne, the CEO of the Company, and defendant Molinaro, the CFO of
the Company, were aware of the SEC's concerns about Bear Steams risk management program.
According to a February 8, 2008 presentation by defendant Molinaro at a Credit Suisse Financial
Services Forum, the Company's risk management structure "reports directly to the CFO."
Moreover, it stated that the Company's "CEO is intimately engaged in the risk management
process."
107. Despite its awareness of TM's concerns, the Company made no effort to revise its
mortgage valuation models to reflect declines in the housing market. In fact, according to
Confidential Witness 5 ("CW 5"), a former employee of the model validation department at Bear
Steams during the latter half of the Class Period, Tom Marano, the head of the Company's
mortgage trading desk, was "vehemently opposed" to the updating of the Company's mortgage
valuation models.
108. This witness' statement is consistent with the findings in the 2008 OIG Report,
which concluded that the Company did not begin to make any effort to incorporate measures
reflecting declines in housing prices into its mortgage models until "towards the end of 2007"—
long after the Company had acquired a huge hoard of highly illiquid mortgage-backed assets.
109. In fact, the OIG concluded,
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the reviews of mortgage models that should have taken place
before the subprime crisis erupted in February of 2007
appears to have never occurred, in the sense that it was still a
work in progress when Bear Steams collapsed in March 2008.
110. As the housing market plummeted throughout 2007 and into 2008, Bear Steams
continued to rely on its flawed valuation models which exacerbated the spread between the true
value of their assets and the value Bear Stearns was publicly reporting. Level 3 assets, including
retained interests in RMBS and the equity tranches of CDOs, made up 6-8% of the Company's
total assets at fair market value in 2005, and increased to 20-29% of total assets between the
fourth quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008.
111. According to the Company's Form 10-K for the period ending November 30,
2007, the majority of the growth in the Company's Level 3 assets in 2007 came from "mortgages
and mortgage-related securities"—the very assets that the Company was valuing using its
misleading models. Indeed, as of August 31, 2007, the Company carried $5.8 billion in Level 3
assets backed by residential mortgages, a figure that grew close to $7.5 billion by November 30,
2007.
c. The Importance of Value at Risk Models
112. The SEC's second criticism of the Company's models related to Bear Stearns'
assessment of risk.
113. Broadly, risk is defined as the degree of uncertainty about future net returns, and
is commonly classified into four types. Credit risk relates to the potential loss due to the
inability of a counterpart to meet its obligations. Operational risk takes into account the errors
that can be made in instructing payments or settling transactions, and includes the risk of fraud
and regulatory risks. Liquidity risk is caused by an unexpected large and stressful negative cash
flow over a short period. If a firm has highly illiquid assets and suddenly needs some liquidity, it
27
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may be forced to sell some of its assets at a discount. Finally, market risk estimates the
uncertainty of future values, due to the changing market conditions.
114. The most prominent of these risks for investment bankers is market risk, since it
reflects the potential economic loss caused by the decrease in the market value of a portfolio.
Because of the crucial role that market losses can play in the financial health of investment
banks, they are required to set aside capital to cover market risk.
115. Value at Risk ("VaR") is one method of quantifying market risk. It is defined as
the maximum potential loss in value of a portfolio of financial instruments with a given
probability over a certain horizon. For example, a one-day 5% VaR of negative $1 million
implies the portfolio has a 5% chance of losing $1 million or more over the next day.
116. Companies measure VaR using models that are intended to capture different
variables that may lead to loss. One input to the VaR models is the data supplied by valuation
models, such as models used to value mortgages and mortgage backed assets.
117. VaR models are used by investment banks to ensure that a company is
maintaining sufficient capital to cover risks associated with potential market decline. If the
company's VaR is high, it must increase the amount of capital it sets aside in order to mitigate
potential losses or reduce its exposure to high risk positions.
118. When the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, an international banking
group that advises national regulators, decided that investors and regulators needed more
accurate ways to gauge the amount of capital that firms needed to hold in order to cover risks,
Bear Stearns, together with other Wall Street firms, successfully lobbied the Basel Group to
allow them to use their internal VaR numbers for this purpose.
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119. In an August 5, 2003 letter to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System ("August 5, 2003 letter"), defendant Michael Alix, the Company's Head of Global Risk
Management and the Chairman of the Risk Management Committee of the Securities Industry
Association, described then-current capital requirements as "excessive." He advocated for the
adoption of a new "flexible capital regime that relates regulatory requirements to observable
risk," one that would turn on the use of VaR models. He explained:
Investment banks typically value risk assets, including loans, on a
mark-to-market basis, and estimate risk to that market using
various tools, including robust VaR models. Risk models are
continuously enhanced to incorporate new products and markets,
and may be used by investment banks to measure the risk of
activities that are considered under Basel II as part of the banking
book.
120. Defendant Alix recommended in his August 5, 2003 letter that regulators rely on
VaR "[t]ci the extent that an institution can produce reliable mark-to-market values and robust
VaR base-based estimates."
121. This use of VaR was incorporated into the requirements for CSE program
participants when the CSE program was launched in 2004. Companies participating in the
program were required to regularly supply their VaR numbers to federal regulators and to the
public.
122. During Alix's June 22, 2004 testimony before the House Financial Services
Subcommittee, Alix touted the benefits of the CSE program's adoption of VaR as a measure of
assessing the "true risks" faced by investment banks. He stated that:
the framework will permit securities firms registered under it to
determine the regulatory capital for their broker-dealers by means
of approved Value at Risk ("VaR") models. This will better align
capital requirements with the true risks of the securities business,
with the added benefit of harmonizing the SEC's capital rules with
global standards as represented by Basel II.
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d. Bear Stearns' Value at Risk
Models Were Misleading
123. According to the 2008 OIG Report, the Company knew before the Class Period
began that its VaR models would not reflect declines in the housing market, the heart of Bear
Steams' business and its principal source of risk. The 2008 OIG Report stated that in November
of 2005, the OCIE "found that Bear Stearns did not periodically evaluate its VaR models, nor did
it timely update inputs to its VaR models."
124. Bear Stearns was warned of these deficiencies in a December 2, 2005
memorandum from OCIE to defendant Farber, the Company's Controller and Principal
Accountant.
125. The DIG also found that:
Bear Stearns' VaR models did not capture risks associated with
credit spread widening.... These fundamental factors include
housing price appreciation, consumer credit scores, patterns of
delinquency rates, and potentially other data. These fundamental
factors do not seem to have been incorporated into Bear Steams'
models at the time Bear Stearns became a CSE.
126. The 2008 OM Report stated that in September of 2006, TM concluded after a
meeting with Company risk managers that the Company still had failed to improve the accuracy
of the models it used to hedge against risk. In fact, according to the 2008 DIG Report, it was not
until "towards the end of 2007" that Bear Steams "developed a housing led recession scenario
which it could incorporate into risk management and use for hedging purposes."
127. Moreover, the DIG found that the mortgage-backed asset valuation inputs to the
VaR models employed by the Company were never updated during the Class Period, and were
still a "work in progress" at the time of the Company's March 2008 collapse.
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128. As the housing crisis spread during the Class Period, the Company knew that
fundamental indicators of housing market decline, including falling housing prices and rising
delinquency rates, were not reflected in the VaR figures it disclosed to the public.
2. Bear Stearns' Impoverished Risk Management Program
129. In its 2008 Report, the OIG was also highly critical of the minimal role that risk
management played in Bear Stearns' overall business. The 2008 OIG Report concluded that in
2006, as the Company's business was becoming increasingly concentrated in mortgage
securities, the expertise of its risk managers was in "exotic derivatives" and in validating models
for those derivatives. Accordingly, the managers were ill-equipped to offer reliable assessments
of risk associated with the mortgage securities that had come to be the largest and riskiest part of
the Company's business.
130. Moreover, the OIG saw ample evidence that during the Class Period Bear
Stearns' trading desks had gained ascendancy over the Company's risk managers. TM found
that model review at Bear was less formalized than at other CSE firms and had devolved into a
support function. Indeed, the OIG concluded that "each of Bear Steams' trading desks evaluated
profits and risk individually, as opposed to relying on one overall firm-wide approach."
131. As a result, the OIG investigators concluded that Bear Stearns reported different
VaR numbers to OIG regulators than its traders used for their own internal hedging purposes.
132. The OIG's conclusion is confirmed by Confidential Witness 6 ("CW 6") who
reported that during his work as a model valuator at Bear, traders were able to override risk
manager marks and enter their own, more generous, marks for some assets directly into the
models used for valuation and risk management. Traders did this by manipulating inputs into
Bear Stearns' WITS system, which was the repository for raw loan data, including such crucial
information as a borrowers' credit score, prepayments, delinquencies, interest rates and
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foreclosure history. Traders did so to alter the value of pools of loans to enhance their profit and
loss positions at the end of the day.
133. The OIG's expert also pointed out that the Company's risk managers sat at the
same desks as the traders, an arrangement that reduces and potentially eliminates the
independence of the risk management function. This finding is consistent with the statements of
CW 6, who asserted that that when there was a dispute regarding the value of assets traded, Phil
Lombardo, the head of Bear Steams' fixed income trading desk, would prevail over risk
managers because of his close relationship with upper management.
134. The 2008 OIG Report reveals other ways in which risk management
responsibilities at Bear Steams had been co-opted by the traders. TM memoranda reflected that
the risk management department was persistently understaffed, and that the head of the
Company's model review program "had difficulty communicating with senior managers in a
productive manner." The OIG viewed this as an indicator that the Company's risk managers
were telling its traders something they did not want to hear—that they were taking on too much
risk.
135. The 2008 OIG Report asserts that the reins on the Company's trading desks were
loosened even further in March of 2007 with the resignation of the beleaguered head of model
review at the Company. According to the 2008 OIG Report, this vacuum in risk management
gave trading desks more power over risk managers. The Inspector General found that by the
time a new risk manager arrived in the summer of 2007, the department was in a shambles, and
risk managers were operating in "crisis mode."
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136. Indeed, according to CW 5, by October of 2007, just five months before the
Company's collapse, "the entire model valuation team had evaporated, except for one remaining
analyst."
F. Bear Stearns Hides its Mounting Exposure to Loss
137. The Company's huge exposure to loss in the housing market, combined with its
misleading valuation and risk models, were to have terrible consequences for investors. During
the Class Period, as the housing market underlying the bulk of the Company's business began a
titanic decline, the Company used its misleading models to inflate asset values and revenues and
to offer the public artificially low calculations of its Value at Risk.
1. Early Warnings
138. The collapse in the housing market in late 2006 and 2007 did not come as a
surprise to Bear Stearns.
139. Beginning in early 2006, record numbers of subprime loans began to go bad as
borrowers failed to make even their first payment ("First Payment Default" or "FPD"), or failed
to make their first three payments ("Early Payment Default" or "EPD"). These defaults were not
caused by higher resetting rates, which were still one to three years off, but instead indicated
borrower inability to pay even the initial, low teaser rates.
140. During 2005, only one in every 10,000 subprime loans experienced an FPD.
During the first half of 2006, the FPD rate had risen by a multiple of 31; nationwide, about 31.5
out of every 10,000 subprime loans originated between January and June 2006 had a delinquency
on its first monthly payment, according to Loan Performance, a subsidiary of First American
Real Estate Solutions.
33
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141. Bear Steams was well aware of the growth in EPDs. In April of 2006, Bear
Steams' EMC Mortgage, reputed to be a primary EPD enforcer, sued subprime originator
Mortgage IT over approximately $70 million in EPD buyback demands.
142. Just a month later, in May of 2006, the California Association of Realtors lowered
expectations for California home sales from a 2% decline (2006 sales vs. 2005 sales) to a 16.8%
decline.
143. In the same period, disasters in a U.K. subsidiary brought home to the Company
the threat posed by lax underwriting standards to the values of its mortgages and mortgage-
backed assets. Between April and June of 2006, the Company faced repeated crises in its United
Kingdom subsidiary as a result of poor performance of U.K. loans due to weak underwriting
standards. As a result, the Company was left holding some $1.5 billion in unsecuritized whole
loans and commitments from this subsidiary. According to Confidential Witness 7 ("CW 7"), a
former head of model valuation at Bear Steams at the time, top management at Bear Steams
were deeply concerned about the U.K. developments and defendant Spector personally made
calls to investigate the crisis.
144. Given the lax underwriting practices for the loans it packaged into CDOs and its
careless standards for purchasing loans from other originators, there was every reason for
Company management to believe that similar catastrophes awaited it in the United States.
However, as the 2008 OIG Report points out, the Company did not "use this experience to add a
meltdown of the subprime market to its risk scenarios."
145. In May of 2006, after recent data demonstrated dramatically slowing sales, the
highest inventory of unsold homes in decades, and stagnant home prices, the chief economist for
34
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Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 50 of 347
the National Association of Realtors ("NAR") — a long-time advocate of the "soft landing"
school — admitted that "hard landings" in certain markets were probable.
146. The monthly year-over-year data provided by the NAR showed that by August
2006, year-over-year home prices had in fact declined — for the first time in 11 years. In fact,
sales of existing homes were down 12.6% in August from a year earlier, and the median price of
homes sold dropped 1.7% over that period. Sales of new homes were down 17.4% in August of
2006.
147. As 2006 progressed, evidence of the deflation of the housing bubble was
everywhere. Data aggregated in the NAR's monthly statistical reports on home sales activity,
home sales prices, and home sales inventory revealed (1) accelerating declines in the numbers of
homes sold during 2006, which continued and deepened throughout 2007; (2) steadily decreasing
year-over-year price appreciation in early 2006, no year-over-year price appreciation by June
2006, and nationwide year-over-year price declines beginning in August 2006 and continuing
thereafter; and (3) steadily rising amounts of unsold home "inventory," expressed in the form of
the number of months it would take to sell off that inventory, rising 50% by August of 2006 and
doubling by late 2007.
148. By the end of 2006, EPD rates for 2006 subprime mortgages had risen to ten
times the mid-2006 FPD rate; 3% of all 2006 subprime mortgages were going bad immediately.
The 2006 subprime mortgages from First Franklin Financial, Long Beach Savings, Option One
Mortgage Corporation and Countrywide Financial had EPD rates of approximately 2%; those
originated by Ameriquest, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, New Century and WMC
Mortgage had EPD rates of 3-4%; and those originated by Fremont General had EPD rates
35
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Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 51 of 347
higher than 5%. See Moody's Investors Service, 2006 Review and 2007 Outlook: Home Equity
ABS, January 22, 2007, p. 12 at Figure 14.
2. Bear Stearns' Deception Begins
149. Despite this inescapable evidence of a rapid decline in housing prices, by the time
of its September 2006 presentation to TM personnel, Bear Stearns had still failed to revise the
valuation and risk models that it knew to be outmoded and inaccurate. This was not an
oversight.
150. On December 14, 2006, Bear Steams issued a press release regarding its fourth
quarter and fiscal year end results for 2006, which closed on November 30, 2006.3 The release
reported diluted earnings per share of $4.00 for the fourth quarter ended November 30, 2006, up
38% from $2.90 per share for the fourth quarter of 2005, ending November 30, 2005. It also
stated that its net income for the fourth quarter of 2006 was $563 million, up 38% from $407
million for the fourth quarter of 2005.
151. The Company was only able to achieve these results by using valuation models
that ignored declining housing prices and rising default rates. By using these inaccurate models
the Company avoided taking losses on its Level 3 assets, increasing its revenues and earnings per
share and falsely inflating the value of its stock.
152. During a press conference on December 14, 2006, defendant Molinaro fielded
questions from analysts about the Company's exposure to the growing subprime crisis. Jeff
Harte, an analyst at Sandler O'Neill, asked Molinaro whether the increased defaults threatened to
make the securitization of those mortgages, which were increasingly being originated by Bear
Stearns, a risky business. Molinaro responded "Well, I don't — no, it doesn't. Because
3
The Company's fiscal year ran from December 1 to November 30.
36
EFTA00316764
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 52 of 347
essentially we're originating and securitizing." Molinaro's statement was false, in that the
Company faced dangerous exposure through both the retained CDO tranches it kept on its books
and the agreements it maintained with counterparties and CDOs.
153. As a result of the Company's artificially inflated results and the false assurances
by Molinaro, the Company's stock rose by $4.07, closing at $159.96.
154. As the mortgage crisis worsened, the scope of the problems with subprime
mortgages was reflected in two indices that closely tracked the markets for nonprime mortgages.
The ABX index, launched in January of 2006, and the TABX index, introduced in February of
2007, synthesized subprime mortgage performance, refinancing opportunities, and housing price
data into efficient market valuation of CDOs' primary assets — subprime RMBS tranches, via the
ABX — and of Mezzanine CDO tranches, via the TABX. These indices provided observable
market indicators of CDO value.
155. In fact, The Bank of International Settlements has observed that "ABX price
information also seems to have been widely used by banks and other investors as a tool for
hedging and trading as well as for gauging valuation effects on subprime mortgage portfolios
more generally."
156. In February of 2007, the ABX index, which tracks CDOs on certain risky
subprime loans (those rated BBB), materially declined. According to Market Watch, in early
February, the ABX Index was above 90. Then, the index had declined from 72.71 on
February 22, 2007, to 69.39 on February 23, 2007. An ABS strategist at RBS Greenwich Capital
commented in a Market Watch article dated February 23, 2007 stated that "ABX needs
protection sellers badly. . . Real (not perceived) problems in select mortgage pools and in the
37
EFTA00316765
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 53 of 347
subprime mortgage lending industry do not make for an ideal fundamental opportunity at this
time."
157. Further, immediately upon launch TABX tranches materially declined, indicating
that the value of many CDOs had plunged. As depicted in the chart below, the Senior TABX
Tranche dropped from a price of nearly 100 in mid-February 2007, to around 85 by the end of
February 2007. Indeed, the TABX continued to fall significantly in the months after February
2007, also as shown in the chart below reflecting historical TABX data from Markit Group of
London.
100
,T44314 HEMS 07-1 C6-2 0.6
90 •- WU ME MEE 071 062510
TABX4-6.11166. 07.1 C6-210-15
TABXH6.11166 07-1 06-215-25
ea --.-TABCHE.111B9 071 06-2 2540 I
-4- TAECCHE.888- 07-1 C6-2 40-11:0
70
E0
50
40 .,---
30
20 41- 0 1 1- • 0
10
0
11111111111/1111II!Ill 1 !ill
158. Bear Stearns was aware of these declines because it was one of the 16 licensed
market makers for the ABX and TABX. The changes indicated that the exceptionally risky
tranches of CDOs that the Company kept on its books as retained interests were rapidly losing
value. Because these assets were highly leveraged, their loss in value had serious repercussions
for the Company.
38
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159. Even as the indices tracking subprime performance began to crater, the Company
embarked on an aggressive expansion of its subprime business. On February 12, 2007, the
Company completed its acquisition of ECC, a major originator of subprime loans.
160. Bear Stearns knew that investors would flee if they found out that the Company
was failing to undertake any meaningful assessment of its exposure to risk while it aggressively
expanded its exposure to subprime losses.
161. Accordingly, in its Form 10-K for fiscal year 2006, filed February 13, 2007, the
Company reported reassuringly low VaR numbers, including an aggregate risk of just $28.8
million — far lower than its peers. This statement was wildly misleading, in that the Company
knew that its VaR modeling failed to reflect its exposure to declining housing prices and rising
default rates.
162. Bear Stearns also asserted, "The Company regularly evaluates and enhances such
VaR models in an effort to more accurately measure risk of loss." In fact, the Company had
undertaken no such review, and had been repeatedly warned by government regulators that its
VaR models were inaccurate and out of date.
163. The Company also asserted that it marked all positions to market on a daily basis
and independently verified its inventory pricing. It assessed the value of its Level 3 assets as
$12.1 billion.
164. These statements were materially misleading, in that the Company knew that the
models it used to value its Level 3 mortgage-backed assets were badly out of date and did not
reflect crucial data about housing prices and default rates. It also knew that its hamstrung risk
managers had little power to provide any independent review of these figures.
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165. Because the Company was failing to take appropriate losses on its Level 3 assets,
the revenues and earnings per share it reported in its 2006 Form 10-K were false and misleading,
artificially inflating the value of its stock.
166. Defendants Cayne and Molinaro executed a certification of these statements,
annexed as an exhibit to the Form 10-K filing, stating that they had put in place disclosure
controls and procedures to ensure the accuracy of the Company's filings, and that they had:
Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known
to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period
in which this report is being prepared.
167. Accordingly, at the time the Company filed its Form 10-K for 2006, Defendants
Cayne and Molinaro had taken care to inform themselves of the Company's improper risk
management and valuation practices, and knew the harmful consequences this deception would
have on investors. Moreover, the SEC had reported its findings regarding the Company's
deficient models to Molinaro's immediate subordinate, Farber.
168. The Company's artificially low VaR numbers stood in sharp contrast to the risk
exposures that many of its peers were reporting during the housing crisis. For the first half of
2007, as other investment banks with substantial subprime holdings saw their VaR figures
increase dramatically in tandem with rising problems in the housing market, Bear Steams'
reported VaR remained virtually unchanged and much lower than peers.
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Average Daily Value-at-Risk
400
350
Cit Grot
300
250
a
200
O Coldnum Sack-
150
Amon I koilicr,
100 •
Bear Steams
50
0
OO-06 Jan-07 Apr-07 Aug-07 Nov-07 Feb-08
Sources: Company 10-K's and 10-9's. The reported quarterly avenge of daily value-at-risk amounts is used.
169. Bear Steams' deception about its risk exposure had the desired effect, as analysts
covering the Company took note of its remarkably low VaR numbers. In a February 9, 2007 pre-
filing comment, Credit Suisse analysts Susan Roth Katzke and Ross Seiden stated that Bear
Steams' "[m]anagement will continue to invest to grow revenues via new products and new
geographies, rather than increasing VaR (the latter has been the most stable amongst peers)."
(Emphasis added.)
170. In a February 14, 2007 report, the same analysts were again struck by the
Company's apparently rising revenues and low exposure to risk, observing:
VaR and Revenue Growth; RoE and Book Value...Tying these
elements together with valuation leads us to the conclusion that
Bear ought to be a lower risk play in the brokerage group. From a
business perspective, note that Bear's revenue growth has kept
pace with peers, with far less VaR.
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171. As a result of the Company's continuing misrepresentations about its 2006 results
and its VaR exposure, its stock rose $5.71 on February 14, 2007, to close at $165.81.
172. Three weeks later the Credit Suisse analysts were still touting the Company's
strong revenue growth and unusually low VaR numbers. In a March 5, 2007 report on the
Company, they reported that:
Not only has revenue growth been equal to or better than peers, the
volatility of the revenue stream has been lower. This lower level
of revenue (and earnings) volatility is consistent with Bear
Stearns' less aggressive principal/proprietary trading posture-
less VaR and lower loss rates.
What's driven above-average equities revenue growth for Bear
Stearns? Best we can tell, it's the combination of hedge fund
client focus, personnel upgrades, and a somewhat increased capital
commitment. How much capital? Judging by the relatively low
level of VaR committed to the business, we think Bear's
willingness to use capital is still quite limited.
173. Less than two weeks later, on March 15, 2007, the Company issued a press
release touting its results for the first quarter of 2007. The press release provided, in relevant
part, the following:
The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (NYSE:BSC) today reported
earnings per share (diluted) of $3.82 for the first quarter ended
February 28, 2007, up 8% from $3.54 per share for the first quarter
of 2006. Net income for the first quarter of 2007 was $554
million, up 8% from $514 million for the first quarter of 2006. Net
revenues were $2.5 billion for the 2007 first quarter, up 14% from
$2.2 billion in the 2006 first quarter.
174. The Company knew these results were false and misleading because the
encouraging revenue growth and earnings per share it reported were made possible by the fact
that Bear Stearns relied on misleading valuation models. These models failed to reflect the
declining value of its highly illiquid Level 3 assets, which at that point made up more than ten
percent of its total assets.
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175. The Company followed up the release with an even more deceptive conference
call. On March 15, 2007, Bear Steams held its first quarter 2007 earnings conference call,
conducted by the Company's CFO, defendant Molinaro. When Molinaro was asked by a caller
whether he saw any trends in the Company's Value at Risk, Molinaro stated that there would be
"No real change. Should be about the same." Molinaro, as CFO of the Company, knew at the
time that the Company had been repeatedly warned by the SEC that its VaR numbers did not
reflect omnipresent indicators of a rapidly declining housing market.
176. Molinaro had to parry more questions during the March 15, 2007 call from
analysts regarding the Company's subprime exposure. An analyst asked, "[D]id you take any
write downs during the quarter and do you expect to as conditions have worsened?" Molinaro
responded that the subprime market was a small part of Bear Stearns' overall business, and the
Company had reduced the number of subprime mortgages it was purchasing and securitizing.
Molinaro failed to explain that the Company was avoiding writing down its illiquid subprime-
backed assets only by using inaccurate models to value them.
177. Molinaro also stated in the March 15, 2007 call that the Company was well-
hedged in the market for subprime-backed securities. Because Molinaro understood that the
VaR numbers the Company relied upon to calculate hedging ratios did not take housing market
deterioration into account, he knew that these assurances were misleading.
178. In fact, Molinaro actually boasted that the worsening outlook for housing would
only increase the number of subprime-backed CDOs the Company would acquire.
I think that the more likely scenario is there is going to be in
dislocations like this, there's likely to be large bulk sales of assets,
and certainly given the trouble that many companies have faced
with their sub prime portfolios, there certainly would appear to be
plenty of opportunity over the months and quarters ahead for that
kind of activity.
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179. As a result of these deceptions the Company's quarterly results sent its stock up
by $2.10, to close at $148.50.
180. On April 9, 2007, Bear Steams filed its Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended
February 28, 2007. In it, Defendants made various representations concerning Bear Steams' risk
management and mortgage-related operations. The Company asserted, inter alia, that it valued
its Level 3 assets using "internally developed models or methodologies utilizing significant
inputs that are generally less readily observable from objective sources."
181. However, the Company did not disclose that it knew that the models it was using
for this valuation were outdated and inaccurate, and that it made no effort to review and update
its valuation models.
182. The Company claimed that it engaged in an "ongoing internal review of its
valuations" and that "senior management from the Risk Management and Controllers
Departments" are responsible for "ensuring that the approaches used to independently validate
the Company's valuations are robust, comprehensive and effective." In fact, the Company's risk
management department was in chaos, and its chief of model review had quit the Company less
than a month earlier. It also knew that no substantive review of its mortgage valuation or value
at risk models had even been undertaken—indeed, its mortgage-backed asset valuation models
were more than a decade out of date.
183. In the same filing, the Company continued to offer materially false and
misleading Value at Risk numbers to investors, stating that, in the midst of the worst housing
downturn in decades, its Value at Risk numbers had declined since the Company's last filing, to
an aggregate level of $27.9 million, using a one-day interval and a 95% confidence level.
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184. The Company hastened to allay any skepticism about this strange result, insisting
that "[t]he Company regularly evaluates and enhances such VaR models in an effort to more
accurately measure risk of loss." It also stated that "[t]he Company utilizes a wide variety of
market risk management methods, including trading limits; marking all positions to market on a
daily basis; daily profit and loss statements; position reports; daily risk highlight reports; aged
inventory position reports; and independent verification of inventory pricing."
185. These statements were false and misleading, in that the Company had been
repeatedly informed by the SEC that its VaR modeling did not reflect key market risks.
Moreover, the Company knew that it had made no effort to review or update these defective
models, and that its risk managers had no power to constrain the Company's trading desk.
186. The first quarter 2007 10-Q also stated that the Company's net revenues for
Capital Markets increased 15.4% to $1.97 billion for the 2007 quarter and that its total assets at
February 28, 2007 increased to $394.5 billion from $350.4 billion at November 30, 2006. These
statements were false and misleading, because the Company only avoided taking losses on its
Level 3 assets by using improper valuation models. This avoidance of loss permitted the
Company to increase its revenues and asset values, inflating the value of its stock.
187. Defendants Cayne and Molinaro once again certified these statements, stating that
they had made efforts to ensure the accuracy of the Company's reporting and the reliability of its
internal controls. Unbeknownst to Bear Steams' investors, the scale of the Company's deception
was about to get much larger.
G. The Implosion of the Hedge Funds
188. The rapid decline in the subprime mortgage market in early 2007 had devastating
consequences for the Hedge Funds, which were heavily laden with subprime-backed assets. The
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implosion of the Hedge Funds contributed directly to the even larger crisis that would befall Bear
Stearns just months later.
189. As subprime mortgage risks materialized and subprime mortgage performance
deteriorated during late 2006 and early 2007, the prices fetched by subprime loans on the
secondary market (i.e., the prices obtained by securitizers such as Bear Stearns) fell. The end
result was that by March of 2007 subprime origination had almost entirely collapsed.
190. On February 8, 2007, HSBC, the largest originator of subprime loans during
2006, raised its subprime loan loss reserves to $10.6 billion to cover anticipated losses from its
subprime lending. During a February 8, 2007 conference call, HSBC officials explained that
ARM resets were set to explode, and that subprime borrowers likely would not be able to make
their payments when their rates rise. Not surprisingly, HSBC also announced plans to cut back
on further subprime lending and to eliminate all stated income lending.
191. HSBC' s February 2007 announcement proved to be a turning point in the
industry. The announcement made the scale of subprime risks widely apparent, and precipitated
further and severe contraction in subprime origination. Moreover, it caused indices tracking the
securities backed by subprime mortgages to fall precipitously.
192. As the indices fell, capital rapidly receded from the subprime industry. With that
withdrawal of capital, securitizers such as Bear Steams found themselves increasingly unable to
sell the subprime mortgages they repackaged to investors. The decreased demand for RMBS and
CDOs created a chain reaction. Because the demand for RMBS and CDOs was decreasing,
securitizer demand for subprime mortgages (to turn into RMBS) and for subprime RMBS (to
turn into CDOs) was decreasing. Because securitizer demand for subprime mortgages was
decreasing, subprime mortgage origination itself decreased.
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193. Rather than explain these difficult market conditions to investors, BSAM
misrepresented the Hedge Funds' subprime exposure to hedge fund investors in "Preliminary
Performance Profiles" ("PPP"). For example, in monthly PPPs, BSAM represented that only 6-
8% of the Hedge Funds' assets were invested in subprime RMBS. However, unknown to the
Hedge Funds' investors and the market, BSAM was only disclosing the Hedge Funds' direct
subprime RMBS holdings. In fact, the Hedge Funds held tremendous amounts of subprime
RMBS indirectly through the CDOs it had purchased.
194. The Hedge Funds' large and undisclosed exposure to subprime assets placed
enormous stress on the Hedge Funds as the subprime mortgage crisis accelerated. Returns in the
subprime CDOs, and CDOs backed by slices of other CDOs, termed CDO-squares, diminished,
thus creating diminishing yield spreads, leading to accelerating losses for the Hedge Funds. As a
result, the High Grade Enhanced Fund experienced its first negative return in February 2007.
195. In an email dated March 1, 2007, Cioffi told BSAM managers not to "talk about
[the February results] to anyone or I'll shoot you ...I can't believe anything has been this bad."
196. Declines in the High Grade Hedge Fund soon followed, resulting in its first
negative return in March of 2007.
197. Because Bear Steams had effectively bankrolled the Hedge Funds by giving them
huge sums of cash in exchange for their subprime-backed collateral, the Hedge Funds' crisis had
serious implications for the Company. Notwithstanding the fact that Defendant Spector, Bear
Stearns' Co-President, directly oversaw the Hedge Funds and understood the gravity of their
situation, his CFO Molinaro denied the existence of any trouble.
198. On a March 15, 2007 conference call with analysts, Molinaro was asked "[c]an
you give any insight about whether you've seen or had issues with margin calls or any kind of
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difficulties in hedgefund-land given how volatile the Markets have been the last few weeks?" In
response, Molinaro said that Bear Steams' hedge funds were having no issues with margin calls:
"We haven't seen any difficulties. I would say it's been, obviously there's a lot of market
volatility but we've had no difficulties there."
199. In making this statement, Molinaro not only misrepresented the crisis facing the
Hedge Funds, but failed to disclose Bear Steams' exposure to the declining value of the
subprime-backed Hedge Fund assets it held as collateral on its own books.
200. The Hedge Funds' situation continued to deteriorate throughout the Spring of
2007. On April 19, 2007, Matthew M. Tannin, Chief Operating Officer of the Hedge Funds,
reviewed a credit model that showed increasing losses on subprime linked assets. Tannin agreed
with the model's assessment and, in a April 22, 2007 e-mail stated:
IF we believe the runs [the analyst] has been doing are
ANYWHERE CLOSE to accurate I think we should close the
Funds now. The reason for this is that if [the runs] are correct then
the entire subprime market is toast ... If AAA bonds are
systematically downgraded then there is simply no way for us to
make money- ever."
201. Tannin concluded that "caution would lead us to conclude the [CDO report] is
right and we're in bad shape." On May 13, 2007, Tannin reiterated to another BSAM manager
that "1 think [the Enhanced Leverage Hedge Fund] has to be liquidated."
202. Bear Steams had much to fear in a liquidation of the Hedge Funds. A forced "fire
sale" of the thinly traded CDOs held by the Hedge Funds could compel the Company to
acknowledge the huge declines in value in the subprime-backed assets it already held as
collateral and as retained interests, and would also reveal the fact that the Company had been
grossly overvaluing its Level 3 assets. To avoid this, the Company became involved in an
intense effort to prop up the Hedge Funds.
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203. Defendant Spector, Bear Stearns' Co-President, personally made the decision to
extend a line of credit to the High Grade Hedge Fund. He decided to let the High Grade
Enhanced Fund fail, because its high leverage ratios left it virtually unsalvageable. The purpose
of the facility was to allow the High Grade Hedge Fund to liquidate in an orderly way by
gradually selling assets into the market without having other assets seized by repurchase
agreements counterparties, who would mark the assets to their true value.
204. In the midst of this turmoil, on June 14, 2007, Bear Steams issued a press release
regarding its second quarter 2007 results. In it, the Company continued to hide its mounting
losses on Level 3 assets, permitting it to misrepresent its revenues and earnings per share.
205. On June 22, 2007, Bear Stearns announced that it was entering into a $3.2 billion
securitized financing agreement with the High Grade Hedge Fund in the form of a collateralized
repurchase agreement. In exchange for lending the funds, Bear Steams received as collateral
CDOs backed by subprime mortgages allegedly worth between $1.7 to $2 billion. Pursuant to
the agreement, Bear Steams gave up the right to collect all of the upside in the event that the
collateral saw a miraculous increase in value.
206. During a Friday, June 22, 2007 conference call arranged to explain the bailout,
Defendant Molinaro, the CFO of Bear Steams, took pains to explain that the Hedge Funds'
problems with their subprime-backed assets did not extend to the securities that Bear Stearns
itself held. Molinaro failed to disclose that even prior to the bailout, Bear Steams held large
amounts of the Hedge Funds' toxic debt as collateral. Moreover, by virtue of the bailout, Bear
Stearns had just taken on an enormous amount more of the same illiquid and devalued securities.
207. During the June 22, 2007 conference call, Molinaro was asked "To what extent
has this event caused you to retook at some of your practices overall for Bear Steams since you
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are such a big player in the mortgage market? I mean you have had the subprime problem for
more than three months now. Are there other trigger events we should pay attention to over the
next year?" Molinaro responded with the following:
Well [] I don't know that it's causing us to have any different point
of view on the activities in our mortgage business. Our mortgage
business has basically been not affected by this and has not redly
been a part of this situation. So our mortgage business continues
to operate in a very effective way. Albeit in a more in a lower
volume environment and a more difficult operating environment
given the macro picture in the marketplace.
As it relates to our Asset Management division, we feel that we
have adequate controls in place. Obviously if you have a problem
like this, you are going to reassess those controls and look to
strengthen them. But I think the simple point in this Fund is that or
these two Funds, they are invested in an asset class that went
through a period of severe distress.
208. During the same June 22, 2007 conference call, an analyst asked Molinaro for his
current sense of the broader impact of the losses being experienced by the BSAM funds.
Molinaro stated:
Well, I think clearly when you have a situation like this; it puts a
lot of pressure on asset values and spreads in the marketplace.
That's undoubtedly happening. I'm not expecting any material
impact from that, at least as it relates to ourselves, can't speak to
the broader market. We're not seeing any material difficulties in
repo lines or in counterparties who are having difficulty away
from this meeting margin requirements. So, I would say, at least
from our perspective, at the moment it appears to be relatively
contained.
(Emphasis added.)
209. During the June 22, 2007 call, Mike Mayo, an analyst at Deutsche Bank, asked
how Bear Steams valued the collateral that it had received from the Hedge Funds. Molinaro
stated that "the collateral values that we have are a reflection of the market value levels that
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we're seeing from our street counterparties." In fact, the market for such securities had become
highly illiquid, providing no basis for Molinaro's statements.
210. On June 25, 2007, market reaction to the news of Bear Stearns' bailout of the
High Grade Fund was sharply negative. Investors, fearing that the collapse of the Hedge Funds
reflected on the Company's own exposure, sent Bear Steams' stock down by $4.65, to close at
$139.10.
211. The next day, June 26, 2007, defendant Cayne assured investors that "we see no
material change in our risk profile or counterparty exposure as a result of the reaction in the
marketplace regarding the situation surrounding these hedge funds." The Company's share
prices increased as a result. Cayne's statement was materially false and misleading, in that the
Company had effectively taken onto its books billions of dollars of worthless subprime-backed
collateral, causing its risk exposure to grow enormously.
212. According to Bear Stearns, by the end of June 2007, asset sales had reduced the
loan balance to $1.345 billion, but the estimated value of the collateral securing the loan, the
High Grade Hedge Fund's compromised CDOs, had deteriorated by nearly $350 million—that
is, to approximately the value of the loan Bear Stearns had given the High Grade Hedge Fund.
Because the High Grade Hedge Fund had no other assets, any further declines in the value of the
assets that Bear Steams held as collateral would be borne directly by Bear Steams.
213. The 2008 OIG Report concluded that, given these circumstances, the Company
should have taken this collateral onto its own books and taken an immediate charge against net
capital. Instead of immediately reflecting its assumption of the declining collateral onto its
books, the Company delayed for months. By doing so, the OIG stated, Bear Stearns was able "to
delay taking a huge hit to capital."
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214. On July 18, 2007, Bear Steams informed investors in the Hedge Funds that they
would get little money back after "unprecedented declines" in the value of AAA rated securities
used to bet on subprime mortgages. According to the Company, estimates showed there was
"effectively no value left" in the High Grade Enhanced Fund and "very little value left" in the
High Grade Fund, Bear Steams said in a two-page letter.
215. Accordingly, the more than $1.3 billion in collateral drawn from the Hedge Funds
subprime-backed assets that the Company had effectively taken onto its books by assuming the
assets as collateral just a month earlier was nearly worthless as well. Despite this fact, the
Company did not reveal the enormous losses that it was absorbing.
216. According to internal credit memoranda reviewed by the GIG, Bear Steams
ultimately did take much of the High Grade Fund's remaining collateral onto its books—but did
not make the actual book entries until some time in the fall of 2007, months after the losses were
actually incurred by the Company. As set out below, the Company ultimately only wrote off a
fraction of the worthless collateral it held that it had valued at $1.3 billion.
H. Repercussions of the Hedge Funds' Implosion
217. The implosion of the two Hedge Funds reverberated through both the financial
markets and the Company's senior management.
218. In the wake of Bear Steams' assumption of billions of dollars of Hedge Fund
collateral through the bailout, Bear Stearns' lenders increasingly questioned the true extent of the
Company's exposure to loss. As a result, they became unwilling to supply the Company the vast
amounts of cash it needed to finance its daily operations and interest payments. The 2008 OIG
Report explained that the market no longer perceived the Company "to be sufficiently capitalized
to justify extensive unsecured lending. In this sense, Bear Steams was not adequately
capitalized."
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219. As set out in the 2008 OIG Report, Bear Steams' declining ability to obtain
unsecured financing meant that the Company had a strong incentive to lower capital costs by
raising new equity capital, making the Company a safer bet for lenders offering unsecured
financing. However, instead of raising new capital, the Company steadily shifted its funding
model from unsecured to secured financing, using its mortgage-backed assets as collateral. In
May of 2007, Bear Steams' short term borrowing was 60% secured. Just four months later, in
September of 2007, it was 74% secured. By March of 2008 it was 83% secured.
220. Bear Steams' principal source of secured financing was the market for repurchase
or "repo" agreements. By the end of the Class Period, Bear Steams was funding its $50 billion
daily needs by using 71% of its risky mortgage-backed assets as collateral for repo agreements.
221. Given that the Company's mortgage-backed assets were serving to prop up the
cash needs of the entire Company, Bear Steams literally could not afford to reveal that they were
rapidly losing value.
222. Even financing through repo agreements was becoming difficult for the Company
to secure. Bear Steams' repo agreement counterparties were increasingly suspicious that they
were being duped about the value of the CDOs that the Company was using as collateral. As a
result, the 2008 OIG Report states that mark disputes between Bear Steams and its counterparties
became more common beginning in the summer of 2007.
223. A mark dispute can occur when two parties to a repo agreement disagree about
the value of the collateral. If a lender believes that the collateral posted in a repo agreement has
lost value, it can make a "margin call" on the borrower, demanding more collateral or a return of
part or all of the money loaned.
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224. The 2008 OIG Report revealed that, during July of 2007, shortly after the Hedge
Fund bailout, Bear Steams told the SEC that there were two large dealers with whom it had mark
disputes that were in excess of $100 million each.
225. Because Bear Steams knew that its assets were overvalued, it was frequently
obliged to settle these disputes by paying money to its repo counterparties. However, the
Company could not afford to reveal that its mortgage-backed collateral was rapidly declining in
value. Accordingly, Bear Steams continued to carry the assets on its books at full value even
while conceding to its counterparties that the value of the collateral had declined.
226. The 2008 DIG Report states that "[t]here are indications in the TM memoranda
that Bear Steams tended to use the traders' more generous marks for profit and loss purposes,
even when Bear Steams conceded to the counterparty for collateral valuation purposes." By
failing to record the assets at the lower compromise price, the Company was able to perpetuate
its scheme to hide from investors the extent of its losses on the value of its mortgage-backed
assets.
227. Doubts about the Company's true exposure were slowly making their way to the
market. On July 31, 2007, Standard & Poor's analysts downgraded the Company's stock
because, among other things, "widening credit spreads and increasing risk aversion may cause a
slowdown in its investment banking operation." The Company's stock fell $6.03 as a result,
closing at $121.22.
228. On August 3, 2007, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had revised its
outlook on Bear Steams from stable to negative. Notwithstanding the Company's denials, the
ratings firm explained that "Bear Steams has material exposure to holdings of mortgages and
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), the valuations of which remain under severe pressure. It
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also has exposure to debt it has taken up as a result of unsuccessful leveraged finance
underwritings, and it has significant further underwriting commitments."
229. That same day, Bear Stearns issued a press release responding to the S&P
downgrade:
The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (NYSE: BSC) said today that it
is disappointed with S&P's decision to change its outlook on Bear
Stearns. Most of the themes highlighted in its report are common
to the industry and are not likely to have a disproportional impact
on Bear Stearns. S&P's specific concerns over issues relating to
certain hedge funds managed by BSAM are unwarranted as these
were isolated incidences and are by no means an indication of
broader issues at Bear Stearns.
230. On the same day, Cayne and his top lieutenants arranged a conference call with
investors and analysts to try to calm concerns. They did this by touting the Company's illusory
risk management program.
231. After prefatory remarks by defendants Cayne and Molinaro, defendant Michael
Alix, the Company's Chief Risk Officer, stated that "our fixed income franchises, particularly
our mortgage and securitization businesses, have long focused on the origination, transformation
and redistribution of risk. We've always managed the risk in this process by adjusting the intake,
the origination of risk, to the demand for the end products." He added that "we run risk analytics
to demonstrate that the Firm is well protected against further deterioration in both the subprime
and Alt-A sectors across both whole loans and all securitization tranches."
232. In fact, at the time of the August 3, 2007 conference call, Alix and the Company
had already been informed that Bear Stearns' "risk analytics" did not take into account crucial
information on risk of default and volatility in housing prices. Moreover, as a result of the
Hedge Fund bailout, Bear Stearns had just assumed as collateral more than a billion dollars
worth of subprime-backed CDOs that were virtually worthless. As the Company only held
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approximately $11 billion in highly-leveraged net equity at the time, this was a very significant
new exposure.
233. On August 5, 2007, in an effort to restore investor confidence in the Company's
management and to distance itself from the collapse of the hedge funds, Bear Steams announced
a management shake-up that included the ouster of Defendant Spector. He was replaced by
Defendant Schwartz as the Company's sole president. Defendant Molinaro became the
Company's Chief Operating Officer in addition to his continuing role as CFO.
234. On September 20, 2007, Bear Stearns posted its results for the third quarter,
ending August 31, 2007 (closing stock price $108.66). It reported net income for the quarter of
$171.3 million, or $1.16 a share, down from $438 million, or $3.02 a share, in the period a year
earlier. Net revenue for the Company, or total revenue minus interest costs, fell 37% to $1.33
billion, while net revenue at the fixed-income division dropped 88%, to $118 million from $945
million in the third quarter of 2006. Return on equity stood at 5.3%, compared with 16% a year
earlier.
235. During a conference call with analysts and investors, Molinaro said that, despite
adverse impacts from "losses incurred from the failure of the [in-house funds], ... our
counterparty exposures have been dramatically reduced and we've hedged remaining assets."
When asked about "collateral damage that you might have suffered on the [BSAM) business
[following the in-house hedge funds' collapse)", Molinaro responded that the damage "was
relatively limited and we saw very few situations where clients moved their entire business ... I
think the crisis passed in mid-August things have returned to kind of a normal state ... the wont
is behind us there and business is normalizing and returning."
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236. Bear Stearns' third quarter results and Molinaro's statements were false and
misleading, in that they were achieved only by avoiding losses through the use of valuation
methods that artificially boosted the values of the Company's growing hoard of Level 3 assets.
237. The Company explained that its declining profits were the result of diminished
fixed-income revenue coupled with a $200 million loss from its June Hedge Fund failures. Of
this figure, the Company stated that only $100 million represented decline in value of the
collateral that the Company held as a result of the Hedge Fund bailout.
238. This $100 million figure was a far cry from the Company's true losses due to the
Hedge Fund collapse, which had left more than a billion dollars of worthless subprime CDOs on
the Company's balance sheet. The Company did not disclose the full amount of its losses on the
collateral for fear that its lenders and counterparties would realize that it had been consistently
overvaluing its assets.
239. The small size of the write down falsely reassured the markets about the
Company's exposure. In a September 20, 2007 conference call with investors, an analyst asked
"And — and then on the — on the $200 million writedown of the High Grade funds. That
effectively a writedown what was last reported a $1.3 billion balance?" Company management
responded:
It basically — Roger, two big pieces to that. About $100 million —
it is almost split evenly. About $100 million of that is the write-off
of our investment in the fund and the write-off of receivables that
we had from the funds related to predominantly related to
management and performance fees that related to 2006. And the
balance of that was the mark on the inventory when we closed out
the position.
240. In fact, even by the Company's own estimations regarding the writedowns
associated with the Hedge Fund, this statement was false and misleading. The 2008 OIG Report
states that the Company's internal documents reflect that it ultimately took a $500 million write
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down in connection with the bailout some time in the fall of 2007. The Company never
disclosed this additional write down to investors, for fear that it would telegraph to the market
the decline in the value of the other subprime-backed assets it carried on its books.
241. On October 10, 2007, Bear Stearns filed its Form 10-Q for the quarterly period
ended August 31, 2007, which included the same misleading financial results it reported on
September 20, 2007.
242. In addition, Defendants made various representations concerning Bear Steams'
risk management. The Company stated that "I[n] recognition of the importance the Company
places on the accuracy of its valuation of financial instruments as described in the three
categories above, the Company engages in an ongoing internal review of its valuations."
243. In fact, at the time this statement was made, the Company had been repeatedly
warned that its mortgage valuation models were outdated and inaccurate, but had refused to
revise them.
244. The Company also stated that it "regularly evaluates and enhances [its] VaR
models in an effort to more accurately measure risk of loss," and that its aggregate VaR was still
only $35 million, well below its competitors.
245. This statements were false and misleading, in that the Company understood that
its VaR models did not reflect key data showing declines in the housing market, and had made
no effort to revise them.
246. On November 14, 2007, defendant Molinaro announced that Bear Steams would
write down $1.2 billion of its assets in the fourth quarter. However, Molinaro attempted to
reassure nervous investors by claiming that, in spite of the fact that Bear Steams still bore more
than a billion dollars of subprime exposure in the form of the collateral it had received from the
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failed High Grade Fund, Bear Stearns had reduced its CDO holdings to $884 million as of
November 9, down from $2.07 billion at the end of August. Molinaro claimed that during the
period between August 31, 2007 and November 9, 2007, the Company significantly increased its
short subprime exposures—that is, its insurance against declines in the subprime market—
reducing its reported August 31, 2007 net exposure of approximately $1 billion to a negative $52
million net exposure as of November 9, 2007.
247. During an analyst conference call held on November 14, 2007, Molinaro was
asked what Bear Stearns was doing to "fight back" against "the impact of the unprecedented
times in the mortgage market compounded by fallout from the firm's mortgage hedge funds this
summer." Molinaro responded that:
the liquidity crisis [with the hedge funds] that did ensure during
July and August did have some effect on the business .... we did
see some balance migration, but importantly we're seeing balance
is coming back .... where we look at balances, currently they
have been basically steady from where we closed the third
quarter at, and the business, I would say, is continuing to show
improvement from where we the quarter at, and we think getting
back on track for what should be a very strong 2008.
(Emphasis added.)
248. Peter Goldman of Chicago Asset Management was relieved, stating that lvde
didn't have a clear picture of their exposures. Now we do, and it's much smaller than that of its
peers." Bear Stearns shares rose $2.58, or 2.6 percent, to $103.45 in New York Stock Exchange
composite trading.
249. Investors and analysts did not realize that the extent of Bear Stearns' exposure
was in fact far from clear. The Company still had more than a billion dollars in subprime backed
collateral from its Hedge Fund bailout to write down, and the Company's hedging efforts were
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doomed by its failure to use accurate models to assess risk. These secrets were becoming
increasingly difficult for the Company to hide.
250. On December 20, 2007, Bear Stearns announced that it would take the first
quarterly loss in the Company's 84-year history (quarter closing on November 30, 2007 at
$99.70 per share). It reported that its fiscal fourth-quarter loss after paying preferred dividends
was $859 million, or $6.90 per share, compared to a profit of $558 million, or $4 per share, a
year earlier. The Company had negative net revenue of $379 million, compared to revenue of
$2.41 billion a year earlier.
251. These figures were false and misleading, because reported losses would have been
far greater but for the Company's use of misleading valuation models to inflate asset values and
revenues.
252. Notwithstanding Molinaro's assurance just weeks before that the Company's
hedging efforts had resulted in a net negative exposure to subprime assets, the Company also
announced on December 20, 2007 that it would write down $1.9 billion of its holdings in
mortgages and mortgage-based securities — more than $700 million more than it had announced
on November 14, 2007.
253. The lack of any schedule giving details regarding the nature of the write downs
left investors with little information about the nature of the Company's true exposure. Write
downs by other companies in the same period provided far more information, including the
source of exposure (retained interest, derivatives, commitment to provide liquidity and/or credit
support, or warehoused loans and mortgage-backed securities), the type of CDOs to which they
were exposed (high grade, mezzanine, CDO-squared, etc.) and vintage of the subprime
mortgages that underlie their CDO exposures.
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254. In their write downs, Bear Steams' peers also provided other information with a
bearing on the creditworthiness of the exposure and the extent of write-downs taken against par
value, including the amount that was hedged and how it was hedged, how the exposures were
valued, and the main drivers of value. The fact that Bear Steams was withholding such key
information from investors began to fuel a consensus that the Company's risk was far greater
than had been assumed and fanned investor anxieties about the Company.
255. Major shareholders begin questioning Cayne's leadership. On January 8, 2008,
the Company announced that Cayne would step down as chief executive. However, he would
continue reporting for work at Bear Stearns' headquarters, attempting to get the Company badly
needed funding. Cayne was replaced as CEO by defendant Schwartz.
256. Analysts such as Punk Ziegel & Co. ("Punk Ziegel") saw Cayne's departure as an
indictment of the Company's failed risk management policies.
257. Cayne's departure only raised investors' anxiety about the Company's exposure,
and its stock dropped nearly 7%, to close at $71.17.
I. Bear Stearns' Catastrophic Collapse
258. In the weeks following Cayne's departure, Bear Steams continued to try to
reassure its shareholders. On February 8, 2008, the Company asserted that it had increased its
short subprime position from $600 million in November 2007 to $1 billion in an effort to hedge
its trading positions in subprime mortgages. Explaining the increase, Molinaro was quoted in a
Bloomberg article as stating that one of the Company's biggest mistakes had been "not being
conservative enough and bearish enough on the subprime market." The firm has reversed "long"
subprime trades that stood at $1 billion at the end of August, Molinaro said.
259. The market was struck by the dissonance between Molinaro's statements and the
Company's previous assurances that it dealt in less risky "agency" mortgages and was not
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exposed to the subprime market. Punk Ziegel's Richard X. Bove ("Bove") was openly skeptical.
In a report dated February 8, 2008 he stated that:
the firm is marking down the value of its more questionable
securities. Bear has actually gone to a net short position in its
CDO/subprime portfolio. This latter condition is somewhat of a
surprise since the company has argued, for almost ever, that it does
not play the markets; it claims to be an agency-only company. (So
much for that concept.)
260. Bove's chagrin was shared by the Company's lenders. On March 6, 2008,
Rabobank Group, one of Bear Stearns' European lenders, told the brokerage that it wouldn't
renew a $500 million loan coming due later that week. That meant Rabobank Group was
unlikely to renew an additional $2 billion credit agreement set to expire the following week.
261. Moreover, analyst reports released the same day predicted that the Company's
quarterly results would be dogged with problems stemming from its fixed income business,
sending the Company's stock tumbling by more than $5, to close at $69.90.
262. As a result, on Friday, March 7, 2008, the cost of credit default swaps on Bear
Stearns' debt surged.
263. Bear Stearns again tried to stanch the market's loss of confidence with
announcements by senior management. In a March 10, 2008 press release the Company said that
"Where is absolutely no truth to the rumors of liquidity problems that circulated today in the
market" and suggested that the Company had some $17 billion in cash. The same day,
Defendant Greenberg claimed during an interview with CNBC that the Company had no
liquidity problems, calling such an assertion "ridiculous, totally ridiculous."
264. This assertion did little to quell fear, because investors knew that Bear Steams had
$11.1 billion in tangible equity capital supporting $395 billion in assets, a leverage ratio of more
than 35 to I. Almost daily, Bear Steams had to renew a large percentage of its $102 billion
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worth of open repurchase agreements - or short term loans from Wall Street dealers - or make up
the difference out of its cash position.
265. Interpreting Greenberg's announcement as a tacit admission that the Company
faced liquidity problems, on March 10, 2008 investors sent the Company's stock down another
$7, to close at $62.30.
266. The morning of March 11, 2008 saw still another blow, when Goldman Sachs'
("Goldman") credit derivatives group sent its hedge fund clients an e-mail announcement about
Bear Stearns. In previous weeks, banks such as Goldman had done a brisk business agreeing to
stand in for nervous institutions that feared Bear Stearns could not meet its obligations on an
interest rate swap. But in the March 11, 2008 email, Goldman told clients that, at least
temporarily, it would not step in for them on Bear Stearns derivatives deals.
267. Kyle Bass ("Bass") of Hayman Capital reported that he had a colleague call
Goldman to see if it was a mistake. "It wasn't," said Bass, himself a former Bear Stearns
salesman. "Goldman told Wall Street that they were done with Bear, that there was [effectively]
too much risk. That was the end for them."
268. Hedge funds flooded Credit Suisse Group's brokerage unit with requests to take
over trades opposite Bear Stearns. In a mass email sent out that afternoon, Credit Suisse stock
and bond traders were told that all such "novation" requests involving Bear Stearns and any
other "exceptions" to normal business required the approval of credit-risk managers.
269. Bear Stearns' counterparties began to back away from the Company. Early in the
morning on Tuesday, March 11, 2008, ING Groep NV informed Bear Steams that it was pulling
about $500 million in financing. Staffers at the Dutch bank told Bear Stearns that ING's
management "wanted to keep their distance until the dust settled."
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270. The same day, analysts at Punk Ziegel suggested that Bear Steams' future profits
were likely to be squeezed by its exposure to "esoteric securities." The Company's stock
dropped $3.75 as a result, closing at $62.97.
271. The crisis of confidence accelerated rapidly. Bear Steams' cost of insuring $10
million of debt via credit default swaps, which had hovered near $350,000 in the month before,
shot past $1 million. By the end of March 11, 2008, the rate was irrelevant. Banks simply
refused to issue any further credit protection on the Company's debt.
272. These developments had a devastating effect on the Company's liquidity.
Liquidity is simply the measure of an organization's ability to meet its current financial
obligations. In banking, adequate liquidity means being able to meet the needs of depositors
wanting to withdraw funds and borrowers wanting to be assured that their credit or cash needs
will be met.
273. According to a March 20, 2008 letter from SEC Chairman Cox to the Chairman
of the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation, on March 11, 2008, the Company's liquidity
pool stood at $15.8 billion, "adjusted for the customer protection rule." By March 13, 2008,
according to the letter, the pool stood at $2 billion—a loss of more than $13 billion over the
course of March 12, 2008.
274. On March 12, 2008 Defendant Schwartz, Bear Steams' CEO appeared on CNBC
and said that the Company's liquidity position and balance sheet had not weakened at all. "We
finished the year, and we reported that we had $17 billion of cash sitting at the bank's parent
company as a liquidity cushion," he said. "As the year has gone on, that liquidity cushion has
been virtually unchanged." Schwartz added that "We don't see any pressure on our liquidity, let
alone a liquidity crisis."
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275. Schwartz's statement was false, in that the day before his assertion that the
Company's liquidity position was unchanged Bear Steams' liquidity pool already had fallen to
an adjusted level of $15.8 billion. Moreover, as Schwartz spoke on March 12, 2008, some $13
billion of the Company's cash was evaporating.
276. Moreover, Schwartz specifically denied that the Company's risk had scared away
any counterparties:
CNBC: Let me start off with this broad idea that's been in the
market now for a few days and pressuring your stock.
Namely, that counterparty risk is something — new
counterparty risk is something that a number of firms on
Wall Street no longer want to take in terms of dealing with
Bear Steams. Is that true?
SCHWARTZ: No, it's not true. We are — there's a been a lot of volatility
in the market, a lot of disruption in the market, and that's
causing some pressure administratively on getting some
trades settled up, but we're workin' hard gettin' that done.
We're in a constant dialogue with all of the major dealers
and the counterparties in the Street, and we're not being
made aware of anybody who is not taking our credit as a
counterparty.
CNBC: All right, so when I'm told by a hedge fund that I know
well, that last night they tried to close out a mortgage — a
credit protection mortgage position with Goldman Sachs
that they had bought a year ago, Bear was the low bid, and
I'm told that Goldman would not accept the counterparty
risk of Bear Steams. You're saying you're not aware that
that would be the case.
SCHWARTZ: I'm not aware that, you know, on a specific trade from one
counterparty to another and where you're a third-party, we
have direct dealings with all of these institutions, and we
have active markets going with each one, and our
counterparty risk has not been a problem.
277. At the time he made this statement, Schwartz, as the Company's CEO, was only
too well aware that ING had pulled nearly half a billion in financing and that Goldman Sachs,
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once a principal source of cash for the Company, had at least temporarily halted covering any
more Bear Stearns risk.
278. Moreover, according to the 2008 OIG report, the Company informed TM on
March 12, 2008, the same day as Schwartz's statement, that "Bear Stearns paid out $1.1 billion
in disputes to numerous counterparties in order to squelch rumors that Bear Stearns could not
meet its margin calls."
279. Investors were cheered by Schwartz' false optimism and the decline in the
Company's stock value slowed, dropping only $1.39 for the day, closing at $61.58.
280. In fact, the Company's liquidity was plummeting, falling to just $2 billion on
March 13, 2008.
281. On March 13, Renaissance Technologies Corp., a major hedge fund and trading
client of the Company, said it was shifting more than $5 billion to Bear Stearns' competitors.
282. On the evening of March 13, 2008 a desperate Schwartz telephoned JPMorgan
CEO Jamie Dimon ("Dimon") in an effort to negotiate a rescue package.
283. Dimon thought it was too risky for Morgan Stanley to lend the Company the $30
billion it needed to get through the following day, Friday. Schwartz and Dimon determined that
Bear Stearns had to be given access to the Federal Reserve's "window," a credit facility available
to the nation's commercial banks, but not to investment banks. The only way for the Federal
Reserve to give the Company access to the window was to lend JPMorgan the money, allowing
the bank to act as a bridge across which the Federal Reserve cash could stream into Bear Stearns.
284. JPMorgan and Bear Stearns contemplated that the Company could get the facility
though JPMorgan as part of a deal in which JPMorgan bought Bear Steams.
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285. On March 14, 2008 at 9 A.M., Bear Stearns announced $30 billion in funding
provided by JPMorgan and backstopped by the federal government.
286. As a result, Bear Steams' stock dropped nearly 40% in the first half-hour of
trading, closing at $78.47.
287. JPMorgan dispatched 16 teams of accountants, ultimately numbering more than
300 people, to Bear Stearns to meet with top management and assess the Company's books. On
Saturday night, March 15, after the reports from these due diligence teams began to make their
way back to JPMorgan management, JPMorgan's Steve Black and Doug Braunstein called
defendant Schwartz. They told him that, given the state of the Company's exposure, JPMorgan's
bid for the Company's stock would be low.
288. During the call, Black stated that "[t]tle fact you're at 32 doesn't mean much at
this point." Black suggested that a JPMorgan bid might be in the range of $8 to $12 a share.
289. By the next morning, many JPMorgan executives were getting cold feet. The
more they studied the securities Bear Stearns owned, the worse the Company looked. For
instance, Bear Steams had initially estimated it had $120 billion in so-called risk-weighted
assets, those that might go bad. By Sunday morning, JPMorgan executives felt the actual
number was closer to $220 billion.
290. By Sunday, March 16, JPMorgan had concluded that the deal was too risky, and
had informed Schwartz that they were unwilling to undertake the purchase.
291. JPMorgan relented only upon obtaining a promise from federal officials that
taxpayers would foot the bill in the event that Bear Stearns defaulted on its securities. Late in the
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afternoon on Sunday, it told Bear Steams that it would purchase the Company's shares for $2 per
share.°
292. The same afternoon, JPMorgan held a conference call addressing questions about
the offer. Analyst Guy Moszlowski of Merrill Lynch asked, "is there some reconciliation that
you could give us in broad terms from the book value per share, which of course is a reported
number of around $84 at last reporting, and the $2, other than the transaction related costs of $6
billion"?
293. Mike Cavanaugh, the CFO of JPMorgan, responded:
Yes, Guy, I think that the — all I can tell you is we did extensive
work over a short period of time to get comfortable with putting
together a transaction that made sense all around. But obviously
looking at our duties to JPMorgan shareholders and so the deal
we've lined out — laid out, didn't result in the ability to pay more
than the modest amount that was paid over to the Bear Stearns
shareholders.
294. The next day, Monday, March 17, Bear Steams share prices tumbled to $4.81 as
the market learned the true state of the Company's finances, a drop of 84%.
295. On March 24, 2008, one week after announcing its takeover deal with Bear
Stearns, JPMorgan raised its takeover offer for Bear Stearns to $10 per share, or about $2.1
billion, and agreed to take on the first $1 billion of Bear Stearns' losses while the Federal
Reserve guaranteed $29 billion in losses. The updated agreement also included a provision
allowing JPMorgan to purchase 95 million newly issued shares of Bear Stearns common stock,
or 39.5% of the Company, ahead of a shareholder vote on the acquisition deal.
J.C. Rowers & Co., a leverage-buyout company, had also reviewed Bear Steams books the same
weekend, and made an unsuccessful proposal to buy 90% of the Company at a price between $2.00 and
$2.60 per share.
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296. The higher offer price reflected JPMorgan's efforts to quell shareholder
opposition to the deal and discourage competitors. Moreover, JPMorgan had been forced to
renegotiate the price after it discovered that a mistake in the language of its guaranty agreement
with Bear Steams obligated JPMorgan to guarantee Bear Stearns' trades even if the Company's
shareholders voted down the acquisition deal.
Post Class Period Events
297. On April 3, 2008, the United States Senate Banking Committee, chaired by
Senator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut, held hearings to discuss Bear Stearns' collapse.
Senator Dodd disclosed that weeks before Bear Steams' collapse he discussed with Schwartz
whether Bear Steams should have access to the Federal Reserve's "discount window" which
allows commercial banks (but not investment banks like Bear Steams) access to low interest
loans to maintain liquidity. Senator Dodd's disclosure indicated that Bear Steams insiders,
including Schwartz, were aware, weeks before investors, that Bear Steams' liquidity was
threatened by its deteriorating asset values.
298. Shareholders approved the sale to JPMorgan on May 29, 2008. Just prior to the
vote approving the merger, Cayne apologized to shareholders for Bear Steams' collapse. Under
the terms of the merger, shareholders received about $10 worth of JPMorgan shares for every
Bear Stearns share they held as of the date of the merger.
299. After the approval of the merger, JPMorgan moved aggressively to reorganize
Bear Steams, dismantling some of the subsidiaries most implicated in the Company's collapse.
JPMorgan first closed down BSAM, the subsidiary responsible for the mismanagement of the
Hedge Funds and for hiding true value of the Hedge Funds' assets from investors while, in the
process, soliciting additional investments. JPMorgan also did not acquire Bear Steams'
merchant banking unit, which was spun off into an independent entity.
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300. In June of 2008 the Department of Justice, through the U.S. Attorney for the
Eastern District of New York, indicted Cioffi and Tannin, both Senior Managing Directors of
BSAM and members of BSC's Board of Directors. The indictment charged that Cioffi and
Tannin misled investors regarding the value of MBS and CDOs containing MBS owned by the
Hedge Funds.
301. The indictment further charged that Cioffi's and Tannin's fraud caused $1.8
billion in losses to investors. Cioffi and Tannin were formally arrested on June 19, 2008. On the
same day, the SEC filed a civil complaint against Cioffi and Tannin. The allegations in the
SEC's civil suit were similar, but also focused on Cioffi's and Tannin's attempts to solicit
additional contributions to the Hedge Funds when they knew the funds were failing. Both the
indictment and the SEC complaint allege that key documents, including Cioffi's calendar and
personal notes that could contain incriminating evidence, were destroyed by Cioffi and Tannin
before the investigation began.
302. As of July 3, 2008 the assets of Maiden Lane, the entity holding the $30 billion in
Bear Stearns assets, had already decreased in value to $28.9 billion—almost $1.1 billion less
than the value given to them by Bear Stearns just several weeks earlier. By October 22, 2008,
the value of the assets had dropped another $2.1 billion, to $26.8 billion. All told, the assets held
by Maiden Lane were actually worth 10.6% less than the value provided by Bear Steams,
another indication that Bear Stearns' valuation methods were deeply flawed.
303. On September 27, 2008, the SEC Inspector General's Office released a report
detailing Bear Stearns' misleading VaR and mortgage valuation models, as well as Bear Stearns'
manipulation of asset values. As alleged above, the practices discovered by the SEC's Inspector
General had the effect of misleading investors about the value of the assets held on Bear Stearns'
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books, the Bear Steams' daily VaR and the risk involved with Bear Steams' securitization
business model, all of which fraudulently inflated Bear Steams' share price.
K. Defendants' Fraudulent Statements Adversely
Impacted Current and Former Company Employees
304. Defendants' materially false and misleading statements during the Class Period,
as described at paragraphs 589 to 794 below, defrauded certain Class Members who are or were
current and former employees of Bear Steams, and whose compensation, in part, was in the form
of restricted stock units ("Restricted Stock Units") and/or Capital Accumulation Plan units
("CAP Units") issued pursuant to the Company's Restricted Stock Unit Plan (the "RSU Plan")
and Capital Accumulation Plan (the "CAP Plan"). The Class includes only those holders of
Restricted Stock Units and CAP Units whose rights to either Restricted Stock Units and/or CAP
Units were vested, providing them a present entitlement to be paid and/or credited an equivalent
number of shares of Bear Steams common stock upon settlement at the end of a deferral period.
1. The RSU Plan
305. Since at least 2000, the Company offered certain employees shares of its common
stock through a Restricted Stock Unit Plan. In April of 2007 the Company explained that the
purpose of its Restricted Stock Unit Plan was to provide stock ownership to certain employees as
an incentive for superior performance.
306. The Company stated in April of 2007 that Restricted Stock Units could be granted
to or for the benefit of any employee who held the position of a managing director or below.
Employees who held the position of senior managing director or above were not eligible to be
granted awards of restricted stock under the Plan.
307. Each Restricted Stock Unit represented a right for one share of Common Stock to
be delivered upon settlement at the end of a defined Deferral Period. The Company established
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and maintained an account for the participant to record Restricted Stock Units and transactions
and events affecting such units.
2. The CAP Plan
308. Since at least 2000, the Company offered certain employees compensation
through its CAP Plan that was tied to the value of the Company's common stock. In April of
2007 the Company described the purpose of the CAP Plan as follows:
to promote the interests of the Company and its stockholders by
providing long-term incentives for the benefit of certain key
executives of the Company, Bear Steams and any of the
Company's subsidiaries who contribute significantly to the long-
term performance and growth of the Company.
309. Employees eligible for participation in the CAP Plan included any individual
employed by Bear Steams or any of its subsidiaries and affiliates as a Senior Managing Director
or an equivalent title. Under the Plan, Bear Stearns credited to each Plan participant, as of the
last day of such Plan Year, a certain number of CAP Units. Each CAP unit corresponded to a
single share of the Company's stock. The Company determined the number of units to award by
dividing (i) an amount determined by the Board Committee with respect to such Participant, by
(ii) the Fair Market Value of Bear Stearns' common stock on the date of the grant action by the
Board Committee granting the Award.
310. The Company purchased shares of Common Stock in the open market or in
private transactions during the term of the Plan for issuance to Participants in accordance with
the terms of the Plan.
3. Defendants' Fraud Harmed Holders of RSU and CAP Plan Units
311. Class Members with compensation packages including eligibility for Restricted
Stock and or CAP Units took these packages on the understanding that any stock received under
the Plans accurately reflected the true value of the Company's shares. Such Class Members were
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unaware when they took Units under these Plans that the value of the Company's stock had been
artificially inflated by the Company's materially false and misleading statements and omissions.
When the disclosure of the Company's fraud described at paragraphs 589 to 794 below caused
Bear Stearns' share values to plummet, the RSU and CAP Plan Unit holders suffered enormous
losses.
L. The SEC Comment Letters
312. An exchange of letters between Bear Stearns and the SEC's Division of Corporate
Finance ("CF Division") offers ample evidence that the Company's public filings for fiscal years
2006 and 2007 failed to disclose material information about the Company's risk management
practices and exposure to risk in the subprime market.
313. The SEC's CF Division selectively reviews filings made under the Securities Act
of 1933 ("Securities Act") and the Exchange Act to monitor compliance with those statutes'
disclosure and accounting requirements. In general, the SEC only selects for review a filing that
"at least on its face, seems to conflict significantly with generally accepted accounting principles
or Commission rules, or to be materially deficient in explanation or clarity.s5
314. In September of 2007, amidst what appeared to be a substantial increase in
mortgage defaults and the deteriorating value of assets linked to mortgages (such as RMBS and
CDOs containing RMBS), the SEC reviewed Bear Stearns' Form 10-K for 2006. As a result of
its review, in September 2007, SEC Accounting Branch Chief John Cash sent a comment letter
to Defendant Molinaro requesting that Bear Steams provide the SEC with certain "material
s March 20, 2002 Testimony by Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman of the U.S. Securities Exchange
Commission, before the House Committee on Financial Services, at
hap://www.sec.govinews/testimony/032002tshIp.htm#P124_30878.
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information" not disclosed in the 2006 Form 10-K filing, including "a comprehensive analysis of
your exposure to subprime loans" ("2006 Form 10-K comment letter").
315. Specifically, the SEC asked Bear Steams to:
-Quantify your portfolio of subprime residential mortgages. If
practicable, please breakout the portfolio to show the underlying
reason for subprime definition, in other words, subject to payment
increase, high LTV ratio, interest only, negative amortizing, and so
on.
-Quantify the following regarding subprime residential mortgages.
Explain how you define each category;
-Non-performing loans;
-Non-accrual loans;
-The allowance for loan losses, and;
-The most recent provision for loan losses.
316. In the 2006 Form 10-K comment letter, the SEC also requested information
regarding Bear Steams' investments in subprime-backed securities that the Company had not
made available in its public filings. The SEC requested that Bear Steams:
-Quantify the principal amount and nature of any retained
securitized interests in subprime residential mortgages.
-Quantify your investments in any securities backed by subprime
mortgages.
-Quantify the current delinquencies in retained securitized
subprime residential mortgages.
-Quantify any write-offs/impairments related to retained interests
in subprime residential mortgages.
317. In the same letter, the SEC asked that Bear Steams supply it with previously
undisclosed information regarding its exposure to the special purpose entities that it created to
purchase subprime loans and issue securities, as well as its exposure related to warehouse lines
and reverse repurchase agreements involving subprime loans.
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318. Finally, the SEC asked that Bear Steams "[p]rovide us with your risk
management philosophy as it specifically relates to subprime loans." The SEC requested
information regarding, inter alia:
-Your origination policies;
-The purchase, securitization and retained interests in loans;
-Investments in subprime mortgage-backed securities; and
-Loans, commitments, and investments to/in subprime lenders.
319. Pursuant to CF Rules, Bear Steams was obliged to reply to these requests within
ten days of its receipt of the letter. Thus, Bear Steams' reply was due on October 12, 2007. As
set out in the 2008 OIG Report, Bear Steams obtained an extension to early November to file its
response. However, Bear Steams, without explanation, did not file its promised response until
January 31, 2008-after it filed its 10-K for fiscal year 2007. Despite the fact that Bear Steams
had been put on notice by the SEC that disclosures regarding its subprime exposure and risk
management policies were material to investors, the Company failed to incorporate any of the
additional information sought by the SEC into its 2007 Form 10-K.
320. Despite the fact that the Company was delaying any response to the SEC's
pending questions, the Company falsely asserted in its Form 10-K filed January 29, 2008 that
there were no "unresolved staff comments" in connection with its financial disclosures.
321. The reasons for the Company's long delay in responding were apparent in the
Company's response on January 31, 2008, less than three months before its collapse. In reply to
the 2006 10-K comment letter, Bear Stearns for the first time quantified its non-performing
loans, non-accrual loans, allowances for loan losses and its most recent provision for loan losses.
Bear Steams also, for the first time, disclosed to the SEC its retained interests in subprime
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mortgages and losses due to payment delinquencies and defaults in mortgages contained in its
retained interest in the securitizations.
322. Unfortunately for investors, the version of the Company's January 31, 2008
response that was released to the public redacted all relevant figures. Moreover, by the time the
SEC completed its review of the Company's response on April 2, 2008, Bear Stearns had
imploded.
323. In the 2008 OIG Report, the Inspector General concluded that the information
regarding subprime exposure and risk management philosophy that the Company had omitted
from its 2006 and 2007 Forms 10-K was "material information" that investors could have used
"to make well-informed investment decisions."
M. Bear Stearns' Practices Violated Accounting Standards
324. During the housing market declines of the Class Period, the Company's enormous
exposure to losses on mortgage-backed securities made it especially critical that Bear Stearns
ensure the accuracy of its reported results. The Company failed to do so. In fact, despite its
public statements to the contrary, throughout the Class Period the Company suffered from a
pervasive weakness in its internal controls, and repeatedly and systematically violated Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP").
1. GAAP Overview
325. SEC Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.4 01(a)(1), provides that financial
statements filed with the SEC that are not presented in conformity with GAAP will be presumed
to be misleading, despite footnotes or other disclosures.
326. GAAP constitutes those standards recognized by the accounting profession as the
conventions, rules and procedures necessary to define accepted accounting practices at a
particular time. The SEC has the statutory authority for the promulgation of GAAP for public
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companies and has delegated that authority to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (the
"FASB") and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA").
327. GAAP consists of a hierarchy of authoritative literature. The highest authority is
the FASB Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS), followed by FASB
Interpretations (FIN), FASB Staff Positions (FSP), Accounting Principles Board Opinions
(APB), AICPA Accounting Research Bulletins (ARB), AICPA Statements of Position (SOP),
and AICPA Industry Audit and Accounting Guides (AAG). GAAP provides other authoritative
pronouncements including, among others, the FASB Concept Statements (FASCON).
328. The AICPA issues industry specific Audit & Accounting Guides ("AAG") to
provide guidance in preparing financial statements in accordance with GAAP. The AAG for
Depository and Lending Institutions ("D&L AAG") was applicable to Bear Steams with respect
to its mortgage banking activities, including mortgage originations, securitizations, and holdings
of investments in debt securities (e.g., Ch.4, Industry Overview — Mortgage Companies). The
D&L AAG interpreted GAAP pronouncements on the proper methods to assess fair value for
financial instruments and Rh.
329. In addition, there was an AAG that was applicable to Brokers and Dealers in
Securities ("B&D AAG"). Among other applications, the B&D AAG provided guidance on
GAAP related to Bear Steams' trading of financial instruments.
330. Bear Stearns was also expected to adhere to fundamental accounting principles
that state a Company's financial statements should be presented in a manner which, among other
things, should:
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(a) Provide information that is useful to present and potential investors and
creditors and other users in making rational investment, credit and similar
decisions. (FASCON I 134);
(b) Provide information about an enterprise's economic resources,
obligations, and owners' equity. That information helps investors,
creditors, and others identify the enterprise's financial strengths and
weaknesses and assess its liquidity and solvency. (FASCON 1 140);
(c) Provide information about an enterprise's financial performance during a
period. "Investors and creditors often use information about the past to
help in assessing the prospects of an enterprise. Thus, although
investment and credit decisions reflect investors' and creditors'
expectations about future enterprise performance, those expectations are
commonly based at least partly on evaluations of past enterprise
performance." (FASCON 1 142);
(d) Include explanations and interpretations to help users understand financial
information because management knows more about the enterprise and its
affairs than investors, creditors, or other "outsiders" and can often increase
the usefulness of financial information by identifying certain transactions,
other events, and circumstances that affect the enterprise and explaining
their financial impact on it. (FASCON 1 ¶ 54);
(e) Be reliable in that it represents what it purports to represent. That
information should be reliable as well as relevant is a notion that is central
to accounting. (FASCON 2 U58-59);
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(f) Be complete, which means that nothing material is left out of the
information that may be necessary to ensure that it validly represents
underlying events and conditions. (FASCON 2 179);
(g) Be verifiable in that it provides a significant degree of assurance that
accounting measures represent what they purport to represent. (FASCON
2 181); and
(h) Reflect that conservatism be used as a prudent reaction to uncertainty to
try to ensure that uncertainties and risks inherent in business situations are
adequately considered. (FASCON 2 1195, 97).
2. Fraud Risk Factors Present at Bear Stearns
a. Fraud Risk Factors Applicable to
Depository and Lending Institutions
331. Because of Bear Steams' role in the mortgage origination market, it was subject
to risks associated with depository and lending institutions. One such risk factor identified by
the AICPA in the applicable AAG in the section was "significant declines in customer demand
and increasing business failures in either the industry or overall economy," including
"deteriorating economic conditions...within industries or geographic regions in which the
institution has significant credit concentrations." (Ch. 5, Audit Considerations and Certain
Financial Reporting Matters, Ex. 5-1, Fraud Risk Factors). Given the widespread evidence of
housing declines set out in paragraphs 138 to 148 above, this risk factor assumed particular
gravity as the Class Period wore on.
332. Another AICPA risk factor set forth in the AAG specific to depository and
lending institutions is "Unrealistically aggressive loan goals and lucrative incentive programs for
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loan originations", as shown by, among other things, "relaxation of credit standards", and
"excessive concentration of lending."
333. Given the lax underwriting and loan origination standards described in paragraphs
53 to 63 above, Bear Steams' financial disclosures were deeply susceptible to this form of risk.
For example, Bear Steams' 2006 Form 10-K disclosed that "Mortgage-backed securities
revenues increased during fiscal 2006 when compared with fiscal 2005 on higher origination
volumes from asset-backed securities, adjustable rate mortgage ("ARM") securities..."
334. Bear Steams did not disclose this critical information until January of 2008
pursuant to the SEC's efforts to seek expanded disclosure from the Company. As described
below at paragraphs 346 to 347 and 579, these "2/28 ARMs" carried a particularly high degree
of risk of misstatement, and constituted the types of risk highlighted by the D&L AAG. In fact,
Bear Steams delayed efforts to adopt stricter underwriting standards related to non-agency loan
originations until the quarter ended August 31, 2007.
335. The AICPA identifies another source of industry-specific risk as occurring when
an institution has "assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that
involve subjective judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate (Significant
estimates generally include...fair value determinations)" and when "material amounts of
complex financial instruments and derivatives held by the institution that are difficult to value."
Because such a large proportion of the Company's assets were Level 3 instruments valued using
Bear Steams' proprietary valuation models that required significant judgments by management,
the Company faced significant risk of exposure to misstatement.
336. The AAG identifies another risk factor for lenders as occurring when "[v]acant
staff positions remain unfulfilled for extended periods, thereby preventing the proper segregation
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of duties", and when there exists an "[u]nderstaffed accounting or information technology
department, inexperienced or ineffective accounting or information technology personnel, or
high turnover." As set out above at paragraphs 129 to 136, during the Class Period the
Company's risk management desk virtually evaporated, leaving a single analyst in October of
2007, as the housing crisis reached a crescendo.
b. Risk Factors Applicable to Brokers and Dealers in Securities
337. Due to Bear Stearns' role in trading financial instruments, the Company was
subject to special risk factors applicable to brokers and dealers in securities, including those
described in Ch.5, Appendix A, 1 5.195, Part 1 Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
338. Among the risk factors the AICPA identifies for brokers and dealers are
"concentration in a particular type of financial instrument" and "a failure by management and
those charged with governance to set parameters (for example, trading limits, credit limits, and
aggregate market risk limits) and to continuously monitor trading activities against those
parameters." As set out in the 2008 OIG Report, Bear Stearns repeatedly exceeded its own
internal limits on concentration in mortgage-backed securities, invoking this risk.
339. The AICPA identifies a further risk factor for broker dealers as being "A failure
by management to have an adequate understanding of the entity's trading and investment
strategies as conducted by the entity's traders, including the types, characteristics, and risks
associated with the financial products purchased and sold by the entity." As set out at
paragraphs 137 to 187 above, throughout the Class Period the Company persisted in using
valuation and VaR models it knew to be faulty in an effort to avoid disclosing its losses to the
public. Accordingly, Bear Stearns' management was deliberately "flying blind" with respect to
the enormous risks the Company faced.
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340. Several specific conclusions of the 2008 OIG Report are also implicated by the
AAG. As set out above at paragraphs 134 to 135, the GIG concluded that during much of the
Class Period the Company's risk management department was virtually deserted, preventing the
department from functioning effectively.
341. Moreover, the Company's efforts to delay taking a huge charge against capital, as
described at paragraphs 212 to 213 above, invoked the B&D AAG's assessment of risk
associated with "Intercompany transactions designed to improperly manage earnings."
342. Finally, in that the B&D AAG warned accountants regarding the "[u]se of
different valuations of same product in two related companies", the Company's accountants
should have been especially wary of its practice of booking assets at full value even after making
price concessions to counterparties in mark disputes and its knowledge that similar holdings of
its hedge funds were worthless, as set out at paragraphs 222 to 226 above. This risk was
observed by the 2008 OIG Report to be present at Bear Stearns (e.g., "...each of Bear Stearns'
trading desks evaluated profits and risks individually, as opposed to relying on one overall firm-
wide approach.").
3. Audit Risk Alerts
343. The AICPA issues Audit Risk Alerts ("ARAs") that are particularized by
industry, including for the financial industry in which Bear Stearns participated. The ARAs are
used by industry participants, such as Bear Stearns and its auditor, Deloitte, to address areas of
concern and identify the significant business risks that may result in the material misstatement of
the financial statements. The factors highlighted in the ARAs are most often summaries of
existing industry-specific considerations such as those provided by, for example, the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, or the National Association of Realtors.
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344. It was also typical practice for the audit quality departments of major accounting
firms such as Deloitte to integrate the ARAs into firm memoranda for purposes of disseminating
that information to applicable clients and firm professionals. The ARAs are included in the
AICPA's annual Audit and Accounting Manual ("AAM").
345. In particular, Farber, Bear Steams' Senior Vice President-Finance and Controller,
had previously been a partner with Deloitte. Accordingly, Farber should have had familiarity
with the existence and application of the ARAs.
346. The 2006 ARA observed the following risk factors that were relevant to Bear
Steams' financial statements:
(a) "Customers holding adjustable rate mortgages may not be able to make
payments if interest rates rise significantly." The ARA continued to say "Upon foreclosure,
these financial institutions may not be able to liquidate underlying assets without absorbing
significant losses..." (2006 ARA 8050.37).
(b) Any increase in originations of risky loan products, such as ARMs and
Pay Option ARMs posed particular risks for entities that had not "developed appropriate risk
management policies...." (2006 AAM 8050.35)
(c) Of significant relevance to Bear Stearns, the 2006 ARA heightened
awareness that the value of these non-conforming products was often predicated on an
assumption that home prices would continue to rise, which it observed was an assumption
unlikely to be sustainable: "[S]ome of these [ARM] products assume a continued rise in home
prices that may not continue." (2006 AAM 8050.35)
347. The 2007 ARA reiterated the factors observed in the 2006 ARA and expanded on
the following risk factors:
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(a) It observed "This quarter's foreclosure starts rate is the highest in the
history of the survey, with the previous high being last quarter's rate." (2007 AAM 8050.27)
(b) That the "American Banker recently reported that home resales hit a 4-
year low due to continued price decline. Many in the housing industry believe the decline in
resales signifies a protracted housing slump. Another issue contributing to sluggish home sales
is the rising number of foreclosures of properties financed with subprime debt." (2007 AAM
8050.30)
(c) That "On June 29, 2007, the federal financial regulatory agencies (Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FDIC, NCUA, 0CC, and OTS) issued the
Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending to address issues related, to ARMs. ...The agencies
primary concern is the possibility of `rate or payment shock' to the borrower that may result
from the expiration of a fixed introductory rate to an adjustable variable rate for the duration of
the loan." (2007 AAM 8050.48)
348. These risk factors were relevant for Bear Stearns to consider in the establishment
of its internal controls and ultimately the preparation of its financial statements. Moreover, these
risk factors were generally observable to industry participants. And so, Bear Stearns, with its
access to material inside information regarding its specific high-risk environment, had an
obligation to ensure that its certifications regarding the effectiveness of its internal control over
financial reporting as well as the assertions it made in its financial statements, reflected
appropriate consideration of these issues.
4. Bear Stearns Falsely Represented that its Internal
Controls Over Financial Reporting Were Effective
349. Throughout the Class Period, Bear Stearns falsely asserted in its public filings that
it maintained effective internal controls over financial reporting in clear violation of SEC rules.
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The lack of effective internal controls at Bear Steams facilitated its efforts to mislead investors
because without those controls it was able to represent that:
(a) It was exposed to significantly less risk than was truly inherent in the
assets it possessed;
(b) Its risk management personnel and procedures were effective and reliable,
when Bear Stearns knew they were not;
(c) It had properly recorded reserves for, and made adequate and complete
disclosures about its failed hedge funds;
(d) It was able to make reasonable estimates of the fair value of its financial
instruments, when it knew at least its mortgage-related models were deficient;
(e) The write-downs of the fair value of the Company's financial instruments
and other securitization-related assets were adequate; and
(f) Its reported revenue, earnings, and earnings-per-share were artificially
inflated.
350. Bear Steams' 2007 Form 10-K filing asserted management's responsibility over
internal controls:
Management...is responsible for establishing and maintaining
adequate internal control over financial reporting for the Company.
... In making its assessment of internal control over financial
reporting, management [claimed to] use[ ] the criteria established
in `Internal Control-Integrated Framework' issued by the
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO).
351. COSO defines "internal controls" in Chapter 1 of its Framework as follows:
Internal control is a process, effected by an entity's board of
directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in
the following categories: (i) Effectiveness and efficiency of
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operations; (ii) Reliability of financial reporting; (iii) Compliance
with applicable laws and regulations.
352. Moreover, COSO emphasizes the importance of a strong control environment,
which sets a positive "tone at the top" and then flows down through the Company. The COSO
Framework Executive Summary identifies the pervasive influence that the control environment
has on the Company, as follows:
The control environment sets the tone of an organization,
influencing the control consciousness of its people. It is the
foundation for all other components of internal control, providing
discipline and structure. Control environment factors include the
integrity, ethical values and competence of the entity's people;
management's philosophy and operating style; the way
management assigns authority and responsibility, and organizes
and develops its people; and the attention and direction provided
by the board of directors.
353. In addition, the COSO Framework, Ch. 2, establishes that management's
philosophy and operating style directly affects the manner in which the company is managed, the
amount of risk that the company accepts and ultimately the success of the company. Chapter 2
of the COSO Framework states:
Management's philosophy and operating style affect the way the
enterprise is managed, including the kinds of business risks
accepted...Other elements of management's philosophy and
operating style include attitudes toward financial reporting,
conservative or aggressive selection from available alternative
accounting principles, conscientiousness and conservatism with
which accounting estimates are developed, and attitudes toward
data processing and accounting functions and personnel. . . . The
impact of an ineffective control environment could be far
reaching, possibly resulting in a financial loss, a tarnished public
image or a business failure.
354. Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("the Sarbanes-Oxley Act")
requires management to assess the effectiveness of the internal control structure and the financial
reporting for procedures. Management is responsible for performing this assessment in the
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context of a top-down risk assessment, which requires management to base both the scope of its
assessment and the evidence gathered on risk. Management's conclusion of its assessment of the
effectiveness of the Company's internal control must be included in the Company's annual
report. Moreover, it was crucial for Bear Steams to regularly monitor those controls to verify
their operating effectiveness.
355. Further, SEC rules require management to report publicly all material weaknesses
in the Company's internal controls.
356. Beginning in 2002, the Officer Defendants were required under Rule 302 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to provide assurances relating to the Company's "internal control over
financial reporting." Rule 302 states as follows:
[E]ach annual report ... [should] contain an internal control report,
which shall: (1) state the responsibility of management for
establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure
and procedures for financial reporting; and (2) contain an
assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the
issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and
procedures of the issuer for financial reporting.
357. In connection with the Company's 2006 Form 10-K, Defendants Cayne and
Molinaro executed the applicable Rule 302 certification.
358. Defendants Schwartz and Molinaro filed identical certifications with respect to
the Company's 2007 Form 10-K.
359. As explained above and in the Company's regulatory filings, in doing so the
Officer Defendants represented to the marketplace that their assessment of internal controls over
financial reporting was based upon the framework established by COSO. Also, the Officer
Defendants represented in the Company's Form 10-K filings that "management concluded that
the Company's internal control over financial reporting was effective as of the years ended
November 30, 2006 and November 30, 2007. These statements were false because Bear Stearns
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concealed its lax risk management efforts which enabled vastly increased exposure to securities
inextricably linked to subprime risk. Furthermore, the lax risk management permitted
incomplete and deficient pricing models, which was a material weakness that ultimately resulted
in the overstatement of the fair value of its financial instruments as well as reported revenues and
earnings. As a result, management's reports on internal control over financial reporting, required
by Rule 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, were materially false and misleading because Bear
Stearns' internal controls were ineffective. The Officer Defendants' statements were false and
misleading because Bear Stearns' internal controls were significantly deficient and ineffective to
prevent or detect errors or misstatements in its operations, underwriting practices or financial
reporting.
360. Management's assessment of internal control over financial reporting was a
critical metric for investors because it provided assurance that the Company's financial
statements were reliable and in compliance with applicable laws. However, during the Class
Period, as alleged herein, Bear Stearns did not properly assess its internal controls over financial
reporting, thus it violated the "Internal Control-Integrated Framework" issued by COSO and
various other requirements found in the SEC regulations and Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
a. Risk Management
361. In light of the 2008 OIG Report's specific criticisms of Bear Stearns' risk
management program, the Company's assertion that it maintained effective internal controls was
materially false and misleading.
362. In the midst of the housing crisis in 2007, the Company's risk management
department had virtually disappeared. As set out in the 2008 OIG Report,
[t]here was also turnover of Bear Stearns' risk management
personnel at critical times. Bear Steams' head of model
validation resigned around March 2007, precisely when the
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subprime crisis was beginning to hit and the first large writedowns
were being taken."
363. Moreover, the 2008 OIG Report explains that:
there are indications...that the risk manager who left had difficulty
communicating with senior managers in a productive manner. In
the opinion of the OIG expert, difficulties in communication are
a potential red flag indicating that a risk manager could be telling
the traders to take on less risk that they would otherwise choose to
do (i.e., information that the traders presumably would not want to
hear)."
364. Even before 2007, the few risk management analysts the Company did have were
ill-suited to assess the risks facing Bear Steams. According to the 2008 OIG Report,
In 2006...Bear Steams' business was becoming increasingly
concentrated in mortgage securities, an area in which its model
review still needed much work. The OIG expert concluded that, at
this time, the risk managers at Bear Stearns did not have the skill
sets that best matched Bear Stearns' business model." See also,
Id., "Given the risk managers' lack of expertise in mortgages, it
would have been difficult for risk managers at Bear Steams to
advocate a bigger focus on default risk in its mortgage models.
365. The Company had little interest in addressing the chaos in the risk management
department, as it understood that effective risk management might reveal the actual extent of its
exposure to the housing declines.
366. As a result, according to the 2008 OIG Report,
the OIG expert concluded that the reviews of the mortgage models
that should have taken place before the subprime crisis erupted in
February 2007 appear to have never occurred, in the sense that it
was still a work in progress when Bear Steams collapsed in March
2008.
b. Pricing Models and VaR Systems
367. The Company's assertion that it maintained effective internal controls was also
materially false and misleading in light of the Company's decision to use valuation and risk
models that did not reflect the impact of the housing crisis on its most important assets: MBS.
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368. As set out in the 2008 OIG Report,
TM concluded that Bear Steams model review process lacked
coverage of mortgage-backed and other asset-backed securities, in
part because the models were not used for pricing and in part
because the sensitivities to various risks implied by the models did
not reflect risk sensitivities consistent with price fluctuations in the
market.
369. The 2008 GIG Report stated that "Bear Steams VaR models did not capture risks
associated with credit spread widening...These fundamental factors include housing price
appreciation, consumer credit scores, patterns of delinquency rates, and potentially other data.
These fundamental factors do not seem to have been incorporated into Bear Steams' models at
the time Bear Stearns became a CSE."
370. Because Bear Steams did not update its VaR models on a timely basis, it was not
possible for Bear Steams to have effective internal controls over financial reporting, despite its
certifications otherwise.
5. GAAP Violations Relating to the Company's Financial Statements6
a. Bear Stearns Misstated Its Exposure to Loss
from the Failed Hedge Funds
371. As described above, in June of 2007, Bear Steams loaned $1.6 billion to the
BSAM "High Grade" fund in a last-ditch attempt to salvage the entity. At that time, despite their
6
The failures described herein apply to Bear Stearns' annual and interim financial statements. APB
No. 28, Interim Financial Reporting ("APB 28"), states "Interim financial information is essential to
provide investors and others with timely information as to the progress of the enterprise." (APB 28 9)
In addition, in interim periods "Contingencies and other uncertainties that could be expected to affect the
fairness of presentation of financial data at an interim date should be disclosed in interim reports in the
same manner required for annual reports. Such disclosures should be repeated in interim and annual
reports until the contingencies have been removed, resolved, or have become immaterial." (APB 28122)
Bear Stearns' interim financial reporting was required to be on the same basis as its annual financial
reporting (APB 28 1 10).
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internal concerns otherwise, Bear Steams' representatives claimed to the SEC that those loans
were purportedly sufficiently collateralized by $1.7 to 2.0 billion of the fund's assets.
372. During June of 2007, the loan balance was reduced to $1.345 billion through the
funds sale of certain assets for repayment purposes. However, in the same period, the value of
the collateral had been reduced to an amount approximately equal to the size of the then-
outstanding loan.
373. This predicament implied that the collateral assets had lost at least $100 to $400
million of purported value in less than one month.
374. In actuality, as a result of its inside knowledge of the asset composition
comprising the collateral and the rapid loss of value of those assets even in June of 2007, Bear
Steams knew that the collateral of the assets provided by the hedge funds was clearly insufficient
to guarantee the value of the loans it had extended. Moreover, Bear Steams knew that the hedge
funds were otherwise incapable of repaying those loans.
375. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, Accounting for
Contingencies ("SFAS 5") was issued in March 1975 by the FASB. The principles described in
SFAS 5 set forth the standards of financial accounting and reporting for loss contingencies.
SFAS 5 sets forth the standards Bear Steams was required to adhere to in order to properly
account for loss contingencies.
376. SFAS 5 provides in paragraph 8:
An estimated loss for loss contingency ... shall be accrued by a
charge to income if both of the following conditions are met:
a. Information available prior to issuance of the financial
statements indicates that it is probable that an asset had been
impaired or a liability had been incurred at the date of the financial
statements. It is implicit in this condition that it must be probable
that one or more future events will occur confirming the fact of the
loss.
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b. The amount of loss can be reasonably estimated.
377. As described above, on July 18, 2007, Bear Stearns informed Hedge Fund
investors that "unprecedented declines" in the value of the investments had been sustained. The
letters to the investors also disclosed that there was "effectively no value left" in the High Grade
Enhanced Fund and "very little value left" in the High Grade Fund. As a result, in accordance
with SFAS 5, Bear Steams should have taken an immediate loss on the remaining value of the
loan of $1.345 billion in the quarter ended August 31, 2007.
378. Instead of recording a loss of $1.345 billion, Bear Steams recorded a mere $200
million in the quarter ended August 31, 2007 without providing any explanation for the
determination of the amount of the loss or its justification for maintaining the remaining $1.1
billion of the loan value in its reported financial statements. In fact, Bear Steams' disclosures
were vague as to whether the write-down was attributable to the loan or to the accrued income
from management fees of the fund. Specifically, it disclosed, "Included in the 2007 quarter
results are losses of approximately $200 million representing the write-off of the Company's
investment and fees receivable from the Funds, losses from the closure of the $1.6 billion
secured financing agreement provided to the High Grade Fund and other directly related
expenses."
379. These issues concerning the rapid de-valuation of the collateral should also have
raised alarm bells that any similar assets maintained by Bear Steams needed to be subjected to
similar fair value write-downs. Bear Steams permitted one trading desk, its hedge funds, to
recognize valuation losses related to CDOs at the same time other trading desks, such as those in
its prime brokerage business, used alternative valuation methods on similar assets to avoid such
write-downs.
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380. Bear Steams provided no further public disclosure about the losses it incurred
related to its loans to the hedge funds.
381. As more fully set forth below, Deloitte knew or should have known of an
additional auditing red flag in the Company's related party transactions.
382. The primary literature for related party transactions is FAS 57, Related Party
Disclosures. Related party transactions include transactions between affiliates, which are
defined as "a party that, directly or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, is
controlled by, or is under common control with an enterprise" (FAS 571 1).
383. FAS 57 paragraph 3 states:
Transactions involving related parties cannot be presumed to be
carried out on an arm's-length basis, as the requisite conditions of
competitive, freemarket dealings may not exist. Representations
about transactions with related parties, if made, shall not imply that
the related party transactions were consummated on terms
equivalent to those that prevail in arm's-length transactions unless
such representations can be substantiated."
384. Under FAS 57, Deloitte was obliged to evaluate related party transactions with a
high degree of professional skepticism. If the parties to the transaction are related, it cannot be
assumed that the recorded amounts properly reflect the true economic substance of the
transaction.
385. Indeed, GAAP provides detailed guidance as to specific disclosure requirements
and audit procedures in SAS 45 and AU section 334, entitled Related Parties, that must be
followed in order to provide the market with a better understanding of the transaction.
386. Bear Stearns' related party transactions included the loans it provided to its failing
High Grade Hedge Funds. Accordingly, with respect to that transaction, Bear Stearns was
required to disclose (FAS 57 1 2):
(a) The nature of the relationship(s) involved,
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(b) A description of the transactions for each of the periods for which income
statements were presented, and such other information deemed necessary to an understanding of
the effects of the transactions on the financial statements,
(c) The dollar amounts of transactions for each of the periods for which
income statements are presented and the effects of any change in the method of establishing the
terms from that used in the preceding period, and
(d) Amounts due from or to related parties as of the date of each balance sheet
presented and, if not otherwise apparent, the terms and manner of settlement.
387. Furthermore, Bear Stearns should have provided specific disclosure concerning
the outcome of the write-downs to the loans provided to the hedge-funds. This obligation to
disclose to investors did not expire at the time when, or if, Bear Stearns assumed the collateral
onto its consolidated financial statements.
388. As described above, however, the 2008 OIG Report observed that Bear Steams
eventually wrote down the value of collateral it acquired by at least $500 million in the fall of
2007. Thus, it is clear that Bear Stearns failed to disclose at least $300 million of write-downs.
Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that the Company should have written off the entire value of
the loan in the quarter ended August 31, 2007, Bear Stearns' financial statements failed to
comply with GAAP because investors were inappropriately left in the dark about how the losses
on the remaining $845 million exposure were ultimately recorded, or if those losses were in fact
ever recognized prior to its collapse.
b. Bear Stearns' Financial Statements
Misrepresented its Exposure to Decline in the Value of RIs
389. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 140, Accounting for Transfers
and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishment of Liabilities ("SFAS 140"), was issued in
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September 2000 by the FASB. The principles described in SFAS 140 set forth "the standards for
accounting for securitizations and other transfers of financial assets and collateral." In particular,
SFAS 140 sets forth the standards to properly assess the fair value for RIs. For purposes of Bear
Stearns' financial statements, RIs were components of the revenue line item Principal
Transactions and reported on the balance sheet as a component of financial instruments at fair
value.
390. Once RIs were initially recorded, Bear Stearns was required to determine the fair
value of the RIs in each subsequent quarter. For purposes of its 2006 financial statements, the
methods prescribed by SFAS 140 for measuring the fair value of financial assets and liabilities
were similar to those in SFAS 157, which required that the valuation assumptions be consistent
with those that market participants would use in their estimates of values, including assumptions
about interest rates, default, prepayment, and volatility. (FAS 140, 11 68-70) SFAS 157 defined
the fair value requirements for purposes of the 2007 financial statements. In all periods from the
quarter ended February 28, 2007 to February 29, 2008, Bear Steams reported with respect to RIs
"The assumptions used for pricing variables are based on observable transactions in similar
securities and are further verified by external pricing sources, when available." This disclosure
indicates that RIs were classified by Bear Steams as Level 2 assets (see further discussion
below).
391. As the issuer of many securitizations, Bear Stearns often maintained the riskiest
tranche (the one in the first loss position) on its books as RIs. RIs provided Bear Steams with an
opportunity to receive additional cash flows if specific loan performance criteria were met. Bear
Steams' valuation of its RI from securitizations was a critical metric for investors because it
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indicated the financial health of the Company, given that the valuation of its RI was directly
linked to Principal Transactions revenue and, ultimately, net income.
392. In the fall of 2006, Bear Stearns represented to the SEC that it was (i) "moving
away from holding residuals in its portfolio; (ii) attempting to sell aging residuals, and (iii) aware
that its residuals on second lien mortgage securitizations were very risky." Nevertheless, Bear
Stearns' holdings of RIs continued to increase during this period, rising from $5.6 billion as of
November 30, 2006 to $7.1 billion as of February 28, 2007. This trend indicated either an
increasing difficulty in selling RIs or that Bear Steams' representations to the regulators were
unreliable.
393. By February of 2007, Bear Stearns had been forced to write-down nearly 30% of
a portion of its RIs that were worth $300 million. In the following quarter, losses on RIs rose to
a total of $168 million on second lien inventory and $240 million on RMBS and structured
products. The 2008 OIG Report observed that Bear Steams had been unable to predict these
losses. Bear Steams' inability to predict such losses was in all probability attributable to its
deficient pricing models. Bear Stearns failed to make any disclosure of these losses in its Form
10-Q for the quarter ended May 31, 2007 or any other SEC filing.
394. In fact, in its May 2007 Form 10-Q, Bear Steams continued to tell users of its
financial statements "Actual credit losses on retained interests have not been significant," which
was entirely misleading. Bear Stearns repeated this disclosure through the time of its collapse.
395. Despite these escalating losses, Bear Stearns holdings of RIs continued to grow in
both the quarter ended May 31, 2007 and August 31, 2007, ultimately reaching $9.6 billion —
nearly two times the levels at which it had reported to the SEC that it was planning to take the
opposite course.
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396. One of the important disclosures made by Bear Steams concerning its RIs was
that it quickly divested the related risks to the market. For example, it disclosed that the
weighted average holding period for RIs was 150 days as of November 30, 2006. Accordingly,
it is important to put the losses Bear Steams was incurring in the context of the brief reported
holding period.
397. Specifically, if Bear Stearns had incurred total losses on RIs in excess of $400
million by May 31, 2007 even though its holding periods were only 150 days, Bear Stearns
should have given appropriate consideration to the loss implications of potentially longer holding
periods. The reality confronting Bear Steams at that moment in time was that the market
liquidity for RIs was evaporating. For example, in the quarter ended February 28, 2007, Bear
Stearns reported that the new issue volume had decreased 11.9% compared to the prior year.
Although Bear Steams did not measure the decline in volume in the May 2007 quarter, it
observed revenues from its mortgage-related business "decline significantly."
398. Moreover, as an originator of the mortgages underlying the RIs, Bear Stearns
knew that valuation of the RIs was at serious risk because it was contingent on the assumption of
home prices staying level or in any event not decreasing. Specifically, because of the risk of
payment shock at the time of the initial interest rate reset (e.g., the risk described in both the
ARA and broadly by the federal financial regulatory agencies), it was well-understood that
borrowers would need to be able to refinance, which would at a minimum avoid principal losses
to RI holders. The ability to refinance rested on the continued availability of nonprime financing
or an accumulation of equity in the home. Even in early 2007, neither of these conditions was
evident.
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399. In fact, as described above, Bear Steams knew that (1) losses would rise higher
into the RMBS tranche structures than initially expected; (2) RMBS (and CDO) credit ratings
were no longer valid, because each tranche was not as far removed from real loss as its
originally-assigned ratings indicated; and (3) the consequences would actually be most drastic
for RIs (i.e., the aspect of the structured financing closest to encroaching mortgage losses).
400. The market for residential mortgage-related securities in these periods was in
systematic decline by February of 2007. This decline suggested that Bear Steams' holdings of
RIs were already illiquid. Moreover, at least until the quarter ended May 31, 2007, Bear Steams
continued to originate risky non-agency related mortgages pursuant to its relaxed lending
standards. Accordingly, when the balance of RIs grew from November of 2006 through May of
2007, the resulting RIs generated were of the highest risk of loss.
401. In addition to the general economically adverse valuation factors for RIs, Bear
Steams' pricing models for mortgage securities, which would have included Rh, were not
reliable, and yielded overstated valuations. In particular, its "Non-Investment Grade" RIs, which
included those RIs with credit ratings below BBB-, were overstated (i.e., amounts of at least $1.3
billion in all periods from February 28, 2007 onwards). As an example of the faulty credit
ratings, Bear Steams reported in February of 2008 that it held $2.0 billion of retained interest in
subprime ARM loans. Nevertheless, the Non-Investment Grade RIs totaled only $1.3 billion.
Therefore, even assuming that all of the subprime ARM loans were Non-Investment Grade, Bear
Steams attributed Investment Grade or higher credit ratings to at least $700 million of subprime
RIs.
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c. GAAP Violations Related to Failure to Appropriately
Determine the Fair Value of Financial Instruments
402. In December of 1993, the FASB issued SFAS No. 115 Accounting for Certain
Investments in Debt and Equity ("SFAS 115"). SFAS 115 addresses the accounting and
reporting for all investments in debt securities. Those investments are to be classified in three
categories: (1) trading, (2) available-for-sale, and (3) held for investment (SFAS 115 1 6). The
accounting treatment for the specific investments depended upon its classification.
403. Bear Stearns treated its financial instruments as trading securities. As a result,
Bear Stearns was required to report its financial instruments at fair value and included all
unrealized gains and losses in earnings (SFAS 115 1 12). Bear Stearns reported the periodic
fluctuations in the fair value of its financial instruments in its income statements within the
revenue line-item Principal Transactions. In the MD&A portion of its SEC filings, Bear Steams
further stratified revenue from Principal Transactions into (a) Fixed Income and (b) Equities.
Bear Stearns reported revenue from mortgage securitizations as well as the unrealized gains and
losses from the fluctuations in the fair value of its financial instruments in the Fixed Income
component of Principal Transactions.
404. When the fair value of an investment is not readily available, there are several
methods available to financial statement preparers to determine the fair value, including the use
of pricing models (FASB Staff Implementation Guide for SFAS 115, Question 59). In these
instances, GAAP observes that it is important for a preparer to use the best information available
in the circumstances to determine fair value.
405. As a basis for its conclusions, SFAS 115 observed "Measuring investments at fair
value is relevant and useful to present and potential investors, creditors, and others in making
rational investment, credit, and similar decisions — the first objective of financial reporting as
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discussed in FAS Con No.1, Objectives of Financial Reporting in Business Enterprises." (SFAS
115 1 39) Moreover, SFAS 115 noted "...some depository institutions have failed, or
experienced impairment of earnings or capital, because of speculative securities activities and
that other institutions have experienced an erosion of the liquidity of their securities portfolios as
a result of decreases in the market value of those securities. In a liquidity shortage, the fair value
of investments, rather than their amortized cost, is the amount available to cover an enterprise's
obligations." (SFAS 115 1 41) This characterization of the need to reliably determine and report
fair value was consistent with the predicament of Bear Stearns. In other words, market
participants knew that Bear Stearns held speculative securities. And, once the market began to
doubt the legitimacy of Bear Stearns' valuation claims, its liquidity evaporated.
406. In September of 2006, the FASB issued SFAS No. 157, "Fair Value
Measurements" ("SFAS 157"), which became effective for financial statements issued for fiscal
years beginning after November 15, 2007. However, early adoption was permitted if the entity
had not yet issued financial statements for that fiscal year. In its 2006 Form 10-K, Bear Steams
disclosed that it would adopt SFAS 157 early in the first quarter of fiscal 2007.
407. SFAS 157 established a definition of fair value within GAAP as "the price that
would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between
market participants at the measurement date." (SFAS 157 1 5) This standard also clarified that a
fair value measurement assumes that the asset or liability is exchanged in an orderly transaction
between market participants to sell the asset or transfer the liability at the measurement date. An
orderly transaction is a transaction that assumes exposure to the market for a period prior to the
measurement date to allow for marketing activities that are usual and customary for transactions
involving such assets or liabilities; it is not a forced transaction. (SFAS 157 1 7) Nevertheless,
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this definition of fair value was not conceptually different than the definition found in previous
accounting literature in that it remained focused on the assumptions marketplace participants
would use in pricing the asset or liability.
408. This standard also established a framework for measuring fair value and required
enhanced disclosures about fair value measurements. It also requires companies to disclose the
fair value of its financial instruments according to a fair value hierarchy. The fair value
hierarchy ranks the quality and reliability of the information used to determine fair values.
Financial instruments carried at fair value are required to be classified and disclosed in one of the
three categories of the hierarchy (SFAS 157 22-30):
(a) Level 1: Quoted market prices for identical assets or liabilities in active
markets.
(b) Level 2: Observable market-based inputs or unobservable inputs that are
corroborated by market data.
(c) Level 3: Unobservable inputs that are not corroborated by market.
409. Companies such as Bear Steams that reported Level 3 assets or liabilities were
required to provide enhanced disclosure regarding the activities of those financial instruments.
410. In its 2006 Form 10-K, Bear Stearns disclosed that it did not expect the adoption
of SFAS 157 to have a material impact on the consolidated financial statements of the Company.
In part, this particular disclosure was likely attributable to the fact that Bear Steams had
previously reported in its SEC filings that it aggregated its financial instruments in three broad
categories, each of which resembled the stratifications subsequently required by SFAS 157.
Bear Stearns had also provided specific disclosure of the aggregate dollar value of financial
instruments aggregated into the third category (i.e., "Financial Instruments Whose Fair Value Is
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Estimated Based on Internally Developed Models or Methodologies Utilizing Significant
Assumptions or Other Data That Are Generally Less Readily Observable from Objective
Sources").
411. In October 2007, the Center for Audit Quality ("CAQ"), which is associated with
the AICPA, published an audit alert ("whitepaper") entitled "Measurements of Fair Value in
Illiquid (Or Less Liquid) Markets." This whitepaper similarly observed that the implementation
of SFAS 157 was likely to have only a minimal effect on most entities.
412. Throughout the Class Period, "Financial instruments owned, at fair value" was the
largest balance sheet line item in Bear Steams' financial statements, typically comprising one
third of the Company's total assets. "Mortgages, mortgage- and asset-backed" securities, in turn,
were the largest component of Financial instruments owned, making up at least thirty percent of
the Company's financial instruments from the first quarter of 2005 onwards. This proportion
peaked at 39.1% of Bear Steams' total financial instruments, or about $57.5 billion, as of
February 28, 2007.
413. Bear Steams' leverage caused its fair value measurements to have significant
implications to its financial instruments. Specifically, even minor adverse changes in its fair
value assumptions had potentially devastating consequences for Bear Stearns' reported revenues.
As an example, during all periods from the first quarter of 2006 to the second quarter of 2007,
Bear Stearns' revenue from Principal Transactions ranged from $1.1 billion to $1.5 billion.
These amounts were critically important to Bear Stearns' reported revenues during these periods,
typically one-third of amounts reported. However, if the fair value of only its mortgage-related
financial instruments was reduced by an amount of even 3%, all of its reported Principal
Transactions revenue would have been wiped out. Any adverse adjustment to the fair value of
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mortgage-related securities in excess of 3% would have caused reported revenue from Principal
Transactions to turn negative.
414. As described further below, starting at least by November of 2004, Bear Steams
consistently disclosed the dollar value of certain assets whose value had been established using
internally-developed models (consistent with Level 3 in SFAS 157 vernacular). As a percentage
of total financial instruments, the Company's total Level 3 assets grew rapidly from 11% of its
total financial instruments in the fourth quarter of 2006 to 29% of its total financial instruments
by the first quarter of 2008. Accordingly, throughout the Class Period, Bear Stearns was valuing
at least 11%, and up to 29%, of its financial instruments using valuation models devised by the
Company and dependent upon significant assumptions established by management.
415. Bear Stearns revealed for the first time in its quarterly results for the fourth
quarter of 2007 that mortgage securities, valued using the Company's mortgage valuation
models, comprised approximately 70% of all its Level 3 financial instruments. Level 3
residential mortgage-related assets totaled at least $5.8 billion and $7.5 billion as of August 31,
2007 and November 30, 2007, respectively.
416. In addition, in all periods from at least the first quarter of 2007 through its
collapse in March of 2008, Bear Steams reported that Level 2 assets were in excess of $60
billion and comprised at least 50% of reported financial instruments owned. Bear Steams
disclosed that Level 2 assets consisted of "financial instruments for which the Company does not
receive quoted prices; therefore, models or other methodologies are utilized to value these
financial instruments." Since the reported fair value of Level 2 assets was also significantly
dependent on valuation models, any flaws in those models had potentially devastating ripple
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effects. As of November 30, 2007, Bear Stearns reported that it held $28.9 billion of Level 2
mortgage-related securities.
417. As described above, the SEC determined that Bear Stearns' mortgage valuation
models, among other things, failed to incorporate indicators of declines in the house market. In
light of these defects and the downturn of the housing market during the Class Period, it was
virtually inevitable that an overstatement of these assets, especially those Level 3 assets, would
occur.
d. Bear Stearns Failed to Provide Adequate
Disclosure About Risk and Uncertainties
418. Bear Steams was also required to provide disclosure about risk and uncertainties
related to its financial statements. These disclosures were guided in part by the AICPA's
Statement of Position 94-6, Disclosure of Certain Significant Risks and Uncertainties ("SOP 94-
6"). In particular, Bear Steams was required to disclose any vulnerability or risk inherent to its
financial statements as a result of concentrations of risk. (SOP 94-6 1 20) The concentrations
highlighted include "revenue from particular products, services, or fund-raising events. The
potential for the severe impact can result, for example, from volume or price changes or the loss
of patent protection for the particular source of revenue." (SOP 94-6 1 22)
419. These concentration disclosures are related precisely to the issues constituted by
Bear Stearns' holdings of mortgage-related securities, and specifically subprime and CDO-
related securities. During 2007, Bear Steams' periodic SEC filings contain only fleeting
references to its concentration of exposure to subprime investments. For example, in the first
quarter of 2007, Bear Stearns reported that it subprime activities "have historically represented
only a small portion of the Company's mortgage activities."
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420. The 2006 Form 10-K stated that Bear Steams' "Maximum Exposure to Loss" to
CDOs was $211.1 million. In its Form 10-Q for the first quarter of 2007, Bear Steams reported
that its maximum exposure to CDOs had been reduced to $174.2 million. And, at the end of the
second quarter of 2007, the Company's Form 10-Q still only quantified $270.6 million of
exposure to CDOs.
421. By the third quarter of 2007, however, simultaneous to the initial public
disclosure of its valuation markdowns, Bear Steams stated that its maximum exposure to loss on
CDOs had risen to $631 million. This exposure was present even after $700 million of
markdowns to mortgage-related assets had been recorded in the quarter ended August 2007.
Bear Steams' exposure to CDOs was growing at a time when its risk management function when
prudent risk management should have been reducing CDO exposure.
422. In contrast to its quantifications of reported maximum exposure, the Company
recorded writedowns of $2.3 billion in the fourth quarter of 2007, of which CDOs were a "large
component." Even assuming that 50% of the markdowns were a "large component," the
implication is that Bear Steams understated its disclosed exposure to CDOs by a factor of two
(i.e., $631 million maximum exposure at August 31, 2007 and a $1.2 billion write-down). After
those write-downs, Bear Steams reported that its maximum remaining exposure to CDOs as of
November 30, 2007 was $409 million. Yet, once again, in the first quarter, Bear Stearns
recorded $600 million of valuation markdowns although the Company's disclosure of the
specific assets subject to the markdowns was ambiguous.
423. Bear Steams' failure to provide meaningful disclosures of the concentrations of
risk it had to the subprime and CDO market were particularly glaring in light of the failures of its
hedge funds, which as described above, focused on CDO and CDO-related investments. Thus, it
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is logical that the SEC pursued more detailed disclosure from Bear Steams via its comment letter
related to its financial filings shortly after the failure of those hedge funds. In all likelihood, the
SEC sought to ensure that public investors, unlike the hedge fund investors, were aware of risk
concentrations present in the Company's financial statements. Indeed, this finding was presented
in the 2008 DIG Report.
e. Bear Stearns Failed to Provide Reliable Disclosures
to Investors in Accordance with SEC Regulations
424. In addition to the financial statement disclosures described above, Bear Stearns
was also required to provide certain additional information in the Management's Discussion &
Analysis ("MD&A") section of its SEC filings. (Regulation S-K §229.303(a)) The SEC
required, among other considerations that "The registrant's discussion and analysis shall be of
the financial statements and of other statistical data that the registrant believes will enhance a
reader's understanding of its financial condition, changes in financial condition and results of
operations." (Instruction 1) The SEC also required "The purpose of the discussion and analysis
shall be to provide to investors and other users information relevant to an assessment of the
financial condition and results of operations of the registrant. (Instruction 2) "
425. MD&A is also required to "focus specifically on material events and uncertainties
known to management that would cause reported financial information not to be necessarily
indicative of future operating results or of future financial condition."
426. As described above, Bear Steams' MD&A included disclosures of the amounts it
reported as VaR as well as certain accompanying details, which as described above was among
the most closely watched performance indicators by users of its financial statements. As
reported, Bear Stearns' VaR was lower than that of its peers, which suggested that Bear Steams'
financial statements reflected relatively low levels of risk. In fact, the amounts Bear Steams'
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management reported as VaR were materially misleading because its VaR models were
defective. Thus, Bear Stearns' VaR failed to comply with SEC Regulations.
N. Bear Stearns' Practices Violated Banking Regulations
427. In its Forms 10-K filed for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, Bear Steams stated that
"the Company is in compliance with CSE regulatory capital requirements." This statement was
materially false and misleading.
428. In fact, during the Class Period, while Bear Steams offered regulators data
showing that it apparently met the CSE program's 10% minimum net capital requirements, the
Company was only able to achieve this result by repeatedly violating regulatory requirements
relating to the appropriate calculation of net capital. As set out in the 2008 OIG Report, the
Company violated these rules by (i) failing to take appropriate capital charges related to its
collapsed hedge funds; (ii) inflating its profit and its capital by using inflated marks on assets
subject to mark disputes; and (iii) falsely inflating its net capital by using misleading VaR
models to calculate capital requirements.
1. Overview of Capital Requirements
429. Net capital, the value of a firm's assets less the value of its liabilities, is at the
core of any bank's operations. The more net capital a firm has, the better equipped it is to cover
any unexpected losses.
430. Capital requirements are one way of ensuring that banks hold sufficient net capital
at all times to meet unexpected losses. The principal sources of loss are market risks, credit risks
and operational risks. Capital requirements provide that a certain amount be set aside to cover
potential risk for each kind of loss. These amounts, taken together with adjustments for hedging
or diversification, are called capital charges. If the total capital charge is greater than the firm's
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minimum required net capital, the firm needs either to raise more capital or reduce some of its
risk.
431. Registered broker-dealers are subject to the Net Capital Rule (Rule 15c3-1) (the
"Net Capital Rule") under the Exchange Act. The Net Capital Rule, which specifies minimum
net capital requirements for registered broker-dealers, was designed to measure the general
financial integrity and liquidity of broker-dealers and requires that at least a minimal portion of a
broker-dealer's assets be kept in relatively liquid form.
432. Under the Net Capital Rule, Bear Stearns was required to maintain a minimum net
capital ratio of 10% — that is, Bear Steams was required to maintain at least ten percent of its
assets in cash or in securities that could be easily converted to cash. If the overall value the
assets Bear Steams maintained on its books went up, then its net capital requirements went up as
well.
433. Upon Bear Steams' approval as a CSE on December 1, 2005, the SEC permitted
Bear Stearns to use a specified alternative method for calculating net capital in exchange for
Bear Stearns' compliance with requirements of the CSE program.
434. According to the SEC's Release No. 34-49830 "[u]nder the alternative method,
firms with strong internal risk management practices may utilize mathematical modeling
methods already used to manage their own business risk, including value-at-risk ("VaR") models
and scenario analysis, for regulatory purposes," The release explains that the purpose of the
alternative method of computing net capital is "to permit regulated companies to align their
supervisory risk management practices and regulatory capital requirements more closely."
435. The conditions of Bear Steams' participation in the program and the alternative
manner in which it was permitted to calculate net capital is set out in Appendices E and G to the
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Net Capital Rule. Appendices E and G permit the calculation of capital charges for market risk
and derivative-related credit risk based on mathematical models, in a manner "consistent with the
standards (`Basel Standards') adopted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (`Basel
Committee')".7
2. Bear Stearns Failed to Take Timely and Adequate Capital Charges
436. As the 2008 OIG Report points out, Bear Stearns' treatment of its hedge fund
bailout ran afoul of the Basel II standards relating to capital charges. In light of Appendix E's
adoption of this standard, the Company's treatment of the hedge fund bailout violated the SEC's
Net Capital Rule 1 as well.
437. Basel II requires that "[w]hen a bank has been found to provide implicit support
to a securitization, it will be required to hold capital against all of the underlying exposures
associated with the structure as if they had not been securitized."
438. The 2008 GIG Report pointed out that the High Yield Fund was financially
distressed, and that the terms of the bailout repo agreement had resulted in the Company's
assumption of all of the risk, and none of the possible upside, relating to the collateral it had
received in the transaction. Accordingly, the 2008 GIG Report concluded, "Bear Stearns'
financing of the BSAM funds is conceptually similar to implicit support."
439. The GIG explained that:
Since Bear Stearns bore all of the downside risks, sound risk
management (consistent with Basel II) requires that the impact on
Bear Stearns' capital associated with these reports should have
7 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is an institution created by the central bank
Governors of the Group of Ten nations. It was created in 1974 and meets regularly four times a year.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking
supervisory matters. Its objective is to enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the
quality of banking supervision worldwide. (http://www.bis.org/bcbs0
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been at least as great as the impact Bear Steams would incur if it
held that assets in its own trading book at the end of June 2007.
440. Bear Steams failed to take an appropriate charge against capital when it provided
the credit facility to the High Grade Fund. The 2008 OIG Report states "TM memoranda
summarizing discussions with Bear Steams' risk managers suggest that the capital charge
incurred by Bear Steams at the end of June 2007 was far less than the capital charge consistent
with sound risk management."
441. That is to say, by failing to include the Hedge Fund collateral on its books, Bear
Steams was able to avoid having to increase the amount of net capital it needed to maintain in
order to meet the CSE's program's 10% ratio.
3. Inflation of Capital By Using Incorrect Marks
442. The 2008 OIG Report also explains that Bear Steams' accounting treatment of
certain assets subject to mark disputes resulted in violations of capital rules.
443. As the 2008 OIG Report explains, fair values of positions relating to derivative
transactions are used in estimating the capital charges and capital requirements corresponding to
the transactions.
4.44. As set out in paragraphs 222 to 226 above, in the summer of 2007, mark disputes
between Bear Steams and its repo counterparties became more and more common. As a result of
these disputes, the Company made repeated concessions to its counterparties regarding the value
of assets it offered as collateral. These amounts were sometimes very large, as in Company's
March 12, 2008 payment of $1.1 billion to its counterparties detailed in paragraph 278 above.
445. The 2008 GIG Report explains that "there are indications in the TM memoranda
that Bear Stearns tended to use the traders' more generous marks for profit and loss purposes,
even when Bear Steams conceded to the counterparty for collateral valuation purposes." This
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permitted Bear Steams to record a gain on its books even while it conceded a loss in the dispute
with the counterparty.
446. The OIG states that "it is inconsistent with the spirit of Basel II for two firms to
use a mark dispute as an occasion to increase their combined capital, as would occur when both
parties to a trade book profit at the expense of the other simply because they each mark positions
favorably for themselves." In such a circumstance neither party would be acknowledging the
reduction in the value of the disputed asset.
447. As a result of its inflation of the value of the disputed assets, Bear Steams was
able to overstate its capital for the purposes of calculating its net capital requirement.
4. Misrepresentations to Regulators Relating to VaR
448. Because net capital turns on an accurate assessment of the risks facing a company,
the reliability of models used to estimate risk, such as VaR, are crucial to determining
appropriate capital charges and the calculation of net capital.
449. Appendix E to the Net Capital Rule required Bear Steams to submit to the SEC,
on a monthly basis, "[a] graph reflecting, for each business line, the daily intra-month VaR."
450. Moreover, under Appendix E of the Net Capital Rule, Bear Steams was obliged to
review its VaR models both periodically and annually. The periodic review could be conducted
by the broker's or dealer's internal audit staff, but the annual review had to be conducted by a
registered public accounting firm.
451. As described in paragraphs 100 to 105 above, the SEC repeatedly warned Bear
Steams that the VaR models it used to calculate net capital did not consider fundamental factors
including changes in housing prices, consumer credit scores, patterns of delinquency rates, and
other key data. Accordingly, throughout the Class Period the net capital the Company reported
to the regulators was misleading and inaccurate.
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452. Moreover, neither the Company nor its auditor, Deloitte, performed adequate
reviews of key inputs into VaR during the Class Period. Indeed, according to the DIG, "reviews
of mortgage models that should have taken place before the subprime crisis erupted in February
of 2007 appear to have never occurred."
V. DEFENDANTS' SCIENTER
A. James E. Carne
453. As Chief Executive Officer, Chairman of the Board, and director, Defendant
Cayne participated in the issuance of, signed and certified Bear Steams' materially false and
misleading SEC filings, as required by Sarbanes-Oxley, issued during the Class Period through
January 8, 2008, when he was forced to resign as CEO.
454. Specifically, in connection with the Forms 10-K for 2006 and 2007, Cayne
certified that he had put in place disclosure controls and procedures to ensure the accuracy of the
Company's filings, and that he had:
Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known
to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period
in which this report is being prepared.
455. Also in connection with the Forms 10-K for 2006 and 2007, Cayne certified that
he had:
Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused
such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under
our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial
statements for external purposes in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles[.]
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456. These disclosure controls, together with his position as the Company's CEO,
meant that Cayne was aware that the Company had been warned by the SEC in 2005 and 2006
that its mortgage valuation and VaR modeling failed to reflect key indicators in the housing
market.
457. Indeed, according to a February 8, 2008 presentation by Defendant Molinaro to a
Credit Suisse Financial Services Forum, the Company's CEO was "intimately engaged in the
risk management process."
458. Throughout the Class Period, Defendant Cayne also made a number of materially
false and misleading statements regarding Bear Steams' ABS exposure as well as the
effectiveness of its risk monitoring procedures.
459. Bear Stearns' acquisition and aggressive trading of risky ABS assets was fostered
by Cayne who implemented a business strategy that required Bear Stearns to become an industry
leader in the origination and securitization of ABS, including MBS. It was Cayne who guided
Bear Stearns' entrance into debt securitization. However, as Bear Steams was increasing its
exposure to risk, Cayne knew it was doing so without effective policies and controls to ensure
that Bear Stearns' exposure to risk was accurately communicated to its investors in direct
contrast to its public statements. Cayne was aware, or recklessly disregarded, the weaknesses in
Bear Steams' reporting and risk management processes.
460. While Defendants told shareholders and investors that Bear Stearns' growth and
concomitant expanding risk were prudent and keeping with sound risk control practices, Cayne
knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that Bear Steams' risk control models were severely
flawed and not up-to-date. Moreover, Cayne knew, or was reckless in not knowing that,
according to the SEC Inspector General, Bear Stearns' own risk managers did not have an
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expertise in the very assets upon which Bear Stearns had focused its investment strategy.
Further, Cayne knew, or was reckless in disregarding, the fact that Bear Steams publicly
disclosed VaR was far below the industry average, even as Bear Steams' concentration of risky
ABS was the highest in the investment banking community.
461. Cayne was aware of the Company's $1.3 billion bailout of the High Grade Fund.
Cayne knew of the toxic assets housed in the High Grade Fund and knew, or recklessly
disregarded, that the Company should have taken an immediate charge against net capital after it
took the High Grade Fund's collateral onto its own books. As alleged in paragraph 216, instead
of immediately reflecting its assumption of the declining collateral onto its books, the Company
waited months. By doing so, the SEC Inspector General stated, Bear Steams was able "to delay
taking a huge hit to capital."
462. Cayne also knew of Bear Steams' stated reliance on GAAP accounting, and
banking standards such as the Basel II Standards, but either ignored them or recklessly
disregarded them. For example, Cayne was aware of the FAS 157 requirement to accurately
mark values to their market prices, and was further aware that Bear Steams was not in
compliance, because it either had no way of doing so, or had flawed models which rendered its
financial statements false and misleading. Likewise, although Bear Steams maintained a capital
cushion which was barely compliant with SEC guideliness, Cayne was aware that this cushion
was the bare minimum required and, due to Bear Stearns' tremendous leverage, would not
protect Bear Steams in the event that creditors made margin calls caused by declining asset
values.
8
Schwartz testified to Congress that their capital cushion was, at times, well above the SEC
requirement.
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463. Cayne was so involved in the Company's failed business strategy — a business
strategy that he knew, but failed to disclose to the market, was flawed — that when his resignation
was announced, Bear Steams share price plunged nearly 7%.
B. Alan D. Schwartz
464. As Chief Executive Officer, Co-President, Co-Chief Operating Officer, and
director of Bear Steams, Defendant Schwartz participated in the issuance of, and signed and
certified as accurate and complete as required by Sarbanes-Oxley, Bear Steams' materially false
and misleading SEC filings issued during the Class Period. Schwartz became sole President on
August 5, 2007, and remained in that position until January of 2008, when he replaced Cayne as
CEO. Throughout the Class Period, Defendant Schwartz signed the Company's materially false
and misleading Forms 10-K for the 2006 and 2007 fiscal years.
465. According to a February 8, 2008 presentation by Defendant Molinaro to a Credit
Suisse Financial Services Forum, Schwartz, the Company's CEO, was "intimately engaged in
the risk management process." Accordingly, Schwartz was aware that the Company had twice
been warned by the SEC that its mortgage valuation and risk modeling failed to reflect key
indicators in the housing market. Despite this knowledge, Schwartz signed SEC filings setting
out, among other things, the value of level three assets and the Company's VaR, as described in
paragraphs 589 to 790 below.
466. Moreover, as alleged in 1 274 to 278 above, Schwartz offered false reassurances
to the public while the Company's liquidity plummeted the week of March 10, 2008. On March
10, 2008, the Company's liquidity pool had stood at $18.1 billion. By the close of March 11,
2008, it had declined to $11.5 billion - a one-day loss of more than $6 billion.
467. Feeling pressure to dupe the market into that Bear Steams did not have a liquidity
problem, Schwartz appeared on CNBC the morning of March 12, 2008. As alleged in
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paragraph 274, Schwartz stated, "We finished the year, and we reported that we had $17 billion
of cash sitting at the bank's parent company as a liquidity cushion. As the year has gone on, that
liquidity cushion has been virtually unchanged." Schwartz added, "We don't see any pressure on
our liquidity, let alone a liquidity crisis."
468. The next day, the Company's liquidity stood at about $2 billion. Accordingly,
while Schwartz was speaking, nearly ten billion dollars of liquidity was evaporating from Bear
Stearns.
469. Moreover, Schwartz also knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that Bear
Stearns' counterparties were deserting the Company. As alleged in paragraphs 266, 269, and
271, NG Groep NV informed Bear Stearns that it was pulling about $500 million in financing;
banks were refusing to issue any further credit protection on the Company's debt; and Goldman
Sachs, once a principal source of cash for the Company, had at least temporarily halted covering
any more Bear Stearns risk. This in turn lead other Bear Steams counterparties to refuse to lend
to the Company.
470. Moreover, as the Company's CEO, Schwartz knew or was reckless in not
knowing that on March 6, 2008, Rabobank Group, one of Bear Stearns' European lenders, told
the brokerage that it wouldn't renew a $500 million loan coming due later that week.
C. Samuel L. Molinaro, Jr.
471. As Chief Financial Officer during the Class Period, and as of August 5, 2007
Chief Operating Officer of Bear Stearns, Defendant Molinaro participated in the issuance of,
signed and certified as accurate and complete as required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Bear
Stearns' materially false and misleading SEC filings issued during the Class Period.
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472. Specifically, in connection with the Forms 10-K for 2006 and 2007, Molinaro
certified that he had put in place disclosure controls and procedures to ensure the accuracy of the
Company's filings, and that he had:
Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known
to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period
in which this report is being prepared.
473. Also in connection with the Forms 10-K for 2006 and 2007 Molinaro certified
that he had:
Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused
such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under
our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial
statements for external purposes in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles[.]
474. Moreover, according to a February, 2008 presentation given by Molinaro himself
to Credit Suisse analysts, the Company's risk management structure reported directly to him.
475. As alleged above in paragraphs 106,167 and 175, Molinaro knew, or recklessly
disregarded, that Bear Stearns' internal controls were virtually non-existent with respect to risk
management over MBS valuation and VaR. As CFO of the Company and the head of its risk
management structure, Molinaro knew about, or recklessly disregarded the existence of, the
SEC's warnings about serious deficiencies in the Company's mortgage valuation and VaR
models. As alleged in paragraph 102, during the CSE application process, the SEC told Principal
Accounting Officer Jeffrey Farber — Molinaro's direct report — that "Is* believe that it would
be highly desirable for independent Model Review to carry out detailed reviews of models in the
mortgage area." These concerns were again communicated to the Company in a December 2,
2005 memorandum from the SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations ("OCIE")
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to Defendant Farber, who reported directly to Molinaro. The disclosure controls and procedures
that Molinaro purportedly put in place should have informed him that the SEC found the
Company's risk management metrics deficient.
476. The degree to which the SEC Inspector General found Bear Steams' internal
controls to be deficient raises the strong inference that Molinaro could not have believed, or
recklessly disregarded the truth of, his Sarbanes-Oxley Act certification of the Company's
internal controls.
477. As Bear Steams' CFO, and COO starting August 5, 2007, Defendant Molinaro
participated in the issuance of, signed and certified Bear Stearns' materially false and misleading
SEC filings as accurate and complete, as required by Sarbanes-Oxley. During the Class Period,
Molinaro signed and certified Bear Steams' Form 10-Qs and Form 10-Ks filed with the SEC,
and throughout the Class Period, Molinaro conducted quarterly earnings conference calls with
shareholders and investors and made a number of materially false and misleading statements
regarding Bear Stearns' ABS exposure as well as its risk-monitoring infrastructure.
478. As Bear Stearns' CFO, Molinaro was responsible for monitoring Bear Stearns'
internal controls and reporting the Company's risks. In an investment bank such as Bear Stearns,
a CFO must be fully aware of the bank's own securities because the CFO is responsible for
obtaining the financing to purchase them. Therefore, Molinaro could not have been ignorant
about the existence, size and nature of Bear Stearns risky positions without having been reckless
in his ignorance. As the CFO of a major investment bank, Molinaro was acutely aware of the
Fair Value reporting requirements and had purportedly implemented them at Bear Stearns.
During the Class Period, Molinaro knowingly and recklessly caused Bear Stearns to issue and
file financial statements and reports with the SEC that stated that Bear Stearns had implemented
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accounting standards in line with GAAP requirements when, in fact, Bear Steams was not
complying with GAAP through its failure to accurately value the MBS and CDOs it carried on
its books.
479. Thus, while Molinaro was assuring analysts and the market that Bear Stearns had
not suffered from any adverse marks in the mortgage area and its hedging activities, he knew or
was reckless in not knowing that Bear Steams was heavily exposed to deteriorating market
conditions.
480. Subsequent to the Hedge Funds' collapse, on November 14, 2007, Molinaro
stated that Bear Steams would write down $1.2 billion of its subprime holdings in the fourth
quarter. However, Molinaro attempted to reassure investors by claiming that, in spite of the fact
that Bear Stearns still bore more than a billion dollars of subprime exposure in the form of the
collateral it had received from the failed High Grade Fund, Bear Steams had reduced its CDO
holdings to $884 million as of November 9, 2007 from $2.07 billion at the end of August 2007.
Molinaro claimed that during the period between August 31, 2007 and November 9, 2007, the
Company significantly increased its short subprime exposure. However, Molinaro knew, or was
reckless in not knowing, that Bear Steams' valuation models could not accurately value the CDO
and subprime exposure which he was allegedly "disclosing" to the market. It became further
apparent to Molinaro that the figures disclosed to the market were inaccurate when,
notwithstanding Molinaro's assurance just weeks before that the Company's hedging efforts had
resulted in a net negative exposure to subprime assets, on December 20, 2007, the Company
wrote down $1.9 billion of its holdings in mortgages and mortgage-based securities — over $700
million more than it had announced on November 14, 2007. On November 14, 2007, Molinaro
knew this additional write down was necessary, or was reckless in not knowing.
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481. As CFO, Molinaro also knew of Bear Steams' stated reliance on GAAP
accounting and banking standards such as the Basel II Standards but either ignored them or
recklessly disregarded them. For example, Molinaro was aware of the SFAS 157 requirement to
accurately mark values to their market prices, but was aware that Bear Steams had flawed
models for doing so which necessarily rendered its financial statements false and misleading.
D. Warren J. Spector
482. As Co-President and Co-Chief Operating Officer and a director of Bear Steams,
Defendant Spector participated in the issuance of, signed and certified as accurate and complete
as required by Sarbanes-Oxley, Bear Steams' materially false and misleading SEC filings issued
during the Class Period. Spector, due to his active involvement in the collapse of the Hedge
Funds, resigned his position on August 5, 2007 but remained a Bear Stearns employee and held
the title of Senior Managing Director. During his tenure as Co-President and co
-COO, all
divisions of the firm save investment banking reported to Spector, including the Hedge Funds.
Throughout the Class Period, Defendant Spector made a number of materially false and
misleading statements regarding Bear Steams' ABS exposure as well as the effectiveness of its
risk monitoring procedures.
483. Spector, due to his position as co
-COO overseeing the Company's vertically-
integrated mortgage business, was in a unique position to understand the subprime mortgage
market. As alleged in paragraph 143, disasters in a U.K. mortgage subsidiary brought home to
the Company the threat posed by lax underwriting standards to the values of its mortgages and
mortgage-backed assets. Between April and June of 2006, the Company faced repeated crises in
its United Kingdom subsidiary as a result of poor performance of U.K. loans due to weak
underwriting standards. As a result, the Company was left holding some $1.5 billion in
unsecuritized whole loans and commitments from this subsidiary. According to CW 7, a former
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head of model valuation at Bear Steams at the time, top management at Bear Steams were
deeply concerned about the U.K. developments and defendant Spector personally made calls to
investigate the crisis.
484. As the co-COO, Spector oversaw BSAM, the subsidiary of Bear Steams that
managed the Hedge Funds. Spector was fully aware of the serious problems at the Hedge Funds
being concealed from both the Hedge Funds' investors and Bear Steams' investors.
485. As set out in paragraph 203 above, Spector personally made the decision to allow
the High Grade Enhanced Fund to fail, while extending a $1.3 billion loan, in the form of a
repurchase agreement, to the High Grade Hedge Fund. Spector knew at the time Bear Steams
entered into the facility that the CDOs it had received as collateral were actually worth far less,
in that he had already become aware of serious flaws in Bear Steams' valuation methodologies.
486. While Defendants told shareholders and investors that Bear Steams' growth and
concomitant expanding risk were prudent and keeping with sound risk control practices, Spector
knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that Bear Steams' risk control models were severely
flawed and not up-to-date. The Fixed Income division dealt with ABS and MBS. The head of
the Fixed Income division reported directly to Spector. Spector knew, or was reckless in not
knowing that Bear Steams' own risk managers did not have an expertise in the very assets —
ABS and MBS — upon which Bear Steams had focused its investment strategy. Further, Spector
knew or was reckless in disregarding the fact that Bear Steams' VaR was far below the industry
average, even as Bear Steams' concentration of risky ABS was the highest in the investment
banking community.
E. Alan C. Greenberg
487. As a director and Chairman of the Executive Committee of Bear Stearns,
Defendant Greenberg participated in the issuance of Bear Steams' materially false and
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misleading SEC filings issued during the Class Period. The Executive Committee was
responsible for running the day-to-day operations of Bear Steams.
488. Greenberg also participated in weekly meetings with the Company's risk
managers during the Class Period, and knew or should have known that the Company had twice
been criticized by the SEC for failing to review and update its inaccurate models.
489. Throughout the Class Period, Defendant Greenberg made a number of materially
false and misleading statements regarding the effectiveness of Bear Steams' risk monitoring
procedures, as stated in the Forms 10-K for 2006 and 2007 that he signed.
490. On March 10, 2008, Greenberg, responding to the price liquidity rumors which
caused shares of Bear Stearns to drop 10 percent in early trading, told CNBC that the liquidity
rumors surrounding the Company are "totally ridiculous." Greenberg had been informed,
immediately before his announcement, that la]ll of Bear Stearns') institutions are calling us, and
we're in trouble."
491. Bear Stearns shares responded and initially jumped on the news, only to lose more
ground later in the day.
492. Greenberg's statement that rumors of liquidity problems at Bear Steams were
"totally ridiculous" was made without any basis in fact, and with the motive to prop up the
falling price of Bear Steams' stock. Indeed, while on March 10, 2008, the Company's liquidity
pool had stood at $18.1 billion, by the close of March 11, 2008, it had declined to $11.5 billion -
a one-day loss of more than $6 billion.
493. While Defendants told shareholders and investors that Bear Steams' growth and
concomitant expanding risk were prudent and keeping with sound risk control practices,
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Greenberg knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that Bear Steams' risk control models had
been failed to reflect downturns in the housing industry.
494. Moreover, Greenberg knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that Bear Stearns'
own risk managers did not have an expertise in the very assets upon which Bear had based its
investment strategy. Further, Greenberg knew or was reckless in disregarding the fact that Bear
Stearns' VaR was far below the industry average, even as Bear Steams' concentration of risky
ABS was the highest in the investment banking community.
F. Michael J. Alix
495. As Chief Risk Officer of Bear Stearns during the Class Period, Defendant Alix
had an intimate understanding of the risk management tools and processes in place at the
Company. Alix was global head of credit risk management from 1996 until February 2006,
when he became Chief Risk Officer. Alix made materially false and misleading statements
during about Bear Steams' risk management on an August 3, 2007 conference call.
496. As Chief Risk Officer, Alix was ultimately responsible for the Company's VaR
calculations. Indeed, as alleged in paragraph 122, in 2004 Alix touted the benefits of the CSE
program's adoption of VaR as a measure of assessing the "true risks" faced by investment banks.
He stated that:
the framework will permit securities firms registered under it to
determine the regulatory capital for their broker-dealers by means
of approved Value at Risk ("VaR") models. This will better align
capital requirements with the true risks of the securities business,
with the added benefit of harmonizing the SEC's capital rules with
global standards as represented by Basel II.
497. As alleged in paragraph 101, prior to Bear Steams' approval as a CSE in
November 2005, OCIE found that Bear Stearns did not periodically evaluate its VaR models, nor
did it timely update inputs to its VaR models.
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498. As alleged in paragraph 104, after Alix became Chief Risk Officer, the SEC's TM
division met with the Company's risk managers in September 2006 and concluded that the
Company still had failed to improve the accuracy of the models it used to hedge against risk. In
fact, it was not until the end of 2007 that Bear Steams developed a housing led recession
scenario which it could incorporate into risk management and use for hedging purposes.
Moreover, the SEC's Inspector General found that the mortgage-backed asset valuation
component of the VaR models employed by the Company were not updated at any time before
the Company's collapse.
499. While Defendants told shareholders and investors that Bear Steams' growth and
concomitant expanding risk were prudent and keeping with sound risk control practices, Alix
knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that Bear Steams' risk control models were seriously
flawed and not up-to-date. Moreover, Alix knew, or was reckless in not knowing that, according
to the SEC Inspector General, Bear Steams' own risk managers did not have an expertise in the
very assets upon which Bear Steams had focused its investment strategy. Further, Alix knew or
was reckless in disregarding the fact that Bear Steams' VaR was outdated, and far below the
industry average, even as Bear Steams' concentration of risky ABS was the highest in the
investment banking community.
G. Jeffrey M. Farber
500. As Senior Vice President of Finance and Principal Accounting Officer since
February 2007, and Controller of the Company since January 2004, Defendant Farber
participated in the issuance of, and signed and certified as accurate and complete as required by
Sarbanes-Oxley, Bear Steams' materially false and misleading SEC filings issued during the
Class Period, including all Forms 10-Q and 10-K.
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501. The quarterly and annual reports signed by Farber repeatedly touted the
Company's risk management, including its use of internally-developed models to derive the fair
value of the Company's financial instruments.
502. As alleged in paragraphs 102 to 103, during the CSE application process, the SEC
told Farber that "IwIe believe that it would be highly desirable for independent Model Review to
carry out detailed reviews of models in the mortgage area." These concerns were again
communicated to the Farber in a December 2, 2005 memorandum from the SEC Office of
Compliance Inspections and Examinations. Farber therefore knew that the valuation models
used to determine fair value of MBS were deficient.
503. While Defendants told shareholders and investors that Bear Steams' growth and
concomitant expanding risk were prudent and keeping with sound risk control practices, Farber
knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that Bear Steams' risk control models were severely
flawed and not up-to-date. Moreover, Farber knew, or was reckless in not knowing that,
according to the SEC Inspector General, Bear Steams' own risk managers did not have an
expertise in the very assets upon which Bear Steams had focused its investment strategy.
Further, Farber knew, or was reckless in disregarding, the fact that Bear Steams' VaR was far
below the industry average and failed to rise in tandem with the VaR reported by the Company's
peers, even as Bear Steams' concentration of risky ABS was the highest in the investment
banking community.
H. Corporate Scienter
504. Bear Steams' knowledge need not be possessed by a single officer or agent;
rather, the cumulative knowledge of all its agents is imputed to it.
505. The facts alleged herein create a strong inference that one or more officers of the
Company acted knowingly or recklessly in violating the securities laws.
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506. Among other things, (1) although Defendant Farber was personally told by the
SEC that Bear Steams' mortgage valuation and Value at Risk models failed to reflect declines in
the housing industry, he signed the Company's Forms 10-K for financial years 2006 and 2007
that set out artificially low VaR numbers and inflated asset values; (2) although Defendant Cayne
was "intimately engaged" in the Company's risk management process and consequently was
apprised of the SEC's criticism of Bear Steams VaR and mortgage valuation models, he signed
quarterly and annual financial statements that misrepresented the Company's Value at Risk and
asset values; (3) although Defendant Alix was the global head of the Company's risk
management department and consequently was aware that the Company had failed to review or
revise its VaR and mortgage valuation models at any time before its collapse, he represented to
the public in an August 3, 2007 conference call that "we run risk analytics to demonstrate that
[Bear Steams] is well protected against further deterioration in both the subprime and Alt-A
sectors across both whole loans and all securitization tranches;"; and (4) although Defendant
Molinaro was told by the SEC that its public disclosures of its subprime mortgage exposure
omitted material information to investors, he failed to disclose this information in the Form 10-K
filed for fiscal year 2007.
VI. ADDITIONAL ALLEGATIONS SUPPORTING
THE OFFICER DEFENDANTS' SCIENTER
A. General Allegations of Scienter
507. The Officer Defendants were active participants in the fraudulent scheme alleged
herein, in that:
(a) each was privy to confidential proprietary information concerning Bear
Stearns by virtue of their receipt of information reflecting the improper and fraudulent conduct
described above and/or their failure to review information they had a duty to monitor;
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(b) each actually issued materially false and misleading statements; or
(c) each had control over the Company's materially false and misleading
statements.
508. The nature of Bear Stearns' business — and the importance to it of mortgages,
mortgage-backed securities, and CDOs composed of mortgage-backed securities — strongly
supports the inference that the Officer Defendants knew of or recklessly disregarded the
Company's sorely deficient risk management over the valuation of mortgage-backed securities.
Bear Stearns' mortgage-related business was vertically integrated, allowing it a uniquely detailed
perspective into the entire process from mortgage origination (of subprime, Alt-A, and prime
loans) through securitization.
509. The fact that Bear Stearns suffered the first pains of the subprime mortgage
meltdown — through the collapse of the Hedge Funds and the Company's subsequent assumption
of the High Grade Fund's toxic assets — also raises a strong inference that the Officer Defendants
knew of the need to scrutinize MBS and mortgage risk management, but knowingly or recklessly
disregarded that function at the Company.
510. Moreover, the Officer Defendants knew, or recklessly disregarded, that Bear
Stearns had billions of dollars of exposure to subprime mortgage defaults as a result of the CDOs
that Bear Stearns carried on its own books. The Officer Defendants became aware that Bear
Stearns' CDO modeling was inaccurate in June of 2007 when the Hedge Funds collapsed and
Bear Stearns entered into a $1.3 billion repurchase agreement with the High Grade Hedge Fund,
which required Bear Steams to take title to assets that turned out to be worth substantially less
than the amount of the loan. Defendant Spector was directly responsible for the decision to
extend the repurchase agreement to the High Grade Hedge Fund and was aware of the weakness
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of the High Grade Fund's assets, which were almost identical to those assets held on Bear
Steams' books at the time.
511. Each of these Officer Defendants was keenly aware of the deteriorating
conditions in the U.S. subprime mortgage market and the effect of these conditions on the value
of securities linked to these mortgages and other asset backed securities. As a consequence of
Bear Stearns' prominence and large market share of ABS, including securities originated by Bear
Steams subsidiaries BEARRES and ECC and purchased and serviced by Bear Steams subsidiary
EMC and securitized by Bear Steams, the Officer Defendants knew that Bear Steams' exposure
to drops in the value of ABS, including MBS and CDOs containing ABS and MBS, was far
greater than otherwise disclosed.
512. Defendants Cayne, Greenberg, Molinaro, Schwartz, Spector, Alix and Farber also
knew or recklessly disregarded that the materially false and misleading statements and omissions
contained in Bear Steams' public statements would adversely affect the integrity of the market
for Bear Steams' common stock and would cause the price of Bear Steams' common stock to be
artificially inflated. Defendants Cayne, Greenberg, Molinaro, Schwartz, Spector, Alix and
Farber acted knowingly or in such a reckless manner as to constitute a fraud and deceit upon
Lead Plaintiff and other members of the Class.
513. Moreover, as noted below, Cayne, Greenberg, Molinaro, Schwartz, Spector, Alix
and Farber were all aware that Bear Steams was unable to accurately value these assets due to
weaknesses in its modeling and risk management systems. In fact, the Officer Defendants made
material misstatements and omissions when asked direct questions by analysts about risk
management and ABS exposure.
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514. Each of the Officer Defendants either knew, or recklessly disregarded, the fact
that the Company's disclosures relating to ABS were wholly misleading; there were billions of
dollars in ABS exposure on Bear Steams' balance sheets that were unaccounted for due to Bear
Stearns' inability to accurately value asset backed securities. Moreover, the Officer Defendants
either knew that Bear Stearns' VaR was inaccurate because it was not reacting to the
deteriorating conditions in the U.S. mortgage market or recklessly disregarded evidence that this
was the case.
515. The knowledge and/or recklessness of the Officer Defendants is also evident from
the rapid firings and/or resignations following the disclosure to shareholders of Bear Steams'
exposure to declining ABS and CDO values. For example, on August 5, 2007, less than 60 days
after the Hedge Funds collapsed, due in large part to their investment in CDOs containing
subprime RMBS, Bear Steams fired Defendant Spector, who oversaw the failed Hedge Funds as
head of BSAM. Likewise, on January 8, 2008, Cayne was forced to resign as CEO, in part
because of Bear Stearns' potentially large exposure to risky ABS.
B. Abnormal Profit Taking
516. The Class Period sales of Bear Steams stock by Defendants Cayne, Greenberg,
Molinaro, Schwartz, Spector and Farber were highly unusual, and therefore suspicious, as
measured by (1) the amount and percentage of shares sold, (2) comparison with these
Defendants' own prior trading history and that of other insiders, and (3) the timing of the sales.
Such sales therefore provide strong evidence of scienter.
517. To evaluate the selling activity of Defendants Cayne, Greenberg, Molinaro,
Schwartz, Spector and Farber, Lead Plaintiff used publicly available trading data required to be
reported to the SEC on Form 4. Lead Plaintiff analyzed the trading by insiders that occurred
during the Class Period and during the equal-length period immediately preceding the Class
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Period, beginning September 13, 2005 and ending December 13, 2006 (the "Control Period").
The Bear Steams' Form 4s filed during the Class Period and Control Period are hereby
incorporated herein by reference, and the transactions reported therein are set forth in Exhibit B,
annexed hereto.
518. The following methodologies were used to analyze these Defendants' sales. First,
Lead Plaintiff calculated total sales by each of the Individual Defendants, together with the cash
proceeds from such sales, during the Control and Class Periods. To calculate the amounts and
percentages of shares sold, Lead Plaintiff then calculated holdings at the end of the Class Period
by referencing Bear Stearns' Class Period annual proxy statements on Schedule 14A, which set
forth shares owned and stock options exercisable by the Individual Defendants during the Class
Period. Such data were then adjusted to the Class Period end date using the purchase and sale
data set forth in Bear Stearns' Form 4s. "Holdings" were deemed to include both shares held and
stock options that were vested but not yet exercised. Class Period sales were then calculated as a
percentage of total shares available for sale during the Class Period, i.e., the sum of Class Period
sales plus end-of-Class-Period holdings. To compare Class Period sales with prior trading
history, Lead Plaintiff compared sales by the these Defendants during the Class Period with their
sales during the Control Period. Lead Plaintiff also compared these Defendants' sales across the
Control and Class Periods with those of lower-level (non-Defendant) reporting persons.
519. Lead Plaintiff then determined whether the Class Period sales by Defendants
Cayne, Greenberg, Molinaro, Schwartz, Spector and Farber generated abnormal (that is, above-
normal) profits. Abnormal profits were evaluated using an event study methodology called the
"market-adjusted method," which computes cumulative shareholder returns not explained by
market factors. Under this approach, if an insider buys a share of stock which then increases in
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price from $100 to $120 (20%), and the benchmark index increases from 1000 to 1010 (1%)
during the same period, then the abnormal profit would be 19%. Under the same analysis, if a
company's stock price declines subsequent to a sale by a greater amount than the relevant
benchmark index, then the sale enabled the insider to generate an abnormal profit by avoiding
the decline. For example, if an insider sells a share of stock which then declines from $100 to
$80 (20%) while the relevant benchmark decreases from 1000 to 990 (1%), then the abnormal
profit would again be 19%. This methodology has been used extensively in the academic
literature studying the profitability of insider trading. In a typical study, abnormal profits are
calculated using a 250 trading day period following the day of trade, measured against a value-
weighted index of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks for 2000-2008. Due to Bear Steams'
collapse in March of 2008, the abnormal profits were calculated using a 125 trading day period
following the day of trade.
520. After calculating abnormal profits for the these Defendants' Class Period sales,
Lead Plaintiff then calculated the probability that such abnormal profits resulted from random
chance. This probability was calculated by computing the trade-dollar-weighted residuals from
the market-adjusted model for 125 trading days before and 125 trading days after the day of
trade, and averaging these residuals across event days for each insider. This data was then used
to compute a "t-statistic" (a statistical tool) to infer the probability that the observed cumulative
abnormal profits were due to random chance.
521. By each analysis, each of these Defendants' Class Period sales was extremely
large and highly unusual. For one, the amount and percentage of shares sold during the class
period was extraordinary. During the Class Period, when the price of Bear Steams' shares was
artificially inflated, Cayne sold 219,036 shares for a total realized value of $23,010,474. During
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the Class Period, when the price of Bear Steams' shares was artificially inflated, Greenberg sold
371,986 shares for a total realized value of $34,594,027. Greenberg sold 40.89% of his Bear
Steams shares during the two year Class Period as compared to 11.91% of his Bear Steams
shares during the Control Period. During the Class Period, when the price of Bear Steams'
shares was artificially inflated, Molinaro sold 38,552 shares for a total realized value of
$4,230,828. During the Class Period, when the price of Bear Steams' shares was artificially
inflated, Schwartz sold 91,233 shares for a total realized value of $9,867,001. During the Class
Period, when the price of Bear Steams' shares was artificially inflated, Spector sold 116,255
shares for a total realized value of $19,066,373. During the Class Period, when the price of Bear
Steams' shares was artificially inflated, Farber sold 3,324 shares for a total realized value of
$362,000.
522. Second, Defendants Cayne, Greenberg, Molinaro, Schwartz, Spector and Farber
generated enormous abnormal profits on their sales of Bear Steams stock. In all, by avoiding the
declines associated with Bear Steams' falling share value and by capitalizing on the false
information when it was greatest, these Defendants recognized abnormal profits of
approximately 86.3%, on average. Molinaro, Farber, Cayne and Schwartz more then doubled
their money by timing their sales either to days when inflation was highest or when the market
declines were least. Molinaro's were an astounding 173% higher than they otherwise would
have been if the shares were not falsely inflated. Farber's abnormal profit was 158%, Cayne's
was 132% and Schwartz's was 115%. In addition, Greenberg's abnormal profit was 73%, while
Spector's profits were 35%. These abnormal profits on the part of insiders who sold stock
during a period of inflation of their own making is further evidence of scienter.
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VII. DELOITTE'S DEFICIENT AUDITS OF
BEAR STEARNS' FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
A. Overview of Allegations Against Deloitte
523. As more fully set forth below, during the Class Period, Deloitte's audits of the
Company's financial statements were so deficient that the audit amounted to no audit at all, were
an egregious refusal to see the obvious or investigate the doubtful, and/or disregarded specific
"red flags" that would have placed a reasonable auditor on notice that the Company was engaged
in wrongdoing to the detriment of its investors. Although auditing guidelines required that
Deloitte give especially close scrutiny to the Company's fair value measurements, Deloitte
deliberately or recklessly disregarded several red flags with respect to valuation, including the
fact that the Company had persisted in using mortgage valuation models that the SEC had
repeatedly criticized as inaccurate and outmoded.
524. Similarly, although Deloitte was obliged to evaluate the statements of VaR set out
in the MD&A section of the Company's regulatory filings, Deloitte deliberately or recklessly
disregarded the fact that by at least November of 2005 the Company had been warned by the
SEC that its VaR models failed to reflect key indicators in the housing market.
525. Moreover, despite the fact that Deloitte was obliged to be especially skeptical of
related party transactions such as the High Grade fund bailout, Deloitte deliberately or recklessly
disregarded the fact that the collateral the Company had received as a result of the bailout was
far less than the value of the loan Bear Stearns had offered to the High Grade Fund.
526. Finally, in spite of multiple risk alerts that related to the Company's internal
controls, internal audits, and disclosures, Deloitte deliberately or recklessly disregarded
significant red flags in these areas as well.
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B. Deloitte's Certifications
527. Deloitte issued a "clean opinion" pursuant to each of its audits of Bear Steams'
financial statements for the fiscal years ended November 30, 2006 and November 30, 2007, and
issued similar certifications for each of the Company's quarterly statements during the Class
Period. In connection with the Company's Form 10-K for fiscal year 2006 Deloitte stated:
We have audited the consolidated financial statements of The Bear
Stearns Companies Inc. and subsidiaries (the "Company") as of
November 30, 2006 and 2005, and for each of the three years in
the period ended November 30, 2006, management's assessment of
the effectiveness of the Company's internal control over financial
reporting as of November 30, 2006, and the effectiveness of the
Company's internal control over financial reporting as of
November 30, 2006, and have issued our reports thereon dated
February 12, 2007; such consolidated financial statements and
reports are included in your 2006 Annual Report to Stockholders
and are incorporated herein by reference. Our audits also included
the financial statement schedule (Schedule I) of The Bear Stearns
Companies Inc. (Parent Company Only), listed in Item 15. This
consolidated financial statement schedule is the responsibility of
the Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an
opinion based on our audits. In our opinion, such consolidated
financial statement schedule, when considered in relation to
the basic consolidated financial statements taken as a whole,
presents fairly, in all material respects, the information set
forth therein.
528. In connection with the Company Form 10-K for fiscal year 2007, Deloitte stated:
We have audited the consolidated financial statements of The Bear
Stearns Companies Inc. and subsidiaries (the "Company") as of
November 30, 2007 and 2006, and for each of the three years in
the period ended November 30, 2007, and the Company's internal
control over financial reporting as of November 30, 2007, and have
issued our reports thereon dated January 28, 2008 (such report on
the consolidated financial statements expresses an unqualified
opinion and includes an explanatory paragraph relating to the
adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
("SFAS") No. 155, "Accounting for Certain Hybrid Instruments,
an amendment of FASB Statements No. 133 and 140" and SFAS
No. 157, "Fair Value Measurements"); such consolidated financial
statements and reports are included in your 2007 Annual Report to
Stockholders and are incorporated herein by reference. Our audits
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also included the financial statement schedule (Schedule I) of The
Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (Parent Company Only), listed in
Item 15. This financial statement schedule is the responsibility of
the Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an
opinion based on our audits. In our opinion, such financial
statement schedule, when considered in relation to the basic
consolidated financial statements taken as a whole, presents
fairly, in all material respects, the information set forth
therein.
C. Overview of GAAS
529. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB"), established by
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, is responsible for the development of auditing and related
professional practice standards that are required to be followed by registered public accounting
firms. On April 16, 2003, the PCAOB adopted as its interim standards GAAS as described by
the AICPA Auditing Standards Board's SAS No. 95, Generally Accepted Auditing Standards,
and related interpretations in existence on that date. Accordingly, an auditor's reference to "the
standards of the Public Accounting Oversight Board (United States)" includes a reference to
GAAS in existence as of April 16, 2003. For simplicity, all references to GAAS hereinafter
include the standards of the PCAOB.
530. GAAS is comprised of ten basic standards that establish the quality of an
auditor's performance and the overall objectives to be achieved in a financial statement audit.
Auditors are required to follow those standards in each and every audit they conduct.
531. The GAAS standards fall into three basic categories: General Standards;
Fieldwork Standards; and Reporting Standards. The General Standards require, among other
things, provide guidance planning and conducting an audit, and require that the auditor exercise
professional skepticism. The Field Work Standards require, among other things, that an auditor
obtain a sufficient understanding of the entity's business and operating environment to properly
plan an audit in accordance with GAAS. Finally, the Reporting Standards require that an auditor
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express an opinion on the financial statements of a company taken as a whole, or an assertion to
the extent that an opinion cannot be expressed.
D. GAAS Required Deloitte to Consider Risk Factors as Part of Audit Planning
532. For purposes of planning and conducting its audits of Bear Steams, Deloitte was
required to give special consideration to risk factors identified in "Fraud Risk Alerts" and "Audit
Risk Alerts" that may have resulted in material misstatements of the Company's financial
statements (AU 316.14). Fraud risk factors may be relevant to economic circumstances in
general, an industry, or to a particular entity. An understanding of applicable fraud risk factors is
important for an auditor to be able to appropriately determine the nature, extent, and timing of
audit procedures performed (AU 316.15). Moreover, because Deloitte audited the books of the
Hedge Funds and knew that BSAM had valued the Hedge Funds' assets, it should have been
especially skeptical of the valuations that the Company provided for its own assets.
1. Fraud Risk Alerts Relevant to Deloitte's Audit of Bear Stearns
533. The fraud risk factors described above at paragraphs 331 to 348 relating to Bear
Stearns' financial statements were also relevant to Deloitte's considerations of the nature, timing,
and extent of its audit procedures.
534. In addition, due to its role as the Company's independent auditor, there were
supplemental fraud risk factors that should have been considered by Deloitte. These included:
(a) The estimation of the fair value of investments (AU 316.39). As described
above, Bear Stearns' use of leverage caused these estimations to have material implications on
reported Principal Transactions Revenue;
(b) The risk of transactions with related parties that do not have the substance
or the financial strength to support a transaction without assistance from the entity under audit
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(AU 316.67). Accordingly, transactions that Bear Steams may have entered into with its hedge
funds, for example, warranted scrutiny by Deloitte;
(c) The ever-present risk of management overriding internal controls (AU
316.08, 42, and 57-65). For purposes of its audits of Bear Steams, this risk should have caused
Deloitte to perform specific procedures to address the internal controls related to the models used
to determine the reported valuation of financial instruments; and
(d) The risk that new regulatory requirements, such as the recently
implemented CSE structure, may cause an incentive or pressure of fraudulent financial reporting
(AU 316.85, A.2.a). In this regard, Deloitte should have been familiar with nature of Bear
Steams' relationship with the TM and conducted certain procedures to understand the
communications between those parties.
2. Audit Risk Alerts Relevant to Deloitte's Audit of Bear Stearns
535. The ARAs also addressed specific risk factors for Deloitte to consider in its audits
of Bear Steams. The ARAs were released annually, typically in mid-summer, which enabled
them to be considered for purposes of Deloitte's annual audits of Bear Steams. The SEC
recognized the import of the ARAs and the need to consider the presented risks in the
preparation and audits of financial statements. The risks in the ARAs that were incrementally
relevant to Deloitte for purposes of its audits of Bear Stearns included the following:
(a) 2005 ARA stated "...the auditor needs to be aware of any changes in the
institution's loan profile (for example, prime vs. subprime, secured vs. unsecured, direct lending
vs. indirect lending) and understand the institution's ability to identify, manage, and control the
attendant risk for those credit profiles" (2005 AAM 8050.28).
(b) The 2006 ARA warned auditors to "Examine specific collateral
surrounding the client investment portfolio and evaluate potential impairment." (2006 AAM
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8050.17) The potential for impairment was particularly relevant for "products [that] assume a
continued rise in home prices that may not continue." (AAM 8050.35) As a result, Deloitte
should have been aware of the risk factors related to the valuation of Bear Stearns' financial
instruments such as CDOs.
(c) The 2007 ARA cautioned auditors to "Consider the pressures financial
institutions are facing when planning and performing the audit engagement." (2007 AAM
8050.16) In addition, it apprised auditors of the need to "Consider the current real estate climate
when conducting an audit of a mortgage company." (2007 AAM 8050.30) Thus, Deloitte
should have been attuned to the risks associated with home price depreciation and the pressures
on management to avoid the negative adjustments to liquidity and capital caused by reductions in
the reported value of financial instruments.
3. Deloitte's Experience Auditing the Hedge Funds
536. In addition to its audits of Bear Stearns, Deloitte was also responsible for the
audits of the Hedge Funds. Based on knowledge gained during those audits, Deloitte knew that
very large percentages of the hedge funds' holdings were valued by BSAM itself, with Bear
Stearns' oversight. In fact, in 2006, Deloitte issued audit opinions on the hedge funds stating that
it was relying upon BSAM's representations of the fair market value of the vast majority of the
funds' assets.
537. Deloitte also knew that Bear Stearns was the source of the majority of the assets
held by the hedge funds. The notes to the financial statements of the High Grade Fund for the
year ended December 31, 2006 stated: "[t]he Master Fund may invest in securities issued by
Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. or an affiliate. At December 31, 2006, $751,840,048 (approximately
81.96% of net assets) is invested in such securities."
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538. The notes to the financial statements of the High Grade Enhanced Fund for
August 1, 2006 through December 31, 2006 similarly stated: "[t]he Master Fund may invest in
securities issued by Bear, Steams & Co., Inc. or an affiliate. At December 31, 2006,
$473,302,969 (approximately 71.54% of net assets) is invested in such securities."
539. Because Bear Steams retained large amounts of the CDOs it sold on its own
books, the collapse of the Hedge Funds should have put Deloitte on notice that Bear Stearns'
books were vulnerable to the same extraordinary declines.
E. Red Flags Recklessly or Deliberately Disregarded by Deloitte
540. Deloitte was required to performed an integrated audit of Bear Steams in
accordance with PCAOB Auditing Standards.9 Specifically, Deloitte was charged with
evaluating the Company's fair value measurements, internal controls, internal audits, and
financial disclosures. In each area Deloitte's accounting audit practices were so deficient that it
was deliberately or recklessly ignored significant red flags.
1. Bear Stearns' Misleading Fair Value Measurements
541. The most significant dollar-value asset on Bear Stearns' balance sheet was
"Financial Instruments Owned, at Fair Value." Accordingly, it was exceedingly important that
the Company accurately determine the fair value of these assets.
542. For purposes of both its 2006 and 2007 audits, GAAS required Deloitte to apply
auditing procedures to Bear Steams' financial instruments (GAAS including AU 328, "Auditing
Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures" and AU 332, "Auditing Derivative Instruments,
Hedging Activities, and Investments in Securities"). Among other things, GAAS required
9
Anintegrated audit is a reference to the fact that the independent auditor opines on both the
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting and the consistency of the financial statements
with GAAP.
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Deloitte to evaluate management assumptions used in determining fair value and controls over
the consistency, timeliness, and reliability of the data used in valuation models.
543. GAAS also required Deloitte to test Bear Stearns' processes for preparing fair
value measurements and the reasonableness, relevance, and timeliness of the information,
assumptions, inputs and models (AU 328.23-.24). Deloitte's audit testing should have included
an evaluation of whether the fair value measurements were consistent with market information,
were determined using an appropriate model, and included relevant information that was
reasonably available at the time (AU 328.26).
544. Deloitte's duties also included identification of those assumptions that had high
sensitivities on valuation (AU 328.34).10 This duty should have focused Deloitte on Bear
Stearns' stress testing or other sensitivity analysis as well as caused Deloitte to assess whether
any sensitive assumptions had been excluded from the valuation process (AU 328.35).
545. In addition, to the extent that the inputs and assumptions employed in Bear
Stearns' valuation models were dependent upon historical data, GAAS required Deloitte to test
whether reliance on historical financial information in the development of assumptions was
justified (AU 328.37).11
546. Standard audit procedure also required that Deloitte focus on testing the
Company's pricing models to compute the reported fair value of Level 2 and Level 3 financial
1° AU 328.34, "The auditor considers the sensitivity of the valuation to changes in significant
assumptions, including market conditions that may affect the value. Where applicable, the auditor
encourages management to use techniques such as sensitivity analysis to help identify particularly
sensitive assumptions. If management has not identified particularly sensitive assumptions, the auditor
considers whether to employ techniques to identify those assumptions."
" AU 328.37, "If management relies on historical financial information in the development of
assumptions, the auditor considers the extent to which such reliance is justified. However, historical
information might not be representative of future conditions or events, for example, if management
intends to engage in new activities or circumstances change."
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instruments, which included both mortgage-related securities and RIs. Deloitte also should have
tested the Company's method of classification of financial instruments as either Level 2 and
Level 3 since that information was material to users of the Company's financial statements.
547. For these assets, GAAS recognize that "an entity may use its own assumptions as
long as there are no contrary data indicating that marketplace participants would use different
assumptions." (AU 328.06) Accordingly, Deloitte was required to assess whether Bear Stearns'
assumptions were reasonable and reflected market-based information.
548. Moreover, for purposes of Deloitte's 2007 audit of Bear Steams, it was no longer
possible for the auditors to ignore the fact that the housing market downturn was in full force and
that the market for mortgage-related securities was illiquid. At that time, it was widely
understood that particular scrutiny should be applied by independent auditors to pricing models
used to determine the valuation of financial instruments. For example, in October 2007, the
Center for Audit Quality ("CAQ"), which is associated with the AICPA, published an audit alert
entitled "Measurements of Fair Value in Illiquid (Or Less Liquid) Markets."
549. This alert observed in pertinent part,
The level of defaults has, in many cases, exceeded the model-based
projections originally used to structure and assign ratings to
securities backed by subprime mortgage loans...and holders of
existing loans and mortgage-backed securities have experienced
sharp declines in their value.
550. Thus, in advance of Deloitte's 2007 audit, Deloitte should have been alert that (I)
Bear Stearns' mortgage-related valuation models may not have anticipated the rising level of
defaults associated with the housing market downturn, and (2) the resultant fair value of related
financial instruments should reflect appropriately increased conservatism.
551. Indeed, during its audit of the Company's fair value measurements, Deloitte was
confronted with significant red flags relating to measurement of fair value. According to the
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2008 OIG Report, during the Class Period Bear Steams failed to include crucial factors in its
valuation models including, for example, inadequate consideration of default risk and scenarios
of home price depreciation. These missing assumptions would have been known to, and
employed by, market participants, who were the focal audience for fair value measurements in
accordance with GAAP.
552. Moreover, as set out at paragraphs 124 to 126 above, in November of 2005 and
again in December of 2006, Bear Steams had been informed by the SEC that its models were
critically deficient. In conducting its audit, Deloitte either deliberately or recklessly disregarded
the fact that the SEC had already warned the Company of these problems.
2. Bear Stearns' Failures to Disclose Risks
Inherent In Its Financial Statements
553. Deloitte also had a professional obligation to assess whether other disclosures in
documents containing the financial statements were materially inconsistent with the financial
statements (AU 550, Other Information in Documents Containing Audited Financial Statements
I 4).
554. Bear Steams disclosed its VaR in the MD&A section of its regulatory filings with
the SEC.
555. As set out above at paragraphs 123 to 124, the Company had been warned by the
SEC as early as November of 2005 that its VaR models failed to take into account critical inputs
reflecting risk in the housing market.
556. As set out in paragraphs 124 to 128 above, despite this warning, the Company did
not complete any review of key inputs to its VaR models during the Class Period.
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557. In light of the significant deficiencies in Bear Steams' VaR models that should
have been identified during its testing of internal controls over financial reporting, Deloitte knew
or should have known that the amounts reported as VaR were inaccurate and unreliable.
3. Bear Stearns' Misleading Accounting
Treatment of the Hedge Fund Bailout
558. As a result of its bailout of the High Grade Fund that it managed, Bear Steams
had effectively assumed onto its books more than $1.3 billion in the Fund's subprime-backed
collateral. As set out above at paragraphs 214 to 216, less than a month later, the Company
informed the Fund's investors that the Fund was virtually worthless. Deloitte deliberately or
recklessly disregarded the fact that the Company carried this worthless collateral on its books for
months without taking an appropriate write down.
559. Deloitte should have approached its testing of any related-party transactions with
particular caution if they exhibited traits identified within GAAS to be of higher risk including
(AU 334.06):
(a) "An urgent desire for a continued favorable earnings record in the hope of
supporting the price of the company's stock."
(b) "Dependence on a single or relatively few products, customers, or
transactions for the continuing success of the venture."
(c) "A declining industry characterized by a large number of business
failures."
560. For purposes of its 2007 audit, Deloitte knew or should have known that on June
22, 2007 Bear Steams had provided loans, in the form of a repo agreement, to the failing High
Grade Hedge Fund. As a result, Deloitte was required to obtain an understanding of the business
purpose of the transactions and obtain satisfaction concerning the value of any related collateral
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(AU 334.09). Further, Deloitte was required to obtain information about the financial capability
of the High Grade Hedge Fund (AU 334.10).
561. In this case, Deloitte knew or should have known that the collateral provided by
the High Grade Funds was clearly insufficient to guarantee the value of the loans extended by
Bear Stearns. The Company had informed the High Grade Fund investors in July of 2007 that
the High Grade Fund "had very little value left."
562. Moreover, Deloitte knew or should have known that the hedge funds were
otherwise incapable of repaying those loans. Indeed, as noted at paragraphs 211 to 213 above,
the 2008 OIG Report noted that the hedge funds lacked the capability to repay the loans.
563. As a result, Deloitte also should have considered that both GAAP and GAAS
recognize the "importance of reporting transactions and events in accordance with their
substance" and "whether the substance of transactions or events differs materially from their
form." (AU 411, "The Meaning of `Present Fairly in Conformity with GAAP"16).
Accordingly, the substance of these transactions was that Bear Steams had guaranteed the High
Grade Fund by absorbing its worthless assets. Deloitte should also have ensured that the loan
value and related implications on reported capital were appropriately incorporated into Bear
Stearns' financial statements. Finally, Deloitte should have ensured that appropriate disclosure
was provided to inform investors of the substance of Bear Steams' related party transactions with
the hedge funds (AU 334.02).
4. Bear Stearns' Failure to Disclose Critical Information Relating
to the Company's Valuation of Its Financial Instruments
564. GAAS requires the presentation of financial statements in accordance with GAAP
includes adequate disclosure of material matters. (AU 431, Adequacy of Disclosure in Financial
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Statements) This particular standard is specifically referenced in AU 328 because fair value
information is significant to users of financial statements.'2
565. GAAS further state "If an item contains a high degree of measurement
uncertainty, the auditor assesses whether the disclosures are sufficient to inform users of such
uncertainty." (AU 328.45)
566. Nevertheless, in light of the SEC's repeated warnings to the Company, Deloitte
knew or should have known that Bear Stearns, in violation of GAAP, failed to disclose in its
financial statements that:
(a) Its pricing models failed to consider inputs that were critical to the
determination of the fair value of material holdings of mortgage-related financial instruments
such as default rates and liquidity risk;
(b) Programs to review mortgage pricing models were not put into place prior
to the collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008;
(c) There were questions as to the independence of risk management
personnel and that risk management personnel lacked experience in valuing mortgage-related
assets, which represented the most significant component of Bear Stearns' financial instruments;
and
(d) The Company did not implement stress-testing scenarios that addressed
negative house pricing appreciation (HPA) assumptions and shocked credit spreads for certain
mortgage-back securities.
12 AU 328.43, "Disclosure of fair value information is an important aspect of financial statements.
Often, fair value disclosure is required because of the relevance to users in the evaluation of an entity's
performance and financial position."
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567. A further red flag came in September of 2007, when the SEC informed Bear
Steams that it was required to provide more information about its exposure to subprime
investments." By virtue of its position as Bear Steams' auditors, Deloitte would have been
knowledgeable about the receipt and contents of the SEC's comment letter.
568. While the resolution of the SEC Comment Letter pertained to the 2006 Form 10-
K, Deloitte had been put on notice of the value of such disclosure in subsequent SEC filings.
Accordingly, Deloitte's opinion that the 2007 financial statements were materially consistent
with GAAP represented a significant shortcoming of due professional care because by then it
was undeniable that at a minimum Bear Steams' fair value related disclosures were inadequate.
569. Indeed, Deloitte knew that Bear Steams not only failed to provide users of its
financial statements with any of this meaningful information, it further failed to acknowledge
Comments.''
even the existence of the Unresolved SEC
5. Bear Stearns' Inadequate Internal Controls
570. For purposes of its 2006 audit, Auditing Standard ("AS") No. 2, An Audit of
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of the
Financial Statements was applicable to Deloitte. AS 214 states that "[m]aintaining effective
internal control over financial reporting means that no material weaknesses exist; therefore, the
objective of the audit of internal control over financial reporting is to obtain reasonable assurance
that no material weaknesses exist as of the date specified in management's assessment." A
13 The 2008 OIG Report Stated that "[i]nvestors would have benefited from enhanced disclosures
regarding [Bear Stearns] involvement in the subprime mortgage market and their potential exposures in
this market.-
14 p
art' Item 1B of the 2007 Form 10-K entitled "Unresolved Staff Comments" reported that there
were "None." The 2007 Form 10-K was filed January 29, 2008 — two days prior to the Company's initial
response to the SEC Comment Letter of September 2007. Bear Steams' response solely related to the
(continued. .. )
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material weakness is a significant deficiency that "results in more than a remote likelihood that a
material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or
detected.s15 (AS 21 10)
571. For purposes of its 2007 audit of Bear Stearns, AS No. 5, An Audit of Internal
Control Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated with An Audit of Financial Statements, was
applicable to Deloitte. AS 5 12 reflected substantially similar provisions as AS 2 1 4.
572. AS 2, 1 27 (No. 5,17; No. 5, 162) describes components of internal controls and
explains how an independent auditor should obtain a sufficient understanding of the internal
controls for the purpose of assessing the risk of material misstatement and identifying
deficiencies in internal control. AS 2127 (No. 5, 17; No. 5, 162) states as follows:
In an audit of internal control over financial reporting, the auditor
must obtain sufficient competent evidence about the design and
operating effectiveness of controls over all relevant financial
statement assertions related to all significant accounts and
disclosures in the financial statements. The auditor must plan and
perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance that deficiencies
that, individually or in the aggregate, would represent material
weaknesses are identified.
573. AS 2152 required Deloitte to test "Company-level controls" (AS 5 1 22 refers to
these controls as "Entity-level controls"). Company-level controls include management's risk
assessment processes, controls to monitor the results of operations, controls to monitor other
controls, including activities of the internal audit function, the audit committee, self-assessment
( continued)
SEC's inquiry on subprime accounting issues extended over ten pages, which reflected the materiality of
that information.
Is AS 21 9 defines a significant deficiency as "is a control deficiency, or combination of control
deficiencies, that adversely affects the company's ability to initiate, authorize, record, process, or report
external financial data reliably in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles such that
there is more than a remote likelihood that a misstatement of the company's annual or interim financial
statements that is more than inconsequential will not be prevented or detected."
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programs, the period-end financial reporting process, and Board-approved policies that address
significant business control and risk management practices (AS 2 1 53, AS 5 1 23). Accordingly,
Deloitte was required to include testing of Bear Stearns' risk management processes in its audit
of internal controls over financial reporting.
574. Moreover, AS 21 108 precluded Deloitte from delegating the authority to
perform procedures to assess the operating effectiveness of Bear Stearns' risk management
personnel. While AS 51 19 modified this standard slightly for purposes of the 2007 audit, the
significance of the control risk addressed by the risk management function at Bear Stearns called
for Deloitte to continue to perform procedures to assess the effectiveness of the internal controls
constituted by risk management. Deloitte was required to consider its understanding of Bear
Stearns' internal controls gained in prior periods for purposes of its 2007 audit.I6
575. AS 2160 (AS 5 1 28) required Deloitte to perform targeted procedures to assess
the internal controls over financial reporting related to the financial statement assertions of
significant accounts. Bear Stearns' reported balance of financial instruments met the criteria of a
significant account, which included the size and composition of the account, susceptibility of
loss due to errors or fraud, accounting and reporting complexities associated with the account,
and exposure to losses represented by the account (AS 2 1 65, AS 5 1 29). Accordingly, Deloitte
was required to consider, among other factors, whether effective internal controls existed to
16 AU 319.26, "The nature, timing, and extent of procedures the auditor chooses to perform to obtain
the understanding will vary depending on the size and complexity of the entity, previous experience with
the entity, the nature of the specific controls used by the entity including the entity's use of IT, the nature
and extent of changes in systems and operations, and the nature of the entity's documentation of specific
controls." (emphasis added)
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ensure that the reported valuation of Bear Steams' financial instruments was appropriate (AS 2
1 68, AS 5 1 28)."
576. GAAS recognized audit risk stems in part from the "business risk that the
institution does not properly understand the terms and economic substance of a significant
complex investment. Such misunderstandings could result in the incorrect pricing of a
transaction and improper accounting for the investment or related income." (D&L AAG 7.107)
As implementation guidance, the D&L AAG notes that relevant control activities include:
(a) Procedures exist to identify and monitor credit risk, prepayment risk, and
impairment.
(b) Current fair value of securities are obtained and reviewed on a timely
basis.
(c) Securities are monitored on an ongoing basis and factors affecting income
recognition and the carrying amount of the securities are analyzed periodically to determine
whether adjustments are necessary.
577. The D&L AAG also provides guidance for independent accountants when testing
internal controls. It states (Ch. 7 Investments in Debt & Equity Securities ¶ Ill):
Control activities that would contribute to internal controls over
financial reporting in this area include the maintenance of
management policies, adopted by the board of directors or its
investment committee, that establish authority and responsibility
for investments in securities.
578. When reviewing such management policies, GAAS observes "...the independent
accountant should be alert to potential abuses and override of policies and procedures when such
circumstances exist." (D&L AAG 7.113)
11 AU326.07, Valuation or allocation assertions address whether balances and transactions presented
(continued. .. )
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579. Deloitte's internal controls testing should have addressed Bear Steams' mortgage-
underwriting and securitization practices.I8 In doing so, Deloitte was on notice that it should
take special care, as Bear Stearns was increasingly relying on non-conforming loans (i.e., the
2/28 Hybrid ARMs) (D&L AAG Ch. 8, Loans).19 This pattern was reflected in the growth of
Bear Stearns' assets that were subject to management's subjective estimates. These were the
very types of investments explicitly identified in the ARAs as possessing higher degrees of
inherent risk (2006 AAM 8050.35). Moreover, Deloitte should have been attuned to material
industry and Bear Steams specific risks such as:20
(a) The June 2006 meltdown of the Bear Steams U.K. subsidiary that
specialized in subprime originations;
(b) The observations of the housing market downturn by the National
Association of Realtors beginning in May 2006 described above; and
(.. .continued)
within the financial statements have been reflected using the appropriate amount.
IS AU 319.49, "The auditor should obtain sufficient knowledge of the information system relevant to
financial reporting to understand — The procedures, both automated and manual, by which transactions
are initiated, recorded, processed, and reported from their occurrence to their inclusion in the financial
statements."
19 2006 D&L AAG 8.06, "Internal factors—such as an institution's underwriting practices, credit
practices, training, risk management techniques, familiarity and experience with its loan products and
customers, the relative mix and geographic concentration of its loan portfolio and the strength of its
internal control—also have a significant effect on an institution's ability to control and monitor its credit
exposure." (emphasis added) See also 8.07, which notes that concentrations of particular type of product
increases credit risk. Ch.8 in conjunction with AU 319 requires that the auditor gain an understanding of
an entity's internal controls.
20 AU 319.49, "The auditor should obtain sufficient knowledge of the information system relevant to
financial reporting to understand — How the information system captures other events and conditions that
are significant to the financial statements."
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(c) The FDIC reiteration that "Bankers and bank regulators need to
remember that rapid expansion in loan volumes often leads, over time, to declining credit
quality.s21
580. A close scrutiny of the Company's internal controls relating to its securitization
business should have placed Deloitte on notice that Bear Steams was engaged in wrongdoing to
the detriment of its investors. The GIG identified a:
Lack of expertise by risk managers in mortgage-backed securities
at various times; lack of timely formal review of mortgage models;
persistent understaffing; a proximity of risk managers to traders
suggesting lack of independence; turnover of key personnel during
times of crisis; and an inability or unwillingness to update models
quickly enough to keep up with changing circumstances.
581. In addition, the 2008 OIG Report found "Bear Stearns' concentration of mortgage
securities was increasing for several years and was beyond its internal limits, and that a portion
of Bear Steams' mortgage securities (i.e., adjustable rate mortgages) represented a significant
concentration of market risk...". Accordingly, Deloitte should have been aware of the red flag
associated with the fact that Bear Stearns' holdings of MBS-related securities were in excess of
its internal policy limits.
582. In addition to the above, Deloitte should have taken notice of the varying risk
management and pricing approaches taken by Bear Stearns' trading desks described at
paragraphs 130 to 131 above. The B&D AAG observed that this practice constitutes a fraud risk
factor, which for purposes of Deloitte's audits of Bear Steams should have become a red-flag.22
21 http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2006/pr06072.html
22 Ch. 5, Auditing Considerations, Fraud Risk Factors, Appendix A,1 5.195, Part 1 Fraudulent
Financial Reporting, B.2.i, "Use of different valuations of same product in two related companies?'
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6. Bear Stearns' Deficient Internal Audit Function
583. GAAS recognize that the internal audit function serves an important role in
monitoring the performance of an entity's controls (AU 322, The Auditor's Consideration of the
Internal Audit Function in an Audit of Financial Statements, 1 4). Accordingly, GAAS states
"the auditor should obtain an understanding of the internal audit function sufficient to identify
those internal audit activities that are relevant to planning the audit." (AU 322.04)
584. Deloitte was subject to professional standards to evaluate the work performed by
Bear Stearns' internal auditors. Specifically, when the work of internal auditors is used, the
independent auditor is required to evaluate:
(a) The competence of those internal auditors (AU 322.09);
(b) The procedures performed by internal audit to develop an understanding
of relevant internal controls (AU 322.13).
585. GAAS further specify that when there is a high risk of misstatement, such as with
23
the valuation of assets, the external auditor is required to conduct its own testing. The auditor
is similarly responsible for critical judgments such as inherent and control risks, and the
materiality of misstatements.24
586. In addition to the material weaknesses it observed with respect to Bear Stearns'
risk management function, the SEC concluded that there were significant deficiencies of the
23 AU 322.21, "However, for such assertions, the consideration of internal auditors' work cannot
alone reduce audit risk to an acceptable level to eliminate the necessity to perform tests of those assertions
directly by the auditor. Assertions about the valuation of assets and liabilities involving significant
accounting estimates, and about the existence and disclosure of related-party transactions, contingencies,
uncertainties, and subsequent events, are examples of assertions that might have a high risk of material
misstatement or involve a high degree of subjectivity in the evaluation of audit evidence."
24 AU 322.19, "Because the auditor has the ultimate responsibility to express an opinion on the
financial statements, judgments about assessments of inherent and control risks, the materiality of
(continued . )
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Company's internal audit function. These deficiencies were observed relative to Bear Steams'
Internal Audit's assessment of risk management controls. Importantly, this conclusion was
reached on a contemporaneous basis as set forth in the 2008 OIG Report:
TM's own memorandum dated November 2006 noted significant
deficiencies in Bear Steams internal auditors' work as follows:
The audits for Market Risk Management, Credit Risk Management
and Funding/Liquidity Risk Management are completed and the
reports are in draft form. At this point it can be noted the (sicJ
there appears to be significant deficiencies in the coverage for
the review of liquidity and funding risk management which will
be a focal point of our discussions of scope expansion in the 2007
CSE audits. (emphasis added)
587. Given applicable professional standards, Deloitte should have similarly identified
and addressed the red-flags constituted by the deficiencies in Bear Stearns' Internal Audit
function. Deloitte should have been particularly sensitive to its review of the internal audit
reports regarding Bear Steams' risk management because Sarbanes-Oxley as originally drafted
required the external auditor rather than internal auditors to perform this work. In other words,
applicable standards anticipated that greater levels of independence and expertise were likely to
be necessary in the assessment of risk management than could be provided by internal audit
personnel.
588. Risk control at Bear Steams was inextricably linked to the effectiveness of risk
management and internal audit personnel as well as the procedures those functions carried out.
In consideration of the significant deficiencies identified by the SEC, Deloitte should have
known that Bear Steams' internal audit function did not mitigate any of the shortcomings of the
Company's risk management function. Critically, the ineffectiveness of Bear Steams' oversight
(. . . continued)
misstatements, the sufficiency of tests performed, the evaluation of significant accounting estimates, and
other matters affecting the auditor's report should always be those of the auditor."
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functions raised red-flags about the Company's internal controls and commitment to the effective
risk management operations it was reporting to users of its financial statements.
VIII. DEFENDANTS' MATERIALLY FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS
A. Statements Relating to Fiscal Year 2006 and Fourth Ouarter 2006
589. The Company's deception of its investors began on December 14, 2006, with a
series of false statements regarding its 2006 results made in a press release and press conference.
It continued to misrepresent its results in the Form 10-K it filed with the SEC covering fiscal
year 2006.
1. December 14, 2006 Press Release
590. On December 14, 2006, Bear Steams issued a press release regarding its fourth
quarter and fiscal year end results for 2006. The Company stated:
The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (NYSE:BSC) today reported
earnings per share (diluted) of $4.00 for the fourth quarter ended
November 30, 2006, up 38% from $2.90 per share for the fourth
quarter of 2005. Net income for the fourth quarter of 2006 was
$563 million, up 38% from $407 million for the fourth quarter of
2005. Net revenues for the 2006 fourth quarter were $2.4 billion,
up 28% from $1.9 billion for the 2005 fourth quarter. The
annualized return on common stockholders' equity for the fourth
quarter of 2006 was 20.5%.
For the fiscal year ended November 30, 2006, earnings per share
(diluted) were a record $14.27, up 38% from $10.31 for fiscal
2005. Net income for the fiscal year 2006 was $2.1 billion, up
40% from the $1.5 billion earned in the twelve-month period
ended November 30, 2005. Net revenues for fiscal year 2006 were
$9.2 billion, an increase of 25% from $7.4 billion in the prior fiscal
year. The after-tax return on common stockholders' equity was
19.1% for fiscal 2006.
***
Net revenues in Capital Markets, which includes Institutional
Equities, Fixed Income and Investment Banking, were $1.8 billion
for the fourth quarter of 2006.
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***
Fixed income net revenues were $1.1 billion, up 25% from $839
million in the fourth quarter of 2005.
591. As a result, on December 14, 2006, Bear Steams' stock closed at $159.96 per
share, up from a close of $155.89 per share the day before. The following day, December 15,
2006, Bear Steams' shares closed at $163.68.
a. December 14, 2006 Press Release Statements Regarding
the Company's Fourth Quarter 2006 Results
592. In the press release, Bear Steams misstated its earnings per share, net income, and
net revenues. Revenues from Capital Markets, specifically within the Fixed Income area, were
also falsely inflated.
593. These statements were false and misleading because Bear Stearns achieved these
results by using misleading mortgage valuation models to value significant portions of its Level
3 assets, as described above at paragraphs 100 to 111.
594. At the time of the statements, the Company's Level 3 assets represented 11% of
the Company's total assets held at market value, or a total of about $12.1 billion. Because these
assets were highly leveraged, even a small decline in value would be vastly magnified, as set out
in paragraphs 77 to 80 above.
595. The Company had been warned by the SEC that the models it used to value
mortgage-backed securities, the lion's share of these assets, did not reflect key factors relating to
the downturn in the housing industry, such as rising default rates. As set out above at paragraphs
139 to 148, default rates and other signs of market declines had risen dramatically in the second
half of 2006.
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596. Accordingly, the values the Company assigned to this large group of assets was
significantly higher than they should have been, violating GAAP as set out at paragraphs 324 to
423 above.
b. Press Release Regarding Fiscal 2006 Results
597. Bear Stearns also announced its fiscal year 2006 results in the December 14, 2006
press release. For the 2006 fiscal year, Bear Steams reported that it earnings per share (diluted)
were a record $14.27, its net income was $2.1 billion and its net revenues for fiscal year 2006
were $9.2 billion. These figures were false and misleading for the same reasons set out in
paragraphs 593 to 596 above.
2. Fourth Oulu-ter 2006 Earnines Conference Call
598. On December 14, 2006, Bear Steams held its fourth quarter 2006 earnings
conference call, conducted by defendant Molinaro, the Company's CFO. During the call,
Molinaro repeated the financial results set out in paragraphs 590 above. These statements were
false and misleading for the reasons set out above at paragraphs 593 to 596.
599. During the call, an analyst asked Molinaro:
There's obviously been a lot of worry in the investment
community about slowing originations, the sub prime scare we've
seen. What's your overall take on that? And if there's any way
you can in some way scale the origination platform vis-à-vis the
trading component and the other asset classes within MBS would
be helpful.
600. Molinaro responded that:
(T]he sub prime sector does represent a relatively small piece of
the overall mortgage market and the composition of the sub prime
class representing an even smaller component of the overall
market. While there's clearly been some issues in sub prime, as
we have seen, the issue has really been more of a vintage issue
as we've got some of the production that was originated maybe
of what now looks like the top of the cycle with underwriting
standards diminishing, experiencing some difficulties. But I
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think that is and has been relatively well contained and not
really spilling over into the broader market. In fact, I would
say the broader market continues to be quite healthy and
investor demand for the product continues to be quite robust.
I think a lot of the attention does appear to be somewhat
overblown, certainly there are some issues in the sub prime
segment, but I would say the broader market is — maybe we've
seen the worst of it and I think it feels pretty good right now.
601. The statements above were materially false and misleading when made because
the Company understood that the unusually risky loans it was continuing to purchase through its
EMC subsidiary were not limited to any particular "vintage". As noted above in paragraph 59,
CW 3 reported that during the latter part of 2006 and the beginning of 2007 EMC would "buying
everything" without regard for the known riskiness of the loan. Moreover, the Company
understood that its own loan origination practices had resulted in "cutting corners" on standard
underwriting practices, as set out above at paragraphs 53 to 63.
602. An analyst at Sandler O'Neill, Jeff Harte, asked Molinaro about the Company's
exposure to increased defaults on subprime mortgages:
As we see some default rises in subprime land, and as we also see
you originating more of the mortgages that you're actually
securitizing and sending out, does the risk of defaulting mortgages
coming back to you rise, or how do you look at that?
603. Molinaro responded by vastly understating Bear Steams' exposure to increasing
defaults in the subprime market:
Well, I don't — no, it doesn't. Because essentially we're
originating and securitizing. But I think the point we should
make about what's happening in the subprime sector — in other
words, the vintage class that seems to be experiencing the most
difficulty certainly coming at the end at what appears to be the
heights of the cycle when the lending standards were the most
lenient. What's going on now in the market with a lot of the
weaker hands getting forced out of the business, the business is
really moving into stronger hands, who have improved
underwriting standards and are not going to be stretching as much
for businesses, maybe some of the other shops were who really,
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their livelihood was focused on volume. So what we saw in 2006,
our activity in the subprime sector declined dramatically,
largely because our standards was higher and our pricing was
not at the Level that would generate a lot of business. I think
the good news in the subprime sector, as the business is moving
into the hands of much stronger players in an environment where
the underwriting standards are being tightened and the business
should improve.
604. The statements above in paragraph 603 were materially false and misleading
when made because Bear Stearns did far more than originate and securitize subprime loans—it
retained on its books large amounts of the riskiest tranches of RMBS and CDOs it produced.
Indeed, as set out at paragraph 65 above, by November of 2006, the Company held $5.6 billion
of the riskiest tranches of subprime-backed RMBS on its books.
605. Moreover, Bear Steams' own underwriting standards were not higher in 2006
than in previous years, and the Company understood that the loans it was continuing to purchase
through its EMC subsidiary during the latter part of 2006 and the beginning of 2007 that were
unusually risky, and in fact EMC was not tightening its underwriting standards.
3. Form 10-K for Fiscal Year 2006
606. On February 13, 2007, Bear Steams filed its Form 10-K for the annual and
quarterly period ended November 30, 2006. The 10-K was signed by, among others, defendants
Greenberg, Cayne, Schwartz, Spector and Farber. The Form 10-K made misrepresentations
regarding the Company's financial results, risk management practices, exposure to market risk,
compliance with banking capital requirements, and internal controls. Finally, the 2006 Form 10-
K contained false and misleading statements by the Company's auditor, Deloitte, relating to its
review and certification of the Company's reported financial results.
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607. As a result, on February 13, 2007, Bear Steams' stock closed at $160.10 per
share, up from a close of $157.30 per share the day before. The following day, February 14,
2007, Bear Steams' shares closed at $165.81.
a. The Company's Financial Results and Assets
608. The financial results, including revenues, earnings, and earnings per share
reported by the Company in the Form 10-K for 2006 were misleading for the same reasons set
out in paragraphs 593 to 596 above, relating to the Company's announced results for fiscal year
2006.
609. Moreover, in the 2006 Form 10-K the Company was materially false and
misleading in its assertions about the value of assets corresponding to Level 3. The Company
stated that:
at November 30, 2006 and 2005, the total value of all financial
instruments whose fair value is estimated based on internally
developed models or methodologies utilizing significant
assumptions or other data that are generally less readily observable
from objective sources (primarily fixed income cash positions)
aggregated approximately $12.1 billion and $7.1 billion,
respectively, in "Financial Instruments Owned[.]
610. As set out in paragraphs 100 to III above, by the date of this statement, the
Company's Principal Accountant and Controller had already been informed that the models the
Company used to value the mortgage-backed securities in this asset category failed to reflect
dramatic declines in the housing market.
b. The Company's Risk Management Practices
611. Bear Steams' 2006 Form 10-K misled investors with respect to the Company's
use of its VaR models and the accuracy and of its valuation models for assets linked to subprime
mortgages. The 2006 Form 10-K stated that:
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members of the Controllers and Risk Management Departments
perform analysis of internal valuations, typically on a monthly
basis but often on an intra-month basis as well. These departments
are independent of the trading areas responsible for valuing the
positions. Results of the monthly validation process are reported
to the MTM Committee, which is composed of senior management
from the Risk Management and Controllers Departments. The
MTM Committee is responsible for ensuring that the
approaches used to independently validate the Company's
valuations are robust, comprehensive and effective. Typical
approaches include valuation comparisons with external sources,
comparisons with observed trading, independent comparisons of
key model valuation inputs, independent trade modeling and a
variety of other techniques.
612. In addition, the Company specifically asserted that:
The Company regularly evaluates and enhances such VaR models
in an effort to more accurately measure risk of loss.
613. These statements were false and misleading when made because, as set out at
paragraphs 123 to 127 above, by the time of this statement the SEC had repeatedly warned the
Company that the models it used to assess risk, including its VaR and mortgage valuation
models, failed to reflect key indicators of market declines. According to the 2008 DIG Report,
Bear Stearns' VaR models failed to include critical variables such as "housing price appreciation,
consumer credit scores, patters of delinquency rates, and potential other data." It was precisely
these indicators that would have reflected the rapidly declining housing market.
614. Moreover, according to the 2008 (DIG Report, reviews of the Company's risk
management models which should have taken place before the subprime market cratered were
never completed at any time before the Company's collapse.
615. Bear Stearns' 2006 Annual Report to Stockholders, attached as an Exhibit to the
Form 10-K, misled investors with respect to Bear Stearns' risk control philosophy when it stated
that "the Company's Risk Management Department and senior trading managers monitor
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exposure to market and credit risk for high yield positions and establish limits and concentrations
of risk by individual issuer."
616. In fact, Bear Stearns lacked risk management personnel and was unable to
appropriately model for risk. Even when Bear Steams had the correct personnel in place, the
2008 OIG Report indicates that its risk managers were unable to effectively communicate with
the traders who were responsible for taking on additional risk. Bear Stearns did not have risk
managers that had experience or were capable of valuing the MBS which were central to Bear
Stearns' business models.
617. Bear Steams' 2006 Form 10-K also misled investors with respect to Bear Steams'
risk management procedures when it stated that "comprehensive risk management procedures
have been established to identify, monitor and control [its] major risks."
618. In fact, this statement was false and misleading when made because, according
the 2008 DIG Report and verified independently by confidential witnesses, Bear Steams did not
have risk management personnel at the time capable of accurately valuing MBS.
619. Bear Steams' 2006 Form 10-K also stated that "The Treasurer's Department is
independent of trading units and is responsible for the Company's funding and liquidity risk
management. . . [m]any of the independent units are actively involved in ensuring the integrity
and clarity of the daily profit and loss statements," and that:
The Risk Management Department is independent of all trading
areas and reports to the chief risk officer... [t]he department
supplements the communication between trading managers and
senior management by providing its independent perspective on
the Company's market risk profile."
620. In fact, as set out at paragraphs 129 to 136 above, in this period Bear Steams' risk
managers had little independence from its trading desk, and no ability to reign in the Company's
accumulation of risk.
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c. The Company's Exposure to Market Risk
621. As reflected in the exchange of letters between the SEC and the Company
described above at paragraphs 312 to 323, the Company's 2006 Form 10-K was also false and
misleading in that it failed to disclose the Company's true exposure to the subprime market. The
SEC concluded in the 2008 OIG Report that, as a result, investors were deprived of "material
information" that they could have used "to make well-informed investment decisions."
622. Bear Steams' 2006 Form 10-K also misled investors with respect to its exposure
to "market risk." In its 2006 Form 10-K the Company stated that it:
mitigates its exposure to market risk by entering into hedging
transactions, which may include over-the-counter derivative
contracts or the purchase or sale of interest-bearing securities,
equity securities, financial futures and forward contracts. In this
regard, the utilization of derivative instruments is designed to
reduce or mitigate market risks associated with holding dealer
inventories or in connection with arbitrage-related trading
activities.
623. These statements were false when made because Bear Stearns managers were
aware that it was impossible to effectively hedge against declines in assets in light of deficiencies
in its VaR and mortgage valuation models, as discussed above at paragraphs 100 to 111 and 123
to 128.
624. Furthermore, because of the deficiencies in its VaR models, the Company's
representation in its 2006 Form 10-K that it had an aggregate VaR of just $28.8 million, which
was far lower than its peers, was materially false and misleading. In fact, the Company knew
that its VaR numbers failed to reflect its exposure to declining housing prices.
d. The Company's Compliance With Banking Regulations
625. In its 2006 Form 10-K Bear Stearns stated that "the Company is in compliance
with CSE regulatory capital requirements." This statement was materially false and misleading
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when made because, as set forth at paragraphs 427 to 452 above, the Company had misled
regulators into believing that it was meeting capital requirements only by repeatedly violating
banking regulations relating to the appropriate calculation of net capital. As set forth in the 2008
OIG Report, the Company violated CSE rules by (i) inflating its profit and its capital by using
inflated marks on assets subject to mark disputes; and (ii) falsely inflating its net capital by using
misleading methods to calculate VaR.
The Company's Internal Controls
626. Defendants Cayne and Molinaro each made false and misleading statements when
they executed Sarbanes-Oxley Act certifications, annexed as an exhibit to the Form 10-K filing.
This certification stated that the 10-K report "does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report" and "the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition."
627. Cayne and Molinaro also certified that the Company had:
[d]esigned such internal control over financial reporting, or caused
such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under
our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial
statements for external purposes in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles."
628. These statements were false and misleading, in that, despite repeated warnings
from the SEC, the Company had made no effort to address deficiencies that went to the heart of
the Company's ability to assess the value of its assets and its exposure to risk. Moreover, the
encouraging revenue growth and earnings per share Bear Stearns reported in its certified
statements were only made possible as a result of Bear Stearns' ability to avoid taking losses by
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relying on misleading valuation models that failed to reflect the declining value of its highly
illiquid Level 3 assets.
f. Deloitte's Certification
629. As the Company's auditor Deloitte certified Bear Steams' 2006 Form 10-K, as
required by Sarbanes-Oxley, and, in so doing, knowingly and recklessly offered a materially
misleading opinion as to the financial statements' accuracy. As set out in detail at paragraphs
523 to 588 above, Deloitte knew or recklessly disregarded that these statements and certifications
were materially false and misleading when made, perpetrating a fraud on the Company's
investors.
B. Statements Relating to Fiscal Year 2007 Results
630. In press releases, conference calls and SEC filings, Bear Steams deceived
investors with respect to its 2007 financial results.
1. First Quarter 2007 Results
a. First Quarter 2007 Press Release
631. On March 15, 2007, Bear Steams issued a press release regarding its first quarter
2007 results.
NEW YORK, NY — March 15, 2007 — The Bear Steams
Companies Inc. (NYSE:BSC) today reported earnings per share
(diluted) of $3.82 for the first quarter ended February 28, 2007, up
8% from $3.54 per share for the first quarter of 2006. Net income
for the first quarter of 2007 was $554 million, up 8% from $514
million for the first quarter of 2006. Net revenues were $2.5
billion for the 2007 first quarter, up 14% from $2.2 billion in the
2006 first quarter. The annualized return on common
stockholders' equity was 18.3%.
"We are pleased with this excellent performance, revenues for the
first quarter were up for every business segment," said James E.
Cayne, chairman and chief executive officer of The Bear Steams
Companies Inc. "Growing the company remains a core focus as we
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continue to invest in the clearing, mortgage, international and asset
management franchises with successful results."
***
Capital Markets net revenues for the first quarter of 2007 were
$2.0 billion, up 15% from $1.7 billion
***
Fixed Income net revenues were $1.1 billion, up 27% from $907
million in the year-ago quarter.
632. As a result, on March 15, 2007, Bear Stearns' stock closed at $148.50 per share,
up from a close of $145.29 per share the day before. The following day, March 16, 2007, Bear
Steams' shares closed at $145.48.
633. In the press release, Bear Steams misstated its earnings per share, net income, and
net revenues. Bear Stearns' financial results for Capital Markets, specifically Fixed Income,
were also falsely inflated.
634. These statements were false and misleading because Bear Stearns achieved these
results by using misleading mortgage valuation models to value its Level 3 assets, as described
above at paragraphs 100 to 111.
635. At the time of the statements, the Company's Level 3 assets represented 11.64%
of the Company's total assets held at market value, or a total of about $15 billion. Because these
assets were highly leveraged, even a small decline in value would be vastly magnified, as set out
in paragraphs 77 to 80 above.
636. The Company had been warned by the SEC that the models it used to value
mortgage-backed securities, a large share of these assets, did not reflect key factors relating to
the downturn in the housing industry, such as rising default rates. As set out above at paragraphs
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139 to 148, default rates and other signs of market declines had risen dramatically in the second
half of 2006 and into the first quarter of 2007.
637. Accordingly, the values the Company assigned to this group of assets was
significantly higher than they should have been, violating relevant GAAP as set out at
paragraphs 324 to 423 above. Because the Company was not reflecting these losses on its books,
its revenues, earnings, and earnings per share were overstated.
b. First Quarter 2007 Conference Call
638. On March 15, 2007 Bear Stearns held its first quarter 2007 earnings conference
call, conducted by defendant Molinaro, the Company's CFO. During the call, Molinaro repeated
the financial results described in paragraph 631. For the reasons set out in 633 to 637 above,
these statements were false and misleading.
639. In the same call, Molinaro stated that Bear Stearns' internal origination platform:
allows us to control the performance of the loans and it puts the
servicing at very strong stable hands and historically in periods of
dislocation like this, the opportunities to buy pools of defaulted
loans or semi- performing loans, have been there and that
servicing capacity has been a key asset in our ability to
generate return from those assets."
640. These statements were false and misleading because the Company understood that
the loans it was continuing to purchase through its EMC subsidiary were being bought with little
due diligence. As noted above in paragraph 59, CW 3 reported that during the latter part of 2006
and the beginning of 2007 EMC was "buying everything" without regard for the risk of the loan.
Moreover, as noted above at paragraphs 54 and 58 to 60, additional confidential witnesses have
testified that Bear Stearns' own origination platforms were seriously flawed and were not
accurately measuring the risk of the loans issued. Additional Confidential Witnesses have
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confirmed that Bear Stearns' internal origination platforms were not using prudent lending
standards (paragraphs 54 and 58 to 60 above).
641. In the same call, Molinaro also made false and misleading statements regarding
the Company's exposure to risk connected with the Hedge Funds. An unidentified analyst on the
call asked, "Can you give any insight about whether you've seen or had issues with margin calls
or any kind of difficulties in hedge fundland given how volatile the Markets have been the last
few weeks?"
642. Molinaro responded that "[w]e haven't seen any difficulties. I would say it's
been, obviously there's a lot of market volatility but we've had no difficulties there." Barely two
weeks earlier, Cioffi, a Senior Managing Director of BSAM and a member of Bear Stearns'
Board of Directors, had written of the Funds' February results that "I can't believe anything has
been this bad."
643. In fact, as described at paragraphs 193 to 196 above, the Hedge Funds were in the
midst of a disastrous collapse in the value of their assets. The managers of these Hedge Funds
reported directly to defendant Spector, the Co-President of the Company at the time.
644. When asked to give details regarding Bear Stearns' exposure to subprime CDOs,
Molinaro refused, saying "I think that we feel like we've got the situation in hand. We think it's
well hedged."
645. This statement was false and misleading, in that Molinaro was aware that the VaR
and valuation models, essential to meaningful hedging of risk, failed to reflect key data about
housing declines.
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c. First Quarter 2007 Form 10-0
646. In its report for the first quarter of 2007, signed by defendant Farber, the
Company materially misrepresented its financial results, its exposure to risk, its internal controls,
and its compliance with regulatory capital requirements.
(i) Financial Results
647. In the Form 10-Q it filed on April 9, 2008, the Company stated that:
Net revenues for Capital Markets increased 15.4% to $1.97 billion
for the 2007 quarter compared with $1.70 billion for the 2006
quarter. Pre-tax income for Capital Markets increased 12.9% to
$736.3 million for the 2007 quarter from $652.3 million for the
comparable prior year quarter. Pre-tax profit margin was 37.5%
for the 2007 quarter compared with 38.3% for the 2006 quarter.
* * *
Fixed income net revenues increased 26.7% to $1.15 billion for the
2007 quarter from $907.1 million for the comparable prior year
quarter.
648. These statements were false and misleading because, as explained in paragraphs
100 to 111 above, Bear Steams was able to achieve these results only by avoiding taking losses
on its Level 3 assets. It did this by using misleading valuation models that did not accurately
reflect declines in the housing market. This avoidance of loss permitted the Company to increase
its revenues and asset values, inflating the value of its stock.
649. Because the Level 3 assets the Company reported for the period stood at $15.64
billion, the Company's knowing use of materially deficient models to value those assets had
grave repercussions for accuracy of the Company's financial reporting. These effects were
magnified by the Company's leveraging practices.
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650. Moreover, the Company's assertion that its Level 3 assets stood at $15.64 billion
was materially false and misleading, given that it was a product of a valuation model that did not
reflect key declines in the market.
(ii) Exposure to Risk
651. Bear Steams' first quarter 2007 Form 10-Q also misled investors with respect to
its assessment of risk exposure. In the filing, Bear Stearns asserted that "The Company regularly
evaluates and enhances such VaR models in an effort to more accurately measure risk of loss."
652. In fact, the Company had undertaken no such review, and its Controller and
Principal Accountant, Farber, had been repeatedly warned by government regulators that the
Company's VaR models were inaccurate and out of date. According to the 2008 OIG Report, at
no time before the Company collapsed in 2008 did Bear Steams complete a review of its risk
management models.
653. As a result, according to the 2008 OIG Report, in this period Bear Stearns' VaR
models failed to include critical variables such as "housing price appreciation, consumer credit
scores, patters of delinquency rates, and potential other data." Because these indicators would
have reflected the ongoing collapse of the housing market, the Company's decision to omit them
from its VaR calculations was materially misleading.
654. In the Form 10-Q Bear Steams reported the reassuringly low VaR numbers it had
calculated for the first quarter of 2007, including an aggregate risk of just $27.9 million — far
lower than its peers. This statement was wildly misleading, in that the Company knew that its
VaR modeling failed to reflect its exposure to declining housing prices.
655. The first quarter 2007 Form 10-Q also misled investors with respect to Bear
Steams' risk control philosophy when it stated that "the Company's Risk Management
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Department and senior trading managers monitor exposure to market and credit risk for high
yield positions and establish limits and concentrations of risk by individual issuer."
656. In fact, Bear Steams lacked risk management personnel and was unable to
appropriately model for risk. Even when Bear Steams had the correct personnel in place, the
2008 OIG Report indicates that its risk managers were unable to effectively communicate with
the traders who were responsible for taking on additional risk. Bear Stearns did not have risk
managers that had experience or were capable of valuing MBS which were central to Bear
Stearns' business models.
(iii) Compliance With Banking Regulations
657. In its first quarter 2007 Form 10-Q Bear Stearns stated that "the Company is in
compliance with CSE regulatory capital requirements." This statement was materially false and
misleading when made because Bear Stearns was only able to meet the CSE program's minimum
capital requirements by repeatedly violating CSE rules relating to the appropriate calculation of
net capital. As set out in the 2008 OIG Report, the Company violated CSE rules by (i) inflating
its profit and its capital by using inflated marks on assets subject to mark disputes; and
(ii) falsely inflating its net capital by using misleading methods to calculate VaR.
(iv) Sarbanes-Oxley Certifications
658. Defendants Cayne and Molinaro each made false and misleading statements when
they executed Sarbanes-Oxley Act certifications, annexed as an exhibit to the Form I0-Q filing
for the first quarter of 2007. This certification stated that stated that the 10-Q report "does not
contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report" and "the financial statements, and
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other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition."
659. Cayne and Molinaro also certified that the Company had:
(d]esigned such internal control over financial reporting, or caused
such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under
our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial
statements for external purposes in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles."
660. These statements were false and misleading, in that, despite repeated warnings
from the SEC, the Company had made no effort to address deficiencies that went to the heart of
the Company's ability to assess the value of its assets and its exposure to risk. Moreover, the
encouraging revenue growth and earnings per share Bear Steams reported in its certified
statements reported were only made possible by the fact that Bear Stearns was avoiding taking
losses only by relying on misleading valuation models that failed to reflect the declining value of
its highly illiquid Level 3 assets.
(v) Deloitte's Certification
661. As the Company's auditor Deloitte certified Bear Stearns' first quarter 2007 Form
I0-Q, as required by Sarbanes-Oxley, and, in so doing, knowingly and recklessly falsely offered
an opinion as to the financial statement's accuracy. As set out in detail at paragraphs 523 to 588
above, Deloitte knew or recklessly disregarded that these statements and certifications were
materially false and misleading when made, and perpetrated a fraud on Bear Stearns investors as
a result.
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2. Second Quarter 2007 Results
a. Second Quarter 2007 Press Release
662. On June 14, 2007, Bear Steams issued a press release regarding its second quarter
2007 results.
NEW YORK — June 14, 2007 — The Bear Steams Companies Inc.
(NYSE:BSC) today reported earnings per share (diluted), after a
non-cash charge, of $2.52 for the second quarter ended May 31,
2007, down 32% from $3.72 per share for the second quarter of
2006 ... Net income for the second quarter of 2007, after the non-
cash charge, was $362 million. Net income excluding the non-
cash charge would have been $486 million, down 10% from $539
million for the second quarter of 2006. Net revenues for the 2007
second quarter were a record $2.512 billion, up from the previous
record of $2.499 billion reported for the 2006 second quarter. The
annualized return on common stockholders' equity for the second
quarter of 2007 was 11.6%, and 16.4% for the trailing 12-month
period ended May 31, 2007.
***
Capital Markets net revenues for the second quarter of 2007 were
$1.9 billion.
***
Fixed Income net revenues were $962 million for the 2007 second
quarter.
663. As a result, on June 14, 2007, Bear Steams' stock closed at $149.60 per share, up
from a close of $149.49 per share the day before. The following day, June 15, 2007, Bear
Steams' shares closed at $150.09.
664. In the press release, Bear Steams misrepresented its earnings per share, net
income, and net revenues - specifically its financial results for Capital Markets.
665. These statements were false and misleading because Bear Stearns achieved these
results by using misleading mortgage valuation models to value its Level 3 assets, as described
above at paragraphs 100 to 111.
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666. At the time of the statements, the Company's Level 3 assets represented 10.55%
of the Company's total assets held at market value, or a total of about $14.39 billion. Because
these assets were highly leveraged, even a small decline in value would be vastly magnified, as
set out in paragraphs 77 to 80 above.
667. The Company had been warned by the SEC that the models it used to value
mortgage-backed securities, the lion's share of these assets, did not reflect key factors relating to
the downturn in the housing industry, such as rising default rates. As set out above at paragraphs
139 to 148, default rates and other signs of market declines had risen dramatically in the second
half of 2006 and into the second quarter of 2007.
668. Accordingly, the values the Company assigned to this large group of assets was
significantly higher than they should have been, violating relevant GAAP provisions as set out
at paragraphs 324 to 423 above. Because the Company was not reflecting these losses on its
books, its revenues, earnings, and earnings per share were overstated.
b. Second Quarter 2007 Conference Call
669. On June 14, 2007, Bear Stearns held its second quarter 2007 earnings conference
call, conducted by defendant Molinaro, the Company's CFO. During the call, Molinaro repeated
the financial results described at paragraph 662 above. These statements were false and
misleading for the reasons set out at paragraphs 664 to 668 above.
670. During the June 14, 2007 conference call, Molinaro also stated that the:
During the quarter we adopted tighter underwriting standards in
the origination of sub prime and Alt-A mortgages which served to
dramatically reduce the volume of 100% CLTV lending as well as
stated income lending above 90% LTV, both important segments
of the sub prime and Alt-A market.
671. These statements were false and misleading because the Company understood that
the loans it was continuing to purchase through its EMC subsidiary were unusually risky. As
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noted above in paragraph 59, CW 3 reported that during the latter part of 2006 and the beginning
of 2007 EMC was "buying everything" without regard for the risk of the loan. Moreover, as
noted above, additional Confidential Witnesses have testified that Bear Steams' own origination
platforms were seriously flawed and were not accurately measuring the risk of the loans issued.
Additional Confidential Witnesses have confirmed that Bear Steams' internal origination
platforms were not using prudent lending standards.
c. June 22, 2007 Press Release
672. According to a June 22, 2007 press release announcing the Company's bailout of
the High Grade Fund, Bear Steams had provided the High Grade Hedge fund with a $1.6 billion
credit line, secured by collateral worth more than $1.6 billion. Bear Steams reported that asset
sales had reduced the loan balance to $1.345 billion. This statement was false and misleading.
673. As set out at paragraphs 212 to 213 above, according to the 2008 OIG Report, by
the time of this statement the estimated value of the collateral securing the loan had deteriorated
by nearly $350 million—that is, to approximately the value of the loan Bear Steams had given
the High Grade Fund. Moreover, the High Grade Hedge fund had no assets other than the
collateral Bear Steams already held.
674. Bear Stearns further misled investors during a June 22, 2007 conference call held
to discuss the liquidity difficulties experienced by BSAM's in-house hedge funds. During this
conference call, Molinaro was asked "[t] what extent has this event caused you to relook at some
of your practices overall for Bear Steams since you are such a big player in the mortgage
market? I mean you have had the sub-prime problem for more than three months now. Are
there other trigger events we should pay attention to over the next year?" Molinaro responded
with the following:
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Well [] I don't know that it's causing us to have any different point
of view on the activities in our mortgage business. Our mortgage
business has basically been not affected by this and has not really
been a part of this situation. So our mortgage business continues
to operate in a very effective way. Albeit in a more in a lower
volume environment and a more difficult operating environment
given the macro picture in the marketplace.
As it relates to our Asset Management division, we feel that we
have adequate controls in place. Obviously if you have a problem
like this, you are going to reassess those controls and look to
strengthen them. But I think the simple point in this Fund is that or
these two Funds, they are invested in an asset class that went
through a period of severe distress.
675. In fact, as set out above at paragraphs 139 to 148, by June of 2007 capital was
ebbing from the subprime securitization market, reducing demand for the origination of
subprime loans.
d. Second Quarter 2007 Form 10-O
676. In its report for the second quarter of 2007, signed by defendant Farber, the
Company materially misrepresented its financial results, its exposure to risk, its compliance with
regulatory capital requirements, its internal controls, and the effects of its bailout of the High
Grade Fund. Deloitte also filed a materially false and misleading certification in connection with
the Form 10-Q.
677. As a result, on July 10, 2007, Bear Stearns' stock closed at $137.96 per share,
down from a close of $143.89 per share the day before. The following day, July 11, 2007, Bear
Stearns' shares closed at $138.03.
(i) Financial Results
678. In the Form 10-Q it filed on July 10, 2007, the Company stated that:
Net revenues for Capital Markets decreased 9.7% to $1.86 billion
for the 200 quarter compared with $2.06 billion for the 2006
quarter.
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* * *
Fixed income net revenues decreased 21.3% to $962.3 million for
the 2007 quarter from $1.22 billion for the comparable prior year
quarter primarily due to a decrease in mortgage-related revenues.
Secondary trading revenues decreased in the 2007 quarter
compared with the 2006 quarter, particularly non-agency fixed rate
whole loans and Adjustable-Rate Mortgages ("ARMs"), reflecting
the challenges associated with the subprime mortgage sector.
Partially offsetting these decreases were increases in primary
revenues from commercial mortgage-backed securities and non-
agency fixed rate whole loans.
679. These statements were false and misleading because, as explained in paragraphs
100 to 111 above, in this period Bear Stearns avoided taking losses on its Level 3 assets by using
misleading mortgage valuation models, which did not accurately value its Level 3 assets. This
avoidance of loss permitted the Company to increase its revenues and asset values, inflating the
value of its stock.
680. At the time, the Level 3 assets the Company reported for the period stood at
$14.38 billion. Moreover, just four months later, the residential mortgage component of the
Company's Level 3 assets stood at $5.8 billion.
681. The Company's knowing use of materially deficient models to value its
mortgage-backed assets had grave repercussions for accuracy of the Company's financial
reporting. These effects were magnified by the Company's leveraging practices.
682. Moreover, the Company's assertion that its Level 3 assets stood at $14.38 billion
was itself materially false and misleading, given that it was a product of a valuation model that
did not reflect key declines in the market.
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(ii) Exposure to Risk
683. Bear Stearns' second quarter 2007 Form 10-Q misled investors with respect to its
assessment of risk exposure. In the filing, Bear Stearns asserted that "The Company regularly
evaluates and enhances [its] VaR models in an effort to more accurately measure risk of loss."
684. In fact, the Company had undertaken no such review, and its Controller and
Principal Accountant, Farber, had been repeatedly warned by government regulators that the
Company's VaR models were inaccurate and out of date. According to the 2008 OIG Report, at
no time before the Company collapsed in 2008 did Bear Steams complete a review of critical
inputs into its risk management models.
685. As a result, according to the 2008 OIG Report, in this period Bear Stearns' VaR
models failed to include critical variables such as "housing price appreciation, consumer credit
scores, patters of delinquency rates, and potential other data." Because these indicators would
have reflected the ongoing collapse of the housing market described at paragraphs 139 to 148
above, the Company's decision to omit these key variables from its VaR calculations was
materially misleading.
686. In the Form 10-Q Bear Steams reported the reassuringly low VaR numbers it had
calculated for the second quarter of 2007, including an aggregate risk of just $28.7 million — far
lower than its peers. This statement was materially misleading, in that the Company knew that
its VaR modeling failed to reflect its exposure to declining housing prices.
687. The second quarter 2007 Form 10-Q also misled investors with respect to Bear
Steams' risk control philosophy when it stated that "the Company's Risk Management
Department and senior trading managers monitor exposure to market and credit risk for high
yield positions and establish limits and concentrations of risk by individual issuer."
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688. In fact, Bear Steams lacked risk management personnel and was unable to
appropriately model for risk. Even when Bear Steams had the correct personnel in place, the
2008 OIG Report indicates that its risk managers were unable to effectively communicate with
the traders who were responsible for taking on additional risk. Bear Steams did not have risk
managers that had experience or were capable of valuing MBS which were central to Bear
Steams' business models.
(iii) Compliance With Banking Regulations
689. In its second quarter 2007 Form 10-Q Bear Steams stated that "the Company is in
compliance with CSE regulatory capital requirements." This statement was materially false and
misleading when made because Bear Steams met the CSE program's minimum capital
requirements only by repeatedly violating CSE requirements relating to the appropriate
calculation of net capital. As set out in the 2008 OIG Report and at paragraphs 427 to 452
above, the Company violated CSE rules by failing to take appropriate capital charges related to
its collapsed hedge funds; by inflating its profit and its capital by using inflated marks on assets
subject to mark disputes; and, by falsely inflating its net capital by using misleading methods to
calculate VaR.
(iv) The Company's Internal Controls
690. Defendants Cayne and Molinaro each made false and misleading statements when
they executed Sarbanes-Oxley Act certifications, annexed as an exhibit to the Form 10-Q filing
for the second quarter of 2007. This certification stated that stated that the Form 10-Q report
"does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report" and "the
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financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition."
691. Cayne and Molinaro also certified that the Company had:
[d]esigned such internal control over financial reporting, or caused
such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under
our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial
statements for external purposes in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles."
692. These statements were false and misleading, in that, despite repeated warnings
from the SEC, the Company had made no effort to address deficiencies that went to the heart of
the Company's ability to assess the value of its assets and its exposure to risk. Moreover, the
encouraging revenue growth and earnings per share Bear Steams reported in its certified
statements reported were only made possible by the fact that Bear Stearns was avoiding taking
losses only by relying on misleading valuation models that failed to reflect the declining value of
its highly illiquid Level 3 assets.
(v) The High Grade Fund Bailout
693. The second quarter 2007 Form 10-Q also contained false and misleading
information about the financial impact of Bear Steams' support of the High Grade Hedge Fund.
The second quarter 2007 10-Q advised investors that Bear Steams had entered into a $1.6 billion
secured financing agreement with the High Grade Hedge Fund "in the form of collateralized
repurchase agreements, enabled the High Grade Fund to replace existing secured financing,
thereby improving the High Grade Fund's liquidity and allowing an orderly de-leveraging of the
High Grade Fund in the marketplace. Currently, we believe the High Grade Fund has sufficient
assets available to fully collateralize the Facility."
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694. The statements in the above paragraph were materially false and misleading
because Bear Steams' management knew that the High Grade Fund did not have sufficient assets
available to fully collateralize the facility. The fact that the High Grade Fund did not have
sufficient assets to collateralize the Facility was known to Bear Stearns management because the
collateral that Bear Steams took in the repurchase agreement were the same CDOs that had lost
so much value, causing other lenders to make the margin calls that severally threatened the hedge
fund's liquidity.
(vi) Deloitte's Certification
695. As the Company's auditor Deloitte certified Bear Steams' second quarter 2006
10-Q, and, in so doing, knowingly and recklessly falsely offered an opinion as to the financial
statement's accuracy. As set out in detail at paragraphs 523 to 588 above, Deloitte knew or
recklessly disregarded that these statements and certifications were materially false and
misleading when made.
3. August 3, 2007 Press Release and Conference Call
696. On August 3, 2007, Standard & Poor's cut Bear Steams' credit rating outlook to
negative. In an effort to limit damage to its share price, Bear Steams issued a press release
which contained misleading statements with regard to Bear Steams' liquidity and its risk
controls. The Company also hosted a conference call with analysts making similar
misstatements.
697. In the press release, the Company stated:
The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (NYSE: BSC) said today that it
is disappointed with S&P's decision to change its outlook on Bear
Stearns. Most of the themes highlighted in its report are common
to the industry and are not likely to have a disproportional impact
on Bear Stearns. S&P's specific concerns over issues relating to
certain hedge funds managed by BSAM are unwarranted as these
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were isolated incidences and are by no means an indication of
broader issues at Bear Stearns.
* * *
our balance sheet is strong and liquid. . .With respect to operating
performance and financial condition, the Company has been
solidly profitable in the first two months of the quarter, while the
balance sheet, capital base and liquidity profile have never been
stronger. Bear Steams' risk exposures to high profile sectors are
moderate and well-controlled. The risk management infrastructure
and processes remain conservative and consistent with past
practices.
698. These statements were false and misleading when made for at least two reasons.
First, because the Company knowingly used VaR models that would vastly underrepresent the
risk the Company faced as a result of the declining housing market, it was reckless to assert that
its liquidity and capital were sufficient to cover potential losses.
699. Moreover, the Company's "solid" profits in fact resulted from the Company's use
of misleading valuation models to avoid taking losses, resulting in an overstatement of earnings,
as set out at paragraphs 100 to III above.
700. On the conference call held on the same day, Company executives responded to
analysts' concerns regarding the downgrade. During the conference call, Defendant Alix, Bear
Stearns' Chief Risk Officer, stated "we have long focused on the origination, transformation and
redistribution of risk. We've always managed the risk in this process by adjusting the intake, the
origination of risk, to the demand for the end products."
701. These statements were false and misleading because, as the head of the
Company's Global Risk Management division, Alix knew that the VaR models the company
employed to assess risk and hedge purchases did not reflect the reality of the collapsing real
estate market. Moreover, Alix knew that the Company had made no attempt to revise or update
these defective models in years.
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702. During the same conference call, Molinaro made false and misleading statements
regarding the collateral that Bear Steams took in the repurchase agreement with the High Grade
Fund, stating that "the market value of the inventory approximately reflects what the repo
balance was."
703. However, as noted above, Bear Steams did not have accurate valuation models to
value the Hedge Funds' subprime-backed collateral, and therefore, was at least reckless in
offering any opinion on the market value of the highly illiquid collateral it had received from the
Fund. Moreover, given that barely two weeks earlier the Company had informed the High Grade
Fund investors that the fund was worth almost nothing, the hedge fund collateral that the
Company held on its books was worth closer to zero.
4. Third Quarter 2007 Results
a. Third Quarter 2007 Press Release
704. On September 20, 2007, Bear Steams issued a press release regarding its third
quarter 2007 results.
NEW YORK, NY — September 20, 2007 — The Bear Steams
Companies Inc. (NYSE:BSC) today reported earnings per share
(diluted) of $1.16 for the third quarter ended August 31, 2007,
down 62% from $3.02 per share for the third quarter of 2006. Net
income for the third quarter of 2007 was $171.3 million, down
61% from $438 million for the third quarter of 2006. Net revenues
were $1.3 billion for the third quarter, down 38% from $2.1 billion
for the third quarter of 2006. The annualized return on common
stockholders' equity for the third quarter of 2007 was 5.3%, and
13.7% for the 12-month period ended August 31, 2007. Third
quarter results include approximately $200 million in losses and
expenses related to the BSAM High Grade hedge...
* * *
Net revenues for the Capital Markets segment were $1.0 billion for
the quarter ended August 31, 2007.
* * *
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Fixed Income net revenues were $118 million for the 2007 third
quarter.
705. In light of statements made in connection with these disappointing results, Bear
Steams' stock closed at $115.46 per share, down just eighteen cents from its close of $115.64 per
share the day before. Indeed, the following day, September 21, 2007, Bear Stearns' shares
closed up, at $117.32.
706. In the press release, Bear Steams falsely stated that, for the first quarter, its
earnings per share were $1.16, net income was $171.3 million, and net revenues were $1.3
billion. Financial results for Capital Markets, specifically Fixed Income, were also false and
misleading.
707. These statements were false and misleading because Bear Stearns achieved these
results by using misleading mortgage valuation models to value its Level 3 assets, as described
above at paragraphs 100 to 111.
708. At the time of the statements, the Company's Level 3 assets represented 13%
percent of the Company's total assets held at market value, or a total of about $16.6 billion.
According to a February 8, 2008 presentation by defendant Molinaro to Credit Suisse analysts,
$5.8 billion of that figure was residential mortgage-backed securities. Because these assets were
highly leveraged, even a small decline in value would be vastly magnified, as set out in
paragraphs 77 to 80 above.
709. The Company had been warned by the SEC that the models it used to value
mortgage-backed securities, more than a quarter of these assets, did not reflect key factors
relating to the downturn in the housing industry, such as rising default rates. As set out above at
paragraphs 139 to 148, default rates and other signs of market declines had risen dramatically in
the second half of 2006 and into the third quarter of 2007.
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710. Accordingly, the values the Company assigned to this large group of assets was
significantly higher than they should have been, violating relevant GAAP as set out at
paragraphs 324 to 423 above. Because the Company was not reflecting these losses on its books,
its revenues, earnings, and earnings per share were overstated as well.
b. Third Quarter 2007 Conference Call
711. On September 20, 2007 Bear Steams also held its third quarter 2007 earnings
conference call, conducted by Sam Molinaro, the Company's CFO. During the call, Molinaro
repeated the financial results set out in paragraph 704 above. These results were false and
misleading for the reasons set out in paragraphs 706 to 710 above.
712. Also during the call, Molinaro made false and misleading statements regarding
Bear Stearns' valuation methodology when he stated:
At Bear Stearns we mark our inventory to market Levels that we
can observe in the marketplace. We've taken the view that the
stress markets are the markets and that inventory should be marked
at Levels that transactions are occurring. Of course we do have
inventory that does not actively trade in the market. In those cases,
we rely on valuation models that utilized observable market inputs
in determining fair value. These valuations can typically be
benchmarked against transactions in similar products or assets
taking place in the market."
713. This statement was false and misleading because it disregarded the material fact,
as noted in the 2008 OIG Report that Bear Stearns' valuation methodology did not take into
account key market inputs and were more than ten years out of date.
714. In the same call, Molinaro stated that Bear Stearns would take "$200 million of
losses associated with the failure of the high-grade funds, representing the write-off of our
investment and fees receivable, losses from the liquidation of the $1.6 billion repo facility."
715. An analyst asked "and — and then on the — on the $200 million write down of the
high-grade funds. That effectively a write down what was last reported a $1.3 billion balance?"
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716. Molinaro responded that "about $100 million of that is the write-off of our
investment in the fund and the write-off of receivables that we had from the funds related to
predominantly related to management and performance fees that related to 2006."
717. As set out above at paragraphs 212 to 216, this $100 million figure was $1.2
billion short of the Company's true losses due to the Hedge Fund collapse. The Company did
not disclose the full amount of its losses on the collateral for fear that its lenders and
counterparties would realize that it had been consistently overvaluing its assets.
718. In fact, even by the Company's own estimations regarding the write downs
associated with the Hedge Fund, the numbers revealed to investors in September 2007 were
misleading. The 2008 OIG Report states that the Company's internal documents reflect that it
ultimately took a $500 million write down in connection with the bailout in the fall of 2007.
However, the Company never disclosed this additional write down to investors.
c. Third Quarter 2007 Form 10-0
719. In its report for the third quarter of 2007, signed by defendant Farber, the
Company materially misrepresented its financial results, its exposure to risk, its internal controls,
and its compliance with regulatory capital requirements. In addition, Deloitte made materially
false statements to investors in certifying the Company's results for the quarter.
(i) Financial Results
720. In the Form 10-Q it filed on October 10, 2007, the Company stated that:
Net revenues for Capital Markets decreased 36.4% to $1.05 billion
for the 2007 quarter compared with $1.65 billion for the 2006
quarter.
* * *
Fixed income net revenues decreased 87.6% to $117.6 million for
the 2007 quarter from $945.0 million for the comparable prior year
quarter. The Company recognized approximately $700 million in
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net inventory markdowns during the 2007 quarter related to losses
in the residential mortgage and leveraged finance areas.
721. These statements were false and misleading because, as explained in paragraphs
100 to 111 above, in this period Bear Stearns avoided taking losses on its Level 3 assets by using
misleading valuation models, which did not accurately value its Level 3 assets. This avoidance
of loss permitted the Company to increase its revenues and asset values, inflating the value of its
stock.
722. Because the Level 3 assets the Company reported for the period stood at $16.6
billion, the Company's knowing use of materially deficient models to value those assets had
grave repercussions for accuracy of the Company's financial reporting. These effects were
magnified by the Company's leveraging practices.
723. Moreover, the Company's assertion that its Level 3 assets stood at $16.6 billion
was itself materially false and misleading, given that it was a product of a valuation model that
did not reflect key declines in the market.
724. Bear Stearns' revelation that it recognized "approximately $700 million in net
inventory markdowns during the 2007 quarter primarily related to losses experienced in the
mortgage-related and leveraged finance areas" was false and misleading when made because it
grossly underrepresented the Company's true losses, including its losses on the worthless
collateral it had received under the repurchase agreement with the High Grade Fund and the
devalued and illiquid retained interests that it continued to carry on its books, as set out at
paragraphs 212 to 216 above.
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(ii) Exposure to Risk
725. Bear Steams' third quarter 2007 Form 10-Q also misled investors with respect to
its assessment of risk exposure. In the filing, Bear Stearns asserted that "The Company regularly
evaluates and enhances such VaR models in an effort to more accurately measure risk of loss."
726. In fact, the Company had undertaken no such review, and its Controller and
Principal Accountant, Farber, had been repeatedly warned by government regulators that the
Company's VaR models were inaccurate and out of date. According to the 2008 OIG Report, at
no time before the Company collapsed in 2008 did Bear Steams complete a review of its risk
management models.
727. As a result, according to the 2008 OIG Report, in this period Bear Stearns' VaR
models failed to include critical variables such as "housing price appreciation, consumer credit
scores, patters of delinquency rates, and potential other data." Because these indicators would
have reflected the ongoing collapse of the housing market, the Company's decision to omit them
from its VaR calculations was materially misleading.
728. In the Third Quarter 2007 Form 10-Q Bear Steams reported the reassuringly low
VaR numbers it had calculated for the third quarter of 2007, including an aggregate risk of just
$35 million — far lower than its peers. This statement was materially misleading, in that the
Company knew that its VaR modeling failed to reflect its accelerating exposure to declining
housing prices.
729. The third quarter 2007 Form 10-Q also mislead investors with respect to Bear
Steams' risk control philosophy when it stated that "the Company's Risk Management
Department and senior trading managers monitor exposure to market and credit risk for high
yield positions and establish limits and concentrations of risk by individual issuer."
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730. In fact, Bear Steams lacked risk management personnel and was unable to
appropriately model for risk. Even when Bear Steams had the correct personnel in place, the
2008 OIG Report indicates that its risk managers were unable to effectively communicate with
the traders who were responsible for taking on additional risk. Bear Steams did not have risk
managers that had experience or were capable of valuing MBS which were central to Bear
Stearns' business models.
(iii) Compliance With Rankine Regulations
731. In its third quarter 2007 Form 10-Q Bear Steams stated that "the Company is in
compliance with CSE regulatory capital requirements." This statement was materially false and
misleading when made because Bear Steams only CSE program's minimum capital requirements
by violating CSE rules relating to the appropriate calculation of net capital. As set out in the
2008 OIG Report and at paragraphs 427 to 452 above, the Company violated CSE rules by
(i) failing to take appropriate capital charges related to its collapsed hedge funds; (ii) inflating its
profit and its capital by using inflated marks on assets subject to mark disputes; and (iii) falsely
inflating its net capital by using misleading methods to calculate VaR.
(iv) Internal Controls
732. Defendants Cayne and Molinaro each made false and misleading statements when
they executed Sarbanes Oxley Act certifications, annexed as an exhibit to the Form 10-Q filing
for the third quarter of 2007. This certification stated that stated that the Form 10-Q report "does
not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made,
not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report" and "the financial statements,
and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition."
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733. Cayne and Molinaro also certified that the Company had:
resigned such internal control over financial reporting, or caused
such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under
our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial
statements for external purposes in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles."
734. These statements were false and misleading, in that, despite repeated warnings
from the SEC, the Company had made no effort to address deficiencies that went to the heart of
the Company's ability to assess the value of its assets and its exposure to risk. Moreover, the
encouraging revenue growth and earnings per share Bear Stearns reported in its certified
statements reported were only made possible by the fact that Bear Stearns was avoiding taking
losses only by relying on misleading valuation models that failed to reflect the declining value of
its highly illiquid Level 3 assets.
(v) Deloitte's Certification
735. As an auditor Deloitte also certified Bear Steams' third quarter 2006 Form 10-Q,
as required by Sarbanes-Oxley, and, in so doing, knowingly and recklessly falsely offered an
opinion as to the financial statement's accuracy. As set out in detail at paragraphs 523 to 588
above, Deloitte knew or recklessly disregarded that these statements and certifications were
materially false and misleading when made.
5. November 14, 2007 Write Downs
736. On November 14, 2007, Defendant Molinaro announced that Bear Stearns would
write down $1.2 billion of its assets in the fourth quarter. However, Molinaro misleadingly
attempted to reassure investors by claiming that Bear Steams had reduced its CDO holdings to
$884 million as of November 9, down from $2.07 billion at the end of August. In fact, the
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Company claimed that it now had a net negative exposure to the subprime market—that is, it
would profit if the subprime market continued to decline.
737. Molinaro's November 14, 2007 statements were false and misleading because he
did not disclose the true extent of Bear Stearns' exposure from the repurchase collateral taken
from the High Grade Fund. Beyond the a $100 million write down in the hedge fund collateral
in the quarter ending August 31, 2007, the Company disclosed no further writedowns of the $1.2
billion of toxic hedge fund assets it still held on its books.
738. Moreover, these statements were materially false and misleading because the
write downs the Company reported were far less than would have been required if the Company
had been valuing its Level 3 mortgage-related assets using models that actually reflected the
carnage in the housing market.
739. Finally, Molinaro's statements were false and misleading in that the Company's
faulty VaR models could not permit it to effective hedge against risk in the subprime market.
This fact is confirmed by the Company's announcement barely a month later that it would in fact
have to take an additional $700 million writedown on its mortgage-backed assets.
6. Fourth Ouarter and Fiscal Year 2007
a. Press Release
740. On December 21, 2007 Bear Stearns issued a press release regarding its fourth
quarter and fiscal year end results for 2007.
NEW YORK, NY - December 20, 2007 - The Bear Stearns
Companies Inc. (NYSE:BSC) reported results today for the fiscal
year and the fourth quarter ended November 30, 2007. For the
fiscal year the company reported $1.52 earnings per share
(diluted), compared with $14.27 for fiscal 2006. Net income for
the fiscal year was $233 million compared with $2.1 billion earned
in fiscal year ended November 30, 2006. Net revenues for the
2007 fiscal year were $5.9 billion, compared with $9.2 billion in
the prior fiscal year ... In early November the company
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announced that it anticipated write-downs of approximately $1.2
billion in mortgage inventory net of hedges. At November 30,
total net inventory write-downs were $1.9 billion.
***
Net revenues in Capital Markets, which includes Institutional
Equities, Fixed Income and Investment Banking, were a loss of
$956 million in the fourth quarter of 2007
***
Fixed Income net revenues were a loss of $1.5 billion, down from
net revenues of $1.1 billion in the fourth quarter of 2006.
741. On December 21, 2007, Bear Steams' stock closed at $89.95 per share, down
little from a close of $91.42 per share the day before.
742. In the press release, Bear Steams misrepresented its earnings per share, net
income, and net revenues. The Company's Losses in the Capital Market, specifically Fixed
Income, were also understated.
743. These statements were false and misleading because Bear Stearns achieved these
reported results by using misleading mortgage valuation models to value its Level 3 assets, as
described above at paragraphs 100 to III.
744. At the time of the statements, the Company's Level 3 assets represented 19.9% of
the Company's total assets held at market value, or a total of about $24.41 billion. Moreover,
according to the Company's February 8, 2008 presentation to Credit Suisse analysts, $7.5 billion
of this amount represented residential mortgages. Because these assets were highly leveraged,
even a small decline in value would be vastly magnified, as set out in paragraphs 77 to 80 above.
745. The Company had been warned by the SEC that the models it used to value
mortgages and mortgage-backed securities, a quarter of its Level 3 assets, did not reflect key
factors relating to the downturn in the housing industry, such as rising default rates. As set out
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above at paragraphs 139 to 148, default rates and other signs of market declines had risen
dramatically in the second half of 2006 and into the fourth quarter of 2007.
746. Accordingly, the values the Company assigned to this large group of assets was
significantly higher than they should have been, violating relevant GAAP as set out at
paragraphs 324 to 423 above. Because the Company was not reflecting these losses on its books,
its revenues, earnings, and earnings per share were overstated as well.
747. In addition, these statements were false and misleading because the Company still
failed to disclose the true extent of Bear Stearns' exposure from the repurchase collateral taken
from the High Grade Fund. Beyond the $100 million write down in the hedge fund collateral in
the quarter ending August 31, 2007, the Company had disclosed no further writedowns of the
$1.2 billion of toxic hedge fund assets it still held on its books.
748. Finally, these statements were materially false and misleading because the write
downs the Company reported were far less than would have been required if the Company had
been valuing its Level 3 mortgage-related assets using models that actually reflected the carnage
in the housing market.
b. Fourth Ouarter 2007 Conference Call
749. Bear Stearns announced its fourth quarter 2007 results in a conference call on
December 20, 2007. During the call, Molinaro repeated the financial results described at
paragraph 740. These statements were false and misleading for the same reasons set out in
paragraphs 742 to 748 above.
750. Molinaro also made false and misleading statements when he stated that:
On November 14, we announced we would take a $1.2 billion
write-down on our mortgage securities inventories as a result of
continuing deterioration and market conditions through the end of
October. During the month of November, market conditions
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continued to deteriorate, which resulted additional write-downs,
bringing total mortgage related losses to $1.9 billion.
751. Further, Molinaro stated: "we believe our mortgage positions have been
conservatively valued in light of current market conditions and expected levels of defaults and
cumulative loss estimates." (Emphasis added.) Molinaro further stated "Overall this franchise is
strong; smaller and more focused on restructuring than origination going forward, but our top
talent is in place and we are confident in the underlying earnings potential of the mortgage
business."
752. These statements were false and misleading because they failed to disclose the
Company's undisclosed losses from the worthless hedge fund collateral that it bore on its books.
753. These statements were also false and misleading because the losses were
minimized by the fact that Bear Stearns was relying on misleading valuation models that failed
to reflect the declining value of its highly illiquid Level 3 assets.
754. Moreover, the lack of any schedule giving details regarding the nature of the write
downs left investors with no information about the nature of the Company's true exposure and
compounded the false and misleading statements by such omissions. Write downs by other
companies in the same period provided far more information, including the source of exposure
(retained interest, derivatives, commitment to provide liquidity and/or credit support, or
warehoused loans and mortgage-backed securities), the type of CDOs to which they were
exposed (high grade, mezzanine, CDO-squared, etc.) and vintage of the subprime mortgages that
underlie their CDO exposures.
7. Fiscal Year 2007 Form 10-K
755. On January 29, 2008, Bear Steams filed its Form 10-K for the annual and
quarterly period ended November 30, 2007. The Form 10-K was signed by, among others,
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defendants Greenberg, Cayne, Schwartz, Farber and Molinaro. The Form 10-K made
misrepresentations regarding the Company's financial results, risk management practices,
exposure to market risk, compliance with banking capital requirements, and internal controls.
Finally, the 2007 Form 10-K contained false and misleading statements by the Company's
auditor, Deloitte, relating to its review and certification of the Company's reported financial
results.
a. The Company's Financial Results
756. In the Form 10-K it filed on January 29, 2008, the Company stated that:
Fiscal 2007 versus Fiscal 2006 Net revenues for Capital Markets
decreased 46% to $3.92 billion for fiscal 2007, compared with
$7.32 billion for fiscal 2006.
Fixed income net revenues decreased 84% to $685 million for
fiscal 2007 from $4.19 billion for fiscal 2006. Results for fiscal
2007 were heavily impacted by the severe market conditions
across the fixed income sector. The repricing of credit led to
significantly lower net revenue levels due to illiquidity in the
markets as trading levels deteriorated across the spectrum of fixed
income products. Mortgage-backed securities revenues decreased
significantly during fiscal 2007 when compared with fiscal 2006
due to weaker U.S. mortgage markets and challenges associated
with the subprime mortgage sector. Significant spread widening in
the second half of fiscal 2007 served to reduce inventory values
and activity levels. Mortgage-related revenues reflect
approximately $2.3 billion in net inventory write downs in the
second half of fiscal 2007. A large component of these write-
downs were related to ABS CDOs and the unwinding of ABS
CDO warehouse facilities. As of November 30, 2007, all ABS
CDO warehouse positions have been unwound. The remaining
write-downs were experienced across our U.S. and international
residential and commercial inventories.
757. As a result, on January 29, 2008, Bear Stearns' stock closed at $91.58 per share,
up from a close of $91.10 per share the day before. The following day, January 30, 2008, Bear
Stearns' shares closed at $88.26.
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758. These statements were false and misleading because, as explained in paragraphs
100 to 111 above, in this period Bear Stearns avoided taking losses on its Level 3 assets by using
misleading valuation models, which did not accurately value its Level 3 assets. This avoidance
of loss permitted the Company to increase its revenues and asset values and, for the fourth
quarter and fiscal 2007, avoid additional losses, inflating the value of its stock.
759. Moreover, in the 2007 Form 10-K the Company was materially false and
misleading in its assertions about the value of assets corresponding to Level 3. The Company
stated that, as of November 30, 2006, it held $24.4 billion in Level 3 assets. This statement was
false and misleading because, by January of 2008, the Company had been informed that the
models it used to value the more than $7.5 billion in mortgage-backed securities in this asset
category failed to reflect dramatic declines in the housing market.
b. The Company's Risk Mannement Practices
760. Bear Steams' 2007 Form 10-K mislead investors with respect to the models it
used to value mortgage-backed assets and assess risk. The 2007 Form 10-K stated that:
Members of the Controllers and Risk Management Departments
perform analysis of internal valuations, typically on a monthly
basis but often on an intra-month basis as well. These departments
are independent of the trading areas responsible for valuing the
positions. Results of the monthly validation process are reported
to the Mark-to-Market Committee ("MTMC"), which is composed
of senior management from the Risk Management and Controllers
Departments. The MTMC is responsible for ensuring that the
approaches used to independently validate the Company's
valuations are robust, comprehensive and effective. Typical
approaches include valuation comparisons with external sources,
comparisons with observed trading, independent comparisons of
key model valuation inputs, independent trade modeling and a
variety of other techniques.
761. The Company specifically asserted that:
The Company regularly evaluates and enhances such VaR models
in an effort to more accurately measure risk of loss.
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762. These statements were false and misleading when made because, as set out at
paragraphs 124 to 126 above, by the time of this statement the SEC had repeatedly warned the
Company that the models it used to assess risk, including its VaR and mortgage valuation
models, failed to reflect key indicators of market declines. According to the 2008 DIG Report,
Bear Stearns' VaR models failed to include critical variables such as "housing price appreciation,
consumer credit scores, patters of delinquency rates, and potential other data." It was precisely
these indicators that would have reflected the rapidly declining housing market.
763. Moreover, according to the 2008 (DIG Report, reviews of the Company's risk
management models which should have taken place before the subprime market cratered were
never completed at any time before the Company's collapse.
764. Bear Stearns' 2007 Annual Report to Stockholders, attached as an Exhibit to the
Form 10-K, misled investors with respect to Bear Stearns' risk control philosophy when it stated
that "the Company's Risk Management Department and senior trading managers monitor
exposure to market and credit risk for high yield positions and establish limits and concentrations
of risk by individual issuer."
765. In fact, Bear Steams lacked risk management personnel and was unable to
appropriately model for risk. Even when Bear Steams had the correct personnel in place, the
2008 (DIG Report indicates that its risk managers were unable to effectively communicate with
the traders who were responsible for taking on additional risk. Bear Stearns did not have risk
managers that had experience or were capable of valuing MBS which were central to Bear
Stearns' business models.
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766. Bear Steams' 2007 Form 10-K also misled investors with respect to Bear Steams'
risk management procedures when it stated that "Comprehensive risk management procedures
have been established to identify, monitor and control each of [the] major risks."
767. In fact, this statement was false and misleading when made because, according
the 2008 OIG Report and verified independently by confidential witnesses, Bear Steams did not
have risk management personnel at the time capable of accurately valuing MBS.
768. Bear Steams' 2007 Form 10-K also stated that "The Treasurer's Department is
independent of trading units and is responsible for the Company's funding and liquidity risk
management. . . [m]any of the independent units are actively involved in ensuring the integrity
and clarity of the daily profit and loss statements."
769. Moreover, the Form 10-K stated that the:
The Risk Management Department is independent of all trading
areas and reports to the chief risk officer... [t]he department
supplements the communication between trading managers and
senior management by providing its independent perspective on
the Company's market risk profile."
770. In fact, as set out at paragraphs 129 to 136 above, during 2007 Bear Stearns' risk
managers had little independence from its trading desk, and no ability to reign in the Company's
accumulation of risk.
771. Furthermore, despite the crucial deficiencies in the models Bear Steams used to
value the Company's Level 3 assets, the Company stated in its Form 10-K that it was "marking
all positions to market on a daily basis" and that it had "independent verification of inventory
pricing."
c. The Conman 's Ex osure to the Market Risk
772. The Company's 2007 Form 10-K was also false and misleading in that it failed to
disclose the Company's true exposure to the subprime market by relying on valuation models
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and VaR models that did not accurately reflect the current state of the subprime market. The
SEC concluded in the 2008 OIG Report that, as a result, investors were deprived of "material
information" that they could have used "to make well-informed investment decisions."
773. Bear Steams' 2007 Form 10-K also mislead investors with respect to its exposure
to "market risk." In its 2007 Form 10-K the Company stated that it:
mitigates its exposure to market risk by entering into offsetting
transactions, which may include over-the-counter derivative
contracts or the purchase or sale of interest-bearing securities,
equity securities, financial futures and forward contracts. In this
regard, the utilization of derivative instruments is designed to
reduce or mitigate market risks associated with holding dealer
inventories or in connection with arbitrage-related trading
activities.
774. These statements were false when made because Bear Stearns managers were
aware that it was impossible to effectively hedge against declines in assets in light of deficiencies
in its VaR and mortgage valuation models, as discussed above at paragraphs 100 to 111 and 123
to 128.
775. Furthermore, because of the deficiencies in it VaR models, the Company was
false and misleading in its representation in its 2007 Form 10-K that it had an aggregate VaR of
just $69.3 million—still far lower than its peers. In fact, the Company knew that its VaR
numbers failed to reflect its exposure to declining housing prices.
d. Compliance With Banking Regulations
776. In its 2007 Form 10-K Bear Steams stated that "the Company is in compliance
with CSE regulatory capital requirements." This statement was materially false and misleading
when made because, as set forth at paragraphs 427 to 452 above, the Company had misled
regulators into believing that it was meeting capital requirements only by repeatedly violating
regulatory requirements relating to the appropriate calculation of net capital. As set forth in the
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2008 OIG Report, the Company violated CSE rules by failing to take appropriate capital charges
related to its collapsed hedge funds; by inflating its profit and its capital by using inflated marks
on assets subject to mark disputes; and by falsely inflating its net capital by using misleading
methods to calculate VaR.
The Company's Internal Controls
777. Defendants Cayne and Molinaro each made false and misleading statements when
they executed Sarbanes-Oxley Act certifications, annexed as an exhibit to the Form 10-K filing.
This certification stated that stated that the Form 10-K report "does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with
respect to the period covered by this report" and "the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition."
778. Defendants Cayne and Molinaro made false and misleading statements when they
executed their Sarbanes-Oxley Act certifications, annexed as an exhibit to the Form 10-K filing,
in stating that the Form 10-K report "does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
this report" and "the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report,
fairly present in all material respects the financial condition."
779. Cayne and Molinaro also certified that the Company had:
[d]esigned such internal control over financial reporting, or caused
such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under
our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial
statements for external purposes in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles."
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780. These statements were false and misleading, in that, despite repeated warnings
from the SEC, the Company had made no effort to address deficiencies that went to the heart of
the Company's ability to assess the value of its assets and its exposure to risk. Moreover, the
encouraging revenue growth and earnings per share Bear Steams reported in its certified
statements reported were only made possible by the fact that Bear Stearns was avoiding taking
losses only by relying on misleading valuation models that failed to reflect the declining value of
its highly illiquid Level 3 assets.
f. Deloitte's Certification
781. As an auditor Deloitte also certified Bear Steams' 2007 Form 10-K, as required
by Sarbanes-Oxley, and, in so doing, knowingly and recklessly falsely offered an opinion as to
the financial statement's accuracy. As set out in detail at paragraphs 523 to 588 above, Deloitte
knew or recklessly disregarded that these statements and certifications were materially false and
misleading when made.
C. Additional False and Misleading Statements in Calendar Year 2008
782. Bear Stearns made additional false and misleading statements immediately before
it collapsed in a desperate effort to dupe investors into holding on to their shares in Company
stock.
783. On January 31, 2008, Bear Steams published a letter it had written to John Cash,
Accounting Branch Chief of the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance, in response to certain
concerns the SEC raised about Bear Steams' exposure to subprime loans in its fiscal year 2006
Form 10-K. The Company described its use of econometric models:
Our objective is to securitize all originated and purchased loans.
All securitized retained interests from our subprime originations
are recorded as financial instruments owned, at fair value, along
with any other investments in subprime securities purchased
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through our trading operations. Fair value is determined based on
the net present value of a future stream of cash flows.
Econometric models are used by the trading desk and risk
management to generate these expected cash flows. Such models
are primarily industry standard models that consider various
assumptions, including time value, yield curve, volatility factors,
prepayment speeds, default rates, loss severity, as well as other
relevant economic factors. A degree of subjectivity is required to
determine the appropriate models or methodologies as well as the
appropriate underlying assumptions.
Our models are estimated on a data sample of over [* * *] loans
with performance history extending more than ten years. To better
capture the impact of risk layers in mortgage loans, these models
are estimated and implemented at the loan level. The underlying
structure of the model is a competing hazards model with the
prepayment and charge-off as the two possible terminal states for a
mortgage. The model parameters are recalibrated on a regular
basis to reflect the most recent data.
784. The statements in paragraph 783 above are materially false and misleading
because the Company had actually subordinated its risk management function to the activities of
its trading desks. Specifically, these statements failed to disclose that the pricing of MBS at Bear
Stearns' trading desks was based more on trading levels in the market than on models. These
statements did not disclose that the risk management models that Bear Steams employed were
not used by traders for pricing, and were insensitive to price fluctuations in the housing market, a
factor critical to assessing the risk associated with these securities. Its statements failed to
disclose that the Company did not periodically evaluate its VaR models, and failed to timely
update inputs to these models.
785. In a March 10, 2008 press release the Company said that "[t]here is absolutely no
truth to the rumors of liquidity problems that circulated today in the market" and suggested that
the Company had some $17 billion in cash.
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786. The same day, Defendant Greenberg claimed during an interview with CNBC that
the Company had no liquidity problems, calling such an assertion "ridiculous, totally ridiculous."
787. According to figures released by former Chairman Cox of the SEC in a March 20,
2008 letter to the Basel Group, the Company's liquidity pool on March II, 2008, even adjusting
for the customer protection rule, stood at $15.8 billion.
788. On March 12, 2008, Defendant Schwartz, Bear Steams' CEO, appeared on CNBC
and said that the Company's liquidity position and balance sheet had not weakened at all. "We
finished the year, and we reported that we had $17 billion of cash sitting at the bank's parent
Company as a liquidity cushion," he said. "As the year has gone on, that liquidity cushion has
been virtually unchanged." Schwartz added that "We don't see any pressure on our liquidity, let
alone a liquidity crisis."
789. These statements were materially false and misleading. Chairman Cox concluded
in his letter that the Company's liquidity pool actually stood at $12.4 billion the same day—a
drop of more than $3 billion from the Company's position barely fifteen hours earlier. Its
liquidity pool stood at nearly $5 billion less than it had on Monday, March 10, 2008. A day after
Schwartz' CNBC appearance on March 13, the Company's liquidity pool, according to
Chairman Cox, stood at $2 billion.
790. As Schwartz was assuring investors on March 12 that the Company was
experiencing no threats to its liquidity, $10 billion in cash was evaporating.
791. Moreover, Schwartz specifically denied on March 12 that the Company's risk had
scared away any counterparties:
CNBC: Let me start off with this broad idea that's been in the
market now for a few days and pressuring your stock. Namely,
that counterparty risk is something — new counterparty risk is
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something that a number of firms on Wall Street no longer want to
take in terms of dealing with Bear Steams. Is that true?
SCHWARTZ: No, it's not true. We are — there's a been a lot of
volatility in the market, a lot of disruption in the market, and that's
causing some pressure administratively on getting some trades
settled up, but we're workin' hard gettin' that done. We're in a
constant dialogue with all of the major dealers and the
counterparties in the Street, and we're not being made aware of
anybody who is not taking our credit as a counterparty.
CNBC: All right, so when I'm told by a hedge fund that I know
well, that last night they tried to close out a mortgage — a credit
protection mortgage position with Goldman Sachs that they had
bought a year ago, Bear Stearns was the low bid, and I'm told that
Goldman would not accept the counterparty risk of Bear Steams.
You're saying you're not aware that that would be the case.
SCHWARTZ: I'm not aware that, you know, on a specific trade
from one counterparty to another and where you're a third-party,
we have direct dealings with all of these institutions, and we have
active markets going with each one, and our counterparty risk has
not been a problem.
792. At the time he made this statement, Schwartz, as the Company's CEO, was aware
that on March 6, 2008, more than a week earlier, Rabobank Group, one of Bear Stearns'
European lenders, told the brokerage that it would not renew a $500 million loan coming due
later that week. He also knew that ING had just pulled nearly half a billion in financing and that
Goldman Sachs, once a principal source of cash for the Company, had at least temporarily halted
covering any more Bear Stearns risk.
793. Furthermore, according to the 2008 OIG Report, the Company informed TM on
March 12, 2008, the same day as Schwartz's statement, that "Bear Steams paid out $1.1 billion
in disputes to numerous counterparties in order to squelch rumors that Bear Steams could not
meet its margin calls."
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794. On March 12, 2008 Bear Steams' stock closed at $61.58 per share, down from a
close of $62.97 per share the day before. The following trading day, March 13, 2008, Bear
Steams' shares closed at $57.
IX. LOSS CAUSATION
795. Defendants' wrongful conduct, as alleged herein, directly and proximately caused
the economic loss suffered by Lead Plaintiff and the Class. Throughout the Class Period, the
market prices of Bear Steams securities were artificially inflated as a direct result of Defendants'
materially false and misleading statements and omissions. When the truth became known, the
prices of Bear Steams securities declined precipitously as the artificial inflation was removed
from the prices of these securities, causing substantial damage to Lead Plaintiff and members of
the Class. The chart below shows the fluctuation of the price of Bear Steams common stock
leading up to and during the Class Period:
Bear Stearns Share Price
December 1. 2005 - May 30. 2008
$200
$180-
$160
$140
$120
$100
$80
$ 0
$40
$20
$0
In GO GO GO GO GO r-- r-- N- N- OD OD
o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV
CM CM er (0 CO 0 CM tN1 ;et
- -Co -c35
II- .4-
796. During the Class Period, Bear Steams' common stock traded as high as $171.57
per share as recently as January 12, 2007.
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797. By early March 2008, Bear Steams common stock was trading at above $60 per
share and its management was vigorously denying rumors that Bear Stearns had any liquidity
problems. On March 10, 2008, Bear Steams common stock fell $7.78, or 11%, to close the day
at $62.30 on trading volume of 23 million shares. Despite the Company's attempts to reassure
the market, Bear Steams stock price continued to fall by $5.30, or 8.5%, during the week as the
rumors continued to intensify, eventually closing at $57.00 per share on March 13, 2008 on
higher than normal volume.
798. On March 14, 2008, Bear Steams announced that its liquidity position had
significantly deteriorated requiring the Company to seek financing via a secured loan facility
from JPMorgan. In response to this news, Bear Steams' common stock price fell $27, or 47.3%,
to close at $30.00 per share on particularly heavy trading volume of approximately 187 million
shares (about eight times its three month average trading volume of 23 million shares). On
March 17, 2008, Bear Stearns' stock price fell an additional $25.19, or 84%, to close at $4.81 on
particularly heavy trading volume of about 166 million shares following Bear Steams'
announcement on Sunday, March 16, 2008 that the Company would be acquired by JPMorgan
for $2 per share.
799. In all, as a consequence of the revelation of the truth concerning Bear Steams
during the Class Period, Bear Steams' common stock lost in excess of $19.8 billion in market
capitalization.
800. Specific dates of adverse disclosure, and corresponding declines in the price of
Bear Steams' common and preferred stock, are set forth in Section IV above.
801. Moreover, the adverse consequences of Bear Stearns' disclosures relating to its
exposure to declines in the housing market, and the adverse impact of those circumstances on the
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Company's business going forward, were entirely foreseeable to Defendants at all relevant times.
Defendants' conduct, as alleged herein, proximately caused foreseeable losses and damages to
Lead Plaintiff and members of the Class.
802. As set forth above, the Company's failure to maintain effective internal controls,
its substantially lax risk management standards, and its failure to report its 2006-2007 financial
statements in accordance with GAAP not only were material, but also triggered foreseeable and
grave consequences for the Company. The financial reporting that was presented in violation of
GAAP conveyed the impression that the Company was more profitable, better capitalized, and
would have better access to liquidity than was actually the case. The price of Bear Stearns'
securities during the Class Period were affected by those omissions and false statements and
were inflated artificially as a result thereof. Thus, the precipitous declines in value of the
securities purchased by the Class were a direct, foreseeable, and proximate result of the
corrective disclosures of the truth with respect to Defendants' materially false and misleading
statements.
X. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
803. Lead Plaintiff brings this action on its own behalf and as a class action pursuant to
Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class consisting of
all persons and entities which, between December 14, 2006 and March 14, 2008, inclusive (the
"Class Period"), purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded common stock or other
equity securities, or call options of or guaranteed by Bear Stearns, or sold Bear Stearns put
options, either in the open market or pursuant or traceable to a registration statement, and were
damaged thereby (the "Class"). The Class shall also include all persons who received Bear
Stearns CAP Plan Units and Restricted Stock Plan Units that had fully vested, entitling them to
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an equivalent number of shares of Bear Steams Stock upon settlement at the end of a deferral
period, as a part of their compensation as an employee with the Company and participation in its
CAP and RSU Plans. Excluded from the Class are the Defendants; the members of the
immediate families of the Individual Defendants; the subsidiaries and affiliates of Defendants;
any person who is an officer, director, partner or controlling person of Bear Steams (including
any of its subsidiaries or affiliates) or any other Defendant; any entity in which any Defendant
has a controlling interest; and the legal representatives, heirs, successors and assigns of any such
excluded person or entity.
804. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable. As of March 14, 2008, Bear Steams had approximately 136 million shares of
common stock outstanding and actively trading on the NYSE with the ticker symbol "BSC."
While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Lead Plaintiff at this time and can only
be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Lead Plaintiff believes that the proposed Class
numbers in the thousands and is geographically widely dispersed. Record owners and other
members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by Bear Steams or its transfer
agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using a form of notice similar
to that customarily used in securities class actions.
805. Lead Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. All
members of the Class were similarly affected by Defendants' allegedly wrongful conduct in
violation of the Exchange Act as complained of herein.
806. Lead Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of
the Class. Lead Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities
litigation.
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807. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and
predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. The questions
of law and fact common to the Class include:
(a) whether the federal securities laws were violated by Defendants' acts and
omissions as alleged herein;
(b) whether the SEC filings, press releases and other public statements made
to the investing public during the Class Period contained material misstatements or omitted to
state material information;
(c) whether and to what extent the Company's financial statements were not
presented in conformity with GAAP during the Class Period;
(d) whether and to what extent Deloitte's audits of the Company's financial
statements and management's assessments of internal controls during the Class Period were not
conducted in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board;
(e) whether and to what extent the market prices of Bear Stearns' common
stock and other publicly traded securities were artificially inflated during the Class Period
because of the material misrepresentations and/or omissions complained of herein;
(f) whether, with respect to Lead Plaintiff's and the Class' claims for
violations of the Exchange Act, the Defendants named in those claims acted with the requisite
level of scienter;
(g) whether, with respect to Lead Plaintiff's and the Class' claims pursuant to
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, the Defendants named in those claims were controlling
persons of Bear Stearns;
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(h) whether reliance may be presumed pursuant to the fraud-on-the-market
doctrine; and
(0 whether the members of the Class have sustained damages as a result of
the conduct complained of herein and, if so, the proper measure of damages.
808. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of this controversy because, among other things, joinder of all members of the Class
is impracticable. Furthermore, because the damages suffered by individual Class members may
be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for
members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no
difficulty in the management of this action as a class action.
XI. PRESUMPTION OF RELIANCE
809. Lead Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to a presumption of reliance, because the
claims asserted herein against Defendants are predicated in part upon omissions of material fact
of which there was a duty to disclose.
810. Alternatively, Lead Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to a presumption of
reliance on Defendants' material misrepresentations and omissions pursuant to the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine because:
(a) Bear Stearns' common stock was actively traded in an efficient market on
the NYSE during the Class Period;
(b) Bear Stearns' common stock traded at high weekly volumes during the
Class Period;
(c) As a regulated issuer, Bear Stearns filed periodic public reports with the
SEC;
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(d) Bear Steams regularly communicated with public investors by means of
established market communication mechanisms, including through regular dissemination of
press releases on the major news wire services and through other wide-ranging public
disclosures, such as communications with the financial press, securities analysts and other
similar reporting services;
(e) The market reacted promptly to public information disseminated by Bear
Steams;
(f) Bear Steams' securities were covered by numerous securities analysts
employed by major brokerage firms who wrote reports that were distributed to the sales force
and certain customers of their respective firms. Each of these reports was publicly available and
entered the public marketplace;
(g) The material misrepresentations and omissions alleged herein would tend
to induce a reasonable investor to misjudge the value of Bear Steams' securities; and
(h) Without knowledge of the misrepresented or omitted material facts alleged
herein, Lead Plaintiff and other members of the Class purchased Bear Steams securities between
the time Defendants misrepresented or failed to disclose material facts and the time the true facts
were disclosed.
811. In addition to the foregoing, Lead Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to a
presumption of reliance because, as more fully alleged above, Defendants failed to disclose
material information regarding Bear Steams' business, financial results and business prospects
throughout the Class Period.
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XII. INAPPLICABILITY OF STATUTORY SAFE HARBOR
812. The statutory safe harbor provided for forward-looking statements under certain
circumstances does not apply to any of the materially false and misleading statements alleged in
this Complaint. The statements alleged to be false and misleading all relate to historical facts or
existing conditions and were not identified as forward-looking statements. To the extent any of
the false statements alleged herein may be characterized as forward-looking, they were not
adequately identified as "forward-looking" statements when made, and were not accompanied by
meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to
differ materially from those in the purportedly "forward-looking" statements. Alternatively, to
the extent that the statutory safe harbor would otherwise apply to any statement pleaded herein,
Defendants are liable for those materially false forward-looking statements because, at the time
each of those forward-looking statements was made, the speaker knew the statement was false or
the statement was authorized or approved by an executive officer of Bear Steams who knew that
those statements were false.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT I
For Violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder
(Against All Defendants)
813. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation in the foregoing
paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. This claim is asserted against Bear
Stearns, Cayne, Schwartz, Spector, Molinaro, Greenberg, Alix, Farber, and Deloitte ("Rule 10b-
5 Defendants").
211
EFTA00316939
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 227 of 347
814. During the Class Period, the Rule 1013-5 Defendants: (a) knowingly and recklessly
deceived the investing public, including Plaintiffs, as alleged herein; (b) artificially inflated the
market price of Bear Steams' common stock; and (c) caused Lead Plaintiff and the Class to
purchase or otherwise acquire Bear common stock at artificially-inflated prices.
815. Each of the Rule 10b-5 Defendants, in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 10b-5(b), made untrue statements of material facts and/or omitted to state material
facts necessary to make the statements made by the Rule 10b-5 Defendants not misleading,
and/or substantially participated in the creation of the alleged misrepresentation, which operated
as a fraud and deceit upon Lead Plaintiff and the Class, in an effort to maintain the artificially-
inflated price of Bear Steams' common stock during the Class Period. The Rule 10b-5
Defendants' false and misleading statements (and omissions of material facts) are set forth in
paragraphs 589 to 794, supra.
816. As a result of their making and/or substantially participating in the creation of
affirmative statements to the investing public, the Rule 10b-5 Defendants had a duty to promptly
disseminate truthful information that would be material to investors in compliance with
applicable laws and regulations.
817. The Rule 1013-5 Defendants, individually and in concert, directly and indirectly,
by the use, means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or of the mails, made or
substantially participated in the creation/dissemination of, untrue statements of material fact as
set forth herein, or with extreme recklessness failed to ascertain and disclose truthful facts, even
though such facts were available to them.
818. The facts alleged herein give rise to a strong inference that each of the Rule 10b-5
Defendants acted with scienter. Each of the Defendants knew or with extreme recklessness
212
EFTA00316940
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 228 of 347
disregarded that the Class Period statements set forth in Section VIII above were materially false
and misleading for the reasons set forth herein.
819. The Rule 1013-5 Defendants carried out a deliberate scheme to misrepresent the
effectiveness of Bear Steams' controls, the value of Bear Steams' assets, and the risks to which
the Bear Steams' investors were being exposed.
820. As a result of the dissemination of the materially false and misleading information
and failure to disclose material facts, as set forth above, the market price of Bear Steams'
securities was artificially inflated throughout the Class Period. Unaware that the market price of
Bear Stearns' common stock was artificially inflated, and relying directly or indirectly on the
false and misleading statements made by the Rule 10b-5 Defendants, or upon the integrity of the
markets in which Bear Steams' common stock traded, and the truth of any representations made
to appropriate agencies and to the investing public, at the times at which any statements were
made, and/or in the absence of material adverse information that was known, or with deliberate
recklessness disregarded, by the Defendants but not disclosed in their public statements,
Plaintiffs purchased or acquired Bear Steams' common stock at artificially-inflated prices.
821. As a direct and proximate result of the Rule 10b-5 Defendants' wrongful conduct,
Lead Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their
respective purchases and sales of Bear Steams' common stock during the Class Period, when the
inflation in the price of Bear Steams' common stock was gradually removed as the truth
regarding the Rule 1013-5 Defendants' conduct was revealed causing the price of Bear Steams'
common stock to decline and thereby resulting in economic losses to Lead Plaintiff and the
Class.
213
EFTA00316941
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 229 of 347
822. By reason of the foregoing, the Rule 1013-5 Defendants violated Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(b) promulgated thereunder, and are liable to Lead Plaintiff and
the Class for damages suffered in connection with their transactions in Bear Steams' common
stock during the Class Period.
COUNT II
For Violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act
(Against the Officer Defendants)
823. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegations in the foregoing
paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. This claim is asserted against Cayne,
Schwartz, Spector, Molinaro, Greenberg, Alix and Farber ("the Officer Defendants").
824. Bear Steams is a primary violator of Section 10(b) and Rule 1013-5, promulgated
thereunder.
825. The Officer Defendants acted as controlling persons of Bear Steams within the
meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, as alleged herein, by reason of their positions as
officers and/or directors of Bear Stearns, their ability to approve the issuance of statements, their
ownership of Bear Steams securities and/or by contract. As such, the Officer Defendants had the
power and authority to direct and control, and did direct and control, directly or indirectly, the
decision-making of Bear Steams as set forth herein. The Officer Defendants were provided with
or had unrestricted access to copies of the Bear Stearns' reports, press releases, public filings and
other statements alleged by Lead Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these
statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the
statements to be corrected. Each of the Officer Defendants had direct and supervisory
involvement in the day-to-day operations of Bear Steams and, therefore, is presumed to have had
the power to control or influence, and during the Class Period did exercise their power to control
214
EFTA00316942
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 230 of 347
and influence, the conduct giving rise to the violations of the federal securities laws alleged
herein. The Officer Defendants prepared, or were responsible for preparing, the Bear Steams'
press releases and SEC filings and made statements to the market in SEC filings, annual reports,
press releases, news articles and conference calls. The Officer Defendants controlled Bear
Stearns and each of its employees.
826. By virtue of their positions as controlling persons of Bear Stearns, and by reason
of the conduct described in this Count, the Officer Defendants are liable pursuant to Section
20(a) of the Exchange Act for controlling a primary violator of the federal securities laws.
827. As a direct and proximate result of the Officer Defendants' wrongful conduct,
Lead Plaintiff and other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their
purchases of the Bear Steams' common stock during the Class Period.
COUNT III
For Violations of Section 20A of the Exchange Act
(Against Defendants Cayne, Schwartz, Spector, Molinaro, Greenberg, and Farber)
828. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the allegations set forth above as if fully set
forth herein.
829. This Count is asserted pursuant to Section 20A of the Exchange Act against
Cayne, Schwartz, Spector, Molinaro, Greenberg and Farber (the "Section 20A Defendants"), on
behalf of Lead Plaintiff and all members of the Class who purchased Bear Steams stock
contemporaneously with any of these Defendants' sales of Bear Steams stock during the Class
Period.
830. Each of the Section 20A Defendants sold substantial numbers of shares of Bear
Stearns stock during the Class Period while in possession of material, adverse, nonpublic
information. This conduct violated Section 20A of the Exchange Act.
215
EFTA00316943
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 231 of 347
831. As set forth in the annexed certifications of Lead Plaintiff and the annexed
Exhibit A, Lead Plaintiff purchased shares of Bear Steams stock on the same day as or close in
time to sales of Bear Steams stock made by the Section 20A Defendants while these defendants
were in possession of material, adverse, nonpublic information. These sales and purchases were
contemporaneous within the meaning of Section 20A of the Exchange Act.
832. Numerous other Class members also purchased Bear Steams stock
contemporaneously with the Section 20A Defendants' sales of stock during the Class Period.
833. Accordingly, under Section 20A of the Exchange Act, the Section 20A
Defendants named in this Count are each liable to Lead Plaintiff and the Class for all profits
gained and losses avoided by them as a result of their stock sales.
834. The Defendants named in this Count are required to account for all such stock
sales and to disgorge their profits or ill-gotten gains.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Lead Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and the Class, respectfully prays for
judgment as follows:
A. Determining that this action is a proper class action maintained under Rules 23(a)
and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, certifying Lead Plaintiff as class
representative, and appointing Labaton Sucharow LLP and Berman DeValerio as class counsel
pursuant to Rule 23(g);
B. Declaring and determining that Defendants violated the Exchange Act by reason
of the acts and omissions alleged herein;
C. Awarding preliminary and permanent injunctive relief in favor of Lead Plaintiff
and the Class against Defendants and their counsel, agents and all persons acting under, in
216
EFTA00316944
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 232 of 347
concert with, or for them, including an accounting of and the imposition of a constructive trust
and/or an asset freeze on Defendants' insider trading proceeds;
D. Ordering an accounting of Defendants' insider trading proceeds;
E. Disgorgement of Defendants' insider trading proceeds;
F. Restitution of investors' monies of which they were defrauded;
G. Awarding Lead Plaintiff and the Class compensatory damages against all
Defendants, jointly and severally, in an amount to be proven at trial together with prejudgment
interest thereon;
H. Awarding Lead Plaintiff and the Class their reasonable costs and expenses
incurred in this action, including but not limited to attorney's fees and fees and costs incurred by
consulting and testifying expert witnesses; and
I. Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
217
EFTA00316945
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 233 of 347
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Lead Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and the Class, demands a trial by jury of all issues so
triable.
Dated: February 27, 2009 Respectfully submitted,
BERMAN DeVALERIO LABATON S C AR WLLP
By: C By: \
Jeffr C. Block (JCB-0387) Thomas A. Dubbs (TD-9868)
Patrick T. Egan James W. Johnson (JJ-0123)
Justin Saif Javier Bleichmar (JB-0435)
One Liberty Square Michael W. Stocker (MS-1309)
Boston, Massachusetts 02109 Alan I. Ellman (AE-7347)
Telephone: 140 Broadway
Facsimile: New York, New York 10005
Telephone:
Joseph J. Tabacco, Jr. (JJT-1994) Facsimile:
Julie J. Bai
425 California Street
Suite 2100
San Francisco,
Telephone:
Facsimile:
Lead Counselfor the Class and Attorneysfor Lead Plaintiff
State of Michigan Retirement Systems
218
EFTA00316946
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 234 of 347
Exhibit A
EFTA00316947
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 235 of 347
Stale of Aliehigan Retirement Systems Ass Pond Beginning, .2142006
First•In line-Out CFIF01Sbare Accounting Gain 'LassI Analysis . :an Period End 3/14/2110/
Tie Bear Stearn Companies, Inc. Common Stock Looktsack Peisof Begumeng 3117/200/
Clan Period: December 14, 2006 • Mares le, 2001 i tooliback Persod' Est 5/15/2001
llnyt in 'Lockage/ Period'. 60
-Lookback Persod" Avenge Closing MCC SIO 01111
Offset for
Shales Sold
SWIMS Into Class
Data Dade 7 otal Transaction bade Total Retained Gain Above
Type Date Price Shares Cost Type hate Price Shares Proceeds @OS/15/200g (Loss) * SI 0 0811
Pre-(lass Period Holdiotts 92,1113
Pre•Clan Period Holdings Sold Through End of (lass Period
Pre•Class Period Moldings 1.600 Sale 12/Isacos $162323 1,600 S 259.716 02 S 2433731E
Pre•Claat Period holdings 300 Sale 12/19/2006 $163 75) 300 S 49.125 77 46,099.12
Pre•Class Penod holdings 900 Sale 12/21/2006 $163646 900 S 147.211 12 S 13/20137
Pre-Cass Period Holdings 300 Sale 06015/2007 2150 171 300 S 45263 10 42236.65
Pre•Clan Period holdings 2.600 Sak 07202007 5115 051 2,600 S 351.132 61 S 321,901.70
Prc-Class Patted tickling% 3200 Sale 09/21/2007 5117011 3.200 S 374.61e 26 S 342,39798
Pre-Clam Itr•od IInkling% 200 Sale II/212002 599 441 203 S 19.119 69 S 17,871.92
Pte-Class Penrod I toktnes 2.100 Sale 12/21/2007 591 013 2,100 S 209,329 61 S 116,125.35
Pre•Clan Penile I isid.ng% 200 Sa:c 02/01/2008 $90390 200 S 11,077 90 16,060.13
IA. Tail 11,600 11/600 S 1,474,499.12 S 1,337,44161
Page I oil
EFTA00316948
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 236 of 347
Stale of Michigan RetirtmenISydems Class Pcriod Beginning. IVla:2006
First-In First-Out ("FIF(2") Share Accounting Gain (Loss) Analysis Class Period Fad: Dlli2C0il
The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Common Stock 'Lookback Period- &ginning 1/7/201
Clam Period: December I4, 2Ø. March I 4. 2001 tookbeck Pared" End S/IS/20uS
Days its 'Lathiest Period' 60
1-ookback Period' Amiga Closing Price SI0 Mg
Offset (or
Shares Sold
Shares Into Class
Tramaction TØ Total Transaction Trade Total Retained Gain Above
Type Date Prwe Stiro Cow -Ewe Dare Pine Slimes Proceeds (it 054 5/200g (Loss) ' S10.0888
It Pre-Clan Period Holdrags Sold Daring "tabbed' Period" Mnlatuw of Actual or Avenge Closing Prke between 0341/2008 and dale of sale
Pre-CLass Period Holding. 80,583 Salt 03/24/2008 SI0.51$ 60.583 S 846.53925 0 5 33.55048
It Total 00.583 80.583 5 846,539.25 0 5 33.5511.10
Page 2(.1'7
EFTA00316949
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 237 of 347
State of Michigan Retirement Syslem Clam Period Beynnin" 12/1a/7006
Fint-In Firsl-Out ("FIFO") Share Accounting Gain (Lon) Analysis Clam Period End 3/34,2003
The Bear Smarm Companies, Inc. Common Snick 'Looirbock Period' Reynnorg 1117r2hOt
(lass Period: December 14.2006 March 14.200n "Loramk Period" End 545/2004
Days Look bac Penoe 60
'Leaked l'er.od- Meng< Closing Price 110 OW
Offset for
Shares Sold
Shares Into Class
Transaction Dale Tad blessed«, Trade Total Retained Gam Above
Type Dee Price Shea Cost Type Dare Price Shares Proceeds 0.0915/200E (Loss) 510.0888
IC. Pet-Clas Paled Hakes Held at Fad of "Lookbeek Period"
Pre-Clau Pentad I folding 0 0
IC. Total 0 0 S 0 S
Page 3 of 7
EFTA00316950
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 238 of 347
State of Mkkipa Ruination Symms Class Period Itegonntng 12114)7006
Fint-la Fuss-Oat I- FIFO") Spa re AttOat int Cain (Iraq Analysis Class Period End 3/144000
The Bear Swans Cotentin. lac. Comaion Sion •Lookback Period• Reginnitt4 3/17/2001
Cam Period: December 14, 2006 - March la. 2000 •Lookback Perrot had DIS/2000
Days in *Lnekback Period'. 60
'Lookback Period' Average Closing Price SR/ MOM
Offset for
Shares Sold
Spurr Into Clan
Transaction Trade Total TIIIIISiCli011 Trade Total Retained Gam Above
Type Date Price Shares Cost Type Dale Price Shares Proceeds 0SIIS/2002 (Lose)' 510088E
2A. Class Period Purchases Sold Mot to End of Class Period
Purchase 0 S
2.A. Total 0 S 0 S 0 S
Page 4 of 7
EFTA00316951
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 239 of 347
Stine of %I kbisan Retirement Syslems Class Period Beginning 12/1442006
Pint•In Ftnl•Out ("FIFO") Share Anrosinling Cain (lots) Analysis Class Pelted EM 3/14/20:4
The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Common Stock •Lookhack Penal Berman 3/17/2001
Clam Period: December 14.2006 • March 14, 2008 •Lookback Pewit" End 5/I 5/2008
Days in 'Lookback Bawd" 00
'Lookback Pend' Average Closing Price 5100881
Offset for
Shales Sok1
Skiers Into Class
Transaction Trade Total Transition Trade Total Retained Gun Abuse
Type Date Price Shares Cost Type Date Price Shares Proceeds 05/15/20M tionj 5100885
211. Clam Period Purebams Sold Daring "Lookback Period" Mastmam of As-taal sir Avenge <babe Prim before* 01117120011 and dale of sale
Purchase 03/16/2007 5147 066 2400 5 352.955 88 Sale 03/24/20:05 510.505 2.400 $ 2521244 S (527,74644)
Purchase 07/182007 5137 993 79,429 S 10.960653 94 Sale 03/24/20011 510.505 79.429 5 53441627 5 (10.126.23767)
Purchase 07/18/2007 $139340 1.500 5 209.009.99 Sale 03/24~ 510305 1.500 S 15.757 71 5 (193.252 211
Purchase 07/11/2007 $137 961 70049 S 9374376 01 Sale 01/24.20M 510.914 70049 5 744,281 79 $ (9030,294 22)
Purchase 07/18/2007 5137 964 7,039 S 971,12508 Sale 03/24/2002 510.504 70)9 5 73.94599 $ 097,179 071
Purchase 07/1/2007 $137964 134361 5 10592.099 22 Sale consras 510.741 134,761 5 1450.12092 (17.141.27130)
Purchase 07/11/2007 5138 002 115.239 S 15.903.18943 Sale 03/25120011 510.764 115,2)9 S 1.240.61939 5 (14.662.540 041
Mk Toni 411,217 5 5476341235 411.217 S 4.14.4.164.57 0 5 152,378.527.91) 5
Page 5 017
EFTA00316952
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 240 of 347
bole of MkMiss Ref iremtn1 Syslems Class Period Beginning I 2;14:2006
Fint-In Fir l -Chit ("FIFO- ) Shire Accounting Gain (Loss) Analysis Class Period End 314'2031
The Bear Mira rns Companies. Inc. Common Stock •Lookback Penod Reginiung 3 1712On
( lass Period: December 14, 2006 • March 14,2008 'Lookb.sek Pence End 3 I 51.10(1
Days in -Lookbmk Perot 60
'I ookbadi Period' Average Closing Price 510 OSA1
Offset for
Shares Sold
Shares IMO Class
Transaction Trade Total Transaction Trade Total Retained (iam Above
TYM Dale lice Shares Cosi Tine Date Prue Shares Proceeds lar 0515/200% (Loss) SR) 0888
2C. (lass Period Nreluseis Ileld Al End of "Imokbacik Period-
Purchase 07/1112007 51311002 :5.332 5 2.115,843 60 15,332 5 11.961.161 55)
Purchase 07/18/2007 5119 340 1.900 S 264,745 99 1,900 S 1245.577 20)
Purchase 07111/2007 5139 340 1.400 5 195,075 99 1,403 S (180.951 62)
Pisic'sase 07/19/2007 S1)914) 9.722 S 1,352.747 28 9,722 S (1.254.(61 60)
PurOsase 07/19/2037 5139143 10,561 S I469,488.17 10.561 5 (I.)62,93996)
Purchase 07/20/2007 5115 980 44.068 5 3992.375 45 44.061 S (5.547.710 571
Purchase 10/11/2007 5126 330 200 S 25.266 00 200 5 123,24823)
Purchase 12/26/2007 $17614 200 S 17,522 76 200 S 115.504 99>
2C. Total 83.383 $ 11,433045.24 0 5 13,3113 S (18$91.1127T2/
Page 6 ofl
EFTA00316953
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 241 of 347
State of Michigan Retirement Systems Cis Paned Besmama 12/1472006
First-In First-Otst ("FIFO") Share Amounting Gaits floss) Analysis ClosPeriod fad 3/14/2002
The Bear Starts Companies. Me. Common Stock imaktect Pupal' Retracing 3/17/2002
(lass Period: December 14.2006 - March 14, 2008 "limakback Period- Eat SOS/20011
Days ma 'Lookback Period- 60
lookback Period' Average Clonal Rice SIO 08112
Offset for
Shares Sold
Shares Into Clan
Transaction Trade Total Try/bac:son Trade Total Retained Gam Above
Type Dan Price Shafts Coss T Dale Poet Shares Proceeds (id OS/IS/200S (Loss)' $100888
('Ian Pend Purchase Total 494.600 S 66.19647/.79 411,217 S 4)115084.57 83,383 S (62,970,355.71)
Grand Total 494.600 S 61096,677.79 503.400 S 6.706.122.94 83.383
I For Class Pend Purchases held at end of Locatteck Paled. Gan (Loss) ss tamed oa holdsags valued as SIO 081* per share
Page 7 of 7
EFTA00316954
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 242 of 347
Mate of Michigan Retirement Systems Class Period Beginning 12114/2006
Last-In Fint-Oul ("LIFO") Share Accounting Gain (Ion) Analysis Clan Parur End 311412001
The Bor Swann Companies, Inc. Common Stock tookbadi Period' &prong 3,17,20:11
Class Period: December 14. 2006 March II. 2008 'Lodbock PMOr Pad 5/15/200$
Days ta -Lodback Perrot 60
tookback Period" Aware Closing Price $10 03311
Offset for
Shares Sold
Skates Into Class
Traroction Trade Tow. Transaction Trade Total Retained Gain Above
Date Pic Share Coal Type Date Met Shares Proceeds @05/15/2008 (Lou) 5100188
Pre-flan Period Holdings 92.131
IA. Fre-flass Period Iloldinp Sold 1hrougli End of Class Period
Pre-Class Period Holdings 1 boo Sak 1245(2006 $161323 1,600 5 259.716 02 Irl S 243.57358
Pre-Class Period Holdings 100 Sale 12/19/2006 5161753 300 5 49.125 77 0 T 46 099 12
Pre-Class Period Holdings VOA ‘al< 12/212006 $163.646 SOO 3 1478182 0 1 111291 37
IA. Total 2,51m UM 3 456,123.61 427,37427
Page I of 7
EFTA00316955
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 243 of 347
Stale of blicbigan Retirement Systems Class Period Bey:mu:ay 12:142006i
First-Out (”1.110") share Accounting Gaint tom) A nalmis Class Period End TO41000
The Bear Stearns Companies. Inc. Common `duck tootbak Period' Beginning 3117/2008
Clam Period: December 14, 2006 • March 14. 200a -Laoltback Pamir End 51151200$
Days is*Lookback Period': 60
1.0tOkboirk Pend- Avenge Closing Puce SIO OUR
°Biel foe
Shales Sold
Shares Imo Claus
Transachein Trade Total Tramacaon Trade Total Retained Gain Above
Type Oak Price Shams Co.i Type fame Price Shares Proceeds be OS/Isaws (Lou) ' SIO OUR
IL ?mein. Period Holdinits Sold During - Lotiaback Period" Mailer-a of Actual or Avenge Closing ►rice bents UMW= and date *task
Pre-Class Period Dolan. 6 WO Sale OTIS/200S $10.766 6.000 S 64.595 29 4,062 26
IL Total x.000 6,000 $ 64,595.29 0 4.062.26
Page 2 of 7
EFTA00316956
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 244 of 347
Stale of Michigan Retirement Systems Class Period Beginning 12 142006
Last-In First•Oul ("LIFO") Share Accounting Gain (Loss) Analysts Class Period bad 3/14.2.60‘
The Bear St Companies. Inc. Common Stock *Lookback Period' Beginning Y1212006
Clam Period: December 14. 2006 • March 14.2018 tookbeck Penocr End 915 2001
Days in 'Lookback Period- 60
tooktedk Peeve Average Closets Price $100881
Offset for
Shares Sold
Shares Into Class
Transaction Trade IoW 1minaction rode Total Retained Gam Above
Type Dale Price Shares Cos Ispe Date Price Skates Proceeds .14; 05.15/200g (Lon)' $100881
IC. Pre-Clan Period Holdings Held at End of "Lookbact Period"
Pre-Class Period Holdings !SUM 83.383
IC. Thal JUJU 0 S 83,383
Page 3 of 7
EFTA00316957
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 245 of 347
Stare of Michigan Retirement Systems Cbss Penod Begmnir.g 12 14 2043a
Ian-In lint -Chit ("Linn Share Accounting Gain Moss) Analysis Class Period End 3 14 20,14
The Rear Stearns Companies, Inc. Common Stock idokback Pound" Beginning 3 17,2(4,3
Class Period: December 14,2006 • March 11, 200n Idatock Period' End 5,15,2(xis
Days m 'Look back Period' 6c
-Lectback Period' Average Closing Price 510 0888
Offset fot
Shares Sold
Shawl Into Clan
Transaction Trade Total Ttilitlia)O11 Trade Total Regained Gain Above
Type DaN Puce Shrum Cost lyric Date Price Shares Proceeds fd OS/IS/2008 (Loss) I 5100111
2A. (lam Period Prelims Sold Prior to Fad of (Suss Period
Perham 034612007 $147066 100 S 44,11986 Sale 064512007 SI 50 871 300 S 45,263.30 1,143.44
Nodal. 07/202007 $135980 2.600 S 353548 52 Sale 07/20,2007 SI 35 051 2.600 S 351,132 68 S (2415.84)
Perching 07/202007 5135980 3.200 S 435,13644 Sale 09/21/2007 5117 011 3.200 S 374.6112 26 S (60,45435)
Perchare 1041/2007 $126 330 200 S 25,266.00 Sale 11282007 599.441 200 $ 19,889 69 (5376.31)
Purchase 07/20/2007 $135980 2,303 S 312,714 46 Sale 12/21/2007 $91 013 2,300 S 209.329 613 S (103,424 73)
Purchase 12/262007 $13614 200 S 1732236 Sale 02/012008 $90390 100 S 18,077 90 555 14
2A. Total 8.800 S 1,188,34024 8.100 S 1,018.375451 S (169372.73) S
Page 4 of 7
EFTA00316958
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 246 of 347
State N Mithipa Refitment Stsrents Class Period Beginning: 12/14,2006
ru
Lail-10 First-Out FO") !Rare Areouating Gain (Lem) Analysis Class Period End: 3/14/2008
The Bear Slam Compaaies, Inc Comma Stock "Lookback Period' Beginning: 3117/2008
Class Period: Member 14.2006 - March 14. 20011 -Lookback Period' End. 5/21108
Days in "Lookback Period". ho
tookback Peke Average Closing Pnce. SIC, 0888
Offset for
Shares Sold
Shams Into Miss
Transaction Trade Total Transaction Trade Total Retained Gain Above
Type Date Price Shares Cost Type Dare Puce Shares Proceeds (ca 05/15/200 (Loss) ' 510.0081
it Class Period Plantain Sold During "Lookhan Period" Maximum of Actual or Avenge Closing Prim between 0311 ;2008 mad date of sak
Purchase 07/11/2007 $137964 51,678 S 7,129,677 75 Sale 03/24/2008 510.505 51878 S 542,88690 S (6,586,790.15)
Purchase 07/18/2007 $138002 130,571 S 18019,033 03 Sale 03/24/2008 $10.505 130,571 S 1,371,672 39 S (16447.36064)
Pram 07/142037 5139.340 1.900 S 264,745.99 Sale 03/24/2008 S10305 1,900 5 19959 85 S (244.71614)
Ninny 07/114037 SI19 340 1,400 5 195,075 99 Sale 03/24/2008 510.505 1.400 S 14.707 26 S (110.36173)
Pens 07/19/2007 1139 143 9,722 S 1,352,747 28 Sale 03/24/2008 510.5(6 9.722 $ 102,131 40 S (1.250.615/$)
Puichase 07/19/3007 $139.143 10,561 S 1,469,481 17 Sate 03/24/2002 SI0.505 10.561 S 110.945 25 S (054542 92)
Purchase 0720/2007 $135.980 35,961 S 4,89083513 Sale 03/24/2008 $10305 35.968 S 377850.46 S (4813.085 37)
Purchase 03/16/2007 $147066 2.100 S 30883902 Sale 03/25/2008 $10.766 2,100 S 22,60135 5 (216230 67)
Purchase 07/142007 $137993 79,429 S 10860,65)94 Sale 03/242008 510.766 79829 $ 855.12318 S (10.105.530 761
Purchase 07;142007 $139340 1,500 S 209.009 99 Sale 03/25;2008 510.766 1,500 $ 16,14 V S (192,161 17)
Purchase 07/1/1/2007 $137963 70,849 S 9,774,57601 Sale 03252008 510.766 70,849 $ 762.75192 5 (9,011824 09)
Purchase 07/11/2007 $137964 90,122 S 12,433,546 55 Sale 03;292008 S10.766 90,122 S 970,242 75 $ (11.463.303 30)
28 Total 4/15800 S 67,008,329.55 485.100 S 5.167,02453 S (61.811.301.02) S
Page Sof?
EFTA00316959
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 247 of 347
State of Michigan Retirement Systems Class Period Beginning 121142006
Last-In Fimt-Out ("LIFO") Share Accounting Gain (Loss) Analysis Class Period End. 3/14/2008
The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Common Stock 'Lookback Period" Beginning 3/17/2008
Oats Period; December 14, 2006 - March 14, 2008 "Lookback Period" End: 5,115/2008
Days in "Lookback Period": 60
"Lookback Period" Average Closing Price SI0 0888
Offset for
Shares Sold
Shares Into Clays
Transaction Trade Total Transaction Trade Total Retained Gain Above
Type Dale Price Shares Cost Type Date Price Shares Proceeds :2()08 (Lois)' 510.088
2C. (lass Period Purchases IleM Al End of "Lookback Period"
Purchase 0 S
2C. Total 0 $ 0 S 0 S
Page 6 of 7
EFTA00316960
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 248 of 347
State of Stickman Retirement Silks% Class Penod Beginning 12/14/2006
Last-In Fertb<ht (flair I Share Accounting Cale (Loss) Analysts Class Penod End- 3/142008
The Bear Stearns Companies. Inc. Common Stoat *Lookbeck Period' Beginning 117/2008
(lass Period: December 14, 2006 - March 14, 2000 tookback Period" EM 5/15/2008
Days in "Lockback Penod'' 60
' Lao&bock Period" Average Closing Puce SIC 0688
Offset for
Sham Sold
Shares Into Class
Transaction Trade Total Transaction Trade Total Retained Gam Above
Type Dote Price Shares Coat Type Dale Price Shams Proceeds (al 0115/2008 :Loss) 501OW
Class Period Purchase Total 191,600 S 68,196,677.79 4944O3 S 6.1$5.1•1.14 0 S (62.11,273:75)
Grand Total 494,600 S 66,196.677'9 S03,400 S 6,706,122.94 83.303
I For Class Paned Purchases held at end of LookNck Pen* Gila II-ass) is based o= boa:brigs sawed 0510 08» pet skate
Total Pigtes may differ Boni-PSI, as under LIFO. pod-Class Paned sales are first allocated so post-Clam Penod purchases, if any Thew dominoes and sales, ft any, are not shown here
Page 7 of 7
EFTA00316961
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 249 of 347
Exhibit B
EFTA00316962
.05-cvNiegiit§i§drActiatekINESFAINbVialikNefir 250 tglittit4ippRowth
FORM 4 ase COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person • 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
CAYNE JAMES E BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] _ x _ Director 10% Owner
(Last) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MWDDIYYVY) _ X _ Officer (give title below) Other (specify
below)
Chairman of the Bd., CEO
(YO BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 12/19/2005
C. 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MM/DD/YYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
_ X Form Med by One Reporting Person
(City) (State) (Zip) Form filed by More than One Repotting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I aide of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities Acquired 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code (A) or Disposed of (D) Following Repotted Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (Instr. 8) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date, if (Instr. 3.4 and 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
(1) (Instr.
or
Code V Amount (D) Price 4)
12/19/2005 m ti) 404213
Common A SO 5856589.00 D
-
I/119/2005 202000
Common s D S115.95 5654589.00 I D
By
Common Stock 45669.00 I
Spouse
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible secunties)
I. Tide of Derivate 2. 3. nail , . 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. II. Nature
Security Conversion Dale Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (Instr. Acquired (A) (Instr. 3 and 4) (Imo 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any 81 or Disposed Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security of (D) Owned Direct (D)
(Ins r. 3. 4 Following or Indirect
and 5) Reported (I) (Instr.
Transaction 4)
Amount or
Date 61(Instr. 4)
Expiration Title Number of
Exercisable Date
Code V (A) (D) Sham
12/19/2005 M 404213 11/30/200S 11/30/2003 Common
CAP Units (2000) (21 40421100 SO 0.00 D
(1) to
Explanation of Responses:
( I) Settlement of CAP Units and distribution of common stock to Reporting Person pursuant to CAP Plan; exempt under Rule 16b-3.
( 2) This type of derivative security typically does not have a conversion or exercise price
Reporting Owners
Relationships
Reporting Owner Name / Address
Director 10% OwnerOfficer Other
CAYNE JAMES E
GO BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.
EFTA00316963
Case 1:08-cvi02793 RWS ocument 102 Filed 212 /09 Page 251 of 347
k
i83 MADISON AVENUE.
EW YORK, NY 10179
Signatures
X Chairman of the Bd., (7EO
P
/s/ Cayne, James E. 12/20/2005
•' Signature of Repotting Person Date
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
▪ Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00316964
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 252 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
washnson. O.C. 20549
HoMbOr: 32350287
Experts February 28.
Cold. Ins boa arelonger Gutted te STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Salta IS. Fenno a Forms
otrgelons mad cordate. See
',but° IN. Filed pursuanl to Section 18(a) ol the Seturbes Exchange Ad o11934, Section 1740 oldie Public Utility
88104100 average bortiOn
bon pet
771177840 0.5
Holdng Company Ad of 1915 er Soden 30(h) of the Imestment Company Ad ol 1940
1. Name and AdSess 01 Reporting Person a Issuer Name and Ticker of Tf adrg Symbol 5. Reblionship of Reporting Perron(s) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check al applicable)
CAYIsIE JAMES E X Director 10% Owner
I BSC I
x officer
Wove)
(give title Other (specify
below)
6-as0 Ind) (Middle)
3. Date of Earliest Transacton (Mordh:Dayffeat) Chairman of the Bd.. CE(/
CIO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/22/2005
383 MADISON AVENUE
4 II Amendment. Date of Original Filed (MordIVDayffear) 6. Ind-endued Of JoiMtireup Fling (Check Applicable
Linel
(Mop&
X Fonn liled by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Fort filed by More than One Reporting
Person
(City) (Slate) (Zp)
Table I . Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3) O. Transaction 2A. 0temad 3. 4. Secaities Acquired (At S. Amount of 6. 7. Nature
Date Execution Delo Transaction or Disposed Of (0)(Instr. Securities Ownership of hdirect
(MashDepTear) irony Code (rise. 1.4 and 5) Beneficially Form: Camel Benet kin
(YeattoDatYrne) 4) °amid (Die Ortnersho
Folio I g Indirect (I) (Mau. et
IA) Reported (Intor. 4)
Code V Amount te Prior Trionsection(st
(0) (Ins% 3 and 4)
Table II - erivative Securities Acq fired. Disposed e or Beneficially Owned
(e g.. puts. calls. warrants options. canted le securities)
I. MO Of 2. 3. Transaction 1A. Deemed t S. Humber S. Dale EVOCISONO and 7.7100 and Amount 8. POGO 01 9. Out**, 10. 11. Nobs*
Derivative Conversion 001e EXO0u0On Oahe. Transaction a Expiration Come et Seemittes Dalvaliee of thimerstup of Mime,
Security or Exercise PlonthDayTearl irony Code their. Derivative plonitiOarTeart Underlying Security Otrivalini Form: Benotico4
(Instr. 11 Price of (MendiDayTeag to SecuMies Derivative Sew* (Instr. 5) Securities Deed (DI Ownership
Derivative Acquired (Instr. 3 and 0 Beneficially or Indirect 0nstr..”
Security (a) or Onnel 01 Pingo. et
Disposed rosowing
of (DI Reported
Sow 3 4 Transaction
and 5) (5) (Iine. 4)
Amount
Or
Number
Date Expiration of
Code V (A) ID) Exemisado Date Doe sons
CAP thub A Cenmion
$I$ I2022,2c.... 88)75
. II/JO:20M I ILIU:29 in 88,375 St in 3 Wt... '• r.
120051 '' ' SIAS
Eng Shia Coalman
Opuon Mt 11163 11/22,20W A 56.573 oramoaa inmoiS 56.573 SO 56,573
to Buy) Steck
Explanation of Responses:
I. Thu nye d drnv1nesa my typically dom c.4 haw a conVeb1011 Olblekbe price
2. Defend of ocepermaion and credit to Rryoortms Pence's Account his of la/22.05, retsina to the twin% Capital AOluinu141.0a Plan Ice Stag( Mangles Detectors iCAP Plat% exempt under Rule In,.
Remarks:
IsJ Cayne, James E. I 22341005
'• Signature of Reporting Person Dale
Rentndor: Report on a separate me lot each class of securities beneficially owned d ecty d
• If the term is filed by more than one reporting person. see Instruction 4 (b)(v).
" Intentional inisstalernerts or omissions ol facts consteute Federal Criminal Violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 780(a).
Note: File three copes of this Form. one ol wtich must be manually signed. II space is insufficient. see Iratruction ti ler procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://idea.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700105000117/xs1F345X02/cay37... 2/26/2009
EFTA00316965
.08-cvNiAriMuliscstatatifiEsFAMAMMNalt9e 253 ott4WppRoym,
FORM 4ase COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person • 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
CAYNE JAMES E BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] _ x_ Director 1016 Owner
(Last) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM1DD/YYYY) _ x _Officer (give title below) Other (specify
below)
Chairman of the Bd., CEO
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 1/9/2006
C. 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MWDDNYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
. Form filed by One Reporting PotNall
(City) (State) (Zip) X Form filed by Mott than One Reporting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I.Title of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code Acquired (A) or Following Reported Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (Instr. 8) Disposed of (D) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date, if (Instr. 3.4 and 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
or. (1) (Instr.
Code V Amount (D) Price 4)
Common Stock 1N/2006 G V 260(1 D $0 5651989.00 D
14
Common Stock 45669.00 I
Spouse
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially (hi ned ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options convertible securities)
I. Title of Derivate 2. 3. 3k 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. II. Nature
Security Conversion Trans. Deemed Trans. Derivative and Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Date Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (Instr. 8) Acquired (A) or (Instr. 3 and 4) (Instr. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any Disposed of (D) Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security Owned Direct (D)
(Instr. 3.4 and Following or Indirect
5) Reported (1) (Instr.
Transaction 4)
Date Expiration Title Amount or Number of
Code I V (A) I (D) ExercisablelDate Shales Is) (Instr. 4)
Explanation of Responses:
Reporting Owners
Relationships
Reporting Owner Name / Address .
;Director 10% OwnerOfficer Othei
CAYNE JAMES E
GO BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.
X Chairman of the Bd., CEO
383 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10179
Signatures
Is/ Cayne, James E. 1/10/2006
Date
EFTA00316966
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 254 of 347
•• Signature of Repotting Person
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• if the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
IP* Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00316967
1 .08-cvNiArilMiliesstweitiNEsUsiligiejfiRNeNe 255 eg447ppRovAL.
FORM itse COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person ' 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
CAYNE JAMES E BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] _ x _ Director 10%. Owner
(Last) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (31M/DDNYYY) x _ Officer (give title below) Other (specify
below)
Chairman of the Bd., CEO
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 2/8/2006
C. 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MM/DD/YYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
X Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (State) (Zip)
— Form filed by Moir than One Reporting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
LTItle of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nattily
(Instr.3) Date Deemed Code Acquired (A) or Following Reported Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (Instr. II) Disposed of (D) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date, if (Instr. 3.4 and 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
or (1) (Instr.
4)
Code V Amount (D) Price
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Ox ned ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible secunties)
I. Tide of Derivate 2. 3. Trans. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. II. Nature
Security Conversion Date Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (Instr. 8) Acquired (A) or (Instr. 3 and 4) (Instr. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any Disposed of (D) Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security Owned Direct (D)
(lags. 3.4 and Following or Indirect
5) Reported (I) (Instr.
Transaction 4)
Amount or
Date IN) (Instr. 4)
Expiration Tide Number of
(Al (D) Exercisable Date
Code V Shares
V812006 11/30/2005 11/30/2005 Common
CAP Units (2000) (II
A 421 25809 25809.00 SO 25809.00 D
Stock
Va12006 A (21 2785 11/30/2006 11/30/2006 Common
CAP Units (2001) 2785.00 SO 46415.00 D
Stock
V8/2006 11/30/2007 11/34M2007 Common
CAP Units (2002) 111 A (21 9708 Stock
9708.00 50 161753.00 D
(I, V8/2006 11/30/2008 11/30/2008 Common
CAP Units (2003) A 421 9667 9667.00 50 161078.00 D
Stock
(I, 2/8/2006 11/30/2009 11/30/2009 Common
CAP Units (2004) A at 5906 Stock
5906.00 50 98416.00 1)
Explanation of Responses:
( I) This type of derivative security typically does not have a conversion or exercise price
( 2) CAP Units credited to Reporting Person's account (as of 2/8/06) based on Fiscal Year 2005 Net Earnings Adjustments pursuant to the
Issuer's Capital Accumulation Plan for Senior Managing Directors (CAP Plan); exempt under Rule 16b-3.
Reporting Owners
I
Reporting Owner Name / Address
Relationships
EFTA00316968
Case 1:013-cv-W1 RN:4m &Event 102 Filed uggr /09 Page 256 of 347
CAYNE JAMES E
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.
X Chairman of the Bd., CEO
383 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10179
Signatures
/s/ Coyne, James E. 2/9/2006
•• Signature of Repotting Person Dare
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
Sir Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00316969
tease .05-cvNiAregfilitogifirieekINESFAINIMeiikNegle 257 tatit4ippRowth
FORM COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(0 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person * 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
CAYNE JAMES E BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] _ x_ Director 10%. Owner
(Lau) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (NIM/DDNYYY) _ X _ Officer (give title below) Other (specify
below)
Chairman of the Bd., CEO
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 2/23/2006
C., 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MM/DD/YYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
_ X _ Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (State) (Zip) Form filed by Mom than One Reporting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I tile of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities Acquired 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code (A) or Disposed of (D) Following Reported Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (Instr. 8) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date, if (Instr. 3.4 and 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
a) (Instr.
or
Code V Amount (D) Price 4)
2/2312006
Common Stock M tiI 25809 A SO 5677798.00 D
212M2006
Common Stock S 25809 D $135.08 5651989.00 D
By
Common Stock 45669.00 I
Spouse
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible secunties)
I. Tide of Derivate 2. 3. Trans. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. II. Nature
Security Conversion Date Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (Instr. Acquired (A) (Instr. 3 and 4) (Imo St Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any 8) or Disposed of Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security (D) Owned Direct (D)
(Instr. 3.4 and Following or Indirect
5) Repotted a) (Instr.
Transaction 4)
Amount or
Date (5) (ingf. 4)
Expiration Title Number of
Exercisable Date
Code V (A) ID) Shares
2/23/2006 M
Mt 11/30/7.005 II/30/200S Common
CAP Units (2000) (2) 25809 25809.00 50 0.00 D
Stock
Explanation of Responses:
( I) Settlement of CAP Units and distribution of common stock to Reporting Person pursuant to CAP Plan; exempt under Rule 16b-3.
( 2) This type of derivative security typically does not have a conversion or exercise price
Reporting Owners
Relationships
Reporting Owner Name / Address
Director 10% OwnerOfficer Other
CAYNE JAMES E
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.
EFTA00316970
Case 1:08-c102793rWS locument 102 Filed 212 Page 258 of 347
k
i83 MADISON AVENUE
EW YORK, NY 10179
Signatures
X Chairman of the Bd., CEo
/s/ Coyne, James E. 2/24/2006
•• Signature of Reporting Person Date
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person. see Instruction 4(b)(v).
▪ Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00316971
1 .08-cv04/4365WASoyasek Esummetta Nalbge 259 ggagepRovAL
FORM 4ctse COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person • 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
CAYNE JAMES E BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] _x_ Director 10% Owner
(Last) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (311WDDIYYYY) x _ Officer (give title below) Other (specify
below)
Chairman of the Bd., CEO
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 6/5/2006
C. 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MWDDNYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
X Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (State) (Zip) Form filed by Morethan One Reporting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I.Title of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nattily
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code Acquired (A) or Following Reported Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (Instr. 8) Disposed of (D) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date, if (lnstr. 3.4 and 5) I Direct (D) Ownership
any (A) or Indirect (Instr. 4)
or (1) (Instr.
Code V Amount (D) Price 4)
Common Stock 6/52006 G V 300 D 50 5651689.00 I)
lis
Common Stock 45669.00 I
Spouse
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Ox ned ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible secunties)
I. Title of Derivate 2. 3. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable 7. Tide and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. II. Nature
Security Conversion Trans. Deemed Trans. Derivative and Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Date Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (lnstr. 8) Acquired (A) or (Instr. 3 and 4) (Instr. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any Disposed of (D) Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security Owned Direct ID)
(Instr. 3. 4 and Following or Indirect
5) Reported (I) Ilnstr.
Transaction 4)
Date Expiration Number of
Ammor or um
Title (s) (Instr. 4)
Code V (A) (D) Exercisable Date Shan.
Explanation of Responses:
Reporting Owners
Relationships
Reporting Owner Name / Address .
;Director 10% OwnerOfficer Other
CAYNE JAMES E
GO BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.
X Chairman of the Bd., CEO
383 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10179
Signatures
Is/ Cayne, James E. 6/6/2006
Date
EFTA00316972
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 260 of 347
" Signature of Repotting Person
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• if the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
ss Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the forrn displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00316973
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 261 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE OMB APPROVAL
COMMISSION OMBNumta: 3235-0287
Expo: February 28,
2811
Cheek this box if no tenger Elutdel Estimated dotage burclan
13 Solace le. Form 4 or Form 5 STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
0 celessord may Oarenisa. See
knnclion
ned purSuant to &tenon 16(a)01 the SeCurilieS Exchange Ael 011934. Section 17(a) 01the Pubk UMity
hours per
response 0.5
Holding Company Ad Of 1915 or Sec ion 30(h) Of the Investment COMpany Ad 011940
2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Reteticesnip of Reporting Persons) le Issuer
1. Name and Address 01Reporting Pend,
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC neck Al apple-Able)
CAYNE JAMES E X Diector 10% owner
I BSC I
Officer (give vile Other (Inanity
X below) below)
(Lad) (Filth (Middle)
3. Date 01Easiest Transaction (blOnthiDayNear) Chairman of the Bd.. CEO
C/O BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 11/15/2006
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. II Amencenent Dale of Original Filed 0.foraboayivean 6. Individual or JOintriGreup Filing talent
{steer) Appfeabie Line)
NEW YORK NY 10179 X Form Med by One RepOrling Person
Form Med by MOM than One Reporting
Person
(City) (Slate) IZO:
Tab! I - Non•D rivalive Securities Acquired. Disposed ol. or Beneficially Owned
1. Tide of Security (Instr. 3) 2 Transaction 2A. Deemed 3. a. Securities Acquired S. Amounl or 6. 7. kelt/re
ale Execudon Data. lien:xenon (A) or thsposed Ol ID) Securities Ownership ol Indirect
illontriDaylen) If any Code (Instr. (Instr.3, 4 and 5) Beneficially Form: BeneScisi
(MenthDayNear) 8) Owned Dbeci (0) Ownership
F dewing or indirect prism al
(A) RePoged (II (Intl. 4)
Cod* V Arnaud or Price Transaction(*)
ID) prism 3 and 4)
Common Stock 11/15/20(Hh <3 V 30.000 D 30 5.621.689 I)
Common Stock 45.669 I I
Table II - Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
(e.g.. puts, calls. warrants. options. convertible securities)
1. Title of 2. 3. Transaction 3A. Deemed J. 5. 6. Dote Exercisable and 7. Title and S. Price of 9. Humber 10. II. Nature
Derivative Conversion Date Execution Dare. Transaction Humber Expiration Dale Amount of Derivative of Ownership M Indirect
Security or Exercise (MontriDay,Yeer) it any Cope (inst.. el IMemhDay'rear) Securities Security derivative Form: Beneficial
(Instr. 3) Pam or (lionthDay,Vear) 8) Derivative Underlying (Instr. 5) Secunites Dyed (Dl Ownership
Derivative SeCtrelet DerIVOIIVO Elenellaally or indirect (Instr. a)
Security Acq red Security Owned (ii anew. a)
IA) or (Instr. 3 and II Following
Disposed Reported
MID Transaction
(net . 3,4 HO fins°, 4)
and )
Amount
or
Hunger
Dale Expiration or
Coco V (A) (0) EX./Citable Date True Share"
Explanation of Responses:
Remarks:
/s/ Caync James E. 11/17/2006
Signature 01 RepOrling Person Date
Reminder: Report on a separale line let each Class of SeOollieS bane(Oilly owned directly or indirectly.
• If the term is filed by more man one reporting person. see Instruction 4 (b)(v).
• Intentional missIalements or omissions of fads 0Onsteule Federal Criminal Violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: Fle three copies DI Iris Form. One of which musl be manually signed. II Spate is inufliekvit. See InStrunlien 6 ler procedure.
Persons wtto respond to the Collection of information Contained In this norm are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently d OMB Number.
hup://idea.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700106000108/xs1F345X02/cay44... 2/26/2009
EFTA00316974
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 262 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
washnson. D.C. 20649 01.48 Humber: 32350287
February 28.
Espies 2011
Cheek Pis by H re longer algal to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
0 Stela, le. Fpm a Fees 5
obiggions meg ceramic, See
Febvelto Filed purs.uanl to Section 18(a) of the Se:unless Exchange Ad of 1934, Secten 17(al of the Public Utility
Estimated average buskin
*nape)
rowdree 0.5
Holdng Company Ad el 1935 er Seaton 30(h) of the Investment Company Ad el 1940
1. Name and Address ol Reflecting Pasco' a Issuer Name and Ticker or Tradrg Symbol 5. Relalicenhp el Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check all amicable)
CAYNE JAMES E X Director 10% Owner
I BSC 1
Officer (give title Other (specify
x below) below)
Man (MS) (Middle)
3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MordhDayffear) Chairman of the Bd.. CE()
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/18/2106
383 MADISON AVENUE
4 II Amendinerd. Date of Original Filed ((AordIVDayNear) 6. Individual or JoiM,Greup Fling (Check Applied,*
Line)
(Street)
X Fonn tiled by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Fenn filed by More than One Reporting
Person
(City) (Slate) alp'
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed et. er Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3) 2, Transaction 2A. Deemed 3, 4. Seventh, Acquired IA) or 5. Amount ol 4. 7. Hamm
Dale Execullon Dale, Tanya:don Disposed 01MI (Instr. 3.4 Snail., Owners)* of loafed
MordhiVeynleral II any Code fleet end 5) Beneficially Form: Beneticin
IllorithOgotesrl 8) Owned Direct (DI Ownership
Following or lindereci Omar. iii
(I) Dose. 41
Cede V Amount or
or Once Transadionte)
Orl) (Instr.] and et
M
Common Stock 12/1812006 46.415 A SO 5.668.1(4 I)
Common Stock 12/1812006 S 46.415 I) $164.72 5.621.689 I)
Common Stock 45.669 I it>
Spam sc
Table II • Derivative Securities Ace Red. Disposed ol. or Beneficially Owned
(e.g.. puts. cans. warrants options. convertible securities)
i. Tole of 2. J.Transact:an tk Deemed a 5. Number 5. Dais Exercisable and 7. Tide and Amount 8. Prior el 9. Haider 10. II. Naive
Derivalhe Ocaversien Dale Execution Oast, Transadlon of Expiration Date el Seemities Derivalive of Chmership of Indireci
Security or Edens* EllonthOeyVeat) it any Code (lost Delwin. pioninowtreati Underlying Securliy denvathe Form: Beneficial
anti. 3) Pace of (Mantheap3044) 8) Secunrilos Densely* Secuety (Ince. 51 StailttleS Mad (D) Ownership
Oaftolls° Accparod (Inflt. 3 and 41 Benellcialy or Wiled (InSII. 4)
Security IN or Oared (II (Instr. 4)
Disposed rosomng
01(D) Repartee
ilneu. 3. 4 Transaction
and 5) (0 (imn. 4)
Amount
or
mamba
Date Faeroe:. 01
Code V IN PR Exemisable Date tide Snares
CAP Units i ••:_-non
r 2i 12/15,2006 SSAIS 11/30/2006 IIMO/2006 t 46.415 80 0 it
(20111) Stack
Explanation of Responses:
I. Settlement of CAP Lens and diunbution ol cocoon slat in Renaud's Perron faunal toCAPPlusexempt wider Rule 16b.3.
2 Thu nye ot &et YJIIVC {Num) typicallydoes sac lure • creams of excises pike
Remarks:
A/ Caync, James E. 12/19/2006
Signature el Reporting Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a separate Inc lot each class al secunbes beneficially owned d ect/y or indredly.
• H the Sarni is tiled by more than one mooring person. see Instruction 4 (b)(v).
" Intentional misstatements or omissions ol facts constdute Federal Crimnal Volations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 780(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form. one ol which must be manually signed. II space is insufficienl. see Ire:ruction ti ler procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of Information contained In this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700106000129/xs1F345X02/cay... 10/29/2008
EFTA00316975
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 263 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
washnson. D.C. 20549 01113 Ituratrar: 32350287
Eaptes: February 28.
Check Pis bar arelonger Gutted to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
Seas:ale. Form 4 a Farm 5 BilligtOCI average burden
(Upton may winos See hourS per
bylnicito Filed pursuant to Section 18(a) ol the Secure:es Exchange Act ol 1934, Sedian 17(a) el the Public UIility retieelle 0.5
Heldng Company Ad of 1935 or Seaman 30(h) of the Investment Company Ad ol 1940
1. Name and Address ol Reporting Persen• 2 Issuer Name and Ticker or Tradrg Symbol 5. Reblicnship d Reporting Persons) to bauer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check all applCable)
CAYNE JAMES E I BSC J X Director 10% Owner
0Hket (gwe tille Deter (specify
X belos0 below)
Mat) (SS) (Mittel.)
3. Date of Earliest Transaction (Mordh;Dayffear) Chairman of the Bd.. CEO
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. I2/20/20On
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. II Amendmerd. Dale ol Original Filed (MordIVDayffear) 6. IndMdual or lanttroup Fling (Cheek Applicable
(Sneer) Line)
X Fenn tiled by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY Inn
Fenn tiled by More than One Reporting
Person
(City) (Slate) IZipi
Table I . Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed el. or Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3) 2. Transaction 2.. Nemec' S 4. Secwities Acquirer/1AI S. Amount of 6. 7. Nature
Date Execution Oat.. Transaction or Disposed Of (0)(1ndr. Securities Ormtrahp of Indirect
Planhtby.Tetor) if tun Code (Instr. 3.4 and 5) Bendlenity Form: Creed Beneficial
(apettiparnms) at Owed WI or Dernershe
F lb 9 Indirect II) (Mau. 4)
IA) Reported (Inset 4)
Code V Amount or Price Tranuelion(el
ID) (Mau. 3 and 4)
Table II - Derivative Securities Acq fired. Disposed o or Beneficially Owned
(e g.. puts. calls. warrants options. convert ble securities)
1. Title of 2. 3. Transaction 3A Deemed A. 5. Number 6. Dila EilerCiafiete and 7. Title and Amount 8. Price of 9. Duster to. I I. Nerve
Derlyetive Conversion Date Execution Dote. Transaction of Expiration Dale or Sectorres Dalvetive of cosinotsnip amnion
Security eastern. IllonthOsyNetorl deny Dodo (na. Derivative pAcmhOrynrearl Unclertyn9 Security derivative Form: Benefice'
Omer. 3) Price 01 (MoneibayTeer) /0 Securities Derivative SecuMy (Ms.. 5) Securities Deed (DI Ownership
Derivative Acquired lime. 3 ado) Beneficially or Indirect [Instr. II
Security IA) or Onnel (I1 Omni. 4)
Disposed rohowine
O(D) Reported
(Instr. 3 4 Transaction
and S) (SIUnits 4)
Amount
a
Haagen
Data EXpirallOn of
Code V (A) ID) EleccisaWa Dale The Shares
CAP Vein iii A Common
89.158 t IfOX:0 I I I if-kOZOli 89.758 Se ay.'''. I
(2006) Stock
Erre god Comma
option in S165 A2 I af20f2Olf. A 35.788 12/XV2009 12lb)/2016 35.788 SO 35.7sa
10 top
Suxk
I
Explanation of Responses:
L this nee nl OMV.111W SO: re) typically don. m4 haw • <0400,1011 01 CACMoe price
2. Menai of capenuace and credo to itcsonme Penfe's ACCOOSIA (of Dill/21M)6 museum to dc bructs Caput ACCIMMIIMI011 Plan for Senior Misusing Darden (CAP PLin). tamp under Rule IN
Remarks:
1st Cayne, James E. 12/21/2006
Manaiure or Repelling Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a separate Inc lot each class of securities beneficially maned drectly a indieclly.
• If the term is find by more than one reportng person. see Instruction 4 (b)(v).
" Intentional rnisstalernerds or omissions ol fads oansteute Federal Criminal Violations Sae 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 780(a).
Stele: File three copies of this Form. or ol ?inch must be manually signed. If space is insufficient see Irc.truction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700106000139/xs1F345X02/cay... 10/30/2008
EFTA00316976
SEC FORM 4 Page I of 2
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 264 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE OMB APPROVAL
COMMISSION OIABNumba: 3235.0287
Espies: February 28.
3011
Check this box if nOlOri0Ortinkeel Esbmatol ern:debunks,
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
0 10 SOCI4118. Form 4 or Form 5
angatiora may comma Soo
lintruClign 1M).
Filed pursuant to Secho 16(8)01 the Securities Exchange AC1 01 1934. SeCtiOn 17(a) I the Pubic Utility
how* per
response 0.5
Holding Canpany Ad 01 1935 or SeCliOn 30(h) 01 the Invettinent Company Ad 01 1940
2. Issuer Name and Tidier or Tradlig Symbol S. RelaliCAship DI Reponing PerSCA(S) to Issuer
1. Name and Address d Repotting PerSan.
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Meek al appliCable)
CAYNE JAMES E X Director 1014 Owner
I BSC I
Officer (give Ede Other (Speedy
X below) below)
(last) (First) (Middle)
3. Date 01EanieSI Transaction (Month:Day/Year) Chairman of the Bd.. CEO
C/O BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 01/08/2007
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. II AMentrilent Dale DI Original Filed (1.40nOttlayiYear) 6. Individual or JOintGrCup Filing (ale&
Apptcable Line)
(Steel)
NEW YORK NY 10179 X Form Sled by One atoning Person
Forth Ned by More Than One Reporling
Person
(City) (Slate) 12471
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. 7Ille of Security (Instr. 3) . Transaction 2A. Deemed 1. 4. Securities Acquired S. Mnounl of 6. 7. Allure
Dale Execution Date. Transaction (A) or Msposed 01(D) Securities Ownership of indirect
(MonthDayMear) II any Code distr. (Instr. 3. 4 and 5) Beneficially Form: Beneficial
(MeniktisyNearl (1) Owned Caen (D) Ownership
F dewing or Indirect matt 4)
(A) RePorlail (I) (innr. 4)
Code V MUMMA or TrensectiOn(s)
MI (Instr. 3 and 4)
Common Stock 01/08/2007 t; v 145 f) SO 5.611.544 D
Common Stock 01/0812007 (• v 145 D s0 5.611.399 D
Common Stock 01/08/2001 G V 145 D s0 5.611.254 D
Common Stock 01/08/2007 0 v 145 D s0 5.611.109 D
Common Stock 01/0812007 G V 145 D s0 5.610.964 D
Common Stock 01/08/2007 G V 145 D s0 5.610.819 D
Common Stock 01/08/2007 G V 145 D s0 5.610.674 D
Common Stock 01/08/2007 G V 145 D s0 5.610529 D
Common Stock 01/08/2007 G V 145 D s0 5.610.384 D
Common Stock 01/08/2007 G v 145 D s0 5.610.239 D
Common Stock 01/08/2007 G v 145 D s0 5.610.094 D
Common Stock 01/08/2007 0 v 145 D s0 5.609.949 D
Common Stock 01/08/2007 0 v 145 D s0 5.609.804 D
By
Common Stock 45.669 I
Spouse
Table II - Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed ol. or Beneficially Owned
(e. .. puts. calls. warrants. options. convertible se unties)
1. Title of 2. 3. Transaction 3A. Deemed 4. S. 8. Date Exercisable and 7. Title end 8. Price of 9. Number 10. 11. Nature
Dmloathe Conversion Date Execution Date. Transaction Plumber Expiration Dale Amount or Derivative or Ownership of indirect
Security or Exercise Odenthtlayniear) II any Code dash. or Odombeaykear) Securities Security derivative Form: Beneficial
(Imit. 3) Price or (MowisDaykries) 8) Derivative Underlying (insir. 5) Securities DiMI (D) Ownership
Derivative Secwities Derivative Benelicially or Indirect (bar. 4)
Security Acquired Security Owned el (Instr. 4)
IA) a (InsIr. 3 and A Following
Disposed Reported
or ID Transaction
(Ins .3.4 (ell:nth. A
and )
Amount
or
Number
Dale Eipiration of
Code V (A) (D) Exercisable Date Title Shares
Explanation ol Responses:
Remarks:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000004/xs1F345X02/cay. 10/30/2008
EFTA00316977
SEC FORM 4 Page 2 of 2
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 265 of 347
hi Cayne, James E. 01/09/2007
•• signature of Reposing Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a separale line lot each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indiredly.
' II Ilia Isom is tiled by more than one reputing person. see Instruction 0 (b)(v).
" intenlional misstalements or omissions of fads ocotillo* Federal Criminal visas:ins See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Nola: Fie three copies of this Form. one of which must be manually signed. II space is bsuffident. see Instruction 6 lor procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of Information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OPAB Number.
http://www.see.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000004/xs1F345X02/cay... 10/30/2008
EFTA00316978
SEC FORM 4 Page 1 of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 266 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washmeon. O.C. 20549
OM Hunter: 32350287
Sores February 28.
Omsk en bar dnalone Gutted to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Seaton) Forma a Form 5
(Uptonmay waive See
fraud*, l(y) Filed pursuenl to Section 18(a) ol the Securbes Exchange Ad of 1934, Seaton 17(a) of the Public Why
Finn...COO average orlon
hours per
renienle 0.5
Holdng Company Ad of 1935 or Seaton 30(h) of the Imestrnent Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Persea' a Issuer Name and Ticker or Tradrg Symbol 5. Relaticeship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check all appleable)
CAYNE JAMES E X Director 10% Owner
I Esc I
CtIker (give title Other (specify
x beim) below)
MA (11r11) (Middle)
3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MordIVDayffeat) Chairman of the Bd.. CEO
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 02/14/2007
383 MADISON AVENUE
4 II Amendment. Dale ol Original Filed (Mordh:Dayffear) 6. IndMdual or Jenttroup Fling (Check Applicable
(Street) Line)
X Fenn tiled by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Fenn filed by More than One Reporting
Person
(City) (State) ry&
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed ol. or Renal:daily Owned
1. Tale al Security (Mn'. 3) 2. Transaction 2.4. Dirsewd 1. 4. Seeman, Acquires/ (AI S. Amount of 6. 7. Nature
Omit Execution DSc Transaction or Disposed Of (0)(nstr. Securities Ownership of Indirect
tracmhOrpTesr) (say Code (Inst. 3.4 and 5) erniericialry Form: Direct Beihrlicial
(a"thcayYmr) e) Owned (DI or Ownershm
Folio Me Indirect II) Onstr..0
IA) Reperled (Inert. 4)
Code V Amount or Prim Tninsectional
103 ( ls%) end 4)
Table II . D rivative Securities Acq ired. Disposed o or Beneficially Owned
(e g.• puts. calls. warrants options. cooverti le securities)
I. Tee el 2. 3. Thansacnon 3A. Deemed a S. Hunter 6. Dale Eilenleatera and 7. Tree and Amount 8. Pate 01 9. Ilwriber 10. ILI:Ware
Derlvethe comenion Date Execution Dow. Transaction of opeananDme of Stemless Onlvativo of Ownership or Indirect
Security or Exercise IllonihthyTeer) irony Code (Instr. Derivative garehDayTeart Underlying Security derivative Form: Benciirtai
(Instr.1) Price 01 (MendiDayTmg 1) SecuMies Derivative Seaway (Inert. SI Securities Med (0) Owninshe
Derivative Acquired (Instr. 3 and 4) Semtkially ow Indite., tInstr. 4)
Security IA) or Owned 01 (Mgr. 4)
Disposed following
of (0) Reported
Ong, 3 4 Transaction
end 5) (s) Wert 4)
Amount
OF
Number
Dew Expiration cd
Code V (A) (0) aratecisablo Dam nee snares
CAP Um* A Cornmon
(2001)
it> 02.14(21..... 3.118 I1/3W2006 I 1/Avatua . 3 i is Su
Mod. •
CAP Unie. A Common
(2002) iIi 02/14.7.0ir 12. ) 10.869 II/30/200T 11/30/2007 10.869 So 172.62:
Stock
CAP Um* A Common
III 02/14/2007 10.823 11/30/2008 11/30/20011 10.823 50 171.901
(2003) i 2, Stock
CAP Units A Common
I!)
(2004)
Stock
III 02/14/low 6.613 11W/200Y 11t30/2009 6.613 60 105.029 I)
CAP Outs A Common
Ii. 02/14120u7 5.93h 11/30/2010 11/30/2010 5938 $0 94.313 1)
(.2005) 'Z.)
Stock '
Explanation of Responses:
This nye o denbilOC SO; on typically / rate a ‘oorenion or exercise price
2. CAP Una* reJPeJ m Rqsanwf Pences .mum las of 2/14.07) bawd on Penal Year 2006 Net Earnings Adjustments puma to the lanais Capital AreumuLapan Plan for Sows Hanagins Third.
WAY Mew exterior under Rule 16b.3
Remarks:
Is) Cayne lames E. 08152007
" Signalure of Reporting Person Dale
Renin&r: Reporl on a separate Inc lee each class al securities beneficially owned el cent r indrectly.
• If the lore rs liled by more than one wenn(' person. see Instruclicn 4 (b)(v).
" Intentional rnisstalerneres or omissions ol fads consttute Federal Canna( Violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 780(a).
Note: File three cooks ol this Form. one ol whch must be manudly signed. II space is insufficient. see Instruction 6 tor procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained In this lone are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB (lumber.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000012/xs1F345X02/cay... 10/30/2008
EFTA00316979
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 267 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washinglon. D.C. 20549
01,103Nvinber 3235.0287
Sterol February 28.
Cheekthisbox Irelonger subject to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Section 18. Formed Form5
oblgalions may continuo 51te
Intsnxtfon Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Ad ol 1934. Section 17(a) of the Pubic lAilty
Emmet.," average burden
houro per
moms, 0.5
Holding Company Ad of 1935 or Section *h) el the Investment Company Mel 1940
1. Nome and Address of Repelling Person 2. Issuer Name and Ticket or Trading Syrnbc4 5. Relationship of Rept:ding Person(s) to issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check al applicable)
CAYNE JAMES E X Director 1096 Owner
I BSC ]
- Officer (give Mk Other (Wittily
X
(Sall1 (Fest) (Midlle) bebw) below)
3. Os, of Earliest Transaction (Morith'Daynear) C1101Mlan of the Bd.. CEO
OO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 03/22/2007
383 MADISON AVENUE
4.1Amendment. Dale of Original Filed (MondsDaylYear) 8. Inavicba or JomLGroup Fding (Check Applicable
Line)
(Sired)
X Form filed by One Rem:ding Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form fled by More than One Reporting
Person
(GM (Slate) TIP/
Table I . Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3) 2 Transaction 2A. Deemed 5. 4. Securities A waited (AI 5. Amount of 4. T. Nature
Date Execution Date. Transaction or Disposed 01(DJ (Mtge. Securities Ownership of indirect
IMonlhDay.lean it any Code (Instr. 3.4 and 5) Benelicialty Form: Beneficial
(ficethDay.,Year) 8) Owned Direct 03)o• Ownership
Foao i g Indirect (II (Insp. al
(A) Reported linen 4)
Code V Ainoum or Prise Trainee-fonts)
ID) (nstr. 3 and 4)
act
Common Stock 03/222007 3.118 A 44) 5.612.922 I.)
By
Common Stock 45.669 I
Table III • Derivative Se unties Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
(erg.. puts. calls. warrant . options. convertible securities)
1. Title ol 2. 3. Transaction 3A. Deemed 4. 5. H tuber 4. Doe Exercisable and T. Tint and t Price of 0. Humber 10. 11. Nan
Denvetho Conversion Date Execution Dole. Try...action of Expiration Date Amount of Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
Security or Exercise HolenthDaylean If Cede Onsu. Deenaive (MonthtbyTten Securities Seemly derivative Form: Beneficial
(Instr. 3) Price of PikeghDaylean 8) Sear/hies Ondertrinfl (Instr. 5) Securities Direct ID) Owner/Ina
Derivative Ace iced Derivative Security Beneficially or Indirect grow It
Security IA) r (In*. 3 wad 4) Owned (I) (lose a)
Disposed Following
of( ) Reported
(nstr. 3.4 Transaction
and5) (s)(Iostr. 4)
Amount
or
Numbs.
Dab Expiren of
Cada V IA) 1/1 Itcarcisable Date Deo Shares
CAP Units , r, M Common
Olf22/3007 lit 3.118 I I/30/1006 11/30,21/06 slack 3.118 SO 0
(20011
Emlanallen of Responses:
I. Settlement f CAP Cam. nJ &Hanlon of common 140: L to Reponms P non immures to CAP Plan. meant under Rule 16/s3
2 TM% type of &mauve fe only typical!) does rim have a convenion or exeunt price
Remarks:
1st Caync, James E. 03232007
Signature of Reporting Person Date
Reminder. Report on a separate line for each Class of securities beneficially owned direct,/ or indirectly.
' If the lam is lied by more than one reportng person. see rostruction 4 (b)(v).
InteMional missialemerts or omissions el facts constitute Federal Criminal Violabons See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: File three copies of Ors Form. one ol wNcli must be manually signed. If space iz insufficient. see In:timed, Et for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000040/xs1F345X0Vcay... 12/16/2008
EFTA00316980
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02'27/09 Page 268 of 347
SEC Fonn 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washington. O.C. 2050 OMB ikrreer 3255-0252
Exerts Ftesvarya
Owe Om Pas if no 'abaci to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP Son
n Section 16 Fa14 4 or
U Malice* "WI
5
whine See
Estrealed "sr bunion
mrs per
.4014.146041(01 Filed pursuant to SeCtiOn 161a) 01the SeCultieSExchange
At Of 1934. Section nog el he Public Utility miCceso 05
Holing Company Act 011935 or &Mien 30(h) 01the InvesIMOM Company Ad of 1940
1. Name and Address a Reporting Beam. 2. Issuer Name and ticker er Trading Syrrbel 5. Relationshipof Repealing Person(s)So Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check di apgicabe)
CAVNF! 'AMPS F X Dfrecior 10%Oener
I ESC 1
Officer (give tab Other (speedy
X below) below)
11-ast) Pith girlidde)
3. Date of Earl,esl Transaction (kfonthDaylVear) Chairman of the Bd.. CEO
C/O BEAR. STEARNS @ CO. INC. 12/21/2007
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. II Arnendmenl. Dale of Ongnal Filed (Monthlkw(Year) 8. Indvidual or Joint:Group Fling (Check Apt:doable
(Saner) Line)
X Form SW by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form Mod by More than One Reporting
Person
IC16) iSlate) 1241
Table I - Non Derivative Securities Acquired. DI posed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. Tkle of SeeurNy (Instr. 3) 2. Transaction 2A. Deemed 3. 4. Setualten At tilred (Ala( S. Amount a 6. 7. Haute
Dale Exiltualell DOOR TranfeCOOn Disposed 010))Onstr. 3.4 SeenireleS OWnelfelp of Melted
(likinleOrrynlead II any Code (Neb. and 5) Bentficerry Form. Direct Denelielal
IlionlaDaynewl a) Owned ID) or OwnerMip
F Hoene Indirect II) (Imer. 4)
(A) Reported unser. 4)
Cede V Amount or Price Transeceams)
(0) (Msg. Sewn
6.1
Common Stock 12)21/2007 .I ) 172.621 A 30 5.785.543 1)
Common Stock 12/21/2007 S 172.621 D 09.01 5.612.922 I)
ISM
Common Stock 05.669 I
Table N Derivative Securities Acq fired. Disposed of. Of Beeleflelbly Owned
( g.. puts. calls. warrants options. convertible securities)
I. TS el 2. 3. Transaction 3A. Domed 4. 5 Number of 6. Dale Exercisable and 7. Tae and Amount 8 Pere el 9, Humeri 10 II N.,,„,
Derivative Conversion Dow Execution Dale. TAM...Olen DfiniratiVe Expiration Dale el Securillos Derivative el Ownership or fro irect
Security or Enrols* (11oruhDavesan deny Code (Instr. Stemma geonth.DaMean Um:keying SeturIty dellvallve Form. Benencial
grata) Pelee of ildonthoa)VYean e) moused IA) Oterative Security (Instr. 5) Steureles Direct (Di Ownership
Derinthe or Disposed (Inn, 3 and a) Beneficially or Indirect (Inat: a)
Seetwief of (DI (Instr. Owned (I) Onsir. 4)
3.4 and SI Following
Reported
Arnounl Trans/Nike
IP (5) gear. 4)
Dale Expralkon Number
Code V IA) (DI exercisable Date Tee of Shares
, .i Nt
. 2. Ill2I/2007 • 172421 IMO/2UP 1 itar.nin Common 172.621 so u o
•I Bock
Expanalton of Responses:
'beam of common gait to Itedectop Person pnisuaIl w ('Al' Pim Rule limb
...ally doe. ex tube a conwision or excadie epic
/s/Caync, lames E. 12(21/2007
**Signatureel Reporting Person Dale
Remnder Neon on a separate ine lot Bath NHS 01 8000N•08 benelicialy owned dreay Or intliWAY.
• B the form Is Sled by more than one reportng person. see Instruction 4 Ms)-
" Intentional MtiStateMents or missrens of late COnstitute Federal Criminal VIONAKine See 18 U.B.C. 1801 and 15 U.B.C. 7811(a).
NOID File three copies 013.15 RPM. one 01 which must be Manually peeled. If Wee° Is insufficient see Mstruction 610( reweave.
Persona mu, respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless lee IOWA dispiays a currently valid DNB Number.
hup://www.sec.gov/Archivesiedgaddata/777001/000077700107000127/xs1F345X02/cay... 12/16/2008
EFTA00316981
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 269 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washington. D.C. 20549
0,303Number 3235.0207
SONS
February 29.
Chet* this toe V nelonger subject STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Section It Forme°, Form6
oblostims may continue. See
InUnxion lib) Filed pursuant le Seclion 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 17(a) of the Pubic
Esornaleci average burden
beers per
reeprose 0.5
Holding Company MI of 1935 rx Section *h) ol the Investment Company Act ol 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person. 2. Issuer Name and Toga or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check all applicabit)
CAYNIE JAMES E X Weider 10% Owner
I BSC ]
Officer (give Idle v
Other (speedy
Pon Fest) below) a
Merle) below)
3. Dale of Earliest Transaction (Litonth'DaylVear) Chairman of the Board
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 01/09/2008
383 MADISON AVENUE
4.9 Amendment. Date of Original Filed (MonthiDaylVeari 8. Individual or Jointroup Filing (Check Applicable
Line)
WSW'S)
X Fenn filed by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form Ned by More than One Reporting
Person
(Clio) (Slate) (IP/
Table I r Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. TItle of Security (Instr. 3) a Transaction an. Deemed 3. 4. Securities A qu red (A) 5. Amount of a 7. Nature
Dale Ezecullon Oat!. Transaction or Disposed Crl ID (lose. Securities Ownership of Indirect
WenthOsylipac) earn Code (Instr. 3.4 and 5) Benelicially Form: Beneficial
(MCcallvDayTeer) e) Owned Pimento) or (Mooning
Fob i g indium! (II linen. Ii
(A) Reported (lost? 4)
Code V *mum or Prim Tronsoctiontsi
ID) (Instr. 3 and 4)
Table II • Derivative Se uriti s Acquired. Disp sed of or Beneficially Owned
(e g.. puts. ea s. warrant . options. converti le securities)
I. Title el 2. 3. Transaction 3*. Doomed 4. S. Number 6. Dale Exercisable and 7. Tine and S. Price of 9. Number W. It. Nolan
Derivative Conversion Data Execution WI*. Transaction or Expiration Dale Amount of Derivative of °encamp of indirect
security or Words. illonth'DatTear) Bony Code Pnalr. Derniative (McimhDarrecw) Securities Seclalty derivative Form: Beneficial
(Matt 3) Price of (idontheatTearl B) Securities Underlying (lrate. S) Securnies Direct ID) Ownership
Derivanve Acquired Derivative Security Beneficially or Indirect (Instr.4i
Security IA) or (lasts. 3 and 0) Owned (I) (Instr. 4)
Disposed sosernim
01(D) Reporter,
(left. 3.4 Transaction
end 5) (4)(Inatr. 4)
Arecrua
a
Number
Dais Expation
Oat. ol
Cede V (43 (0) Exercisable Title Snares
ir 010442008 1.182 11/0)/2007 Common
(200Oi ,A
2 ii 1180/2007
Stock 1.18? W 1.182 D
CAPUna A1 Common
iii OlAYNXIOS 1.177 I1/10'2009 Ilf3IV2020 Stook 1•177 93 173.018 D
(2003) (2
CAP Una% A Common
iii OlAYN2009 ( 2i 719 II/3032009 II/300.009 719 so 105.743 D
(2004) Siock
CAP Unsts A Common
'i' al/M/2008 , 2i 643 II/30/20'0 II/311/2010 Slack 645 so 94.938 D
(2003)
CAP Units A
i 01/09/2008 ( 2i
614 I mono' I If AWIDII Comockmon 614 SO 90.372 D
(20061 Si
EsplanatIon of Responses:
I. Thu nine a ikinainv se way typicallyMc% ace haw a conwerwm or tomcat put
2 CAP Can,. induct' in Reporting Person's accouni (as of IM08)buscd on Pascal Year 2007 Net P.amingis Adjustments oarsmen ei the luxes Capnal Accismslanon Plan for Senior Winsome Dimank
CAP Plant elellIpt anon auk Mb.).
Remarks:
/s/Cayne James E. 01/09/2008
Signature.' Reporting Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securilies beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the loan is fled by more than one reportng person. see Instruction 4 (b)(v).
Intentional missiaiernents or omissions ol facts tonsiiiute Federal Criminal Violations See 1B U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78I1fa).
Note: File three copies of this Form. one of which mutt be manually eons. If mace is insufficient. see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the cefeetIen el Information contained In this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700108000002/xs1F345X02/cay... 12/16/2008
EFTA00316982
08_cvicRitzrogiiimiesosigeeknsiEsFitiatocooRNeNe 270 Oka4,113PROVAL
FORM 4ase COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
1 Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(0 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person * 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
ARBER JEFFREY M BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] Director 10% Owner
(Last) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DDNYYY) _ X _ Officer (give title below) Other (specify
below)
Controller
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 12/19/2005
C. 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MM/DD/YYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
(Slate)
s _ Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (Zip) Form filed by More than One Reporting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I.Title of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities Acquired 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code (A) or Disposed of (D) Following Reported Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (lnstr. 8) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date, if (Instr. 3.4 and 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any (A) or Indirect (Lnstr. 4)
R) (Instr.
or
4)
Code V Amount (D) Price
12/19/2005
Common Stock m II) 6244 A SO 6993.00 D
12/19/2005
Common Stock D 3800 I) 5116.22 3193.00 D
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible secunties)
I. Title of Derivate 2. 3. Trans. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. II. Nature
Security Conversion Date Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (Instr. Acquired (A) (hum 3 and 4) anon. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any 8) or Disposed Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security of (D) Owned Direct (D)
(Ins r. 3.4 Following or Indirect
and 5) Reported (I) (Ins° .
Transaction 4)
Amount or
Date Expiration (o) (law. 4)
Title Number of
Exercisable Date
Code V (A) (D) Shares
12/19/2005 M 6244 11/30r2005 11/30/2005 Common
CAP Units (2000) (21 6244.00 SO 0.00 I/
iii Stock
Explanation of Responses:
( 1) Settlement of CAP Units and distribution of common stock to Reporting Person pursuant to CAP Plan; exempt under Rule 16b-3.
( 2) This type of derivative security typically does not have a conversion or exercise price
Reporting Owners
Relationships
Reporting Owner Name / Address
Direct° 10% OwnerOfficer Other
FARBER JEFFREY M
GO BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC
Controller
383 MADISON AVENUE
EFTA00316983
INEW YORK, NY GAIPP 1:08-cv1027931-RWS Clocumeni 104 Filed 02/27/09 Page 271 of 347
Signatures
is/ Farber, Jeffrey M. 12/20/2005
•• Signature of Repotting Person Date
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
•s Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See I8 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00316984
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 272 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washinglon. D.C. 20549
OMBNumote 3235.0207
February 29.
Spares
Cheek this box erelong& subject to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Section 16. Form4 or Forme
obigolions may continue cunt
howler Ilb) Filed pursuant lo Section 16(31 of the Securities Exchange Act ol 1934. Section 17(a) of the Pubic Item
Bimetal average burden
hoses pa
reepowe
0.5
Holding Company Ael of 1935 or Section *h) ol the Investmem Company Act ol 1940
2.1ssuer Name and Molter or Trading Symbei 5. Relationship of Rept:tong Person(s) to issuer
I. Name and Address of Re it.e° Person.
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check all asplicabie)
FARBER JEFFREY M area*, 10% Owner
_ I BSC ] Officer (give age Other (speeily
X below) below)
DSO (Rest) (Wale)
3. Dale of Earliest Transaction (MorditdDayNear) Controller
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 17/2212005
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. V Amendment. Dale of Original Flied (Monds'DayNear) 6. Intivictni or JeniBroup Fling (Check Applicabie
Line)
(Send)
X Fenn filed by One Repcang Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form fled by More than One Repcang
Person
(City) (Male) 12131
Table I. Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed ol. or Sena(icLelly Owned
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3) 2 Transact on 24. Deemed 3. 4. Securities A qu rod IA) 5. Amount of 6 7. Borne
Dale Ezeculion Date. Transaction or Disposed 01ID (bier. Securities Ownership of Indices.
(rIonlIstray'Yese) Heel Code (Instr. 3.4 end 5) Benellcially Form: Beneficial
(MOnlIstay,Year) (I) Owned Direct ID) or Ownership
Folio I g Indirect (II llersh SI
IA) Reported (lrist, 4)
Code V Ainotini or Peke Trawmotonts)
ID) (Instr. 3 and 4)
Table II - Derivative Se urill 5 Acquired. Disposed ol. or Beneficially Owned
(e g.. puts. cal s. warrant . options. cenveni le securities)
I. Title ol 2. 3. Transaction 34. Deemed 4. S. Pi antler 6. Dale Exercisable nd 7. TOW and S. Price of 9. Number 10. It. fixture
Derivative Conversion Date Execution Dive. Transaction of Expiration Dale Amount of Derivative of Ownership or indirect
Security or Exercise (Montheily.Yeas) Reny Code (Mitt. Derivative (MonthDay.Teat) Securities Scarily sanative Fens: Beneficial
(Instr. 3) Price or OfontheatTearl B) Securities undressing Onto. S) Securities Direct iD) Mown*
Derivative ACQ red Derivative Security someway or Indirect (Instr. it
Security (A) o (Unfit. 3 and 4) Owned 0) Onstc 4)
Disposed FoNowing
or lO Reported
(Ins . 3.4 Transaction
and 5) (Odom,. 4)
Amourd
or
Humber
Crate Excerption
Date or
Code V ON (0) Exereiseble Title Shares
(Ai' ........ A Common
,i , 1202/2005 3.365 11000010 11O1V2.O1O 3.365 s1163 3.365 Er
(NMI r2i Stork
Emp Stock
Common
Omen tilt 3116.5 1202/2005 A 3.931 1202/2005 127220015 kuxx I 1931 SO 3.931 D
to Mop
Explanation of Responses:
I. Thu type of &mauve so unty Inman> &exam have a conical...on or ex ewe twee
2 Deferral orionore erotica and credo to Remorse Person's Account (as of 12O2/O5)putiannt to the Woofs Capital Accumulation Plat for Sews Mmusisa Mecums 'CAP Rank eseena under Rule
16h.%
Remarks:
1st Farber. Jeffrey M. 12/23/2005
Signature of Reporting Person Date
Reminder: Report on a separate One tar each class of securities beneficially owned directly of indirectly.
• B the kern is lied by more than one reportng person. see Instruction 4 (b)(v).
Intentional misstatements or omissions ol facts consiiitde Federal Criminal %%lawn See 16 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7131f(a).
Note: File three copies of ths Form. one of Mich mint be manually signed. If space a insufficient. see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained In this form are not required to respond unless the lone displays a currently valid OMB Number.
hup://idea.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700105000119/xs1F345X02/far378... 2/26/2009
EFTA00316985
.08-cvN11119WATIWYErieeitINESFAINIA2leataNaEge 273 tatisqppRowth
FORM 4 ase COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person • 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
ARBER JEFFREY M BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] Director 10% Owner
(Last) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DDNYVY) _ X _ Officer (give title below) Other (specify
below)
Controller
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 2/8/2006
C., 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Cheek
(MWDDNYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
_
X _ Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (State) (tip)
— Form filed by More than One Reporting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I.Title of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code Acquired (A) or Following Reported Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (Instr. 8) Disposed of (D) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date, if (Instr. 3.4 an 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
or (1) (Instr.
Code V Amount (D) Price 4)
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options convertible secunties)
I. Tide of Derivate 2. 3. Trans. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. II. Nature
Security Conversion Date Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (Instr. 8) Acquired (A) or (Instr. 3 and 4) (Instr. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any Disposed of (D) Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security Owned Direct (D)
(lasts. 3.4 and Following or Indirect
5) Reported (I) (Instr.
Transaction 4)
Amount or
Date iN)(Instr. 4)
Expiration Title Number of
Exercisable Date
Code V (A) (D) Shares
2/8., 2006 11/30/2005 II/30/2005 Common
CAP Units (2000) (ti A (21 382 Stock
382.00 SO 382.00 D
2/8/2006 11/30/2006 II/30/2006 Common
CAP Units (2001) A al 124 124.00 SO 2078.00 D
Stock
lia12006 11/30/2007 II/30/2007 Common
CAP Units (2002) O, A (21 137 Stock
137.00 50 2289.00 D
lia12006 11/30/2008 11/30/2008 Common
CAP Units (2003) (I; A (21 139 Stock
139.00 50 2318.00 D
O, 2/812006 11/30/2009 11/30/2009 Common
CAP Units (2004) A (21 184 Stock
184.00 50 3070.00 D
Explanation of Responses:
( I.) This type of derivative security typically does not have a conversion or exercise price
( 2) CAP Units credited to Reporting Person's account (as of 2/8/06) based on Fiscal Year 2005 Net Earnings Adjustments pursuant to the
Issuer's Capital Accumulation Plan for Senior Managing Directors (CAP Plan); exempt under Rule 16b-3.
Reporting Owners
keporting Owner Name / Address
I
Relationships
I I
EFTA00316986
Case 1:08-cv-ifigallaytanglocimpen Filed 02/27/09 Page 274 of 347
FARBER JEFFREY M
GO BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.
Controller
383 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10179
Signatures
/s/ Farber, Jeffrey M. 2/9/2006
Date
•• Signature of Reposing Person
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
Sir Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00316987
tease .08-cvNillegiVivypteetRwi Esummedk Negie 275 eultqpPRovAL.
FORM COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235-0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b). OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person • 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
ARBER JEFFREY M BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] Director 10% Owner
(Last) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY) _ X _ Officer (give title below) Other (specify
below)
Controller
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 2/23/2006
C., 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MM/DD/YYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
X Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (State) (Zip) Form filed by More than One Reporting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I.Title of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code Acquired (A) or Following Reported Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (Instr. 8) Disposed of (D) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date, if (Instr. 3.4 an 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
or (1) (Instr.
Code V Amount (DI Price 4)
212312006 Ng (1)
( 'ototoon Stock 382 A SO 3575.00 D
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options convertible secunties)
I. Tide of Derivate 2. 3. Trans. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. 11. Nature
Security Conversion Date Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (Instr. Acquired (A) (Instr. 3 and 4) (Insu. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any 8) or Disposed of Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security (D) Owned Direct (D)
(Instr. 3.4 and Following or Indirect
5) Reported (I) (Instr.
Amours( or Transaction 4)
Date Expiration IN) (kw. 4)
Title Number of
Exercisable Date
Code V (A) (D) Shares
2/23/2006 M II/30/2005 II/30/2005 Common
CAP Units (2000) O1 U) 382 382.00 So 0.00 I)
Stock
Explanation of Responses:
( 1) Settlement of CAP Units and distribution of common stock to Reporting Person pursuant to CAP Plan; exempt under Rule 16b-3.
( 2) This type of derivative security typically does not have a conversion or exercise price
Reoortine Owners
Relationships
Reporting Owner Name / Address .
)Director 10% OwnerOfficer Other
FARBER JEFFREY M
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.
Controller
383 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10179
EFTA00316988
Signatures Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 276 of 347
id Farber, Jeffrey NI. 2/24/2006
Dale
Signature of Reporting Person
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
•s Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00316989
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02'27709 Page 277 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE OMB APPROVAL
COMMISSION OttEiNumea: 32360287
Washingrcn. D C 2C549 February 28.
&pros: Dili
Check this box it no lamer %Neel Estimated average burchn
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
0 to Sedalia. Forma Or Fenn 5
Woolens may comma See
InStruClitin lib). Fred pursued to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 17(a) I the Pubic Utility
hours per
response 0.5
Hailing Cavern/ Act of 1915 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Ad 01 1940
2. Issuer Name and Tither or Trading Spike 5. Relationship of Reporting Persons) ID Issuer
1. Name and Address Cl Repotting Person•
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check al appielble)
FARBER JEFFREY M Deector 10% Owner
_ I BSC I
Officer (give line Oilier (specify
X Wye!) below)
(Last) (Final) Remo
3. Dated Earliest Transaction (MondaDayNeat) Controller
C/O BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 07/28/2006
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. It Amentraenl. Dale of Original Filed (Misnihtlayrreaq 6. Individual or JointeGfoup Filing neck
Appteabie Line)
IStreel)
X Form Ned by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form Med by More lhan One Reporling
Person
(City) (state) IZpl
Table I - Non Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed of. or Beneficially Owned
1.11Ila at Security (Instr. 3) Transaction 211. Deemed 3 4. Securities squired (A) 5. Amount at 8. 7. N.
Date Execution Dale. Transaction or Disposed 01(D)Onstr. Securities Ownership of In:laceI
(Mentherr.Teari Many Code (nstr. 3,4 end Si Beneficially Form: Benenciti
(uonth.Daylfeee) 81 Owned Direct (D) Ownership
Following minded rinser. 4)
Reported 0) (ralr. 4)
(A) Transaction
Code V Amount ce Pik• (a) (inn.. a
ID) and 4)
Common Stock 07/28/2006 s 1.00f) I) 5138.15 2.575 I)
Table II - Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
(6 .. pals. calls. warrants. plions. convertible securities)
I. Title of 2. 3. Transaction 3A. Deemed 4. 5. 6. Date Exercrsable and 7. Tab and a. Price of 9. Bomber 10. II. Nature
Derivative Conversion Date Execution Dale. Transaction number Expiration Dale Amount el Derivative el Ownership of Indirect
Security or Exercise ilitenthertrear) Many Code (Meta d (1.1onthDaytre44) Securities Security derivative Form: Beneficial
(Instr. 3) Pm* of (MonelaDayMear) 5) Denvadve Underlying (Instr. 5) Secunttes Deed (0) Ownership
Derivative Sactsvies Derivative Semalically or Indirect Mau. 4)
Security Acq red Security Owned Di (Instr. 4)
IA) or (Instr. 3 and 43 Following
Disposed Reported
of ID Transaction
(Ins . 3.4 (5) (Inyl• 4)
and )
Amount
or
Number
Dale Eepirstion or
Code V (A) (D) Exercisable Date Title States
Explanation of Responses:
Remarks:
hi Farber Jeffrey M. 07/28/2006
•• Signature of Reporting Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a separale line for each class of secutities beneficialy owned directly or indirectly.
• II the In is filed by Mere man one repotting person. see instruction 0 (b)(v).
• Inlenlional missialements or omissicos ol fade iamslitule Federal Criminal VittlabOns See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
dole: Fte three copes ol this Form. one of which must be manually signed. II space is insufficient. see Instruclion 61or prOCedure.
Persona who respond to the collection of information contained in this lam are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
hup://idea.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700106000090/xs1F345X02/far430... 2/26/2009
EFTA00316990
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 278 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washington. D.C. 20549
O1.18Nronbie 3235.0207
Ev10:4 FObrualy 28.
Cheek this box erelong& subject STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Section It Format., Form.
(0lgalgm mammary. Sae
Inteutson lib). Filed pursuant le Sedan 16(al of the Securities Exchange Act el 1934. Sack., 17(a) of the Pubic Silty
Cremated average burden
hews pe.
1,1010110 0.5
Holding Company Ad of 1935 or Section 30(h) el me Investment Company Act el 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting person' I Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Renewing PemoNs) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check WI appicabfe)
FARBER JEFFREY M Dream 10%
1 BSC ] Owner
— Officer (give title
X below) Other (8P«ily
below)
0-.50 (First) (Middle)
3. Dale of Earliest Transaction (LiontPutayNea0 Controller
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/18,2006
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. V Amendment. Date of Original Filed (MonINDaytearl 8. Inevickei or Jeannie:up Fding (Cheek Applicable
Line)
(Sweat
X Form filed by One Renewing Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form fled by More man One Repeang
Person
(City) (Slate) Re/
Table I • Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed of or Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Seourlly (Mar. 3) 2. Transaction a Deemed 3 4. Securities As wed (A) 5. Amount of (1. 7. Nature
OS Execution Dale, Trans lion a Disposed Of 10) (lost' 3, Securities Ownership of Indirect
edefithasylrear) • se Cob (Mew. 4 and 5) Berwricially Form Beneficial
(MentivOsteer) A) Owned Direct (DI Ownership
Follows, or Indirect Seth ili
(A) Reported 0) 0030. 4)
Cent V Mown re Price TrensectiOnfel
(0) linstr. 3 and 4)
M
Common Stock 12/18/2006 2.078 A 30 4.653 I)
Common Stock 12/18/2006 9 881 D $164.68 3.772 I)
Table II • Derivative Se uriti s Acquired. Dis esed e . or Beneficially Owned
(e.g.. puts. calls. warrant . options. convert ble securities)
1. This el 2. S. Transaction 3.. Deemed 4. 5. Number 4. Coo Elercemble and 7.71er 110d 4. Price of 9. Number le. II. Nature
Derivative Conversion Date Execution nth. Transaction of Expiration Dale Amount of 0.108810. of Ownership of Indirect
Security or Exercise (lfonlleDaylts) II any Cede (Mgt Derivative (bionthOrtlear) Securities Security derivative Fors Beneficial
Onto 3) PrIcs of (ROMADay.Yeeri 8) Stern's Under*** (Mstr. A) Securities Direct (D) Ownership
(*that." Acquired Derivative Security Beneficially or Indeed OM! el
Security (A) or (lnstr. 3 and 4) Owned (I) 0nst. 4)
Disposed Following
al(0) Reported
BMW 3.4 Transaction
end Of (s)(Inste 4)
Amount
or
Numbs
Date Expiration of
Cade V (A) (0) Exercisable Dale Title Shares
CAP Crum M Common d, ...,
(20011 12.04006 .II 2.1)73 11/30:2006 11/.th2003 SIOPL ef r 8 10 0
Explanation el Responses:
I. Strikes' 4 ('Al' Cnlh nJ dolithuliOn of cannon Na: k to Rye Ding P non minium to CAP Plan. twist under Rule
2 Thy type of demons re only ispredli) des not have, convey." nor ranee price
Remarks:
/s/ Farber Jeffrey M. 12/19/2005
Signature.' Reporting Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a senora,e line for each class of :mollies beneficially own:dere:4N or in:Needy.
• e the loam is fled by more man one reportng person. see Instruction 4 (b)(v).
Intentional missiaternerts or omissions el facts consiiiihe Federal Criminal Vielabens See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: File IhrOeCepies a Pis Fenn. One Sweatt' must be manually signed. If space Is insufficient. see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of Information conlalned In this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700106000133/xs1F345X02Jfar4... 10/29/2008
EFTA00316991
SEC FORM 4 Page. I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 279 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washington. D.C. 20549
01103Nrimber. 3235.0247
SWIM
February 28.
Cheer this box Ire longer subject to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Section 16. Forme or Form5
etrigolons may continue. Ste
Inunoson lib). Filed pursuant lo Seclion 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 17(a) of the Pubic Ltilty
Bimetal average bunion
hours per
impinge 0.5
Holding Company Ad of 1935 or Sedan 30(h) of Me Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Noodling person' 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Syrred 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (0144k all appleabia)
FARBER JEFFREY M Deeded 10% Owner
I BSC I
_ Officer (give title Other (specify
X below) below)
RAMO (First) (Middle)
3. Elate of Earliest Transaction titordieDay(Yea0 Controller
OO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/20/2006
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. II Amendment. Dale of Original Filed (Month:DayNearl 6. Inclviclatd or JonliGroup Fding (Check Applicabie
Line)
iSteedi
X Form filed by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form fled by More than One Reporting
Person
Pin (Stale) IZPI
Table I. Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. Tide of Security (Instr. 3) 2 Transaction 24. Deemed 3. 4. Sowell'', A csi rod (AI S. Amount of 4 7. Nature
Dale Peewee,' Dale. Trenseclion or Disposed PI (0 (bulb. Securities Ownership of Indirect
(Monihtsaylew) harry Cade (Instr. 3.4 and 5) Deneliciaity form: Beneficial
(4lonihtervear) 8) Owned Direct MO or ()woofer.
Felso i g Indirect (II flush 41
(A) Reported (hair. 4)
Cade V Amount or Price Trainee-fonts/
(D) (IMO 3 and 4)
Table ft- Derivative Se uriti s Acquired. Disp sad of or Beneficially Owned
( g.. puts. cal s. warrants. options. convert' le securities)
1. Title ol 2. 3. srensacuon 31i. Deemed 4. S. Number 6. Dale Rae cembie nd 7. Tine and S. Pace of 9. Number 10. 1I. Nature
Derivative Conversion Date Execution Date. Transaction or Expiration Dale Amount of Derivative of ownership cite...act
Security or Exorcise DharithiDayiYear) If any Code (Inch. Deihrative (klemlaDay Tear) Securities Seetwity detivative Fawn: Beneficial
gnat 3) Price of (NontisDayvearl B) Sec tires Uncionying (last 5) Securities Direct ID) Ownership
DerivaaVe Leg fired Derivative Security Beneficially or Indirect (Mau.If
Security W0 linter. 3 and 4) Owned MOMS. 4)
DIsposed Panning
OM Repelled
prat .3.4 Transacuon
and 1 isitinstr.0
Necrua
a
Number
Date Expiration al
Code V (Al (D) Exercisable Dais Thle Shares
CAP i IIIL, 4336 common
iii 1242182006 onoom iii3i37.00 4 536 SO 4316 D
(2006; Mock '
Fmp. Stock Common
Ovum in. 3165.32 12042006 2.606 12120(2006 4.121V21)16 sock 244° 30 2.616 D
ea buy)
Explanation of Responses:
I The. type a dornapor se urnv newally doer not have a conwnao or ex nue poet
2. Deferral ry campeaseuon and cirdu to Rip:tuns Person's Accoun fat of 2420alit pursuant lathe Issuers Carmel Ao:uswalsawa Plan for Senior Mainaina Ducciers (CAP Plank exempt under Rafe
I60.4
Remarks:
1st Farber. Jeffrey M. 12/21/20)6
Signature of Reporting Person Date
Reminder: Report on a separate One foe each class d securilies bene0cially owned directly or indirectly.
' B the lam is lied by more than one reporteig person. See Instruction 4 (b)(v).
Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts eonslilule Federal Criminal Violations See 16 U.S.O. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 713ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which mint be manually signed. If space is insufficient. see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of Information contained In this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700106000143/xs1F345X02Jfar4... 10/30/2008
EFTA00316992
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 280 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washingicet D.C. 20549
Ott Number 3235.0207
February 29.
MINIM
Check Unstop it no baser subject STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Section la. Form 4 er Forme
engine's may continue See
Insevcton lib) Filed purslane lo Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 01 1934. Section 17(a) of the Pubic Lefty
Eiarnated average burden
hours ea
re panne
0.5
Holding Company Act ol 1935 a Section 30(h) ol the Investment Company Act ol 1940
2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Syrrbel 5. Relationship of Repating PersoNs) to issuer
1. Name and Address of Reneging Parsed
(Check all applcabn)
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC
FARBER JEFFREY M meat. 10% Owner
1 BSC ]
— Officer (give lige Other (specify
X betere) below)
OMS0 (First) (Middle)
3. OM. of Earliest Transaction (MoreuDayNeat) Controller
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 02/14/2007
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. V Amendment. Date of Original Filed (Mornh'DayNear) 8. Indvicbal or JonlrGroup Fding (Check Appircatre
Line)
(Stereeg
NEW YORK NY 10179 X Rem Sled by One Repatng Person
Fan Ned by More than One Regaling
Person
ICAO (Slate) (2P/
Table I • Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Security thisir. 3) 1 Transaction 26. Deemed 3. 4. Securities A cm red (Al 5. Amount or 4 7. Nature
Date Emmuilon Date. Transaction or Disposed Ol (DI Owe. Securities Ownership or indirect
(Aanihrsaylmo) ii any Code (Irw*r. 3.4 end 5) Beneficially Form: Beneficial
IfiColhDavTean if) Owned Carman or Owner slue
Fan i g Indlreci (II Omar. 41
IA) Reported Omar. 4)
Dada V Amount or Price Transauliores)
ID) 0mtr. Sande)
Table ft - Derivative Setting a Acquired. Disposed ol. or Beneficially Owned
(e.g.. puts. cal s. warrant . options. conve0i le securities)
I. Tale of 2. 3. Transaction 31‘. Deemed 4. S. 6. Dale exercesabie and 7. Title and It Price or 9. Number 10. 11. Rebate
Derivative Conversion Date Execution Dale. Transaction Monism Expiration Dale Amount of Derivative of overcame *matrix'
Security or Exercise tiataninDerfean It any Code Once. of (MomitDerreer) Securities Sectrity derivative Form: Beneficial
(Instr. 3) Pelee or mental/areearl 8) Dal alive Undonying (Instr. S) Securities Direct ID) Ownersan
Derivative Seca Uses Derivative Security Beneficially or Indirect (Instr.el
Security ACCel red (Inn. 3 and 4) Owned (I) Onus 4)
(A) a Following
Disposed Reported
Du to TrentiretiOn
Miter. 3.4 Is)(Instr. 4)
end I
Amount
C.
Number
Dale Exporalion 01
Cede V (A) (0) Exercisable INIM Title Shares
CAP Unfra A common
(Ii 02
9142007 139 I I /300.096 it/maxis 139 SO 139 II
(3110t) r Ii stel.
CAP Units A common
(3002)
•i • 02
9142007 r2i l54 II/30/2007 outalsol
sw.A.
154 se 2443 D
CAP Units AI Curnmimkon
(2003)
(i i 0.1g4/2007
II
IDS IIMO/200g IIMODOCM
S
156 SO 2.424 D
CAP Units Ai Common
(2004)
riI 0:914/2002 r2 2)6 II/30/2009 itr3W2602 Meek 706
—
SO 3.276 D
CAP tines A Common
(Ii O1/t412107 ns i inotiolo a uswioto 226 SO 3.591 D
C20031 r 2I SIOCk
E) planation ol Responses:
I. flip type of &mauve serumv ispocally does am hate a comnsao or exercise race
2 CAP Unto. guinea to Repxuny Persuirs account list of Vlagibned on Fiscal Year 2006 Not Ramses' Adjustments pursuam to the Isamv‘ Capful ACCSilviallea Plan for Senior Managing
DUD:lois ICA Mani. exempt mar Ruk leb.1
Remarks:
A/ Farber. Jeffrey M. 02/15/2007
Signature of Reporting Person Date
Reminder: Renal on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially ownedOres-0y or indirectly.
'B the lam is lied by more than one reporterp person. see Inmnictron 4 (b)(v).
intemanai misstatements or omissions ol tactseonsiiiure Federal Criminal Molanons See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form. one of which must be manually signed. If space is insullitient. see Instructico 6 (or procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000014/xs1F345X02Jfar4... 10/30/2008
EFTA00316993
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 281 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washington. D.C. 20549
OHS Minor 3235.0207
EMOM FObtualy 28.
Cher* this boa lino longer subject to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Selmer° Forma or Form5
strigabons may continue See
Hemmen 187) Filed pursuant to Sieben 16(4) of the Securities Exchange Ad ol 1934. Section 17(a) of the Pubic Uitty
Emma.," average burden
hours ion
M1080080 0.5
Holding Company Ad of 1935 or Section 30(h) ol the Investment Company Act ol 1940
I. Name and Address el Reporting Person. 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Syrnbot 5. Relationship of Repeetng Person(s) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check SI agplicabe)
FARBER JEFFREY M Dread 10% Owner
I BSC ]
Officer (give tide Other (speedy
X below)
below)
(Tas0 Fest) (Middle)
3. Dale of Earliest Transaction Bionnuttay/Yean Controller
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 03122/2007
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. V Amendment. Dale of Original Filed (MonlIVDayNear) 8. Indvicbal or Joidtroup Filing (Cheek Applicabe
line)
(Seed)
X Form Sled by One Rem:ding Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Fowl fled by More than One Repotting
Person
lay) (Sbn& (2131
Table I . Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed ol. or Beneficially Owned
I. Title of Security (nstr. 3) 2 Transaction 2A. Deemed 3. 4. Securities A cm rod (AI 5 Amount of 5 7. Nature
Date Execution Date. Transaction or Disposed 01(0 (Instr. Securities OwnereNp of Indirect
(Manthtlay.The) ilany Code (Instr. 3.4 and 5) Beneficiary Form: Beneficial
(tinthDay.,Year) 8) 041,4•41 Direct ID) or Owned,*
Foao i o Indirect (II (Instr.4)
RI Reported (Instr. 4)
Code V Amount or Prim Trans's-fonts)
(0) amt.. 3 and el
31
Common Stock 03/22/2007 ,,, 139 A 10 3.911 I)
Table III • Derivative Securiti s Acquired. DMp sad e or Beneficially Owned
(e 9.. Idiots. ea s. warrant options. convert ble securities)
1. Meet 2. 3. Trenaction 3A. Deemed 4. 5. O. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and a Pike of C. Humber 10. 11. NSW*
DidntIVO Conversion Date Emarrion Os. Transaction HI.4111340 ElpisibliOn Dais Amount of Derivative of OwnersNp of
Security co Exercise IllontriDerVem) Reny Code (Weir. of (M*MhOrolear) Securities Security derivative Form: Berudielal
(Neb. 3) Price of (asnItiCleylearl (1) Derivative Underhill* (Instr. 5) Securities Direct (0) OwnereN0
Derivative Securities Derivative Security Beneficially or Imbed grist,. 41
Security Acquired (In*. 3 and 4) Owned (I) (Mee. 4)
(A)on Forioneig
Disposed Reported
*IID Tramection
Rase. 3.4 (0(Inew 4)
end 5)
Amount
or
Number
Dee Experanon al
cede V (A) ID) 884/0114ble Date TM* Shares
CAP Ones ,. , 272007 M Common
(20011 07/2 139 II/3042e% i Vey:cos shxk 139 93 0 D
.l,
Explanation of Responses:
I Sonlement ICAP Lath., J attribution of common sock to Repn mg Person *anuses re CAP Plan. eiturpt under Rule 66-3
2 nu. type al &ramie wcunty dnme mss bait coliveRio or eactose *rite
Remarks:
IS1Farber, Jeffrey M. 03/23/2007
" Signature of Reporting Person Dale
Reminder. Rawl on a separate line for each class of securities benslicially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the kern is lied by more than one mooring person. see instruction 4 (b)(v).
Intim-tonal misstatements or omissions ol facts conslilule Feiner Criminal incisions See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form. one of whch must be manually signed. If mace c insullicient. see Instrudien 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of Information contained in this form are not respired to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000042/xs1F345X02Jfar4... 12/16/2008
EFTA00316994
SEC FORM 4 Page 1 of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02,27/09 Page 282 of 347
SEC Faint 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washington. O.C. 2050 OMB thither 11)6407
Exeter Fetrury 28
Crank me bar il miaow,/ 'awl io STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP zon
U Section le Form 4 or Fom 5
othearces may wine See
trelnicatel(b) Filed Waal 10 Section 1600 Of the SeCullieS Exchange Act 011934. Section 17(e) 01 the Pudic Wray
Eshealed deOfte, burden
ass per
eneonse OS
Melting Company AC1011935 or Sala 3016101 the inveSIMent Wrath Act 011940
1. Name and Address of Reponing Person. 2. Issuer Name and Ticker er Trading Syrrbol 5. Relationshipal Repwling nerson(sl So Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check di applicable)
FARBER JEFFREY M Director 10%Oaner
1 BSC I
Ottner (give Ire OtherISPC4Y
X blow) below)
(Last) (111$ (Midden
1. Dale of Earbasl Transaclien (MonthDaylYear) Controller
C/O BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/21/2007
383 MADISON AVENUE
A. II Amendment Date 01 Ongmd Filed (MOntithaWTearl 6. Ind...RUN Or JOIntthrOup Fling (Cheek *potable
Lire)
(Seal)
X Form lila by Cne Rem:ding Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form Inod by MOM than One Rethnhth
Person
ICIN) ISlate) OP)
Table I - Non Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed ol. or Beneficially Owned
1. Tkie of SecurNy (Instr. 3) 2 Transaction 2A.Dsemed 1. 4. SOCurlfliff Ac find (A) Of S. Amount or 6. 7. Nature
Date Execution Dow. Transaction Disposed Olth)(instr. 3.4 Securities Ownership or Indirect
(thanththrtTear) II any Cods (Insb. end 5) Bentficay Form. Dina Smolder
(Morahtatvew) 5) Dona (Color Ownerehip
F Hoene Indium, (I) (Instr. 4)
(A) Reported (IASto. 4)
Cade V Amount ot Price Transacrion(s)
(IN Omar. land 4)
M
Common Stock 12/21/2007 . r. 2.443 A SO 6.354 D
Common Stock II/21/2007 S 2.443 D 589.01 3.911 D
Tale N - Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed o . or Be elicially Owned
( g.. puts. calls. warrants. options. censer bit securities)
i. MN of 2. 3. Transaction IA.Deemed 4. S. Number or 6. Data Exercisable and 7. Tette and Amount B. Prla or 9. Mabee 10. 11.11mure
Cavan Conversion Date Execution Date. Tramacuon DaYnatfre Expiration Dee 01 Seturitt Darintin el Owashks oneentem
Security ot Exorcise (eonththyVear) irony Code (Instr. Sectroses (11orithDayTecio Underlying Security derivative Farm; Banollelol
(looff 1) Noe of triontaDayYmr) a) Acquired IA) Derivative %malty (Inats. 5) Securities Direct (0) Ownership
Chernitive or Disposed (MS.land 41 Beneficially or Indeed Ilea. 4)
Security of (Di that,. 3, Oared (I) (Moir. 4)
lands FOII0oing
Reported
Amount Transaction
Or Wilma, . 4)
Nab.
Oa* ImIrMl col
Code V (A) (Di Exareisathe Data on Tide &was
CAP Users 94 Common
121202007 rI) 2.443 II/30/2007 I 100,3307 bu d: 2.443 10 0 D
(2002)
CAP Used A Common
12/2 I/2007 )3.340 1Inman motion 13.34(1 D
2001 ) Stock 13.340 SO
Esionadon of Response*:
I Setilemore (CAP Corti al dnifMotion tyrurmmn Ruck to thrones (erten', rant to CAP Man. exempt under Rule 16b.3
2 TN, Inn M ikmeine them' in/wally donate line a Mom ion or toMot pine
rkftfrol N oOmpfmotion andmint to Reporting Pawn', Acroont rm of 1J21AI puresau to in: Inure, Cimul Aonarrulaw Plan for Senior Managing Diftolora (CAP Man). center under Role 161e3
Remarks:
Farber, Jeffrey M. 12/21/2007
812naluteet Repo/log Person Date
Renthder Report on a serer.* Ire kir each ctass of securnes beneficiary owned dreary or insectary.
• n the form Is Bled by more than ore mann° poem. see instruction 4 101144.
• inlenbcnal TO.SaffINTIOAfff or minions 01lade constitute Federal COMA& WNW% See 18 V.S.C. 1031 and is V.S.C. 7111(a).
Nate: Fee three copies el this Form. COO 01Meth Mith be manually signed. It space Is Insufficient. see antrucfion 6 tor procedure.
Persons veto respond to the collection of Intormadon contained In this form are not melted lo respond unless the loan displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000129/xs1F345X02/far5... 12/16/2008
EFTA00316995
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 283 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washington. D.C. 20549
OtilEt Number 32350207
Espree February 28.
CheekHist:ex V nelonger subject te STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Section IS. Forma or Form6
oblaalims may continuo 51re
Insauffion lib) Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) ci the Securities Exchange Act 01 1934. Section 17(a) of the Pubic Lhilty
Bimetal average burden
how, per
moons, 0.5
Holding Company Ac' of 1935 or Section *h) ol Me Investment Company Act ol 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person* 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Repmeng Person(s) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check all applicable)
FARBER JEFFREY M meat. 10% Owner
I BSC ]
Officer (give lide Oliver (speedy
X below) below)
flalli (rest) (Middle)
3. Dale of Earliest Transaction ffitordruDayNeag Controller
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 01/09/2008
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. V Amendment. Dale of Original Filed (MontletayNear) 8. Inclviclea or dalltIOup Filing (Check Applicable
Line)
(Sirteeq
X Fenn filed by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Fan' fled by More than One Repmeng
• Person
(City) (Male) ltpl
Table I • Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3) 2 Transaction 24. Deemed 3. 4. Seenrilles A or rid (A) S. Amount ci S. 7. Baler.
Dale Execullon Date. Prainfiction or Dispostel 01(0 (bulb. Securities Ownership or Indigoes
IManlersay)Yeat) it any Cade 'Instr. 3.4 and 5) Benelicially Form: Beneficial
OlOnletay.Year) Cl Owned Direct ID) or Owner slip
Folio 1 g Wired (II lime- 4)
(A) Reported (Mats 4)
Cackl e Amount o Prim, Transaction's)
ID) OMB. 3 and al
Table II - Derivative Seeuriti a Acquired. Disposed of or Beneficially Owned
(e.g., puts. ea s. warrant . options. convert) le securities)
I. Title of 2. 3. Transaction 3A. Deemed 4. S. 6. Date Exemmeame and 7.TM, and S. Pate el 9. Number to, u. lleture
Derivative Conversion Oslo Cretonne Date. Transaction Number Expfrellon Dale Amount of Deelvattve of Ownership or indirect
Security or Exercise (month Day Year) It any Code (bill,. Of (Momhillaynfoar) Securities Secralty derivative Forms Beneficial
rinse. 3) Price ur month oar Teen 8) Den alive Underlying Omit 5) Securmes Direct ID) °Wettable.
Doi.eurS Secu Mee Derivative Streutity Beneficially or Insect Mut. ili
Security Accra red linter. 3 and 4) Owned (I) (InStr. 4)
IA) of Fob...no
Disposed Reported
of ID Transaction
Wilts. 3.4 Is)(Math 4)
and i
Amount
or
Number
Date Expiation ol
Code V DB ID) Exercisable Own Title Shores
P_L .. A I,
(Ii Or/0912008 ( 21 n I 160t2007 111300.007 C'"
Sl'ic " 17 SO I7
Nil
CAP L iIi DIM/2008
Common
.. ii A
2i IT 11/30/3008 11/SOCIPTS 17 W 2.491 m
(200 i meek
CAP t .. A Common
iIi 01/09/2008
NI2008 m I11/3/32009 ou30080? 22 SO 3.298 D
(Saw i 2i Stock
CAP t .. A ComMockmon
O m
(II OUINI2008 i 2i 24 II/30/2010 INN/2010 24 SO 3.60 D
C2AI. I. .. (11AA Common
iIi Or/0912008 SI I IflOr2011 Ilf380.01I 31 SO 4.567 D
v Stoo
Explanation of Responses:
I Thu type of &mom looms,: gpcollydocs am has a comnuo orexercise pace
2 CAP Cans feinted io Repetung Person's mecum (as of IMileMbosed on Fiscal Year 33(r7 Na Parmitss Admammits pursuant to Mc Issecr's Capitol Atttintilblien Plan los Senior Manassas Directors
'CAP Plan). cumin under Rule 01b.3.
Remarks:
A/ Farber. Jeffrey M. 01/09/2008
Signature of Reporting Person Date
Reminder: Radon on a separate line ter each mass of smudges beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
' If the Icon is fled by more than one repairing person. see tostmcoon 4 (b)(v).
Intentional missiaternems or omissions ol facts constitute Federal Criminal %newborn See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: File three copies of Ms Form. one of welch must be manually signed. If space is insufficient. see Instruclico 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of Information contained In this form are not required to respond unless the fonts displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700108000004/xs1F345X02Jfar5... 12/16/2008
EFTA00316996
.08-cvNi1-6§VailiscstatokiliEsFAtiffeiliaNegje 284 tgagppRovAL
FORM 4ase COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person * 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
REENBERG ALAN C BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] _x_ Director 10% Owner
(Last) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MhUDDNYYY) Officer (give tide below) Other (specify
below)
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 9/14/2005
C., 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MM/DD/YYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
(Slate)
_ X _ Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (Zip) Form filed by Mom than One Reporting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I.Title of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code Acquired (A)or Following Reported Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (Instr. 8) Disposed of (D) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date, if (Instr. 3.4 an 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any (A) or Indirect (Instr. 4)
or (1) anstr.
Code V Amount (DI Price 4)
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially (hined ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options convertible secunties)
I. Tide of Derivate 2. 3. Trans. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. 11. Nature
Security Conversion Date Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (Instr. Acquired (A) (hum 3 and 4) (Instr.5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any g) or Disposed of Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security (D) Owned Direct (D)
(Instr. 3.4 and Following or Indirect
5) Reported (I) (Imtr.
Amount or Transaction 4)
Date Expiration Tide Number of iN) (Instr. 4)
Code V (A) (D) Exercisable Date Shares
Fwd Purchase 103637 11/30/2005 11/30/2005 Common
Contract roblig. to 9/14/2005 .1 al dl III (I) Stock 103637.00 411 (II 0.00 D
II)
sell) ill
Explanation of Responses:
( I) On 9/14/05, the Reporting Person entered into a forward contract pursuant to the CAP Plan with The Bear Steams Companies Inc. (BSC)
in which the Reporting Person agreed to sell up to 103,637 common shares of BSC issuable upon settlement of CAP Units pursuant to
the CAP Plan to BSC. The forward contract is subject to BSCs satisfaction of certain performance goals for the 9 months ending 8/31/05.
The fonvard contract will settle on 11/30/05. The per share price will be the average of the Daily Volume Weighted Average Prices of
the common stock on each day that it trades between $90 and $115 during the period from 9/6/05 through 11/29/05 (Included Days). The
number of shares purchased pursuant to the fonvard contract will be a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of Included Days
and the denominator of which is the number of days the NYSE opens for trading between 9/6/05 and 11129/05, multiplied by 103,637.
Reporting Owners
ID
Relationships
Reporting Owner Name / Address
irecto110% Ownifficeithe
GREENBERG ALAN C X
GO BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC
EFTA00316997
Case 1:08-cvi0279 RWS ocurrent p02 Filed 02/27/09 Page 285 of 347
83 MADISON AVENUE
EW YORK, NY 10179
Signatures
Is/ Greenberg, Alan C. 9/14/2005
•• Signature of 'tenoning Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
•s Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00316998
.08-cvNnyithFASoygieekwiEsuftthckweinNegie 286 Okia3pRovAL
FORM 4ase COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person * 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
REENBERG ALAN C BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC I x Director Kt% Owner
/— —
(Last) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction 0.11(VDDNYYY) Officer (give tide below) Other (specify
below)
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 11/30/2005
C. 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MM/DD/YYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
X Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (Slate) (ZO) Form filed by More than One Reporting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I Tide of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities Acquired 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code (A) or Disposed of (D) Following Reported Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (butt. 8) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date, if (Instr. 3.4 and 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any (A) or Indirect (Instr. 4)
or
(I) (Instr.
Code V Amount (D) Price 4)
11/30/2005 m II) 103637
Common Stock A SO 118637.00 D
11/30/2005 j (2, 103637
Common Stock D $106.67 15000.00 D
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible secunties)
I. Title of Derivate 2. 3. Trans. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. II. Nature
Security Conversion Date Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if ansu. Acquired (A) (hum 3 and 4) (Instr. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any 8) or Disposed Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security of (D) Owned Direct CD)
(Ins r. 3.4 Following or Indirect
and 5) Reported (I) (Ins°.
Transaction 4)
Amount or
Date Expiration (s)(fitstr. 4)
Title Number of
Exercisable Date
Code V (A) (D) Shares
11/3012005 51 103637 11/302005 11/30/2005 Common 103637.00 SO 0.00 D
CAP Vohs (2000) O1
ar Stock
Explanation of Responses:
( I) Settlement of CAP Units and distribution of common stock to Reporting Person pursuant to CAP Plan; exempt under Rule 16b-3.
( 2) On September 14, 2005, the Reporting Person entered into a fonvard contract pursuant to the CAP Plan with The Bear Steams
Companies Inc. (BSC) in which the Reporting Person agreed to sell up to, and including, 103,637 common shares of BSC issuable upon
settlement of CAP Units pursuant to the CAP Plan to BSC. The forward contract settled on November 30, 2005. On November 30, 2005,
the Reporting Person delivered to BSC 103,637 common shares of BSC in settlement of its obligation under the forward contract at a
purchase price of $106.6726 per share.
( 3) This type of derivative security typically does not have a conversion or exercise price
Reporting Owners
EFTA00316999
Case 1:08-cv-O2793-liMongecument 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 287 of 347
Reporting Owner Name / Address
Director 10% Owne rOfficer0ther
GREENBERG ALAN C
GO BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.
X
383 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10179
Signatures
/s/ Greenberg, Alan C. 11/30/2005
Signature of Reporting Person Date
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
▪ Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00317000
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 288 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
washnson. D.C. 20649 01113 Dunbar: 32350287
February 28.
berm
Check Pm bar dnalonger Gutted to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Stetson le. Form 4 a Flom 5
oblgdions may oxbow. See
Pelnicien Filed pursuant to Section 18(a) ol the Securlies Exchange Ad el 1934, Sedan 17(alolthe Public Uglily
Fellssat00 avatar' a iden
roan per
retiOolle
05
Holdng Company Add 1935 er Sectian 30(h) of the Investment Company Ad el 1940
• a Issuer Name and Ticker or Tradrg Symbol S. Relalionsnp el Reporting Perron(s) to Issuer
1. Name and Maass ol Reporting POrsell
applicable)
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check al
GREENBERG ALAN C X Director 10% Orme,
i BSC 1
Oflker (give title Other (specify
below) below)
0-ast) (Thal) (Middle)
& Date of Earliest Transaction (MordIVDayffeat)
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12122/2005
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. II Amendment. Dale ol Odginal Fled (Month:DayNear) 6. Individual Of Jointtroup Fang (Check Applicable
Line)
(Street)
X Form tiled by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Fonts filed by More than One Reporting
Person
(City) (Stale) t2io ,
Table I- Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. Transaction 2k Onewd 3. 4. Sec...Wes Acquires/1AI S. Amount of 6. 7 it,,,,,..
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3)
Dale Execution Date Transaction or Disposed 01(0)(1ndr. Securities Crewel.", of ',wool
McnthDayNear) Rimy Code (Instr. 3. 4 and SI Mmericially Form: Owed Den*.iris'
Gaintagantar) e) Owned (Dl or Onnwsap
Rollo g Indirect (I) (Matt. 4)
IA) Reported findr. 4)
Code V Amount cc Prior Tniniliclional
(0) rine% 3 and 4)
Table II - Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed o or Beneficially Owned
(e g.. W ts. calls. warrants options, convert We securities)
tiling, of 2. 3. Transaction 3/i. Deemed I. S. Hunter 6. Dila Etterriefilikt and 7. TIDO and Amount 8, PDC* Of 9.11utlatt 10. II. Halve
13411vallsia COnstraien Dole Elteetitian Date. TleneeellOil or Expiration Dale or Sommats Derlvativo of on clattered
Security or Exercise IMenlhOay'Yeer) Deny Dock (Inn. Derivative PacenstsaylSeati Unclothing Security derivative Form: Benetkik
(mar. 3) Once of (MonitifiayTew) /0 Securities Derivative SinuMy (Mt*. SI Securities, Wiwi (D) Generals,
Derivative Acquired Omit. 3 and 4) litersiteiclally or Wired °now It
Security VOW Ormird (II tilldr. 4)
Disposed renewing
of (C) Reported
(insts 3 4 Transaction
and 51 is, Onstr. 4)
Amount
fic
lumber
Date Exeltatirio of
Coda V (A) to) Resaleable Date Hilo Shares
CAP Urns A t ocr,non t.
,i i I:J:1;2n., 48.633 I trAV2010 I Itltv20111 Suxl; 48.633 SI In 5 48.0 r;
(2005)
Ewe Stock
Common
Option iftt 11165 11/22/2001 A 32.026 navzoaa 12/Z212012
Stock
32.026 SO 32.020 I)
to Buy)
Explanation el Responses:
I This rage m denvillirt s« very' typically don a.< time o<msemmn or CACICINC price
2, Damao! corceeimmoa and credo to Rcpxters Perws Account (as nl 12/220/51pursues to the b.mar's Capital AC C unuiLilifia Plan for Scrum Managing Directors 'CAPPlank exempt under Rule I Mu
Remarks:
kJ Greenberg, Alan C. [123/2005
„
Signature of Reporting Person Dale
Reminder: Report en a separale Inc Ice each class al securities beneficially owned al eCtbr Of inclieclly.
•U the term k find by more than one reportng person. see Instruction 4 (Whet.
Intentional nisstalerner4s or emissions el fads consteute Federal Criminal Violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and IS U.S.C.70064.
Note: Fite 'Nee copies of !bib Form. ore ol olich must be marually stoned. II space is insufficient. see lintructicn 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid 01113 Number.
http://idea.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700105000121/xs1F345X02Jgre379... 2/26/2009
EFTA00317001
.08-cv19O3b9§AilicyputektiqiEsFithiagkaiR NeNe 289 Okia3pRovAL
FORM 4ase COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person • 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
REENBERG ALAN C BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] _ x _ Director 10% Owner
(Last) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MhUDDNYYY) Officer (give title below) — Other (specify
below)
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 1/3/2006
C., 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MM/DD/YYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
(Slate)
_ X Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (Zip) P01111 filed by Mort than One Reporting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
(.Title of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities Acquired 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code (A) or Disposed of (D) Following Reported Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution ansu. 8) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date. if (Instr. 3.4 and 5) I Direct (D) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
Or (1) anstr.
Code V Amount CD) Price 4)
113a006
Common Stock map 40000 A $64.00 55000.00 D
113a006
Common Stock S 40000 D $114.49 15000.00 D
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible secunties)
I. Title of Derivate 2. 3. Trans. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. II. Nature
Security Conversion Date Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if anstr. 8) Acquired (A) or (Instr. 3 and 4) (Instr. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any Disposed of (D) Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security Owned Direct CD)
(Instr. 3.4 and Following or Indirect
5) Reported (I) %Instr.
Transaction 4)
Amount or
Date Expiration (s)(Instr. 4)
Title Number of
Exercisable Date
Code V (A) CD) Shares
Employee Stock M
I/1/2006 /1/3012005 II/30/2012 Common
Option (Right to 364.00 rte 40000
Mock
40000.00 so 0.00 I)
Buy)
Explanation of Responses:
( 1) Exercise of Employee Stock Option (Right to Buy) granted 11/29/02 and distribution of common stock to Reporting Person pursuant to
Issuer's Stock Award Plan, exempt under Rule 161).3.
Reporting Owners
Relationships
Reporting Owner Name / Address
Director 10% OwnerOfficerOther
GREENBERG ALAN C
GO BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.
X
383 MADISON AVENUE
EFTA00317002
NEW YORK,NY Qme 1:08-cv/02793fRWS gocurrient p02 Filed 02/27/09 Page 290 of 347
Signatures
/s/ Greenberg, Alan C. 1/3/2006
•• Signature of Repotting Person Date
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
•s Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00317003
1 08-cvNithygirmleirstrieekitHEsFAIseliggefiliR NeNe 291 oltti/34 7PPROVAL
FORM itse COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b). OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person ' 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
REENBERG ALAN C BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] _ x_ Director 10% Owner
(Last) (First) thliddlel 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY) Officer (give tide below) Other (specify
below)
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 2/8/2006
C. 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MM/DD/YYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
Form filed by One Reporting Pecson
(City) (State) (Zip) - Form filed by Mote than One Repotting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I.Title of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code Acquired (Al or Following Reported Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (Instr. 8) Disposed of (D) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date. if anstr. 3.4 an 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
or (1) (Instr.
Code V Amount (D) Price 4)
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially ()m ned ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options convertible secunties)
I. Tide of Derivate 2. 3. Trans. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. 11. Nature
Security Conversion Date Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (Instr. 8) Acquired (A) or (hum 3 and 4) (Insu. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any Disposed of (D) Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security Owned Direct (D)
(lams. 3.4 and Following or Indirect
5) Repotted (I) (Instr.
Transaction 4)
moubenttoofr
,..
Date . ki ExPirati°n Title
n...., ANum IN) (law. 4 )
Code V (A) (D) a.,CICIsaine Date Shares
2/8., 2006 11/30/2005 11/3012005 Common
CAP Units (2000) 01 A (21 6617 6617.00 SO 6617.00 D
Stock
2/8., 2006 A Or 1624 11/30/2006 11/3W2006 Common
CAP Units (2001) (it 1624.00 SO 27064.00 D
Stock
2/8/2006 11/30/2007 11/30/2007 Common
CAP Units (2002) di A (21 55S4 Stock
5584.00 50 93041.00 D
of IA/2006 5532 11/30/2008 11/30/2008 Common
CAP Units (2003) A (21 Stock
5532.00 50 92184.01) D
2/8/2006 11/30/2009 11/30/2009 Common
CAP Units (2004) (II
A (21 3345 Stock
3348.00 50 55796.00 D
Explanation of Responses:
( I) This type of derivative security typically does not have a conversion or exercise price
( 2) CAP Units credited to Reporting Person's account (as of 2/8/06) based on Fiscal Year 2005 Net Earnings Adjustments pursuant to the
Issuer's Capital Accumulation Plan for Senior Managing Directors (CAP Plan); exempt under Rule 16b-3.
Reporting Owners
I
Reporting Owner Name / Address
Relationships
EFTA00317004
ease 1:uts-cv-ityil • kfrywvn tr 02 Filed 02/27/09 Page 292 of 347
GREENBERG ALAN C
GO BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.
X
383 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10179
Signatures
/s/ Greenberg, Alan C. 2/9/2006
.. Date
Signature of Repotting Person
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
Sit Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00317005
tease ° 8-cviNnillaitWAIW-SlatetRINESFAIMICA2eNNeNe 293 Oktia'PROVAL
FORM COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(0 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person * 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
REENBERG ALAN C BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC I /—
X
—
Director 10% Owner
(Last) (First) (tvliddk) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DDNYYY) Officer (give title below) Other (specify
below)
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 2/23/2006
C., 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MWDEVYTYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
_ x _ Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (State) (Zip) Form filed by More than One Reporting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I.Tale of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities Acquired 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code (A) or Disposed of (D) Following Repotted Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (Instr. 8) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date. if (Instr. 3.4 and 5) I Direct (D) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
or
(1) (Instr.
Code V Amount (D) Price 4)
2/23/2006
Common Stock m al 6617 A SO 21617.00 D
2/23/2006
Common Stock S 6617 D $135.08 15000.00 D
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible secunties)
I. Title of Derivate 2. 3. Trans. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. II. Nature
Security Conversion Date Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (Instr. Acquired (A) (Instr. 3 and 4) (Instr. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any 8) or Disposed of Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security (D) Owned Direct CD)
(Instr. 3.4 and Following or Indirect
5) Reported (I) (Ins°.
Transaction 4)
Amount or
Date Expiration IN) (law. 4)
Title Number of
Exercisable Date
Code V (A) (D) Shares
2/23/2006 ht unorzoos 11/30/2005 Common
CAP Units (2000) 6617 6617.00 SO 0.00 I)
ID Stock
Explanation of Responses:
( I) Settlement of CAP Units and distribution of common stock to Reporting Person pursuant to CAP Plan; exempt under Rule 16b-3.
( 2) This type of derivative security typically does not have a conversion or exercise price
Reporting Owners
Relationships
Reporting Owner Name / Address
Directo 10% OwnerOfficedDther
GREENBERG ALAN C
GO BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC
X
383 MADISON AVENUE
EFTA00317006
'NEW YORK, NY Q?ge 1:08-cv/02793fRWS Clocurrient (102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 294 of 347
Signatures
/s/ Greenberg, Alan C. 2/24/2006
•• Signature of Reporting Person Dare
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
•s Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00317007
.05-cvi9giiiirDWATIVISIErieekINESFAINIA2lealikNegle 295 tatielippRovAL
FORM 4ase COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235-0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person • 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
REENBERG ALAN C BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] _ x _ Director 10% Owner
(Last) (First) (tvliddle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MbUDDNYYY) Officer (give tide below) Other (specify
below)
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 9/20/2006
C., 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MM/DD/YYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
X Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (State) (Zip) Form filed by Mott than One Reporting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I.Title of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code Acquired (Al or Following Reported Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (Instr. 8) Disposed of (D) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date. if (Instr. 3.4 an 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
or (1) (Instr.
Code V Amount (D) Price 4)
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially ()m ned ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible secunties)
I. Tide of Derivate 2. 3. Trans. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. II. Nature
Security Conversion Date Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (Instr. Acquired (A) (Instr. 3 and 4) (Instr. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any 8) or Disposed of Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security (D) Owned Direct (D)
(Instr. 3.4 and Following or Indirect
5) Reported (I) (Instr.
Transaction 4)
Amount or
Date is)(fitstr. 41
Expiration Title Number of
Exercisable Date
Code V (A) (D) Shares
Forward Purchase
Common
Contract • 9/20/2006 27063 (I) 11/30/2006 11/3012006
Stock
Obligation to Sell di j al II) rti 27063.00 (I i 01 0.00 D
Explanation of Responses:
( I) On 9/20/06, the Reporting Person entered into a forward contract pursuant to the CAP Plan with The Bear Steams Companies Inc. (BSC)
in which the Reporting Person agreed to sell up to, and including, 27,063 common shares of BSC issuable upon settlement of CAP Units
pursuant to the CAP Plan to BSC. The forward contract is subject to BSCs satisfaction of certain performance goals for the nine months
ended 8/31/06. The forward contract will settle on 11/30/06. The per share price will be the average of the Daily Volume Weighted
Average Prices of the common stock on each day that it trades between $122 and $152 during the period 9/5/06 thrugh 11/29/06
(Included Days). The number of shares purchased pursuant to the forward contract will be a fraction, the numerator of which is the
number of Included Days and the denominator of which is the number of days the NYSE opens for trading between 9/5/06 and 11/29/06,
multiplied by 27,063.
Reporting Owners
I
Relationships
Reporting Owner Name / Address
IDirecto110% OwnelOfficelOtherl
EFTA00317008
GREENBERG ALQRSIP 1:08-CV 279 RWS Cocurrent 02 Filed 02/27/09 Page 296 of 347
GO BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INCJ
I X
383 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10179
Signatures
/s/ Greenberg, Alan C. 9/20/2006
•• Signature of Reporting Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
▪ Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00317009
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27709 Page 297 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OIAB APPROVAL
washnson. O.C. 20549 OMB Hurnlartr: 32350287
Expires February 28.
Omsk Ms Isar dnalonger sulisecl to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Settee 16. Forma a Form 5
oblimeons may menu,. See
WIWI:010* Filed pursuant to Section 18(a) el the Se:teases Exchange Ad of 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility
Estimated average Widen
notes per
retionse 0.5
Hokin; Company Ad of 1936 or Seidman 30(h) of the Investment Company Ad of 1940
I. Name and Ad:tress el Regaling Person' 2 Issuer Name and Ticker or Tradrg Symbol 5. Relaticennp of Reporting Person(s) to 1SSUer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check anappwatoe)
GREENBERG ALAN C 1 X Director 10% Owner
BSC I
Officer (give tele Other (specify
(Middle) below) below)
IWO fliral) 3. Deb el Earliest Transaction (MardhtayNear)
CIO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. I1/3012006
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. II Amendment. Dale of Onginal filed (Mordh;Dayffear) 6. Indmdual or JointoGroup Fling (Check Applicable
Line)
(Street)
X Fenn filed by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY I u I -9
Font Med by More than One Reporting
Person
(City) (Stale) flip ,
Table I' Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed ol. or Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3) . Transaction 2A. Deemed S. 4. Seconds, Acquired IA) or 5. Amount el S. 7. Nature
Dale Exertnion Date, Trmeaction Onetier/ Cri (DI (Instr. 3.4 Seciaties Owners.* ol Indirect
MorithDayrlearl If enT Code Orme. and 0) Beneficially Form: Reorient
paceshOarlserl 4) Owned Direct (0) Owns,she
Following or Indirect (Inner. In
Ml Reported (I) Omar. 41
Cede V AmeuM or hen Transadionts)
OM Pau.] and iii
M
Common Stock I 1/30/2(8)6 .Ii 21.295 A SO 36.295 I)
Common Stock I I /30/2(X)6 ji: . 21.295 D $143.48 1.5.(X)0 D
Table la • Derivative Securities Acq ired. Disposed ol. or Beneficially Owned
(e.g.. puts. calls. warrants options. convertible securities)
1. Vale or 2. 3. Transaction 3.4. Deemed I. 5. Humber 6. Date Evercisobte ir2d 7. Tine and Amount 8. Price of 9. Bunter 10. II. Naive
Deelvalivo Corworsion Date Execution MM. Transaction a Expliatlan Date a Snowless Deelvalivo el Ownership of Indirect
Security or ExerCiSe DAOMADay'rear) It any Corte Mot. Derivative plIoninDay.Teart Undenyiro Security dtelvative Form: Beneficial
(Wt. 3) Price of (1.5anthOesarta4 8) Sec Mies 000Valve Security (Instr. 5) Saturnia., Meet (D) Ownership
Derivative AeQuireCi Oren. 3 and 4) Beneficially or Weird finial. It
Security IM r Craned VI Onstr.4)
Die owl Fellowang
of( ) Reported
Omen 3.1 Transaction
and 5) (s) Ong, 4)
Anew
et
Number
Data Expitetice el
Code V (A) (0) IhmecIsabas Dale Tile Mates
CAP Claes Common
i2iMili 11/30I2006 21.295 II/30/2006 11/30/3006 &cis 21.295 so 3.769 I)
Explanation of Responses:
• rd difinhation of ‘omtenn flock to Benson Prism pxmaM to CAP PLe.exemix waki Rule 106.3.
1. on 9.Q11.1:6 Kci:),(r.( Paws entered itea a forward rtneurci pursuant to the CAP Plan with The Bear Steals. Coinpunim lac. (BSC) m which the itcparunc Pena. aw red to ,II up ro. and midis:bog.
27.063 common stain of BSC tunable urea wider:tem of CAP Units coMmuM lode CAP Pb,, to BSC. The tons aid coestaa fettled on I I/301)6 tte II/Monfi. die Reµvung Minn dein fled to BSC
21.295 common >ham of BSC irk xettletners of in ohlgatam arida the km aid Conlin:I al a puoltata Once of 5143 4715 per shire
3 This rye of denrainie security typically dots act hare • comenion or exercise price
Remarks:
/a/Greenberg, Alan C. 11/302006
Signaiure of Reportirq Person Dale
Reminds.: Report on a separate Inc lot each class ol securities tan:tidally owned d ecty or indrecthy.
• If the loon is hied by more than one reportng person. see Instruction 4 (b)(v).
" Intentional rnestaterneras or omissions ol tads constaute Federal Ginn& Violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 780(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form. one ol wlich must be manually signed. II space is insufficient. see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of Information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700106000110/xs1F345X02Jgre4... 10/29/2008
EFTA00317010
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 298 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washington. D.C. 20549
01.1BNmnber. 3235.0207
Foeruary 28.
Check Ibis box y no longer subject te STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Section It Forma*: Forme
cabin/inns may continue See
intavvion lib) Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act el 1934. Section 17(a) of the Pubic Sify
Stomata] moms° burden
hours ph
mums, 0.5
Holding Company Ad of 1935 or Section 30(h) el the Irwestrooni Company Act el 1940
1. Name and Address of Repent° Person. 2. mutt Name and licher or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reptebng Persoys) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check ail appitabe)
GREENBERG ALAN C X Mercier 10% &onto
1 BSC ]
Officer (give title Other (Weedy
(Fast) (Middle) below) below)
0.830
3. Dale of Eadiesi Transaction (Lionh'Daynear)
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/18/2006
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. If Amendment. Date of Original Filed (MonthiDaylVearl 8. Ind vicbat or dOirlI/GIOup Filing (Check Applicable
Line)
(Sweet/
X Form filed by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form Ned by More than One Reperbng
Person
(aty) (Slate) (lel
Table I • Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. Tble of Security (Inset 3) 2. Transaction 211 Deemed 1. 4. Securities Acquired (A) 5. Amount of O. T. Nature
Date Execution Dale. Trance Ion Cr Difoosed Of 0:00nW. 3. Starrilies Ownership of Indirect
OfOnthtsyllear) • an,' Code (Mee. 4 and 5) Brineirciety Form: Beneficial
(IgonthOWEITettr) 4) Owned Direct (0) Owners,*
Following or Indirect jinni. di
(A) Reported 0) finstr. 4)
D000 V Norown c. Price Transactlon(el
Bill (Instr. 3 end 4)
)4
Common Stock 12/18/2006 5.768 A $0 20.768 I)
Common Stock 12/18/2006 n 5,768 D $164.68 15000 I)
Table U • Derivative Se urn' a Aug fired. Disposed e . or Beneficially Owned
(e.g.. puts. ea 5. warrant options. convert ble securities)
1. Title col 2. 3. Transaction 3a. Deemed 4. 5. Number 4. Date Exercise-0W and I. tor and Il. Price of 9. Number 10 II. Nature
Dental.* Conversion Date Execution Dote. Transaction of Expiration Date Amount of Derivative of Ownership of Infante.
Security or Exercise (ionneDarYear) If any Cede Omni. Derivative (MontiaDayleen Securities Seemly dedvalive Form: Beneficial
(Instr. 3) Price of DAoruhtarfeer) 8) Securities Undertyinfl (Ioy. S) Securities Direct ID) Ownership
Derivative Acquired Derivative Security Beneficially or Indeed, (Instr. II
Security IA) r (In.. 3 and 4) Owned (i) (Instr. 4)
Disposed Following
of ( / Reported
(Instr. 3.4 Transaction
and 5) Is/Drat, 4)
Amount
or
Mamba
Dale Expiration el
Coda V IA) (DI Exercisable Dane Title Shares
CAP Units NI Common
!Zit/4006 3.76$ i U3182006 I U.10/21)06 ti
(20)1p Sal -5.767
-76K gi
Explanation el Responses:
I. Seidman, 4 ('Al' Coin nJ dearibtmon of common strut to Reponing P non puntrant to CAP Plan: cumin under Rule tab.)
2 Thu type of &fibulae be may oprrally don cam have a cinnamon or Marl% Imre
Remarks:
/s/ Greenberg, Alan C. 12/19/2006
" Signature of Reporting Person Dale
Reminder: ROW on a separate line lor each class el :acidifies beneficially ownaddreety or
' e the lam is lied by more than one regency person. sae Instniction 4 (b)(v).
Intentional missiaiemerds or omissions el facts eonsiiiuie Federal Criminal Violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: File threeet:pies of its Form. one el which mini be manually signed. If space is insufficient. see instruciico B ler procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of Iononnation contained in this term are not tequired to respond unless the lam displays a currently valid OMB Number.
hap://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700106000131/xs1F345X02Jgre4... 10/29/2008
EFTA00317011
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 299 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
washnoon. O.C. 20549 OMB Humber 32350287
February 28.
Enures
Check Ms Isar iire longer stead to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Settee It Forma a Form 5
ctriptions may cecina,. See
Paulen igti. Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securees Exchange Ad ol 1934. Section 17(a) of the Public Utility
EMMY*: average bunion
hove per
rety:Calle
05
Holdng Company Ad of 1935 or Section 313th) of the Investment Company Acl ol 1940
• a Issuer Name and Tidier or Tradrg Symbol 5. Reblienshp of Reporting Perme(.) to Issuer
1. Name and Address of Reporting Pastel
applicable)
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check all
GREENBERG ALAN C X Diced°, 10% Orme,
i BSC I
Oflicer (pve tille Other (specify
below) below)
9-M) (11r51) (Mittel.)
3. Dale el Earlied Transaction (Mordh'Dayffear)
OO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/20/2006
383 MADISON AVENUE
O. II Amendmenl. Dale of Onginal Filed (MordlYDayNear) 6. Indmdual of JointlGroup Fling (Check Applicable
Line)
(Sleet)
X Form filed by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form filed by More Than One Reporting
Person
(Oily) (Stale) 129)
Table I • Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed rotor Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3) 8. Transaction 2k bierned 3. 4. Seeming' Acquired (Al 5. Amount of O. 7. Hanna
Date Execution Date. Transaction or Disposed Of (0)(Insti. Seemlier' Orminhip of Indirect
(hiceshtiayTear) Reny Cod* (Inn. 3.4 and 5) tieneticialfy Form. Owed Berwricial
Ilienthearymo 4) Owned (Dior Ownership
F IN Mg Indirect ii) Omar. 4I
IA) Reported (Instr. 4)
Code V aflame 4. Price Transoction(sl
ID) (MS. 3 and 4)
Table II • Derivative Securities Acq tied. Disposed o or Beneficially Owned
(0 9.. puts. calls. warrants options. onvertible securities)
I. TIM of 2. S. Transaction 3/1Deemed t 5. Number 6. Dale Escacisataa and 7. Title and Amount O. Price of 9. !knew 10. If. Hamm
Derivative Conversion Date Execution Date. Transaction at E.Witallan Dart of Sommties Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
Security or Exercise PlontioDayTearl irony Code (Ms.. Derivative plonthDayNearl tinderirng Security *denim Form: Rerwricial
I nt*. SI Price of (Montivtiarnrer) I) SemMies Derivative Seemly (nstr. 5) Securities Cored (0) Owners's',
Derivative Acquired (Instr. 3 and et Sentricialty ye Indirect tinter. ei
SecvnlY IA) or Owned (II (Mete)
Cliwomel Follomeg
of (D) Reported
tins.. 3 4 Transaction
and 5) 1st Unite. A)
Amours'
or
Number
Date Expiration of
Code V IA) ID) Exercisable Data Duo snares
CAP tinny „ , Common
1:::11,7.0 • V.. A 46.047 II/AV:Olt I ILIte:III I 46.047 SO
(2006) Stoci.
Erre .neat Common
„p en ,,, Site i1 i z,:i wzr rt. A 18.789 12/XV2009 12/212016 18.789 SO 18.789 I)
Stock
Explanation of Responses:
This Inv a denbainv so. nn tynnally dots not haw a eonsemmn at menbe pore
2, Deferral of mrnensmon and credo ro Repxung Peones Account on of 12/2DIM punuani to the Issues Capital Aom hymn Plan Inn Senior Managing Damon (CAP Han): exempt under Rule 16b.
Remarks:
/s/ Greenberg, Alan C. 12/21/2006
Signature el Reporting Person Dale
Rennder: Reporl on a senora,* Ine for each class of securibes beneficially owned drectijr of indinectly.
• If the form is filed by more Than one reportng person. see Instruclien 4 (a)(v).
" Intenbonal misstatements or omissions ol tans oanstaute Federal Criminal Velations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and IS U.S.C. 780(a).
Note: File three copies ol this Form. ore ol wlich must be manually signed. II space is insulficienl. see 'retraction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.see.gov/Archives/edgaddata/777001/000077700106000141/xs1F345X02/gre4... 10/30/2008
EFTA00317012
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27709 Page 300 of 347
SEC Fonn 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OSAS APPROVAL
washinom. 0.0. 20549
OMB Shrew IBM-6,287
Lower rebury*
201I
CluickMD em II no longer subicci la STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
p Section le Form 4 ow Com 5
eiRgalcas may whim, See
iretruction 1(b). Filed pursuant to Section lee) of the Sociales Exchange Act of 1924. Section 17(e) 01 the Pudic elle
federated average Peen
foss per
nuclease OS
Hotting Company AC1 01 1935 or Section 3096 of Me investment COmpany Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person. 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Syrrbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Personrst to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check all apiSicabki)
pRFPNIRFRG ALAN C i BSC I
X 011OCIor ID% 0AnOr
Onicer (give tab Other (specify
(Last) (Istiddle) below) below)
Firth 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MongsDay4Yeer)
C/O BEAR. STEARNS 8 CO. INC. 01/03/2007
383 MADISON AVENUE
4.11AmenOment. Dale of Ongnal Seed tMonftstayNeaq 6. Intiviguel orJoIntthroup Fling (Check AptYlcabl0
Linel
(Street)
X Form libelby One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form mod by More Stan One Reporting
RerSCon
(CO) (Slate) RIO
Table 1- Non•Derlvative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. TM* el Security (Instr. 3) 2. Transaction 2A. Deemed 3. 4. Seen*, Moulted (A) or S. Amount of 6. 7. Nature
Dare Execution Data. Transaction Disposed 0 (0) (instr. 3.4 SecuMies Ownership of Indirect
(MentliDayrYeari it any Code finny. and 5) Beneficially Form: Beneficial
IMpillYDayeswO a) Owned Direct (Di or *wonder,
FoNowine indirect (q (Neb. 4)
IA) Reported (Instr. 4)
Code V Amara or Rite Donsoclionm
ID) lean. 3 ands)
Mr
Common Stock 01/03/2007 150.396 A 573.75 165.396 I)
Common Stock 01/0312007 3 150.396 D 3163.11 15.000 I
Table N Derivative &mulles Acq Ned. DItipOtied I. Of Benetklatly Owned
(e.g.. puts. calls, warrants options. conver 'Ole se urines)
I. Title of 2. 3. Transaction 3A. Deemed 4. S. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Ammon S. erica of 9. Number le 11.Na:we
Dorhallwr Conversion Data Execution Date. Transaction Derivative Expiration Date of Securities Donvative of Ownership of Melted
Security or Exercise (filorithDayllear) II any Coda Dna:. Setter:its (fibenthDayNear) Underlying Socially derivative Form; Banenclal
(Instr. 3) Proof (MonthDaylear) 8) Acquired IA) Derivative Security Onsb. 5) Secuntres Direct (I)) Owinerld6P
Derivative or noosed Own- 3 and 4) Beneficially or Indirect limb. 4)
Security (0) NNW. Owned 0) entir. 4)
3.4 and SI Following
Reported
Amount TrOnSOCIlen
Ce (S) (Ingo. 4)
Dale Ecoirstien Number
Code V (A) (DI thercluNe Date late or Shame
Eme &oft:
Oplion ‘t
6)3.75 01/03/2007 00.396 12/IS/2006 I VIS/20I3 Common 150.396 So 0 D
(Right to Stack
a, ,
Melinition of Responses:
I liwic to re Emplin re Sat k Optima Rrybr,.• 'I. to Rerun as Pei.on pancint lu ts sex. Sisk, wad Pls . exempt under Risk 161..3.
Remarks:
Is/ Greenberg. Alan C. 0104/2007
&ensue or Repotting Person
Date
Remolds, Report on a separate Ina for each class 01 SeCUres leneficety owned Erectly Of VICIWAY.
• if the form is filed by more than ore reefing person. see Instruction 4 MHO.
• mtenfisnat misstatements or omissions 0l tans constitute Federal Criminal Violations See 18 V.B.C. loot and IS V.B.C.
Note' FIN three COOleS 01 thiS Form, one of whrh roust be manually signori If specs is instances see tnstmction 6 tot rooedure.
Persons *to respond 10 the collection of Information contained In this form are not requited to respond unless the lawn oispitays a currently valid OW Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000002/xs1F345X02Jgre4... 10/30/2008
EFTA00317013
SEC FORM 4 Page 1 of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 301 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washington. D.C. 20549
0118 Number'. 3235.0207
Etprel
February 29.
Check It,,, boo V it longer subject lo STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Section 16. Forma or FormS
chianti:ins may confiners See
tine". on Ida) Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Stamm?. Exchange Ad ol 1934. Section 17(a) of the Pubic Uitty
Boman average motion
hours mu
moons, 0.5
Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) ol the Investment Company Ad ol 1940
1. Name and Address ol Reporting Person* 2. Issuer Name and lick., or Trading Symbd 5. Rdalionship c4 Repcang Per:anis) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check WI appbeabb)
GREENBERG ALAN C X Cued*. 10% Onner
1 BSC ]
- Officer (give fide Other (sootily
(Rest) (Middle) below) below)
Man
3.01M of Earliest Transaction (Lionth'Day)Yead
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 02/14/2007
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. V Amendment. Dale of Original Filed (MordhiDaylVear) 8. intivickiat or JrnilLSIOup Filing (Check Appltable
Line)
(Street)
X Fenn filed by One Repcang Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form fled by More than One Repcang
Person
ICAO (Stale) ROI
Table I • Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. TS of Security (Instr. 3) a Transaction 2A. Deemed 3. 4. Securities A au red (A) 5. Amount at 4 7. Nature
Dale Pls.:ellen Date. Transaction or Disposed 01ID (Mae. Smudges Ownership of blear/et
(Manihriaylern) ii any Cods (Instr. 3.4 and 4) Denelicially Form: Beneficial
(MOnthDarfear) 8) Owned Direct MO or °wieldy
Foso i g indireci (II Pent, II
(id Reported (Man 4)
Dodo V Amourn or Prise Trams:fonts)
ID) Omar. 3 and 4)
Table II • Derivative Se uriti a Acquired. Disposed ol. or Beneficially Owned
(e g.. puts. cal s. warrant . options. convert) le securities)
1. Title el 2. 3. Transaction 3A. Deemed 4. S. Number Cs Dale Exercisable and 7. TRW and S. Price of 9. Number 10. ii . nature
Dmlvattve Conversion Date Evocation Dale. Transacilon of Expration Dale Amount of Dedvanve of ownership or Marcel
Security or Exorcise (MonthDay.Yea) II any Code (Instr. Derivative (Momhtliarfoar) Securities Sectwity derivative Form: Beneficial
(ran. 3) Price of Odontheay.Yeari 9) Securities Underlying Mitt 5) Securities Direct to) Ownership
Derivabve Acquired Derivative Semidry Beneficially or indirect (Instr.4i
Security (Alm (Instr. 3 and 4) Owned (I) (Maw. 4)
Disposed Fosovnng
W(0) Reported
Warn. 3.4 Transaction
and 5) (s)(Instt. 4)
Amount
or
number
Dais Expiration ol
Cods 0 Ski (0) lianclsablit Orias Tide Shares
CAP i Mt, A
(2001)
Illl i 02f143007 (2 i 1.818 iinotzooa iummos COMM011
Snick 1,818 So 1.818 D
CAP Uinta A Common
III 02t14/2007 6.232 11003007 1181112807 slack 6.252 so 99.293 D
(20021 ii 2 I
CAP trims A
III 0M4a007 (21 6.194 1100/2008 1181112001 Common 6.194 SO 98.379 D
(2003) Siock
CAP thins A Common
III 02/14/2007 3.749 II/384200 Ilf3W200? siock 3.749 so 39.343 D
(20041 ii 2 I
CAP Units III OV143007 (A
(2
'11 3.268 1100/2010 118182010 Common 3.268 SO 31.9W D
(2005) Stock
lbgslanalle of Responses:
I. Thu type o defaults< mangy i)pitally &es an have a comenaon or exercise price
2, CAP Cent mined to Reponum Person's amnia( faint 2114(071based on Oncal Vex 2006 Not Umtata Adjustments pursuum to the Inners Cumuli Accumulation Plan lot Senior Masupos
Direviors ICAP Plan): exempt meter Rule 16b.1
Remarks:
Oreenbe 02/15/2007
Signature el Regaling Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beraficialy owned directly or indirectly.
• If the lam is lied by more than one reporting person. see Instruchon 4 (b)(v).
Intentional misstatements or omissions ol facts constitute Federal Criminal Violabons See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: File three copies of ths Form. one of whch must be manually signed. If space is insulficient. see Instructing ti ler procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
hap://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000016/xs1F345X02Jgre4... 10/30/2008
EFTA00317014
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 302 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 0188 APPROVAL
Washington. D.C. 20549
OBBNwhoer 32350207
FobrUary 28.
Cheek this box I nebn9er subject te STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Section It Forman FormS
enlist:pas mar:online. See
insnxtion Filed pursuant le Section 16(a) ci the Securities Exchange Aa el 1934. Beefier, 17(a) of the Pubic WIN
Ernmaled average burden
hours p..
reepinse 0.5
Holding Company Ad of 1935 or Section 30(h) el me Investment Company Act el 1940
I. Name and Address el Reporting Person* 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Rea:tang Person(s) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Cheat all tcp1C3b/e)
GREENBERG ALAN C X DreClor 10% Owner
1 BSC ]
- Officer (give title Other (Racily
(Fest) (Middle) below) below)
0.ao0
3. Dale el Earliest Transaction (Llonth'DaylYear)
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 03/22/2007
383 MADISON AVENUE
4.1Amendment. Date ci Original Filed (MontivDaynearl 8. Incivicbat or JOillIGIOup Filing (Check Applicable
Line)
I MM0 X Form Sled by One Rey:tang Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form fled by More man One Repaling
Person
(MN (Stale) (Zpl
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed of or Beneficially Owned
1. Title el Security (Instr. 3) 1. Transaction 2s Deemed 3. 4. Securities Ace end IA) S. Amount of O. 7. Nature
Date Execution Dale, Transit lion ce Deformed Of ID) Onstr. 3, Securities Ownership of Indirect
(ifOnllythrydearl if any Code (Mew. 4 and 5) Enna'ash Pons Beneficial
(MOrdhOrlyNeer) 0) Owned Direct ID) Owners,*
Following a indirect jinni. 4i
(A) Reported II) (Inat,. 4)
Cede V known a Price TransactiOn(el
ID) (Inet,. 3 and 4)
M
Common Stock 03/22+2007 (11 1.818 A 80 16.818 I)
Common Stock 03/21/2007 S 1.818 D 5151.26 15.000 I)
Table II • Derivative Se uriti a Ara Bed. Dis used e . or Beneficially Owned
(e.g.. puts. ea s. warrant options. convert ble securities)
1. This 01 2. 3. Transaction 9A. Deemed 4. 5. Number 4. Dale Erin:bible and 7. m0. nod 4. Price of 9. Number 10. 11. Nature
Derivative Conversion Date Execution Oa*. Transaction of Expiration Date Amount of Derivative of Ownership of Milken.
Security • Exercise (ldcmOnDayYtiar) it any Code Oink. Derivative (MontiaDaylear) securities Swain derivative Form: Beneficial
(Instr. 3) Price of MfontlyDaydearl 8) Semoriliee UnderdM9 (Instr. 5) Securilies Direct ID) Ownerslip
Derived" Acquired Derivative Security Beneficially or Inbred (Instr. Ii
Security IA) r (inalr. 3 and 4) Owned 0) (nor- 4)
Disposed Following
off ) Reported
(Instr. 3.4 Transaction
and 5) (signed 4)
Arnourd
or
Numbs
Dale Excavation oi
Code V IA) (Dl Exercisable Dale Title Shares
CAP Brum NI Conroon
OVELI2007 it, 1.1118 11/31V2006 111.k0f2006 . IBIS pr D
(2001i Mock
Explanation el Responses:
I Settirmmt n CAP Coil. nJ dionibulion of common star t to Reprints Person pursuant no CAP Plan. ettmpt under Rule Ith..1
2 TM. type o &mauve in wily in:molly does rim haver c011VetA1011 or cyanic price
Remarks:
la Greenberg, Alan C. 03/23/2007
Signature of Reporting Person Data
Reminder: Report on a separate line lor each class ot securities beneficially ownedMeaty or inarectly.
' If the lam is lied by more man one reportng person. see Instniction 4 (b)(v).
Intentional misstatements or omissions el facts constiase Federal Criminal Vedatons See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78Igat
Note: File three tcpies of ms Form. one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient. see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collectkm of Information contained In this form are not required to respond unless the lam displays a currently valid ORS Number.
http://www.see.gov/Arehives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000044/xs1F345X02Jgre4... 12/16/2008
EFTA00317015
SEC FORM 4 Page 1 of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27709 Page 303 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
washnson. O.C. 20549 OM Humber: 32360287
tetras February 28.
Oied Pis ion dnalonger sottect STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Seek. i8. Fam 4 a Form 5
etledions may ccrentre. See
habudian Filed pursuant to Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Ad ol 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility
Estimated average When
hours per
restore. 0.5
Holdng Company Ad el 1935 or Seaman 30(h) of the Imestrnent Company Ad ol 1940
POISCfc
1. Name and Address ol Reverting a Issuer Name and Ticker or Tradrq Symbe4 S. Relationshp of Reporting Perron(s) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check al amicable)
GREENBERG ALAN C X Oiredor 10% Orme,
i BSC I
°nicer (give title Other (specify
(Middle) below) below)
ham) (hird) 3. Data el Ended Transaction (MardIVDayffeag
CIO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/21/2007
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. If Amendment. Dale of Original Filed (MordIVDayffear) 6. Individual a JointOroup fling (Check Applicable
(Skeet) Line)
X Fenn lied by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Fenn filed by More than One Reporting
Person
(City) (Stab) PP)
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed ol. or Benefsciall Owned
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3) 2. Transaction 2A. Deemed 3. 4. Securities Acquired (A) or S. Amami of 4. 7. Nature
Date Execution Date, Treneaction Disposed 01(01Biwa. S. 4 Securities gernenthlp clingier,
itionlimOrrylleari berry Code Pink. end SI Beneficially Form: Direct Beee4lcisi
NkrateDayleirl 4) Owned (DI or OMP•fa,
F II imp indirect II) Omer. flt
01 Reported (lock 4)
Code V Amount or Hoe Transients)
co) pniti. 3 end 41
31
Common Stock 12212007 .I I 99.293 A SO 114.293 I)
Common Stock 12/21/2O07 s 99.293 D $89.01 15.000 I)
Table II - Derivative Securities Acq fired. Disposed o or Beneficially Owned
fa g.. puts. calls. warrants options. convert ble securities)
I. We of 2. S.Transaction a Deemed A S. Humber 6. Data Exorciser* and 7. Tide anti Amount B. Price of 9. Dunbar le. II. Nabs*
DerIvative Converefen Date Execution Oeln Transaction of Expiration Date of Decals., Ihrivalive of Onnerehip of Indirect
Security or Exercise IllonthtlayTearl irony Cale (Men. Der votive (McnikOWYearl Ifodertnnil Security *Avenge Form: Beneficial
(Instr. Si Price el (MendiDaY1Trern 4) SecuMies Derivative Steamy Rimy. Si Securities Oaect (DI Ownership
Derivative Ac awed (Instr.3 and 4) Sentliciely or Indirect Poor. 4)
Security (a) r Orrnel DI Dark 4)
Diapered Folkniong
or (D) Repartee
On) r. 3. 4 Transaction
and 5) co pew. 4)
Amount
Or
Number
Data Expiration of
Code V IA) ID) Riollisal• Data Title Shwas
CAP Vans AI Common
(.2002)
tI t II/21421)07 .I ) 99.293 I IfJCV2007 IWO/2007 Stock 99.293 to o
Explanation or Responses:
I Seekonk of CAP COOS and dionletwin of contemn nal to Itcpotnap Pawn paleam to CAPFla.exempt ender Folk 166.3.
2 This Inv of dalYJIIVC $0:11O1) typicallydors ace have • confernon or eXCII:DV ptia
Remarks:
/s/ Greenberg. Alan C. 12212(%)7
•• Signature ol Reporting Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a separate Inc lot each class ol securities beneficially owned d ea," or indrectty.
• If the term is lied by more than one reportng person. see Instruction 4 (b)(v).
Intentional misstatements or omissions ol facts constitute Federal Gimbal Violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. Ml(e).
Note: File three copies ol this Form. one ol witch must be manually signed. II space is insufficient. see Instruction 61a procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of Inkumaitan containers In this form are not required to respond unless the Seim displays a currently valid OMB Number.
hup://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000131/xs1F345X02Jgre5... 12/16/2008
EFTA00317016
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 304 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washington. D.C. 20549
OMBNenote 32330207
Erpi February 29.
Cheek this box F nokomer subject to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Section 18. Feeder Form6
*Soren, may confinue See
Inovaon lib) Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Aa x11934. Section 17(a) of the Pubic thirty
Estimated average burden
hours per
reeporme
0.5
Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) el me Investment Company Act el 1940
2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Synibel 5. Relationship of Repcong Person(s) to Issuer
1. Name and Address el Reporling Person*
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Cheek all
asplicabre)
GREENBERG ALAN C X Doctor 10% Owner
1 BSC ]
°Meer (give title 011.4, (Raecily
(ISO (Rag pAielile) 3. Dale of Earliest Transaction (Ltonth'DaylYear)
beiaw) below)
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 01.09/2008
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. V Amendment. Dale of Original Flied (MonthiDay1Yearl 8. Inavicba or deiriliGIOup Filing (Cheek Appltable
Line)
(Strew)
X Form filed by One Repaong Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form Ned by More man One Reporting
Person
(City) (Stale) itpl
Table I • Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. Tee of Security (Instr. 3) a Transaction 26. Deemed 3. 4. Securities A rau red (A) 5. Amount of 6 7. Nature
Dale Execution Date. Transaction or Disposed 01ID (Mob. Securities Ownership of Indirect
(.1onlhDaylese) it any Code (Instr. 3.4 and 5) Benelicially Form: Beneficial
IfACellytarfeen 9) Owned Direct (0) or Owner stye
Fob 1 g indirect (II trnso II
(A) Ripened (Instr 4)
Code V Amount or Prim Transactionts)
(0) greltr. 3 and al
Table II - Derivative Securili a Acquired. Disposed ol. or Beneficially Owned
(e.g.• puts, cal s. warrant . options. converti le securities)
I. Title or 2. 3. Transaction 3A. Deemed 4. S. 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and S. Price at 9. Number W. I1. Range
Derivative Conversion Dale Execution Date. Transaction Number Expiranon Date Amount of Derivative of ownensNp of Indirect
Security or Exercise Month Day Year) it any Code (nStr. of (Mcentru)ayNear) Securities Secwity doings. Form: Benedicial
(Instr. 31 Price of (Month Day Tian 8) Dori alive Underlying (Mgt 5) Securnies Dem ID) OvinersMp
Derivative Seca Ines Derivative Security soncoasity or indirect (Instr. 41
Security ACM, red P.P. 3 and 4) Owned (I) Drew. 4)
IA) Of Fomenting
Disposed Reported
MID Transaction
but,. 3.4 Is/(Inite. 4)
end I
Amount
C.
Number
Dale Expiration 01
Cede V (A) 10) Exercisable Diee Title Sure,
CAP them A Common
<I e 01109/2008 6R) I IfaiV:o s; 118441/07 680 SO dace Ir
(20021 I 2i Stock
CAP Unto A
(2003)
i 1I 01/09/2008 .21 on I IfaiV:o o.. I umr-ing Common
Stalk 673 so *soil o
CAP U1Y1s A
III 01/09/2008
I 2i
403 I inomoo9 a umr-ow Common
Stock
408 SO 39.933 D
(20041
CAP Uwe AI Common
ill 010)9/2(088 aSS 1monolo itiSon.M0 S 355 *0 32.236 D
(2003) r2 ock
CAP Unto A Common
it I i 010)9/208 115 II/30/2011 II/304011 315 SO 46.362 D
(2000 r 2r Stock
Explanation of Responses:
I. Thu type el &mauve >minty typicallydam not haw a conversion or excreta* mice
2 CAP Unpin (edited to Ray:ening Pgrson's account On of UsAtra)bused on Pascal Year WO Na Earnings Adjustments pursuam tote liseers Capital Ammulnion Plan for Senior Managang Directors
iCAP Plan). cumin under Rule 16b-3.
Remarks:
is! Greenberg. Alan C. 01/09/2008
Signature of Reporting Person Date
Reminder: Report on a separate line tor each class of securities tanolicially owned areand or indirectly.
• If the lam is lied by more man one reporting person. see Instructon 4 (b)(v).
" InteMional misslalernerds or omissions 01 feels eenslilule Federal Criminal Veterans See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 788(a).
Note: Fite three copies of this Form. one of which must be manually sane]. If spaces insulficient see Instruerico 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of Intemotion contained in this form are not required to respond unless the font, displays a currently valid OHS Number.
http://www.see.gov/Arehives/edgar/data/777001/000077700108000006/xs1F345X02Jgre5... 12/16/2008
EFTA00317017
1 .08-cvNifiregli liessgeekwiEsusitweifik Nefge 305 daqppRovAL
FORM tise COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
I. Name and Address of Reporting Person • 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
MOLINARO SAMUEL L JR BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] Director 10% Owner
(Last) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DDNYVY) _ X _ Officer (give title below) Other (specify
below)
EVP/CFO
CIO BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 12/19/2005
INC., 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MWDDNYYY) Applicable Line)
NEW YORK, NY 10179
(Slate)
_ X _ Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (Zip) Form filed by Mott than One Reporting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I.Tide of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities Acquired 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code (A) or Disposed of (D) Following Reported Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution Muir. 8) (lnstr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date, if (Instr. 3.4 and 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
a) (Instr.
or
Code V Amount (D) Price 4)
12(19/2005
Common Stock m t I) 56123 A SO 66427.00 D
12/19/2005
Common Stock D 41123 D $11622 25304.00 D
By ESOP
Common Stock 1211.00 I
Joint with
Common Stock 13956.00 I
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options convertible secunties)
I. Tide of Derivate 2. 3. Trans. 3A 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. II. Nature
Security Conversion Date Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (lnstr. Acquired (A) (hum 3 and 4) (Instr. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any 8) or Disposed Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security of (D) Owned Direct CD)
(Ins r. 3.4 Following or Indirect
and 5) Repotted a) (lnstr.
Transaction 4)
Amount or
Date Expiration IN) (Instr. 4)
Title Number of
Exercisable Date
Code V (A) (D) Shares
12//9/2005 51 11/30/2005 11/30/2005 Common
CAP Units (2000) (21 56123 56123.00 50 0.00 I)
in Stock
Explanation of Responses:
( I) Settlement of CAP Units and distribution of common stock to Reporting Person pursuant to CAP Plan; exempt under Rule 16b-3.
( 2) This type of derivative security typically does not have a conversion or exercise price
Reporting Owners
Reporting Owner Name / Address
ID Relationships
irecto110% OwnelOfficer
rtherl
EFTA00317018
NIOLINARO SATteiggiAlii8-CVID279 RWS Cocument 10 Filed 02/27/09 Page 306 of 347
.1O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC
EVP/CF(
383 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10179
Signatures
is/ Molinaro Jr., Samuel L. 12/20/201)5
Date
•• Signature of Reporting Penton
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
▪ Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00317019
SEC FORM 4 Page I of
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 307 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
washnson. O.C. 20549 awe Nuretortr: 32350287
Eapres February 28.
Check Ins bar dnalonger stittecno STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Settee le. Forma a Fern 5
cbtbdions may (menthe See
Warden to). Filed pursuant Section 18(a) of the Seourbes Exchange Ad ol 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public tidily
ESIMatOO cottage burtien
hours pet
retireffle 0.5
Holdng Company Ad of 1935 er Section 30th) of the Investment Company Ad ol 1940
1. Name and AdSess el Repotting Pefsell' 2 Issuer Name and Ticker or Tf adrg Symbol 5. Relalionshp of Reporting Perron(s) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check al appleable)
MOLINARO SAMUEL L JR [erector 10% Orme,
f BSC 1 011iCef (give lab Other (specify
X bdoW) below)
Man (MS) (Middle)
3. Dale of Eat' Transaction (Mordh'DayNear) EVWCF0
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/22/2005
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. II Arnenclinent. Dale of Original Filed (MorthitawYear) 6. IndMdual or JointGroup Fling (Check Applicable
Line)
(Street)
X Form tiled by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form filed by More than One Reporting
Person
(City) (Stale) (Zp)
Table I - Non-Derivative Societies Acquired. Disposed of. or Etenelkially Owned
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3) 8. Transaction SA Cfmand 3. 4. gratuities Acquired (AI 5. Anyone of O. 7. Nature
Date Execution Delia Transaction or Disposed Of (0)(Instr. Securities Oannehlp of Indirect
(Mwohtiay,Teer) UMW Code (Instr. 3.4 and 5) Iterwlicially Form Deed Berwricin
GaintriDayiermr) a) Owned (D1 or Ownershp
F Ito Mg Indirect 0) Meer. 41
le) Reported (Instr. 4)
Code V Amount or Prior Trenrection(41
KR (MM. 3 and 4)
Joint
Common Stock 12/21/2005 b V 2350 D $0 11.206 I with
wife
Common Stock 25.309 1)
By
Common Stock 1.211 1
ESOP
Table II • Derivative Securities Aoq Bed. Disposed ol. or Beneficially Owned
(e g.. puts, calls. warrants options. convertible securities)
I. Tale of 2. 3. Transaction 3A- Deemed 4 5. Number 8. Date Exercisable and 7. Tide and Amount 8. Price ol 9. Humber 10. It. Naive
Derlyalive Comention Dale Execution Dear. Transaction of Expiration Date of Sec...item Derivative of Oamorrhip of Indirect
Security or Exercise IllonthOsyNeer) deny Code (Instr. Derivative damithtwy.Teml UncionYng Security denazifies Form: Semi kin
(Instr. 3) Price ol (MonthDaylw) /0 Securities Derivative Security (Imr. 5) Securities Dined (D) Ownershc
Derhative Acquired (Instr. 3 and 4) tiendkially or Indirect Omar. It
Stonily IS) or Owned 01 Pert 4)
Disposed resorting
00(D) Repartee
OnStf. 3 4 Transaction
one 5) (5) flaw. 4)
Amount
or
Mamba
Dom Expiration at
code r (A) (D) Itimmisoble Dow Tido Sham
CAP Vans A
iii I UNNYOU "3" r.
12005) 12/22/2005 r2) 54.313 I ',Jaw it) s40:T n 54.313 $1165 34.3”
Earp Stock Common
Option ITU St les II/22/2005 A 33.534 12/22/208 12/22/2015 35.534 $0 25.334
to Buy) Stmk
Explanation of Responses:
I. ibis type d dall.4111.0 so; my typicallydoes sot have • COMenion orcafe:rue ploy
2. MIMS of oropenumon and credit to Resonate Pence's Account (as of 12/224)51 presume to the CannesCapital Arruinulorfra Plan for Smut Managing (Medan iCAP Plot% exempt under Rule 16h.
Remarks:
IsJ Molinaro Jr., Samuel L. 12,23/2005
•• Sgnalure of Reporting Person Dale
Reminds.: Report on a separate lne or each class of securities beneficially owned d ecuir or indirectly.
If the lam is libd by more than one reportng person. see Instruclice 4 82)(4
Intentional rnisstalernerds or omissions ol (ads oansteute Federal Criminal Violations Sae 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 780(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form one ol whch must be manually sicced. II space is insufficient. see IreArucbon 6 kr procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid 0140 Number.
hup://idea.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700105000131/xs1F345X02/mol38... 2/26/2009
EFTA00317020
tease 08-cvNiAregfAilitoyfirectRINEsFAMMERNeft9e 308 akit4,113PROVAL
FORM COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
I. Name and Address of Reporting Person * 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
MOLINARO SAMUEL L JR BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] Director 10% Owner
(Last) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction attaimivvro _ X _ Officer (give title below) Other (specify
below)
EVP/CFO
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 2/8/2006
C., 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MWDDNYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
_ X _ Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (State) (tip) _ Form filed by Mom than One Repoiting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I.Title of Security 2 Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code Acquired (AI or Following Reported Tramaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (Instr. 8) Disposed of (D) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date, if (Instr. 3.4 an 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
(1) (Instr.
or
4)
Code V Amount (D) Price
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options convertible secunties)
I. Tide of Derivate 2. 3. Trans. 3A. 4. 5. Ntunber of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. II. Nature
Security Conversion Date Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (Instr. 8) Acquired (A) or (Instr. 3 and 4) (Insu. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any Disposed of (II) Beneficially Security: (Instr. 41
Security Owned Direct (D)
(Instr. 3.4 and Following or Indirect
5) Reported (I) (Instr.
Transaction 4)
Amount or
Date O.)(Instr. 4)
.. Expiration Title Number of
Code V (A) (D) Exercisable Date Shares
01 2/8.(2006 121 11/3012005 II/30/2005 Common
CAP Units (2000) A 3557 3557.00 SO 3557.00 D
Stock
2/8(2006 11/30/2006 11/3W2006 Common
CAP Units (2001) A (21 1324 1324.00 SO 22063.00 D
Stock
2002006 11/30/2007 I V30/2007 Common
CAP Units (2002) Ill A (21 3681 Stock
3681.041 50 61345.00 I)
(I, 2002006 11/30/2008 11/30/2008 Common
CAP Units (2003) A (21 4210 4210.00 50 70155.00 I)
Stock
(1) 2/8/2006 11/30/2009 11130/2009 Common
CAP Units (2004) A (21 3084 Stock
3086.00 50 51420.00 D
Explanation of Responses:
( I) This type of derivative security typically does not have a conversion or exercise price
( 2) CAP Units credited to Reporting Person's account (as of 2/8/06) based on Fiscal Year 2005 Net Earnings Adjustments pursuant to the
Issuer's Capital Accumulation Plan for Senior Managing Directors (CAP Plan); exempt under Rule 16b-3.
Reporting Owners
I
Reporting Owner Name / Address
Relationships
I
EFTA00317021
ease tud-cv-pyri • ip ,.,,,lr ghfgtenemg Filed 02/27/09 Page 309 of 347
MOLINARO SAMUEL L JR
GO BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.
EVP/CFO
383 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10179
Signatures
/s/ Molinaro Jr., Samuel L. 2/9/2006
•• Signature of Reponing PCIS011 Date
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
lot Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00317022
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02,27709 Page 310 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washington. D.C. 20549
OMB tio(OPOr: 32350287
Entree February 28.
Owek yes bar fire longer NOM to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Satan) Forma a Form 5
obledionsrmy menus See
eolnichm ion. Filed pursuanl to Section 18(a) of the Securbes Exchange Ad ol 1931, Seden 1706 of the Public Utility
ESIIngtOOPoOraga burtlOn
howl pet
44I4ORIO 0.5
Hctleing Company Ad cd 1935 or Staten 30(h) of the Investment Company Ad ol 1940
1. Name and Address ol Reporting Person. 2 Issuer Name and Ticker or Tradrg Symbol 5. Retalicnship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check all arplicable)
MOLINARO SAMUEL L JR Director 10% Orme,
f BSC 1
Officer (give lille Other (specify
X below) below)
(La-40 PIO (Middle)
1 Dale ol Salter Transaction (Mordh'Dayffear) EVP/CF0
CIO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/I 8f2006
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. II Arnendmerd. Dale of Original Filed (MordlatrawYear) 6. IndMdual or JointGroup Fling (Check Applicable
Linel
(Street)
X Form filed by One Reporting Parson
NEW YORK NY 10179
RIM filed by More than One Reporting
Person
(City) (Stale) alp'
•
Table I' Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed et. or Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3) 2. Transaction 2A. Deemed 3. 4. Securities Acquired la) or 5. Amount el 4. 7. Robot
Dais Ere:rke Date, Trensaction Diseased 01(DI (Instr. 3.4 Seemlier Ownerealp ell...deed
(MonthOsYNeari I( soy Cede On*. and 5) Beneficially Form: Benericin
IMenthOarlirerl ll) Owned Direct (0) Ownership
Following or Waren Onstr. it
(A) Reported (linnet. 41
Cede V Armed or Nos Transadients)
(DI (Instr.] one II
M
Common Stock 12/1812(106 22.062 A 50 47,366 I)
'"
Common Stock 12/1812006 6 9.344 D 5164.68 38.022 I)
By
Common Stock 1.211 1
ESOP
Joint
Common Stock 11.206 1 with
wife
Table II . Derivative Securities AN fired. Disposed ol. or Beneficially Owned
(e.g.. puts. calls. warrants. options. convertible securities)
I. TRW of 2. 3. Transaction 3/1Deemed t 5. Number 6. Dale EllerCISOD* and 7.7154 and Amount 8. PIRO 01 9. tkpoOof 10. II. Noose
Owlvethe comenaan Dole EXOCO50/1 Dab>. TIMIS:588On a Explia4100 DUO Ot SOOMPC4 DeflvatIVO 04 OsnlenAlp Dl IndlIOCI
Security or Exercise (llenththryNear) irony Cede (Inst. Ornivailve (allonihOarrearl Undort).9 Security derivative Form Ramekin
Onslr. 3) Prior el (MentuDayTear) a) Steamier Derivelve SinuMy (na. 5) Securities Direct (D) Ownership
Derivative Accnintd (Instr.3 and 4) Beneficlally to hulked Omer. It
Securily IA) or Owned (II (Indy 41
Disposed Following
al (DI Reported
Onst 3.4 Transaction
ono 5) (1)01411. 4)
Meow
a
HuMbOt
Dale EXplratIOn a
Code V IA) ID) Exercisatio Dale Iltlo Slain
CAP Units NI t ..._• ton
, a, 12/18/21/06 ,, , 22X162 I 101.VL‘Kil. I I i 4.1.Z0.16 . 22 •062 to i
(210 htddl.
Explanation of Responses:
I. Sark-nada of CAP Outs and disinhonon of common stock to Ropothod PC1,011 pursuant to CAP Ph*. cxcmix wider Rate I 6h.1
2 This nyc 01 densame 50:0111y typically cl*e ex Nye 4Ponvenian or exeldoe puce
Remarks:
/5/ Molinaro Jr.. Samuel L. 12/19/2(816
'• Sgnalure of Reporting Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a separate Iine her each class al securities beneficially owned d ectlf or indirectly.
' B the term is lied by more than one mooring person. see Instruclicn 4 (b)(v).
" Intentional rrasstalerner4s or omissions ol fads constaute Federal Cannel violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form. one ol which must be manually signed. II space is insullicient. see Instruction 611procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of Information contained In this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700106000135/xs1F345X02Jmol... 10/29/2008
EFTA00317023
SEC FORM 4 Page 1 of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 311 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE OMB APPROVAL
COMMISSION OMB Plumbic 32350287
Waihngren. D C 20549 February 211
Drum: 20m
Check this box if oolongs Wheel Ethmatal average burclan
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
0 10 Section 16. Form 4 or EOM) 5
*Patricia may commix, See
inktruclion 10h.
fl ed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securilies Exchange Act of 1934. Section 17(a) of the Pubic Utility
Paiute per
response 0.5
Hording Company Act of 1915 or Section 30(h) of the kwestment Company Ad of 1940
2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Repotting Persons) to Issuer
1. Name and Address Cl Repotting Pinter,•
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check al appliCable)
MOLINARO SAMUEL L JR Deector 10% Owner
I BSC I
Officer (give die Other (specify
X below)
below)
(Last) (Fad) (Middle)
3. Date Cl Eadiest Transaction (kioninmaynear) EVP/CFO
C/O BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/2212006
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. It Areellektlerd. Dale of Original Filed (1.4onlh.Dayfireati 6. Individual or JOIIWGIOUD Filing (Cheek
Appielible Line)
(Steel)
X Form filed by One Repairing Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form filed by Mote lhan One Reporling
Person
(City) (Slate) (Zvi
Table I - Non-D I ivalive Securities Acquired. Disposed ol. or Beneficially Owned
1.71de of Security (Instr. 3) TranseCtiOn 2a- Deemed 3. 4. Securires Acquired 5. Atnouni of 6. 7. Nature
Dale Execution Date. Transaction (A) or Disposed 01(0) Secuthies Ownership of Indirect
(Montherf/Yeat) Irony COS °nor. (Instr.3.4 ands) Beneficially Form: Beneficial
(MenikDayiThel) 6) Owned 0-eel (0) Ownership
F Hawing or trld.reer onwr. CI
(A) De904100 ill ilovir 4)
Code V Arnaud or Price Transaction(*)
ID) (Instr.] and 4)
Common Stock 12/22/2006 0 V 1.250 f) 30 36.772 U
Common Stock 12/22/2006 0 V 1.248 I) 30 35.524 U
13y
Common Stock 1.211 I
ESOP
Joint
Common Stock 11.206 I with
wife
Table II - Derivative Sew tiles Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
(e. .. puts. calls. warrants. options. convertible se unities)
I. Title ot 2 3. Transaction 34. Deemed 4. 5. 6. Date Exercisable and T. Title and a. Price of 9. Number M. It Nature
Derivative Conversion Dole Execution Date. Transaction Number Expiration Dale Amount 01 Derivative ot Ownership Of Indirect
Security or Exercise thaanthiDayvear) deny Code tinstr. of itilonthearthar) Securities Security derivative Form: Beneficial
(Instr. 3) Priced (Month.DatTear) 5) Denvative Underlying (Instr. 5) Securities Direct (El) Ownership
Derivative Samuel.* Derivative Beneficially Of Indirect (Instr.4)
Security Acq red Security Owned 01(netr. 4)
IA) 01 (Instr. 3 and 4) Following
Disposed Reported
el (13 Transaction
(Instr. 3.4 (a) limb% 4)
and 5)
Amount
or
Number
Dale Expiration of
Code V (A) (D) Exercisable Date Tit. Snares
Explanation of Responses:
Remarks:
1st Molinaro Jr., Samuel L. 12126/2006
signature 01 Reporting Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each that of securities beneficialy owned dket•thr or Indlredly.
• 11 the in is fled by more than one repotting person. see insItucliOn 4 (b)(v).
• intenlional misstatements or omissions of fads othstkule Federal Criminal Vitiations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: Fie three copies of this Form. one of which must be manually signed. II space is knurl'tient. see Instruction 6 ler procedure.
Persons who respond 10 the collection of Information contained In this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
hup://www.see.gov/Arehives/edgar/data/777001/000077700106000155/xsIF345X02Jmol... 10/30/2008
EFTA00317024
SEC FORM 4 Page 1 of
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 312 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washinglen. D.C. 20549
OMB Number 3235.0207
FObruary 28.
Enarel
Check this box y ne longer subject lo STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Section It Forma or FormS
otegalims may continue 51fe
Infewlfon lib) Filed pursuant to Seclion 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Seeder, 17(a) of the Pubic Lkitty
EillnialOCI average bolden
hem po.
mesons
0.5
Holding Company Acl of 1935 or Section *h) el the Investment Company Act el 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporling Person. 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Rept:rang Person(s) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check all acplicab/e)
MOLINARO SAMUEL L JR Dreclor 10% Owner
— 1 BSC ] Weer (give lisle
X below) Other (*.city
below)
PM) (Fast) (Middle)
3. Oahe of Earliest Transaction (MordiutayNear) EVP/CFO
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 03/2212007
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. 1 Amendment. Date of Original Filed (Mon th'DayNear) 8. Individual or JoirdiGroup Fding (Cheek Applicable
Line)
(Street)
X Farm Sled by One Rept:ding Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Font fled by More Man One Repoang
Person
(City) (Male) IZPI
Table I . Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. Tide el Security (Instr. 3) . Transaction 2.A. Deemed S. 4. Securities Acquired IN 5. Amount of B. 7. Nature
One Execution Date, Trans. inn or Disposed 01(0)(Instr S. Securities Ownership of Snared
Imentatlayrrear) easy Code (naw. 4 art 5) Beneficially Form: Benet'dot
(MonthDayNeor) 0) Owned Direct (DI Ownership
FolloMne or Wired (IrwIr. It
(A) Reported 0) (Instr. 4)
Code V Amman or Nee Transaction(*)
ID) (Instr. 3 and 4)
M
Common Stock 0322+2007 iii 1482 A SO 37.006 I)
Common Stock 03/22+2007 S 1.482 D 3151.26 35.524 I)
Common Stock 1.211 I By
ESOP
Joint
Common Stock 11.206 1 with
wife
Table II • Derivative Se unties Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
(e.g.. puts. calls. warrant . options. convertible securities)
I. Title of 1 5. Transaction 3A. Deemed 4. 5 limber 4. Date Exercisable and 7. TIM and 4. Price of 0. Hunter 10. 11. Nature
Derivative Conversion Date Execution Ds Transaction of Expertion Date Amount of Derivative of OwnersNp of Sadiron
Security or Exercise IMenthDaylean If shy Code Onor. Deena,. (Monthttaylear) Securities Stylist derivative form: Beneficial
(Instr. 3) Price of ObentliDaylearl 0) Securities UndertliNI (Instr. 5) Securities Direct ID) Ownership
Derivable Acquired Derivative Security Beneficially or Indirect jinni.It
Security (A) r (Inner. 3 and 4) Owned 0) (inse. 4)
Disposed following
of( ) Reported
(Instr. 3.4 Tronsoclion
end 3) II) (loot, 4)
Amount
or
Numbm
Dent EXpEn4lOn of
Code V In) (en Exereisamo Dim Tido Snares
CAP Vo.t.) M Common
(2000 ' 2' 03/2.:12007 iii I.442 I 010/2006 116N_lltbS
Sale 1.482 so 0
Explanation el Roseanne:
I. Setimm: of ('Al Cot nJ &wanton M common aura te Rep rung P non purr toCAPPlan:amp under Rule 16261.
2 flu) typo al .nosh to ,c only lynxally /Jon MA have o convene n or manic price
Remarks:
1st Molinaro Jr., Samuel L 03/23+2007
Signature of Reporling Person Date
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities benelicially owned direct,/ or indirectly.
• If the lean is lead by more man one reportng person. see Instruction 4 (b)(v).
Intentional misstatements or omissions el facts conslitule Federal Criminal Violabons See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: File three copies of Mrs Form, one of welch must be manually stoned. If space c insullicient. see Instruction El for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained In this form are not required to respond unless the Iona displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000048/xs1F345X02Jmol... 12/16/2008
EFTA00317025
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 313 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washnedon. C.C.26649
awe 1,1101,01: 3235.0287
bores FObflaff 28.
Dia me oar Oro tondo sated to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
Settee 16 Fame a Forms ESIMatOO evorage bunion
(Uptonmay ceding See bonen
',budge OS Fikd pursuanl to Section 18(a) of the Sedates Exchange Ad ol 1934, Section 17(a) el the Public tidily mon, 0.5
Holdng Company Add 1935 er Seaton 30(h) el the Investment Company Ad of 1940
1. Name and Ackleess ol Reporting Penal' a Issuer Name and Ticker or Tradrg Symbe4 S. Relalionship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check al amicable)
MOLINARO SAMUEL L JR Esc ] Director 10% Owner
f Oflker (give fide Other (specify
X beloW) below)
A-asi) Meal) (Middle)
3. Dale el Earned Transaction (Monlh'DayfIed) EVP/CFCMCOO
00 BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/21/2007
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. II Amendment Dale of Original Filed (ModIstrawYear) 6. IndMdual Of JOirlOGFOLIO Fling (Check Applicable
Line)
(Skeet)
X Form filed by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form bled by More than One Reporting
Person
(Cily) tSlatel 12ici
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneliciall Owned
1. Tele of Security (Instr. 3) 2 Transaction U. Deemed a 4. Seceders Acquired IA) or 5. *mown of A 7. Nature
Date Execution Date, Trines:lion Dimond Of (DI (Intr. 3.4 Securities Ownereng of Indirect
(korehOsyllearl Harry Code lane. end 51 Beneficially Form, Direct BeeeelciO
laawalvDayloorl 9) Owned (DI to Gowan
F II Ins Indirect 0) Onwr. di
(AI Reported (Ira 4)
Code V Amount or Price Transectionts)
(DI Onsit 3 and di
of Joint
Common Stock 12/21/2007 . im 65.468 A SO 74.176 I with
wife
Joint
Common Stock 12/21/2007 S 27.726 D $89.01 46.450 I with
wife
Joint
Common Stock 12/27/2007 G 3.000 D s0 43.450 I with
wife
Common Stock 38.022 I)
By
Common Stock 1.211 I
ESOP
Table II • Derivative Securities Aoq bed. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
(e.g.. puts. calls. warrants options. convertible securities)
1. Teed of t. 3. Transaction 3k Deemed a 5. Number It Date Eden:Mater and 7. Tier and Amount S. Price 01 9. Welber 10. 11. Naive
Derivative Conversion Date Execution Ostie. Transaction of Expirmlon Dare of Sensitive Derivative 04 Dowering of hdlred
Security or Exercise OlonthDayTeari Paw Code (Mal,. Derivative PionthOreTearl Underfed. Security derivative Fern: BelligiCtO
Omar. 3) Price 01 Ileanthearyeao 4) Securities Derivative Security (Insir.5) Securities Direct (DI Donegan
Derivative Amerind (Inter. 3 and 4) itentlkialey or indirect limo. 4)
Security A) r (II tine. 4)
IDisposed Follong
Crowedwi
M( I Repartee
(u s.3.4 ffOltlifliOn
wide) Co (Instr. 4)
Amount
or
Number
Debt Expiration of
Co* V 64 (D) boilable Date The Shane
CAP tions M
e 1' i II/2102801 65.455 II/30/2007 II/30/2007 Cwgn" 65 468 Ii) 0
(902) it) Stack '
Explanation of Responses:
I. Sealemem of CAP Lent and dunbution of eorumon stock to Renegues Person panuam to CAP PLA. exempt under Rule I ilh.3
2 This type of ekrili,111VC sr way typicallydon act lure • CORIPC1,4011 or eXCIVOC pine
Remarks:
Id Molinaro Jr. Samuel L. 12/27/2007
Vegnature el Reporting Person Dale
Fkrinder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned dicta/ or indirectly.
• 8 the form is lied by more than one reportng person. see Inslruclicn 4 IbXvi.
" Intentional rrasstalerneres or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Volabons See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form. on: of which must be manually signed. 11 space is insufficient see Instruction 61r procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of Information contained In this ferns are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid 01IS Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000137/xs1F345X02Jmol... 12/16/2008
EFTA00317026
SEC FORM 4 Page 1 of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 314 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washington. D.C. 20549
081BNtambev 32350207
Eapi February 26.
Cheek Ibis toe V no longer subject to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Section IS. Form 4or Form5
otrigaiions may continue. See
IAS/coon lib) Filed pursuant le Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. SWIM 17(a) of the Pubic Utitty
Bomar.," average burden
Ivens per
"opens. 0.5
Holding Company MI ol 1935 or Swoon 30(h) el me Investment Company Act el 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporling Person. 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check all aeplicabie)
MOLINARO SAMUEL L JR area*, 10% Owner
1 BSC ]
Officer (give title Other (speedy
X below)
below)
0-os0 (First) (Middle)
3. Dare of Earliest Transaction (PlorOutrayNeag EVP/CFO/COO
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 01/09/2008
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. V Amendment. Date of Original Filed (MonthiDayNear) 8. Irdvicbal or deinliGIOup Sling (Check Applcabie
Line)
(Skeet
X Form filedby One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
From fled by More man One Reporting
Person
lain (Slate) (Zpl
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed M. or Beneficially Owned
1. Title el Security ilnsir. 3) a Transaction 2A. Deemed 3. 4. Securities A ea red 1A) 5. Amount of 6 7. Nature
Dale Execution Date. Transaction or Disposed Cal ID limb. Securities Ownership or indirect
Ilitonthriey'Tese) Neel Cede (Instr. 3.4 and $) Beneficially From: Beneficial
IfAcethtUreTear) 8) Owned Direct ID) or Ownership
Feao I g Indirect (II Omar. al
IA) Reported (Iran 4)
Cade V Amount or Price Tracing-tents)
(0) gram. 3 and 41
Table 11- Derivative Securiti s Acquired. Disposed of or Beneficially Owned
(e.g.• puts. calls. warrants. options. cenveni le securities)
I. Title ol 2. 3. Transaction 3A. Deemed 4. S. 6. Dare Exercimbie nd 7. Title and tt. Pelee el 9. Number 10. 11. Nature
Derivative Conversion Dale Execution Dale. Transaction Magni Expiration Dale Amount of Dot/Mtn of ownersNp camas'
Security or Exercise teloninDacTeen It any Code Onstr. el (MoMbinay.Yeat) &monies Security detleatim Fenn: sonnies
(bob. 3) Perm of monuvoarr000 8) Dccl ears unsaytm (Uate. 5) demonic.' Direct ID) Ownership
Derivative seem Ries Derhiailve Security sonesaity or Indirect (Instr. ill
Security ACC., red (Inn. 3 and 4) Owned Monet 4)
IA) lat Fewness
Disposed Reported
ol ID Transaction
Prat 3. 4 :a) (Instr. 4)
and I
Amount
C.
Number
Dale Expiration ol
Cede V (A) (D) Exercisable Os TM* Slums
CAP Ulm Ai orwin°
(2 Ili 01109/2008 4.14 II/30/200T II/3110)07 448 SO 448 II
0021 12 CSlack
C20
AP Uniu Ai Common
(II 01/09/2008 3)2 II/30/2(08 1113021103 Stock 512 SO 73.1" I 1I
( 031 it 2
Ai
Uniu III 01/09i20011 12 376 II/300.009 il/311M)09 Comoc k
mon 376 SO 55.25t D
P41
(200
CA Si
CAPS:Mu Ai Common
Stock
(II 01/09/2008 397 11/302010 111302010 397 SO 58.359 D
(2110d) i2
CAP 1 Ai
Una/ III 01/09i2008 12 454 II/308201J 11(3&2011 CSnick
ommon 454 so 66.820 D
(2006
Emianation of Responses:
I Thu type of &mauve teeny iypicallydoes not have a convene* or exam.< put
2 CAP flub (pined ioRacceung Persods aspen/ las of le60811:used on Racal Year SSIN Na Raminge Adjustments putsuarn iothe Issuers Capitol ACCMItliblIOCI Plan los Senior Slanatang Dumas
CAP Plan). cermet under Rule ten-3.
Remarks:
/s/ MolinaroJr.. Samuel L. 01/09/2008
Signature of Reporting Person Date
Reminder: Report on a sparse line for each class of securities beneficially owned dire-My or in:Sealy.
• a the limn is fled by more man one reportng person. see Instruction 4 (b)(v).
Intentional misstatements or omissions el facts centime Federal Criminal Violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: File three copies of Ms Form. one of which mint be manually signed. If space is insufficient. see Instruclicm 6 [Or procedure
Persons who respond to the collection of information conlained in this form are not required to respond unless the toms displays a currently valid OMB Number.
hap://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700108000012/xs1F345X02/mol... 12/16/2008
EFTA00317027
-°8-cvNillreglicilintlieetRINESFAIP411VENINeEge 315 0itit4iPPRovAL
FORM 4 ase COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b). OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
CHWARTZ ALAN D BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] _x_Directot 10% Owner
(Last) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM1DD/YYYY) _ X _ Officer (give title below) Other (specify
below)
Co-PresJCo-COO
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 12/19/2005
C 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MM/DD/YYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
X _ Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (State) (Zip) Form filed by Mott than One Remitting Person
_
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I tile of Security 2. T ails. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities Acquired 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code (A) or Disposed of (D) Following Repotted Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (huir. 8) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date. if Instr. 3.4 and 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
or
(1) (Instr.
Code V Amount (D) Price 4)
12/19/2005 m II) 317266
Common Stock A SO 1233331.00 D
12119/2005 250000
Common Stock D D $116.22 983311.00 D
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible secunties)
I. Title of Derivate 2. 3. Trans. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. II. Nature
Security Conversion Date Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date, if (Instr. Acquired (A) (Instr. 3 and 4) (Instr. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative my 8) or Disposed Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security of (D) Owned Direct (D)
(Ins r. 3.4 Following or Indirect
and 5) Reported (I) (Instr.
Transaction 4)
Amount or
Date Expiration (s) (Instr. 4)
Number of
Exercisable Date
Code V (A) (D) Shares
, 12/19/2005 St 11/30/2005 11/30/2005 Common
CAP Units (2000) (-I 317266 317266.00 0.00 I)
al Stock
Explanation of Responses:
( I) Settlement of CAP Units and distribution of common stock to Reporting Person pursuant to CAP Plan; exempt under Rule 16b-3.
( 2) This type of derivative security typically does not have a conversion or exercise price
Reporting Owners
Relationships
Reporting Owner Name / Address
Directo 10% OwnerOfficer Other
SCHWARTZ ALAN D
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC
X Co-PresJCo-COO
383 MADISON AVENUE
EFTA00317028
'NEW YORK, NY fine 1:08-cv-102793tRWS Clocument 102 I Filed 02/27/09 Page 316 of 347
Signatures
/s/ Schwartz, Alan D. 12/20/2005
•• Signature of Reporting Person Date
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
•s Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00317029
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 317 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
washnson. O.C. 20549 OMB flufelber 32350287
Panes February 28.
Check P1s bar Ereloner euttect to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Seek. 16. Earn 4 a Forms
cbligitions may ageism. See
heUnctionIN. Filed pursuant to Section 18(a) of the Securbes Exchange Ad 011934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility
ESIOWOCI eying(' burden
tiOn per
rettlaefOrf 0.5
Hc4cing Company Ate el 1935 er Section 30(h) of the Imestment Company Ate 011940
1. Name and Adiress el Reporting Person• 2 Issuer Name and Ticker or Tradrg Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check at applicable)
SCHWARTZ ALAN D X Director 10% Oaner
I BSC I
onker (give iille
x below) Other (specify
Mat) (firs) (Middle) below)
3. Dale el Eat' Transaction (Mordh'Dayffear) Co-Pres/Co-COO
CIO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/22/2005
383 MADISON AVENUE
4 II Amendment. Dale of Original Filed (MordlattayoYear) 8. Individualor Jcifitroup Fling (Check Applicable
Line)
(Street)
X Farm Med by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 11) 1 7)
Form tiled by More than One Reporting
Person
(City) IStatel (Zip ,
Table I' Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Security (Inst. 3) 2 Transaction 2.4. Nand 3. 4. Societies Acquired (Al S. Amount of 8. 7. Velure
Date Extenitean DSc Transaction or Disposed Of (0)(1nslr. Securities Ownership of Indirect
IlAceithOwtleer) ITYry Code (Instr. 3.4 and 5) eerwricnity Form: Deed Benet'cot
(olootneav:Yeet) I) Owns (Dl a Owner/Mc
Folio 9 Indirect II) Omer. M
IA) Reported (Instr. 4)
Code V Amount or Price TnIniteellOn(11
(0) (los% 3 and 4)
Table II' privative Securities Acq ired. Disposed o or Beneficially Owned
(e 9.. puts, calls. warrants options. COirreflt be securities)
I. WM of 2. 3. Tronsoenon 3A. DAVIS A. S. Number 6. Dow Emocitotto and 7. TitM and Amount 8. Price of 9. Mater W. II. Name
Dalvellvo Conversion Dole Execution Dote. Tlennetbart of Expiration Date of Somali:es Dalvetivo ce Ormetstdp Wintered
Security or Exercise IlIcethOay'rearl Reny Cod* (Inne. Derivative ileceehtliarNearl Underhinil Security derivative Form: Beeellcio
tinter. 3) Price of (MonevDarTeet) M Securely* Derivative Security (Inn. 5) Securities Dna (D) Ownership
Derivative Acquired (Instr. 3s 4) Sentlicially or Wired [Instr. et
Security IA) Owned (II Owe. 4)
or
Disposed Following
0(2) Reported
Pose. 3 4 Transaction
and SI (1) (Instr. 4)
Amount
0
Menem
Dew Expiration of
Code V (A) ID) Rierelsoblo Dale Tglo Shares
CAP Vents A Common
Ii 11,11.'2I:r.., 83.643 I Ilex201U II/ON20111 83.644 3116.3 aiM-ti
(2(05) it • Stork
Esem Stud. Common
Option IR. 1,165 11,22,211W A 53.450 12.M2/2008 oinnoi5 Stock 53.650 So 53.63o
to Buy)
Explanation of Responses:
I. This type of densalad so; my typically dam ox have a comenion of exercise Nice
2. ['derail of copenheron and tiedil to Resonate Penwa's Account pas of 11/21031putsurat to the ImurisCepoal Accumulate:a Plan for Satire Managing Dena ICAP Pim). exempt under Rule 16h.
Remarks:
167 Schwartz, Alan D. 12/23/2005
" Signature el Reporting Person Dale
Rennider: Report on a separate Inc. tor each class ol securities beneficially owned d ectly or indinectly.
• If the term k filed by more than one reportng person. see Instruclicn 4 02)(4
Intentional misstatements or omissions ol fads constaute Federal Criminal Violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 780(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form. one of which must be inarually signed. II space is insufficient. see Iretruction 61a procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
hup://idea.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700105000125/xs1F345X02/sch38... 2/26/2009
EFTA00317030
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 0227:09 Page 318 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE OMB APPROVAL
COMMISSION OMBNornta: 32350287
Wm/trig:cm D C 20549 February 28,
Emotes: 3011
Check this box if 0010,19M lotted Esonated amarageburclan
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
0 lo section le. Form 4 or Form 5
°Maoism; may Cortina Soo
inktrUCliOn left
Filed pinuaM L036860(1 16(a) ol the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 17(a) of the Pubic Utility
Mom on.
response 0.5
Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Ad 01 1940
1. Name and Address Cl Repotting Person
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check ril apple
-able)
SCHWARTZ ALAN D X Director 10% Owner
I BSC I
X
Officer (give tide other (welly
(Last) (Fimg (kindle) below) below)
3. Date Cl Earliest Transaction (MoMNDayNear) Co-Pres/Co-COO
C/O BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/23/2005
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. It Amentraeni. Dale ol Original Filed (Monhtlay/Yeall 6. Individual or Joirstroup Filing (meek
(steel) Apostate Line)
X Form Red by One Reponing Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form Ned by Mote Then One Reposing
Person
(City) (Stale) IZpI
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. TNN of Security (Instr. 3) . Transaction 2A. Deemed 3. 4. Securities Acquired 5. Mnounl of 6. 7. Makin
Date Execution Dam. Transa non (Al or Cisposed DI ID) Securities Ownership of Indirect
(AcinavlinkMar) irony Cads (lane (MM. 3, 4 and 5) Beneficially Form Benernisi
(MenthernMar) 8) Owned Died (D) Ownership
F Mowing or indirect Mate. If
(A) Reported (9 (Inat'. 4)
Code V AmouM or Prim Transaction(*)
ID) (nset. 3 and 4)
Common Stock 12/2.1/2005 c V 15.000 I) s0 968.131 I)
Table II - Derivative Seeman Acquired. Disp sed ol. or Beneficially Owned
(e. .. puts, calls. warrants, options. c nvertlble se unities)
1. Title of 2 3. Transaction 3A. Deemed 4. 5. 8. Dale Exercisable and 7. Title end 8. Peke ol 9. Humber 10. 11. Nature
Derivative Conversion Date Execution Date. Transaction number Expiration Date Amount or Derivative or Ownership admired
Security or Exercise Moninflay'roan II any Code yam. of tUomhOciy,Year) Securities Security denvative Form Beneficial
(Una. 3) Priced (MOnthDsyYeer) 8) Derivative Underlying (Inslr. 5) Securities Mimi (D) Ownership
Derivative Sectrnies Derivabve Senelicially or Indirect (Instr. 4)
Secunty rug red Security Owned (Ti (instr. 4)
(A) a (Instr. 3 and 4) Following
Disposed Reported
of ll) Transaction
tInNi 3.4 (s) (Instr. 4)
and )
Amount
or
Number
One Eipincion or
r Cole V (A) (0) Exercisable Date Title Shares
Explanation os Responses:
Remarks:
/s/ Schwartz, Alan I). 01/03/2006
• • signature 01 Reporting Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class ol securities beneficially owned directly of indirectly.
II the loan is tiled by more man one reporting person. see Insiniclion 4 (b)(v).
" Intentional misslalements or omissions ol fads consthule Federal Criminal VitdabonS See 18 V.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: Fie twee copies ol this Form. one of which must be manually signed. II space is insufficient. seeInstruclion 6 lor procedure.
Persons who respond to the collectIon of information contained In this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
hup://idea.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700105000135/xs1F345X02/sch38... 2/26/2009
EFTA00317031
.98-cvNillegfATIVArieektillESFAINIMedkNegle 319 igittisqiwaovAL
FORM 4 ase COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(0 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person • 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
CHWARTZ ALAN D BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] _ x _ Director 1016 Owner
(Last) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MMA)DNYVY) _ X _ Officer (give title below) Other (specify
below)
Co-PresJCo-COO
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 1/9/2006
C., 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MWDDNYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
_ Form filed by One Repotting Person
(City) (State) (Zip) X Form filed by Mote than One Repotting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I.Title of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code Acquired (A) or Following Reported Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (Instr. 8) Disposed of (D) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date, if (Instr. 3.4 and 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
(I) (Instr.
or
Code V Amount (D) Price 4)
( 'fflo mon Stock 1/912006 G V 15000 D $0 953331.00 I)
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially (hined ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options convertible secunties)
I. Tide of Derivate 2. 3. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable 7. Tide and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. 11. Nana,:
Security Conversion Trans. Deemed Trans. Derivative and Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Date Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (hum 8) Acquired (A) or (Instr. 3 and 4) (lnstr. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any Disposed of (D) Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security Owned Direct (D)
(Instr. 3.4 and Following or Indirect
5) Repotted (I) (Instr.
Transaction 4)
Date Expiration Title Amount or Number of
(D) (s) (law. 4)
Code V (A) Exercisable Date Shales
Explanation of Responses:
Reporting Owners
Relationships
Reporting Owner Name / Address .
!Director 10% OwnerOfficer Othet
SCHWARTZ ALAN D
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.
X Co-Pres./Co-MO
383 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10179
Signatures
/s/ Schwartz, Alan D. 1/10/2006
Date
•• Signature of Repotting Person
EFTA00317032
Reminder: Report oc#*alatigia9UN1241§ectWaggiltilliFowrEgtaganaeck?ge 320 of 347
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
▪ Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See I8 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00317033
FORM 4c'se O8-"IggiArlijWK111 4alieektNESFAISSI21
COMMISSION
(e-eifiRNeNe 321 604WPPRovAl-
OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person • 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
CHWARTZ ALAN D BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] _ x _ Director 10% Owner
(Last) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MAUDDNYVY) _ X _ Officer (give title below) Other (specify
below)
Co-PresJCo-COO
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 2/8/2006
C., 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MWDD/YYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
(Slate)
_ X Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (Zip)
— Form filed by More than One Reporting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I.Title of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code Acquired (A) or Following Reported Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution Omit 8) Disposed of (D) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date, if (Instr. 3.4 an 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
(1) (Instr.
or
Code V Amount (D) Price 4)
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible secunties)
I. Tide of Derivate 2. 3. Trans. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. II. Nature
Security Conversion Date Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (Instr. 8) Acquired (A) or (Instr. 3 and 4) (Insu. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any Disposed of (D) Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security Owned Direct (D)
(law. 3.4 and Following or Indirect
5) Reported (I) (Imt.
Transaction 4)
Amount or
Date ;;.) (Iristr. 4 )
Expiration Tide Number of
Exercisable Date
Code V (A) (D) Shares
(II 2/8/2006 11/30/2005 11/3012005 Common
CAP Units (2000) A (21 20257 20257.00 SO 20257.00 D
Stock
2/8/2006 11/30/2006 11/30/2006 Common
CAP Units (2001) (II A (21 2620 2620.00 SO 43666.00 I)
Stock
2/8/2006 11/30/2007 11/30/2007 Common
CAP Units (20021 dr A (21 9091
Stock
9091.00 SO 151483.00 I)
2/8/2006 11/30/2008 111302008 Common
CAP Units (2003) (I; A (21 9126 Stock
9126.00 SO 152064.00 D
(II 2/8/2006 11/30/2009 11/30/2009 Common
CAP Units (2004) A at 5566 5566.00 SO 92744.00 D
Stock
Explanation of Responses:
( I) This type of derivative security typically does not have a conversion or exercise price
( 2) CAP Units credited to Reporting Person's account (as of 2/8/06) based on Fiscal Year 2005 Net Earnings Adjustments pursuant to the
Issuer's Capital Accumulation Plan for Senior Managing Directors (CAP Plan); exempt under Rule 16b-3.
Reporting Owners
Reporting Owner Name / Address
Relationships
I
EFTA00317034
Lase 1:oa-cvsge " tromivn pent tuz (AO d 02/27/09 Page 322 of 347
SCHWARTZ ALAN D
GO BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.
X Co-Pres./Co-COO
383 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10179
Signatures
/s/ Schwartz, Alan D. 2/9/2006
•• Signature of Reporting Person Date
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
* It Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00317035
.08-cvNillehl AilerygiookwiEsuftsekefik Negie 323 OigavRovAL
FORM 4 ase COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
I . Name and Address of Reporting Person • 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
SCHWARTZ ALAN D BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] _x_ Director 1016 Owner
(Last) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MM/DD/YYYY) _ X _ Officer (give title below) Other (specify
below)
Co-PresJCo-COO
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 2/23/2006
C., 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MM/DD/YYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
_ X Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (State) (Zip) Form filed by More than One Reporting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I Xitle of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities Acquired 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code (A) or Disposed of (D) Following Reported Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (lnstr. 8) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date. if (Instr. 3.4 and 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
(I) (Instr.
or
Code V Amount (D) Price 4)
2/23/2006
Common Stock M OP 20257 A SO 973588.00 D
2/23/2006
Common Stock S 6400 D 5735.08 967188.00 D
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)
I. Title of Derivate 2. 3. Trans. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. II. Nature
Security Conversion Date Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr.3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date, if (lnstr. Acquired (A) (hum 3 and 4) (Instr. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any 8) or Disposed of Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security (D) Owned Direct CD)
(Instr. 3.4 and Following or Indirect
5) Reported (I) %Ins°.
Transaction 4)
Amount or
Date Expiration (s) (Instr. 4I
Title Number of
Exercisable Date
Code V (A) (D) Shares
2./23/2006 M 11/30/2005 11/30/2005 Common
CAP Units (2000) III 20257 20257.00 S° 0.00 D
Stock
Explanation of Responses:
( 1) Settlement of CAP Units and distribution of common stock to Reporting Person pursuant to CAP Plan; exempt under Rule I 613-3.
( 2) This type of derivative security typically does not have a conversion or exercise price
Reporting Owners
Relationships
Reporting Owner Name / Address
Directo 10% OwnerOfficer Other
SCHWARTZ ALAN D
GO BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC
X I Co-Pres./Co-COO
383 MADISON AVENUE
EFTA00317036
NEW YORK, NY an* 1:08-cv102793I-RWS Clocument 102 I Filqd 02/27/09 Page 324 of 347
Signatures
/s/ Schwartz, Alan D. 2/24/2006
•• Signature of Repotting Person Date
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
•s Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00317037
.08-cvNiiitreglailegoyatetRigilEsFARligit2aR Neft9e 325 Okitql3PROVAL
FORM 4ctse COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
1. Name and Address of Reporting Person • 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
CHWARTZ ALAN D BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] _ x _ Director 10% Owner
(Last) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MWDDNYYY) _ X _ Officer (give title below) Other (specify
below)
Co-PresJCo-COO
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 3/27/2006
C. 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MM/DDNYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
X Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (Slate) (Zip) Form filed by Mom than One Reporting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I.Title of Security 2 Trans. 2A 3. Trans. 4. Securities 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code Acquired (A) or Following Reported Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (Instr. 8) Disposed of (D) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date, if (Instr. 3.4 and 5) Direct ID) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
or (I) lInstr.
Code V Amount (D) Price 4)
3127/2006
( Me mon St ock G V 13857 D $0 953331.00 D
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options convertible secunties)
I. Tide of Derivate 2. 3. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable 7. Tide and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number la II. Nature
Security Conversion Trans. Deemed Trans. Derivative and Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Date Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (lnstr. 8) Acquired (A) or (Instr. 3 and 4) 0nsu. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any Disposed of (D) Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security Owned Direct (D)
(Instr. 3.4 and Following or Indirect
5) Repotted (I) (lnstr.
Code IV (A) (D)
Date 'Expiration Title Amount or Number of
Exercisable Date Shafts
Transaction 4)
(s) (Instr. 4)
Explanation of Responses:
Reporting Owners
Relationships
Reporting Owner Name / Address .
pirector 10% OwnerOfficer Met
SCHWARTZ ALAN D
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.
X Co-Pres./Co-COO
383 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10179
Signatures
/s/ Schwartz, Alan D. 3/28/2006
Date
•• Signature of Reporting Person
EFTA00317038
Reminder: Report ocMaliggia9gNagnecaaMitillgRowrEggegWe li;pge 326 of 347
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
▪ Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the forrn displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00317039
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 327 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE OMB APPROVAL
COMMISSION OMBNumta: 32350287
Espies: February 2(7
3911
Check this bin if **longer Suttirol Estimated average burro,'
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
0 10 Seato le. Form 4 Of Form 5
°blossom may COMMAS Soo
InStruclion 198.
Flied purSuant to Secton 16(a) Of Ihe SecurilleS Exchange Act Of 1934. seC6On 17(a) of the Pubic Utility
hour. per
response 0.5
Holding Company Act Of 1635 or SeCliOn 30(h) Of the Investment Company Ad 01 1940
. 2. Issuer Name and Ticker Or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship Ol ReportingPerSCA(S)I0 Issuer
1. Name and Ackliess Cl Repotting Perron
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Cheek al approlble)
SCHWARTZ ALAN D X Deector 10% Owner
I BSC I
Otiber (give tide Other (specify
X below) bekm)
(LaSt) (FirS1) (hitildle)
3. moo' EadleSI Transaction (PilOnINDayNear) Co-Pres/Co-COO
C/O BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 10/27/2006
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. II AnienctIlent Dale Ol Original Filed (AMIlhiGayrYear) 6. indbiclual or JOIntiGroup Filing (check
(Street)
eppicabie Line)
NEW YORK NY 10179 X Form Ned by One Reporting Person
Form Ned by Mote lhan One Reporting
Perron
(City) (Slate) 147)
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
1.78N 01Security (USU. 3) 2. Transaction 2A- Deemed 3. 4. Securities Acquired S. Amounl or 6. 7. tenure
Dale Execution Data. Transaction (Alm Disposed 01(D) Securities Ownership oi Indirect
(MonthiCiernYeat) Irony Code noir. (Instr. 3, 4 and 5) Beneficially Font,: limbic:0i
RronlheriyAbal) 8) Owned Dsecl (D) Ownership
F II 0 or indirect tinstr. 4)
(A) Prowled (ti (Ina°. 4)
Cod* V Amami or Price Transaction(*)
ID) tinstr.3 and 4)
Common Stock 10/27/2006 G V 655 D s0 952.676 D
Common Stock 10/30/2006 0 V 20.000 D s0 932.676 I)
Table II - Derivative Secu itie Acqu'red. Disposed Of. Or Beneficially Owned
(e. .. puts. calls. warrants. options. c nvertible securities)
1. Title of 2. 3. Transaction 3A. Deemed 4. S. 8. Date Exec:citable and 7. Tine end 8. Pike Of 9. Relabel 10. 11. Nature
Derivative Conversion Dare Execution DAL Transaction Humber Expiration Dale Amount or Derivative or Ownership al Indirect
Security or Exercise bilanthiDanear) deny Code paw. of OromhDayNear) Securities Security derivative Form: Beneficial
(Inor. 3) Priced (Mon/h.DatYeat) 8) Derivative Undelblro (Ino.. 5) Securities 1:99.1NO OunwirsAIP
Derivative Sectskies Derivative Beneticiaity or indirect Mile 4)
Security Acq red Security Owned DI (Instr. 4)
IA) or (Into. 3 and 4) RAMAN)
Disposed Repealed
of ID Transaction
tinstr. 3.4 tin (Instr. 4)
and 5)
Amcnnl
or
Number
Dale Expiration or
Code V (A) (D) Exercisable Date Trot Shale*
Explanation of Responses:
Remarks:
/s/ Schwartz. Alan D. 10/31/2006
•• Signature of Repelling Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a separale line be nth class DI SeCroillieS bane(billy owned direCtN or indiretlly.
' If II* lorm Is hied by more than one reporting person. see Instruction 4 (b)(v).
" Intentional miSbalementS or OmbSian 01lads iroentitule Federal Criminal %wagons See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: Fte three copies &this Fortin. One Of which musl be manually signed. II Space Is Mufficient. see Instruclicn 6 lOr procedure.
Persons who respond to the colleted) Of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currenlly valid OMB Number.
hup://idea.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700106000106/xs1F345X02/sch44... 2/26/2009
EFTA00317040
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27709 Page 328 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
washnson. O.C. 20549 CUB Humber 32350287
February 28.
Exerts
Pied Pis bar tirolonger witted to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Settee 18. Fame a Fenn 5
abliggions may acclaime. Se
habudiant(e). Filed pursuant to Section 18(a) of the Securbes Exchange Ad ol 1934, Seden 17(al of the Public Utility
Esinsatod average burden
tans per
mesons.
0.5
Raking Company Ad of 1935 or Soden 30(h) of the Imestrnent Company Ad e11940
2 Issuer Name and Ticker or Tradrg Symbel 5. Relalicnshp ol Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
1. Name and oddness 01Reporting Persen'
all applicable)
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check
SCHWARTZ ALAN D X Director 10% Orme,
I BSC I
Cheer (give lille Other (specify
X
below) below)
Mat) (lirS1) (Middle)
1 Dale ci Edges] Transaction (Mordh'Dayffear) Co-PrcsJCo-COO
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/ 18/2006
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. I( Amendment. Dale of Original Filed (NlortlattawYear) 8. Individualor Jenttroup Fling (Check Applicable
Line)
(Skeet)
luro X Farm filed by One Reporling Person
NEW YORK NY
Font. filed by More than One Reporting
Person
(Cily) tSlatel IZipi
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3) . Transaction 2A. Deemed 3. 4. Securities Acquired IA) or 5. Amount el 4. 7. Nature
Date Pee:mien Date, Tnnsaction Diseased 01(DI (Instr. 3.4 Secmilles Ownenthip el Indirect
Month.0•7.Serall if any Cede lanalr. and 5/ Beneficially Form: Beowlicin
lificed.Osyntearl 4) Owned Direct (0) Owner/Mc
Folicaring or Indirect (Instr. II
(A) Reported (i) Scot 41
Cede V Amount or Nos Transact:els)
an Poeta and It
M
Common Stock 12/1812006 .I. 43.666 A SO 976.342 I)
Common Stock I 2/18/2(l06 5 21.833 I) 6164.72 954.509 I)
Table III 'Derivative Securities Acq fired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
(e.g.. puts, calls. warrants. options. convertible securities)
I. TRW el 2. 3. Transacnon 3/1Deemed A. 5. Humber 6. Date Es raise's* and 7. Tide and Amount 8. Prk• of 9. Number 10. I a Posse
Derivative Conversion Date Execution Dew. Transaction or Expiration Date of Seamless Derivative of Ownership of heir ecl
Security or Exercise DlonihDayNesrl irony Code (inn. Der nave (Mcsidh.Dayaearl Underarevil Security derivaiive Form Bent.icol
(Instr.3) lance el (dealvDaY'Fam) I) Securities Derivative Security (Mn. 51 Securities Creel (D) Connecta p
Derivative Ac wired (Instr. 3 and 4) litervelkialy or Indirect Onalf. Cl
Security IA) r Owned (Dtinsti. I)
Die Deed Following
or (D) Repanoe
OM r. 3. 4 Transaction
and 5) (5)Onstr. 4)
Amount
or
Number
Dale Ex Dale ad
Code V (A) (0) Ittercisable Date Title Saws
CAP Liens Al Common
rano0 12/18/21/06 IiI 45.666 I l/30/2036 II/JO/2036
Stock
43.666 to o
Explanation of Responses:
I Sot. ‘.• .u. od <bonhomie of common mock in Repots:is Person pricam to CAP Pba. exempt under Rule 16b.3.
2 Tt... • i so; my typically dius sat hoc a COarebinlinteXelill3C pine
Remarks:
is/ Schwan/. Alan D. 12/192(06
" Signature ci Reporting Person Dale
Reminds.: Report on a separate Inc lot each class al securities benelicially coned ci ecorr or indirectly.
• lithe Sam rs tiled by more than one reponeig person. see Instruclion 4 (b)(v).
" Intentional misstatements or omissions ol facts constitute Federal Ginn& Violation See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form. one ol wlich must be manually signed. 11 space is insulficienl. see lnstruclion 61a procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of Inkumalkm contained in this form are not required to respond unless the lorm displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700106000125/xs1F345X02Jsch... 10/29/2008
EFTA00317041
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 329 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washripn. D.C. 20549
OM Humber 32350287
Expires February 28.
Check Pis tier enslonger stead t0 STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
Sector ie. Form 4 or Fein 5
0 oblgitions may cordite. See
auctionIN. Filed pirsuanl to Section 16(a) of the Steadies Exchange Acl ol 1934. Section 17M) of the Public Utility
Estrnatoa average Waen
*ours per
resioreie 0.5
Holdng Company Ad of 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Investment Company Acl ol 1940
1. Name and Athletes el Repotting Parsed 2 Issuer Name and Ticker or Tradrg Symbol 5. Relationship el Reporting Remade) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check anappwatrie)
SCHWARTZ ALAN D X Oireclor 10% Dane,
I BSC 1
Mkt. (give lille Other (specify
X below) below)
Mat) (11r11) (Middle)
S. Dale of Earliest Transaction (MantDayNear) Co-Prcs/Co-000
CIO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/20/2006
383 MADISON AVENUE
0 II Amendment Dale of Original Filed (MorohtayNea0 E. IndMdual or Jae:Group Fling (Check Applicable
Line)
(Street)
NEW YORK NY 10179 X Fenn filed by One Repealing Person
Fern filed by More than One Reporting
Person
(Cily) iSla!el I2ipi
Table I • Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3) 2. Transaction 2A. Decried 1 4. enmities Acquired (Al 5. Amount of S. 7. rheum
Date Execution Date. Transaction or Disposed Of (0)(Inetr. Secualiim Ownership of Indirect
llicrehOarTear) dam Code (test. 1.4 and 5) thenetinally Form. Deed Bawlkik
(Bentivtiaylem) 41 Owned (Dior Ownership
Folk Ina 'Sited II) (kmar. ii
IA) Reported (Instr. 4)
Cede V Amount or Price Trameadion(s1
ID) (ewe. 3 and 4)
Table II • Derivative Securities Acq fired. Disposed ol. or Beneficially Owned
(e g.. puts. calls. warrants. options. convertible securities)
1. Tae of 2. 3. Transaction 3A. Deemed 4. S. Number 6. Delo Ex /Mob* and 7. Title and Amount 8. Price of 9. meter 10. it. Hamm
Denvellve Conversion Dote Execution One. renseclion of Expitellocr Date or Sectriacts Denvellve of ownership minder:et
Security or Exercise IllonthOsyTerin if any Code (Msir. Derivative (MeelhOey"Yerirl Underlying Security deelva0re Form: Berwriclal
Omar. 3) Price 01 (MenaltbayVesg fg Seventies Derivative Security lest. 51 Securities Wed (DI Ownership
Derivative Acquired Onstr.1end 4) eeneficially er Wired Ono 41
Security (A) or Cranrd ill Pasta)
Ohrocrird Fellowmg
NOD Amerind
lime. 3 4 Transaction
end 5) (s) (Inst. 4)
Amount
m
Mamba
Date Expiration of
Coda V IA) ID) Emreisama Date TM* shares
CAP Limb :Ii 10,'20..y. A
(2000
I Z, 04,769 II/30/201i I [W201I Comm.°
Stock 84.769 10
Eire goo.
,,,,,,as,m SIM ti i.:.Qii,'.7.r.re. A 33.847 12f2 (2009 12./S)/2016 Common"
Stock 33.847 to 33.04,
Explanation of Responses:
I Thu npe Jmrauresa my typkilly dots eat haw a coarcimon or exercue price
2. Darnel of ocepensmou.mi unlit to Rqameis Pence's Amount (as of larshvo possimm tome tunas Capital Accuroulamon Plan for Semnr Minions DurtcO (CAP Plan): me urban Rule
Remarks:
is/ Schwartz, Alan D. 12/21/2006
" Signature el Reporting Person Dale
Reminder: Reece] on a senora,* lire ter each class ol securities tanalicially conned drecty or indrectly.
• If the Corm o lied by more than one reporting person. see Indruclicn 4 (b)(v).
" Intentional rrasstalernerds or omissions ol fads osnsteute Federal Criminal Violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. alga).
Note: File three copies of this Form. one ol which must be manually signed. II space is insulficienl. see instruclion 6 la Procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
hup://www.see.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700106000149/xs1F345X02/sch... 10/30/2008
EFTA00317042
SEC FORM 4 Page 1 of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 330 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE Oh1B APPROVAL
COMMISSION OMB Numta: 32350287
WaOlingten. D C 20549 February 28,
Expros:
ten
Check this box if or3 longer Wheel Estimated ayorageburclan
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
0 lo Sear:41E Form 4 or FormS
cIaloaeord may avenue See
InktruClian ID)).
Filed pursuaM to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 17(a) of the Pubic Utility
haute ON
response
0.5
Holding Company Act 01 1915 or Section 30(h) Cl the kweislment Company Act 01 1940
• 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship ol ReportingPersons) to Issuer
1. Name and Address Cl Repotting Person
ill applicable)
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check
SCHWARTZ ALAN D X Meow to% Owner
I BSC I
Officer (give MN Olher (specify
X below) below)
(Last) (First) Ream
3. Date Cl Earliest Transaction (donavoaynear) Co-Pres./Co-COO
C/O BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/21/2006
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. If Amentrneni. Dale ol Original Filed (1.42n1hDayrYear) 8. Individual or JoirtGroup Filing (Check
Apple -able Line)
(Striae.)
NEW YORK NY 10179 X Form Med by One Waning Person
Form Med by Mote than One Reporting
Person
(City) (State) IZ9)
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
1.UM of Security gnat 3) 2. Transaction 24. Deemed 3. 4. Securities Acquired S. Amount of S. 7.1.filure
Dale Execution Date. Transaction (A) or Deposed Of (0) Secunties Ownership ot Indirect
(Monthetrellfili) irony Code intr. (Instr. 3.4 and 5) Beneficially Form: Beneficial
osonmosyvaso 8) Owned Direct (0) Ownership
F Hawing or Indirect gnat* in
(A) Reported (0 (Instr. 4)
Cod* V AmouM or Price Transaction(*)
ID) (Malt. 3 and 4)
Common Stock 12/21/2006 0 V 20.000 I) s0 934.509 D
Common Stock 12/21/2006 G V 1.815 I) s0 932.694 I)
Common Stock 12/21/20(6 6 V 1.210 I) s0 931.484 I)
Table II - Derivative Secu ilk Acquired. Disp sod ol. or Beneficially Owned
(e. .. puts. calls. warrants. options. convertible securities)
I. Title of 2, 3. Transaction 34. Deemed 4. 5. 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and S. Price ol 9. !lumber 10. II. Nature
Derivative Conversion Dare Execution One, Transaction Number Expiration Dale Amount of Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
Security or Exercise (librithDay.Year) If any Code (Instr. of Illonthearrear) Securities Security derivative Form: Beneficial
(Instr. 3) Price of (rorith,Darreor) 8) Derivative Underlying (Instr. 5) Secunties Deed (0) Ownership
Derivative Securities Derivative asnsaciany or Indirect (Instr. 4)
Security Acq red Security Owned (I) (Instr. 4)
IA) or Onsu. 3 and 4) Following
Disp red Reported
a ID Transaction
{Intl . 3.4 (s) (Instr. 4)
and 1
Amount
or
Number
Date Expiration of
Code V (A) (0) Exercisable Date 'rift Shorn
Explanation of Responses:
Remarks:
is/ Schwanz Alan D. 12122/2006
• • Signature of Reporting Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a sena:ale line for each class ol securities beneficialyowned directly or indirectly.
II the form is filed by more than one reporting person. see Instruction 4 (Into).
" Intentional miestalements or omissions ol rads CCOSIllule Federal Criminal Violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note; Fie three copies ol this Foml. one of which must be manually signed. II space is inufficient. see indwells:4 6 low procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of Information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently v d OMB Number.
http://www.see.gov/Arehives/edgar/data/777001/000077700106000159/xs1F345X02/sch... 10/30/2008
EFTA00317043
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 331 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
WasheigIon. D.C.28649
OM Hombre: 32350287
Expires February 28.
Deck /is bar il re longer rutted to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Settee le. Form 4 or Form
ctligitions may menus. See
Isbuelto Cited pursue:II to Sefton 18(a) of the Secunlies Exchange An of 1934, Section 17(a) el the Public Ulildy
EOM.= (woofs biotin
honor
mown. 0.5
Holdng Company Act of 1935 or Seaman 30th) of the Imestment Can-party Act of 1940
1. Name and Address ol Reflecting Person a Issuer Name and Ticker or Tradrg Symbol 5. Relalicnship el Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check all appkable)
SCHWARTZ ALAN D X Direclor 10% Orme,
I BSC I
Mica- (give lille Other (specify
X below)
(Fins) (Middle) below)
Man
3. Dale of Earned Transaction (Mordh:DawYear) Co-Pres/Co-COO
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 07/14f2007
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. II Arnendinerd. Dale of Original Filed (Mordlatery/Year) 6. Individual or Jointroup Fling (Check Applicable
Line)
(Street)
X Farm filed by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Fenn filed by More than One Reporting
Person
(Cily) (Stale) 'Zip'
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3) 2 transsclion 26. Deemed 3. 4. Tecmillee Acquired 1.41 S. Amount 0 6. 7. Nature
Dale Execution Oda Transaction or Disposed Of (0)(Instr. Securities Ownership of Indices.
Of mIlvDay(eer) if Ind Code (Mslr. 3.4 end 5) &mgidally Form: Oireel Benelicod
gao,,mganwe) 8/ Owned (DI Or Ovnersho
dello 9 Indirect (I) Omar. Ii
Id) Reported (Ina. 4)
Code V Amount of Oft, Tniniaction(M
ID) (belt. 3 and 4)
--..
Table II . er(vative Securities Acq fired. Disposed 0 or Beneficially Owned
(e 9.. puts. calls. warrants options. canned le securities)
1.114le of 2. 3. Trensadten 34. Doomed 4. S. Number 6. Dale Exorcised* end 7. Dee and Amount 8, Price of 9. IlleibOf 10. 11. Nam*
otrivanvo Conversion Dote Execution Dew. Tratosollon or °puma* Data or Soci.00m Dolvelivo of Osinotstilp of Indlrecl
Security or Exercise IllonihthyTear) deny Code (Msir. Derivalive DAmehOrylrearl Unclerlyin9 Security **rainy Form: Beaercir
Omar. 31 Price or (MondvDarTem) () Secumies Derivative Security (last'. 51 Securities Meet (D) Growth,
Derivative Acchired (lna. 3 and 4) Beneficially or beinel tb.Mr. It
Security IA) or Onneel (II find, . 4)
Dimond Following
01(D) Reported
(Instr. 1.4 Transaction
and 5) 10 (laid. 4)
Amount
a
(limber
Date Expiration a
Cede V (A) (D) lesercisable Deb Rea Wins
CAP ni
Un. A Common
(0.2:14(21)0. 2.934 I It30/2006 II/30/2004 s wk 2,934 So 2.9).1 1.
(2001) , ,
CAP limo A Common
III 02/I4/2607 10.129 II/JO/200T II/30/2007 10.179 50 i6i.u,„!
(2002) I ZS Stock
CAP limb A Common
III 0204/2007 10.212 II/JO/2008 II/JO/200S M.217 W 161.221
(2003) r2 • Stock
CAP Uri* A Common
Iii 02/I4/2007 6.232 Ilf30/2009 It/JO/2009 6.232 50 98.970
12x01 0.1 s &ea
CAP Vans A
IiI 02/I4/2007 IT s 5.620 i I/3072010 tido/20M Common 5.620 SO 89.204
(20051 Stock
Esplanatke of Responses:
I. ibis t7pc oh deny fine sn: my typically do:, natc aconsomme orCare:1W price
2. CAP Usti recliteJ In gerunds Nom% moo= las of murotused on Ptif al Year 2006 Nct Ening% Adjustments pursuant to the Issuer's Capitol Accumulapan Plan for Seams >Imams ()mom s
WAY Plan_ exempt under Rule ROT
Remarks:
AI Schwartz, Alan D. 02/15/2007
" Signature of Reporting Person Dale
Rennes.: Report on a separale Inc lie each class ol securities beneficially earned arced/ a indinadly.
• If the bon is lied by more than one reporteg person. see Instruclice A tb)(v).
" Inlenbonal rrnstalernerds or omissions ol fads oanstdde Federal Criminal Violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 780(a).
Note: File three codes of this Form. one ol which must be manually signed. 0 space is insulficient. see Instn7clion 6 Ice procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of inlormation contained In this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid 0110 Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000022/xs1F345X02/sch... 10/30/2008
EFTA00317044
SEC FORM 4 Page 1 of
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 332 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washington. D.C. 20549
Oln8Nnnoin 3235.0207
February 29.
Espial
Cheek this tor y rte longer subject te STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Section 18. Forma °, Form5
obloalions may continue ffice
Insexlion Itb). Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) ol the Securities Exchange Act el 1934. Section 17(a) of the Pubic Lenty
Eremitic average burden
hours pe.
menus,
0.5
Holding Company MI of 1935 or Section *h) ol me Investment Company Am ol 1940
2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reneging Personfs) to Issuer
I. Name and Address of Reporting Person.
applicable)
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check ad
SCHWARTZ ALAN D X Mellor 10% Diener
I BSC ]
Office, light title Other (speedy
X betow) below)
(Lam) (First) Wile)
3. Date of Earliest Transaction ffilonitutayNear)
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. CO-PrCSJCO-COO
03/22/2007
383 MADISON AVENUE
4.1 Amendment. Dale of Original Filed (MentleDayNearl 8. Individual or Johltroup Fling (Check Applicable
Line)
(Sinter)
NEW YORK NY 10179 X Fenn Sled by One Repaing Person
Form fled by More man One Reneging
Person
(City) (Stale) Rpl
Table I . Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed ol. or Beneficially Owned
1. Tkle of Security (Instr. 3) 2. Transaction 2s Deemed S. 4. Securities Acq Wed IN S. Amount of 11. 7. Nature
Dale ExecoliOn Dale, Transit lion C. Chiposed Of (0) (lost 3. Securities Ownership of Snared
ISIOMIttlayllearl if any Code (Instr. 4 and 0 Benericially Form Beneficial
(MontlsOewveerl I) Owned Direct (DI Owners,*
Following or Indirect time II
(A) Reported 0) (Instr.4)
Cafe V Arriowil or Price TransactiOnflq
0:11 Omar. 3 and 4)
M
Common Stock 03/22+2007 ''' 2.934 A 80 934A18 I)
Common Stock 03/2212007 S 1.5(X) D 8151.26 932.918 I)
Table N • Derivative Se uriti a Acq Ned. Dis used o . or Beneficially Owned
(e.g.. puts. ea s. warrant options. convertible securities)
1. Title ol 2. 3. Transaction 3A. Deemed 4. 5. Number 4. Cole Exercemble and 1.110e sad I. Price of 9. Number 19. 11. Nature
Derivative Conversion Date Execution Date. Transaction of Expiration Dee Amount of Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
Security or Exercise ill oninDaylbar) II any Code One'. Derivative (110n1h0e7.111,0) Securities Socwily derivative Fawn: Beneficial
(Instr. 3) Price of ildonihtsyVeari 11) Securities Undertyffig (Instr. 5) Securilles Direct lb) Ownership
(7047• 77" Acquired Derivative Seouray Benericially or Indeed limit. 41
Security (A) or (Inat'. 3 end 4) Owned (I) Own- 4)
Disposed
Of (0) Reported
rted
Prise 3.4 Deneenion
and $) (a)(Inetr. 4)
Amount
or
Number
Dale Expired:in of
Code V (A) (DI Exercisable Ogee Till* Shares
CAP Unita NI Common
121011 oV112007
lI i
2.934 I 120/2006 113012006
Siock
1.934 VP u.
Explanation of Responses:
I Scitirmoit 4 CAP loin nil drontomon of common 144a to Reponmg P non pursuing toCAPPlan. e in under Rule Iffis.3
2 The type of &mime e only hrocalb awn cam haven convection or twirl's. once
Remarks:
la Schwartz, Alan IX 0123+2007
" Signature.' Reporting Person Data
Reminder: Report on a separate line tar each elan of securities benericialy owned directly or inffirecdy.
• d the lean is lied by more man one reporting person. see Instruction 4 (b)(v).
Intentional misstatements or omissions ol facts consiiiuie Federal Criminal Violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: File three copies of the Form. one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient. see instracuicei 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of Information contained In this form are not required to respond unless the lam displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000050/xs1F345X02Jsch... 12/16/2008
EFTA00317045
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 333 of 347
SEC Palm 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ONS APPROVAL
Washington. O.C. 20549 (11.46 Parrlarr 32/6-40$7
Dunn February2A
20n
Owe the ear n no longer subject la STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
U Section 16 Fam • sr Form 5
cldeelow mkt ccubnue See
astrucbon 1(01 Filed pursuant to Section 1614) 0101e Sea/Nee Exchange Ad 011934. SeCtiOn Me) 01 the Pudic Wiley
fancied ammoe burden
roes per
milaanse OS
Holing Canpany Att 011935 or Section 30th) 01the Investment Company Ad 011940
1. Name and Address ol Reponing Person. 2. ISMS Name and Tickerer Trading Synod 5. Relakinshipol Reporting Person(sl to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check SI appicabb)
SCHWARTZ AI AN 12 ( ESC I
X Director tO% Oener
Officer (give tab Cater (speedy
X below) below)
iLaso Firth (Middle)
3. Date of Earbast Transaction (1AonthDaylYear President
C/O BEAR. STEARNS @ CO. INC. 12/21/2007
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. II Amendment. Date of Ongnal Filed thlonthOayNearl S. Indedual or Join9Group Fling (Check Applcable
(Stmen) Line)
X Form Med by One Reverting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form Mad by More than One Reporting
Parson
ICID) ISlate) RIP)
Table I . Non Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed ol. or Beneficially Owned
I. Title Of &Morley (Instr. 3) 2. Transacuce 2A. Maned 3. 4. Stearn*. AC aired (A) ot S. Amount of 6. 7. Haunt
Dale Execution Da Transaction Dirgosed 010))(Instr. 3.4 Securities OWnitiShig) 011nditad
(leaninOry,Tear) Many Code (Iuse. and 5) Bentlichlly Form. Direct Beneficial
(Morebtatyeer) e) Owned ID)or Owner...iv
F Wynne Indirect (I) pose. 4)
(A) Reported tins& 41
Code V Amount en Rica Transact:ems)
(0) Onfill. 3 and SI
Common Stock 12121/2007 •M
•) 161.662 A SO 1.093.580 D
Common Stock 12/21/2007 S 67.900 D 389.01 1.026.680 D
Table N Derivative Securities Aug Pea. DISpOSed 0 • or Beneficially Owned
(e g.. puts. calls. warrants options. conver de securities)
I. Nee 04 2. 3. TranSaCIIM IA. Onotold 4. 5. Numbs of 6. Data Exercisable and 7. Title and Amman & Pane of 9. HUMP( 10. 11.Nesure
Parodic* Conversion Data EXOCu0On Data. Trail...000n Deriontive Esplistion Date of Securities Corinth. of °enemata of lndkect
Socutity ot Exorcise OilorilnDayetor) early Code Onstr. Securities MOnt%Daytt40 Unclailyin0 Slants derivation Fait Bennelel
(MO. 3) Price of (MonlhDsyYsar) in Acquired la) Derivative Senall2 (I000. 5) Semmes Wiwi (to Ownership
Dervearne or Disposed (bsslr 3 and 4) Beneficially or Indirect Omer. 4)
Security of (Oldnistr. Craned (I) (Instr. 4)
3.4 and SI Folicneng
000010,3
Amoral TFOAS001100
or () (Instr. 4)
Oar Eyeshot, Number
Code V IA) (0) exercisable Da* lids ol Sham
CAP Uses NI CaStockren=
lint/2007 161.661 I //302007 1141°2007 161.662 50 0
(2002)
Explanation el Responses:
I. Salliellint i CAP Unns disintnition ot common Moil to Reptlizie a-rson pointed Co CAP P107 cui mitt Rule I6a4
1 Th.. type 01 dein 010: SO.WIly nryetliy Jim 034 hoc a corimsion or cxctau Moe
Remants:
/s/ Schwartz, Alan D. 12/21/2007
*" Signature ol Reporting Person Dale
Remnder. Report on a separate Ire for each class ol securtes tenelicoly owned drectly or indrectly.
• II the tom' is filed by more than ore repartng person. see insuudim 4 Ibliv).
" Intentional mastabarnents or omissions ol (acts constitute Federal Criminal Violatens See t8 U.S.C. 1001 and IS U.S.C. 7811(a).
Nate: File three copies ol this Form. one ol whch must be manually signed. If space is insufliceM. see Instruction S procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained In this form are not required to respond unless the form msplays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000139/xs1F345X02/sch... 12/16/2008
EFTA00317046
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 334 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washington. D.C. 20549
011BNumber' 32350207
February 29.
Check °Sebes /nolonger subject to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Section It Form 4 or Form5
OblgaliOnS may anfinue 511e
insmxdon Filed pursuant lo Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 01 1934. Section 17(a) of the Pubic Utitty
Emmet.," average burden
how's pe'
response 0.5
Holding Company Ael of 1935 or Section 30(h) ol the 'meson:int Company Ad ol 1940
1. Marna and Address of Reporting Parsed 2.1ssuer Name and Ticket or Trading Synibd 5. Relationship of Reporong Persons) to issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Chedt all al:431C3b(o)
SCHWARTZ ALAN D X Dreary 10% Owner
I BSC ]
— Officer (give lige Other (Wetly
X below)
(teal (Ertl) (Middle)
3.130e of Earliest Transaction (MoNhiDayNeag CEO. President
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 01/)9/2008
383 MADISON AVENUE
0.1Amendment. Dale of Original Filed (Mornh'DaylYear) 6. 'Saida' or Fding (Check Applicable
Line)
15Seeq
X Form filed by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form fled by More man One Reporting
Pelson
(City) (Slate) Rpl
Table I • Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed ol. or Beneficially Owned
1. 71110 of Security (Instr. 3) 2 Transaction 24. Deemed 3. 4. Securities A ;pi red (A) 5. Amount of 4- 7. Nature
Dale Execution Date. Transaction or [disposed Ca 10 (frisk. Securities Ownership of Indirect
(MonlhEraylew) it any Code (Instr. 3.4 and a) Benelicially Form: Beneficial
(aIrMUTDirtYtar) 8) Owned Direct ID) or Ormond,/
Feb i g indlreci (0 limn 41
(A) Reported (lost. 4)
Code V Amount Or Price Trans's-fonts)
(D) Proltr. 3 and 4)
Table II • Derivative Se uriti s Acquired. Disp sed of or Beneficially Owned
(e g.. puts. cal s. warrant . options. convert' le securities)
1. Title ol 2. 3. Transaction SA. Deemed 4. S. Number 6. Dale exereembie and 7. Tide and S. Price of 9. Number 10. It . Nature
oetwative Conversion Date Execution Dale. Transaction of Expration Dale Amount of Derivative of Ownership or indirect
Security or Exercise Month:Day:Year) if any Code (Instr. Derivative (MomhDayaleat) Securities Smoky derivative Form: Beneficial
(Instr. 3) Price of INonthDay:Yearl B) Securities Underlying (Instr. 9) &Kunnas Direct ID) Ownership
Derivative Acquired Derivative Security Beneficially or indirect (Instr. 4(
Security (A) or (IOW. 3 and 4) Owned (I) (Instr. 4)
Disposed FosevAng
d(0) Reported
11mM. 3.4 Transaction
ends) BMInstr. 4)
Amount
et
Number
Dare Expiration 0
Cede V (4.1 (0) Exercisable Oats Title Shares
4..h' I ...... A
. I. 01/0922008 121 1.107 1'notion s umr-ow women 1.107 W 1.107 D
(A/00i Meek
C.A
2003
P Units A Common
iii 0140)/2(08 1.111
( 1 12 i 1160/2008 11/3110.006 Sionk I •III W 163.392 D
CAP Units A
(2034i
iii 01/09/2008 (2 i
677 I monoo9 11/3110.00? Common 677 sO 99.653 D
Meek
CAP Units A
(2.1105) 'I' 01/01/2008 iI i 611 11/30/2010 11/3W2010 e isfir" km. 611 SO 89.875 D
CAP Mug A
iii 0M0/2(0R (2 i
380 1inonim 1 11/3W2011 Common 580 SO 85.349 D
(1006) Slack
Explanation of Responses:
I. The. type of &ninny u wnv typically ancs am have a conwnaon or exams< ponce
2. CAP Cain Tedrierl ioRCIAVUO8 Anson% account (as of IANO6)bused on Fiscal Year 82107 Net Sammy. Admit:AAA pursuant io the Issuer's Capnal Aectwoulation Plan fa Senior Manapng Directors
('Al' Plum. cat rare undo 'cult 1M-3.
Remarks:
/s! Schwartz, Alan D. 01/09/2008
Signature el Reporting Person Data
Reminder. Report on a separate line her each class ot seeurilies henaficidly owned directly or indirectly.
• if the Icon is lied by more man one minoring person, see Instruction 4 (b)(v).
intertional misstatements or omissions of facts itonsiihne Federal Criminal Violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: File three copies of Ins Fain, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient. see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700108000014/xs1F345X02/sch... 12/16/2008
EFTA00317047
.08-cvNilleglickilitoareetRINESFANIMMINegle 335 igthiqppRovAL
FORM 4c'se COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b).
OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(0 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
I . Name and Address of Reporting Person 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
SPECTOR WARREN J BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] _ x _ Director 10%. Owner
(Last) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (MWDDNYYY) _ X _ Officer (give title below) Other (specify
below)
Co-PresJCo-COO
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 12/19/2005
C 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Check
(MM/DD/YYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
X Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (State) (Zip) Form filed by Mott than One Reporting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securi ies Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I title of Security 2. T Ws. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. SCOWAles Acquired 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code (A) or Disposed of (D) Following Repotted Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (hum 8) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date, if butt 3.4 and 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
(1) (Instr.
or
Code V Amount (D) Price 4)
12/19/2005 385592
Common Stock M it) A SO 616398.00 D
12/19/2005 [385592
Common Stock D D 571622 230806.00 D
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible secunties)
I. Title of Derivate 2. 3. Trans. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. II. Nature
Security Conversion Date Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr.3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (Instr. Acquired (A) (hum 3 and 4) (Instr. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any B) or Disposed Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security of (D) Owned Direct (D)
(Ins r. 3.4 Following or Indirect
and 5) Reported (I) (Ins°.
Transaction 4)
Amount or
Date Expiration (s)(Insu. 4)
Title Number of
Exercisable Date
Code V (A) (D) Shares
12119/2005 M 385592 11/30/2005 11/30/2005 Common
CAP Units (2000) (21 385592.00 0.00 I)
iii Stock
Explanation of Responses:
( 1) Settlement of CAP Units and distribution of common stock to Reporting Person pursuant to CAP Plan; exempt under Rule 16b-3.
( 2) This type of derivative security typically does not have a conversion or exercise price
Reporting Owners
Relationships
Reporting Owner Name / Address
Direct° 10% OwnerOfficer Other
SPECTOR WARREN J
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC
X I Co-Pres./Co-COO
383 MADISON AVENUE
EFTA00317048
INEW YORK, NY CAW :08-cv-f027931-RWS Elocument 102 I Filed 02/27/09 Page 336 of 347
1
Signatures
/s/ Spector, Warren J. 12/20/2005
Signature of Repotting Person Date
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
** Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See IS U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00317049
SEC FORM 4 Page I of
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 337 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washeglon. O.C. 20549
NUMbfir: 32350287
berm February 28.
Cheek Ins tere itnolonger Gutted to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Settee M. Foam 4 a Fern 5
otlgeons maw cordite Sep
frelnicien try. Filed pursuanl to Seaton 16(a) of the Securbes Exchange Ad el 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility
Filtrated average tnatIO0
hoursper
101POrO0 0.5
Maine Company Ad ol 1935 or Seamen 30(h) of the Imestment Company Ad el 1940
1. Name and Acklress M Reporting Person 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Tradrg Symbol 5. Reblionskp el Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check al applicable)
SPECTOR WARREN 1 X Director 10% Owner
I Esc!
CdIker (give fide Other (specify
X below)
(Middle) below)
MA (FirSI)
3. Dale el Earliest Transaction (Mordb1DavYear) Co-Pres-/Co-COO
00 BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/.2242005
383 MADISON AVENUE
0 I( Amendment Dale of Original Filed (Morthi•DayNear) 6. Individual or Jen0Group Fling (Check Applicable
Line)
(Sheet)
X Fenn likd by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Fain liled by More than One Reporting
Person
(Oily) ISlate) 148
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Security (lnstr. 3) 2. Transaction 2k Deemed 3. 4. Secwitlee Acquired (Al S. Amount of S. 7. Nature
Dale Execution Date. Transaction or Disposed Of (0)(1nstr. Securities Oanwrshe of belled
tucathi3ay.Tear) limy Code (Mite. 3.4 and 5) Ilerwlicialry Form: Direct Benerkoo
(Menthearyno 4) Owned an or Onnersh,p
Folio 9 Indirect 0) (Mau. 4)
(A) Reported (Inset 4)
Code Amount l e: leder Tninseclion(41
10) rinse. 3 and 4)
Table II - erivalive Securities Acq !red. Disposed o or Beneficially Owned
(e g.. puts. calls. warrants. options. converti le securities)
I. TIM of 2. 3. Trimmed:in 3A. Deemed I. 5. Number C. Dole EIMICISOIXO and 7. Tide and Amount 8, Price of 9.11mnbor it II. Nerve
Deelvellve Conversion Dale Eastman MM. Transaction et Expiration Dine or Seances Dalvative or Ownership of eaved
Security or Leads* (alonthtiayTeer) deny Code rinse. Derivative irscrentiam7emi Undemrimil Security derivative Form: Beeeelcbi
(Instr. 3) Price of (Menth,Day,Teen I) SmuMies Derivative Security (MeV. 5) Securities Direct (DI Ownerelne
Derivative Acquired (Instr. 3 and 4) Sennkially or bleared finstr. m
Security (A) or Owned 61 (Mau. 4)
Disposed Fonowing
of (D) Reported
(Instr. 3 4 Transaction
end 5) (4) (line. 4)
Amount
Or
/limber
Date Expiration of
cods V (A) ID) Era/VIM/MO Data TM* Shares
12005Limb
CAP A
i ni 12122,2cri., x3.644 W3012010 W3012010 Cbmia'
Stook n 83.644 SIM 3 si.c.4,
)
Erap swa. Common
Opuon ifti SII6 5 1if22MXIS A 53.850 12/12/2008 12/12/2015 Stied 53.650 SU 53.6in
loftily)
Explanation of Respoeses:
I This nry m dern.tirre se; my typical). don. WC haw a CallenuM or eXCIVOC Ii iec
2. Ddenal of orspernmen and credit to Rcpxues Poxes ACCOUN fur of 11/22,05; penman in the bum'sCigna ACCUMUUllOa Plan for Smut Alanapms Dual iCAPPlan exempt under Rule 166
Remarks:
Is! Spector, Warren J. I 2/23.12005
'• Signaiure o1Reporting Person Dale
Reminder: Reperl on a separate Inc ler each class of securibes beneficially owned d ecthr a indirectly.
• If the term is lied by more than one reportng person. see Instruction 4 (0)(v).
" Intenbonal inisstaiernerss or omissions el fads consteute Federal Criminal Volations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 780(a).
Note: File three copies at this Form. one ol wlich must be manually signed. II space is insufficient. see Iretruction 6 tor procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
hup://idea.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700105000129/xs1F345X02Jspe38... 2/26/2009
EFTA00317050
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 338 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE OMB APPROVAL
COMMISSION Oft/INumbee: 3235-0287
Expo: Fabruary 28,
20m
Check this box if no lamer ....Neel Estimated dotage burden
lo Seoul le. Form 4 or Feral 5 STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
0 obloalorts may coronae Soo
instruclien
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securilies Exchange Act of 1934. Seclon 17(a) of the Pubic Utility
hours per
response 0.5
Bolding Ccomany Act of 1935 or Seelion 30(h) ol the Investment Company Ad 01 1940
2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship ol Reporting Persons) lo Issuer
1. Name and Address d Reporting Person•
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check al appkable)
SPECTOR WARREN I X Drector ID% Ownd
I BSC I
X
Officer (give lille other (specify
(Last) (RIM) (Middle) below) below)
3. Date Cl Earliest Transactiontmentamaynear) Co-Pres./Co-COO
C/O BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/23/2005
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. H Amentrneni. Dale ol Original Filed (Monlhtlay/YeaB 6. Individual or JointtGroup Filing (Caeca
(street) agates. Line)
X FOrM Ned by One Retailing Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form Ned by Mote Than One Reporting
Peron
(City) (State) tZO:
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
'knee el Security (Instr. 3) 2. Transeclion 211.0isenwd I a. Securities Acqueed 5. Saloum of 6. ?Jailor.
Date Exectaion Dale. Transaction (Ai or Disposed Of ID) Securities Ownership of Indirect
(MonlIviirriefear) if eny Code (Inna. (watt. 3.4 n05) Bendicisily Form: Beneficial
(MonthOerfod 6) Owned Direct (D) Ownership
F 'lowing or Indirect (Instr.II
(A) Repotted (I) (Insa. 4)
COOS V An1OUnil Of Price Transact:anis)
(0) (Instr. 3 and a)
Common Stock 12/23/2005 (1 V 150.000 D 80 80.806 I)
Table II - Derivative Securitie Acquired. Disposed ol. or Beneficially Owned
(e. .. puts, calls. warrants. options, convertible se unities)
I. Title of2. 3. Trandllon 3A. Deemed 4. S. 8. Dale Exercisable and 7. Tide and 8. Price ol 9. Number 10. 11. Nature
Derivative Conversion Date Execution Date. Transaction dumber Expo-dim Dale Amount of Derivative of Ownership el indirect
Security or Exercise tMenthearrear) d any Code Dna'. of Ilionthearlear) Securities Security derivative Form: Beneticial
(Iften. 3) Priced (aorith.Dayolear) 8) Derivative Underlying (InsIr. 5) Securities Died (D) Ownership
Derivative Soccdties Derivative Beneficially or Indirect (Instr. 4)
Secunty Acq red security Owned (II (Inst. 4)
IA) a (inso. 3 and II Following
Disposed Repotted
or ID Transaction
(ins . 3.4 (r) flnitr 4)
and )
AmOUOI
Of
Number
Dale Expiration of
Code V (A) (D) Exercisable Date True Shares
Explanation 01 Responses:
Remarks:
is/ Spector, Warren J. 01/03/2006
•• signature 01 Receding Person Dale
Reminder. Report on a separale line for each class ol securities beneficially armed directly or indirectly.
II the form is filed by more man one reporting person. see Instruction 4 (b)(v).
" Intentional misstalements or omissions ol lads consaule Federal Criminal Vidadons See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: FM three copies ol INs Form, one of which must be manually signed. II space is inufficient. see Instruclias 6 Tor procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://idea.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700105000133/xs1F345X02Jspe38... 2/26/2009
EFTA00317051
FORM itse 1 .08-cvNifftillffliiitogifirieeitINESFAINIA211aaNatge 339004147ppRovAL
COMMISSION OMB Number: 3235.0287
Expires: January 31, 2008
Check this box if no Washington, D.C. 20549 Estimated average burden
onger subject to Section 16
hours per response... 0.5
Form 4 or Form 5
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
obligations may continue.
See Instruction 1(b). OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Section 17(a) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(f) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
I. Name and Address of Reporting Person • 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
SPECTOR WARREN .J BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES
INC [ BSC ] _ x _ Director 1016 Owner
(Lau) (First) (Middle) 3. Date of Earliest Transaction (8181/DDNYVY) _ X _ Officer (give title below) Other (specify
below)
Co-PresJCo-000
C/O BEAR, STEARNS & CO. 2/8/2006
C., 383 MADISON AVENUE
(Street) 4. If Amendment, Date Original Filed 6. Individual or Joint/Group Filing (Cheek
(MM/DD/YYYY) Applicable Line)
EW YORK, NY 10179
_ X Form filed by One Reporting Person
(City) (State) (Zip)
— Form filed by More than One Reporting Person
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired, Disposed of, or Beneficially Owned
I.Title of Security 2. Trans. 2A. 3. Trans. 4. Securities 5. Amount of Securities Beneficially Owned 6. 7. Nature
(Instr. 3) Date Deemed Code Acquired (A) or Following Reported Transaction(s) Ownership of Indirect
Execution (Instr. 8) Disposed of (D) (Instr. 3 and 4) Form: Beneficial
Date, if (Instr. 3,4 an 5) Direct (D) Ownership
any or Indirect (Instr. 4)
(A)
(I1 (Instr.
or
4)
Code V Amount (D) Price
Table II - Derivative Securities Beneficially ()m ned ( e.g. , puts, calls, warrants, options, convertible secunties)
I. Tide of Derivate 2. 3. Trans. 3A. 4. 5. Number of 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title and Amount of 8. Price of 9. Number 10. 11. Nature
Security Conversion Date Deemed Trans. Derivative Expiration Date Securities Underlying Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
(Instr. 3) or Exercise Execution Code Securities Derivative Security Security derivative Form of Beneficial
Price of Date. if (Instr. 8) Acquired (A) or (Instr. 3 and 4) (Instr. 5) Securities Derivative Ownership
Derivative any Disposed of (D) Beneficially Security: (Instr. 4)
Security Owned Direct (D)
(lasts. 3.4 and Following or Indirect
5) Reported (I) (Instr.
Transaction 4)
Amount or
Date i»(Irtstr. 4)
Expiration Title Number of
Exercisable Date
Code V (A) (D) Shares
2/8/2006 11/3012005 11/3012005 Common
CAP Units (2000) (11 A (21 24620 24620.00 SO 24620.00 D
Stock
2/8/2006 11/30/2006 11/30/2006 Common
CAP Units (2001) A (21 2646 2646.00 SO 44096.01) D
Stock
2/8/2006 11/30/2007 11/30/2007 Common
CAP Units (2002) III A (21 9145 9145.00 SO 152374.00 D
Stock
2n02006 11/3012008 11/34W2008 Common
CAP Units (2003) A (21 9162 9162.00 50 152651.00 I)
Stock
2/8/2006 11/30/2009 11/30/2009 Common
CAP Units (2004) A (21 SS88 Stock
554(6.00 SO 93081.00 1)
Explanation of Responses:
( I) This type of derivative security typically does not have a conversion or exercise price
( 2) CAP Units credited to Reporting Person's account (as of 2/8/06) based on Fiscal Year 2005 Net Earnings Adjustments pursuant to the
Issuer's Capital Accumulation Plan for Senior Managing Directors (CAP Plan); exempt under Rule 16b-3.
Reporting Owners
I
Reporting Owner Name / Address
Relationships
I
EFTA00317052
uase 1:ua-cv-ityilabwroixnmegmaient luz (AO d 02/27/09 Page 340 of 347
SPECTOR WARREN J
GO BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.
X Co-Pres./Co-COO
383 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10179
Signatures
/s/ Spector, Warren J. 2/9/2006
Date
•• Signature of Repotting Person
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
• If the form is filed by more than one reporting person, see Instruction 4(b)(v).
Sig Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations. See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient, see Instruction 6 for procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
EFTA00317053
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 341 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE OMB APPROVAL
COMMISSION OtABNumba: 3235-0287
awes: February 28.
3011
Cheek this box if no iongrer SutteCI Esbeated average budan
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
0 10 Seca:418 Form 4 Of Fenn 5
obloatiord may Carona Sr.
Int.trUCliOn
riled purSuant to SOMA 16(a) of the SeCurilleS Exchange Awl Of 1934. Section 17(a) of the Pude Way
Won% per
response 0.5
Holding Company Ac Of 1915 or Section 30(h) Of the blveStMent Company Ad of 1940
2. Issuer Name and Tided Or Trading Symbol 5. Relidesistilp DI RepellingPersons) to Issuer
I. Name and Address d Repanting Person•
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check Al applicable)
SPECTOR WARREN I X Deector 10% Owner
I BSC I
Officer (give die 011IN (specify
X below) below)
(Lad) (Find) Riddle)
3. Date Cl Earnest TranSaCbOn (MOnINDayNear) Co-Pres/Co-COO
C/0 BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/04/2006
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. II Amentritent Dale DI Original Filed (MOrdbiDay/Year) B. IndNidual or JOIntitIOUB Filing (cheek
Appteenie Line)
(Street)
X Form Ned by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form Ned by Mde than One Reporting
Person
(City) (State) ap)
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. Or Beneficially Owned
1. Mlle of Security (Instr. 3) . Transaction 2A. Deemed 3. 4. Securities Acquired S. Amount of 6. 7. Malin.
Ode Execution Date. Transaction (A) or Disposed Of (D) Securities Ownership of Interdi
(McoUvDrylrear) Ifany Code (Instr. (Instr. 3, 4 and 5) Beneficially Form: eeneScisi
(IFenth'Dtvelliad 8) Owned Cared (D) Ownership
F Hawing or indirect Mau. 4)
(A) Repelled (II finals 4)
Cods V Amount or Moo Transaction(*)
019 (Instr. 3 and 4)
Common Stock 12/04/2006 c V 36 D sO 80370 IT
Table II - Derivative Securitle Acquired. Disp sad of. or Be °Boldly Owned
(e. .. puts. calls, warrants, options. c avertible se unities)
1. Tile of 2. 3. Transaction 3A. Deemed 4. S. 6. Dime Exercisable and 7. Title and 8. Peke of 9. Number 10. It. Nature
Derivative Conversion Date Execution Date. Transaction Number Expiration Dale Amount of Derivative of Ownership of Indirect
Security or Exercise (MonifiDaffitar) if any Code PAW. ot (MomhDayNear) Securities Security derivative Form: Beneficial
(Iften. 3) Priced (MontiaDayoneer) 8) Derivative Underlying (Inso. 5) Securities Direct (D) Ownership
Derivative Seed/ties Derivative 8enetwouy or indirect (Instr.4)
Security Acq red Security Owned fg finds 4)
(A) or (Instr. 3 and I) Following
Disposed Reported
ot ID Transact on
(ins . 3.4 (8) (Instr. 4)
and )
Amami
or
Number
Dale Ezpirstion of
Code V (A) (D) Exercisable Date Title Shares
Explanation al Reapailitain
/s pector, Warren 1. 12/05/2006
signalise 01 Reporting Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a separale line It( eadl class 01 securities beneficially Owned orally or indiready.
• If the norm is filed by more man one reporting person. see IndrudiOn 4 (b)(v).
• Inlenlional misstatements or omissions of fads ccestilule Federal Criminal Violations See IS U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7BIfia).
Nofe: FM three copies of this Form. one of which must be manually signed. fl space is Wm?!bled. seeInstruction IS lot procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
hup://www.see.goviluthives/edgar/data/777001/000077700106000120/xs1F345X02Jspe... 10/29/2008
EFTA00317054
SEC FORM 4 Page 1 of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 342 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
washnson. O.C. 20549 ale Humber: 32350287
February 28.
Eaptes:
Cheek Iris basil re longs Gutted to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Salem 16. Form4 a Forms
aligaions may wave. See
hauler, 1(b). Filed pursuant to Section 18(a) of the Securbes Exchange Ad ol 1931, Sectian 17(a) of the Pubic Wily
Estimated average burden
hours per
mesons.
0.5
Holdng Company Adel 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Invesenent Company Ad el 1940
2 Issuer Name and Ticker or Tradng Symbol 5. Reldicnship of Reporting Parents)) to Issuer
1. Name and Aciiress ol Reporting Person
opal/sable)
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check all
SPECTOR WARREN 1 X Director 10% Owner
I BSC I
Miter (gam fide Other (specify
X
(kid) below) below)
Man (Middle)
3. Dale of Earliest Transaction (MardIVDayiYear) Co-Pms/Co-000
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/18/2006
383 MADISON AVENUE
4 II Amendment. Dale of Original Filed (Montfid)awYear) 6. Individuala JenrGroup Fling (Check Applicable
Line)
(Skeet)
X Fenn filed by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 1c)17, )
Form filed by More than One Reporting
Person
(Oily) I SIa t e I IL p i
Table I' Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed ol. or Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3) . Transaction Tell. Deemed t 4. Securities Acquired IA) or 5. Amount ol 4. 7. Nature
Dale Execution OS Traneaction Dieaseed Oi (DI (Mar. 3.4 Socrates Oimeeelap Modred
MonthOsyrreval It any Code lint emus) Beneficially Form: Benedicial
IMorithOOSTeed 5) Owned Direct (DI Owneesho
Following Or Mantel rimer. li
0.1 Reported (i) Oman 41
Cede V AnbeUM er Nee Transactional/
M) rinse.] and It
M
Common Stock 12/18/2006 . I. 44.096 A $0 124.866 I)
Common Stock 12/18/2006 o 44.(96 I) $164.68 80.770 D
Table II - Derivative Securities Acq fired. Disposed ol. or Beneficially Owned
(e.g.. puts. calls. warrants options. convertible securities)
1.11ele ot 2. 3. Transaction 3.A. Deemed 4 5. Humber G. Dile Exercisable and 7. TRW and Amount 8. Price et 9. Number W. II. Naive
Orreivalive Conversion Date Execution Dew. Transaction of Expirmion Date of Socalaes Privaiive el Ornerealp diorama
Security or Exercise glonthOsyNearl irony Cede Chair. Deemlive (McolhOay.Tearl OndartTO9 Security derivative Form: Benencir
Omar. 3) Once ol (Montheaylair) 00 SecuMies Derivative Security (inse. 5) Securities Demi (DI Owneesho
Deelvalive Acquired (Instr. 1 and 4) eantlicially or hulked (lmar.4i
Security IA) or Owned Ol (nelr. 4)
Disposed Following
et( ) reopened
Ins .1.4 Transaction
and 5) (s) (M.o. 4)
Amount
or
Number
Dale [Toreson of
Code V IA) 150 ilkal eisa514 Dot* lido Shares
CAP Units al
,! r II/18/2006 44M96 11/30/2006 NW/20M Common 44.096 to 0
i21)01) Stock
Explanation of Responses:
•' deenbution of common mock to Repented Person cursoam so CAP Plat. exempt under Rule 1663.
• ray typically does ex hare •COIOCRI011 Of CXCII:b! pear
Remarks:
1st Spector. Warren J. 12/19/2006
• • Svgnalure d Reporting Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a separate Inc lot each class of securities beneficially owned d ecta or indrecthr.
• If the form is Med by more than one reportng person. see Instrudion d Ba4v).
" Intentional rrosstaierneres or omissions ol facts con:Note Federal Crain& Violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. MSS.
Note: File three copies of this Form. one of wlich must be manually signed. 11 space is insufficieni. see Iratruction 611 procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information Contained In this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700106000137/xs1F345X02/spe... 10/30/2008
EFTA00317055
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 343 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
'A'azhngton. D.C. 20549
OMB Hunter: 32350287
Expects February 28.
Commk Pis Mu arolonger meted to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Settee 18. Form 4 a Fern 5
cbtkutions may wave See
eelnicito Filed mirsuanl to Section 16(a) of the Securdes Exchange Ad ol 1934. Seakin 17(a) of the Public Utility
FillThittia average buiden
twit per
mesons, 0.5
Holdng Company Ad of 1935 or Section 30th) of the Imestment Company Ad ol 1940
1. Name and Address ol Reflecting Person a Issuer Name and Ticker or Tradrg Symbol 5. Reblicnshp of Reporting Persons) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check all amicable)
SPECTOR WARREN 1 X Oireclor 10% Orme,
1 BSC 1
CdIker (give lille Other (specify
X below) below)
MR) MS) (Middle)
3. Dale of Earliest Transaction (Mordh'DayNear) Co-Pres/Co-COO
CFO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/20/2006
383 MADISON AVENUE
0 II Amendment. Dale of Onginal Filed (Mordhit)awYear) 8. Indnidual or Jenttroup Fling (Check Applicable
Line)
(Street)
X Fenn fikd by One Reporling Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form tiled by More than One Reporting
Person
(City) (Slate) PP/
Table I. NonDerivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3) 2. Transaction 2A. Chemed 3. 4. Decimal., Acquired (Al 5. Amount of 6. 7. Velure
Date Enecubon Date. Transaction or Disposed Of CO/ (loth. Sem/Hies Ormershp of Indirect
PloMbOrrNeen limy Code Onev. 3.4 and 5) Itemiticialry Form: Owen lierterichl
(donthbaylmr) 81 °amid (Dior Ownership
Fade i g Indirect (I) (Min. It
IA) Reponed (Inter. 4)
Dodo V Amount or Prior Transaclkn(st
ID) (MS. 3 and 4)
Table II • Derivative Securities Acq fired. Disposed o or Beneficially Owned
(e 9.. puts, calls, warrants options, cenverti le securities)
1. lltle of 2. 3. Transaction 3A. Doomed t 5. Number 6. Dale DeerCliable and 7. TIde and Amount 8. Price of 9. thentier 10. II. Nabs*
moven.* Conversion Dale Execution Dolt Transaction of anotanoo Dale ot &myrtles Oalvellso of onorson orintotoct
amen or Exercise (MonththyTeer) deny Codt (Instr. Derivative McmhOayNeart Undertrail DeCUrilit *denim Form: Reowlicial
Omar. 31 Price of (MenertiarNear) 44 Securities Derivative Security (Instr. 5) Securities Men (Ell Ownership
Derivative Anchored (Instr. 3 and 4/ Seneficher or Indired finstr. II
Security IA) or Owned (II (Mete)
Ohroosed Felhverna
0()) Asserted
(Instr. 3 4 Transaction
and 5) (s) (line. 4)
Amount
or
flbselbef
non expiration of
Coda V IA) ID) Exertliabla Data TM Maros
CAP Onus A Common ,.„.
nor I Z,20::, et. %Sall IVACO' I I UM:Oil 85.I.A/ I 70 85.1.01
(2006) Suck
Eire 4441. Common
orison le SIM t2 I Z,20::, et% A 33.938 12lb:22009 12lb:22016 33.938 to 33.93s 0
f., b4, , Stock
Explanation of Responses:
I Thu nee o 4en,rine so. on tyen411). du+ set haw a <alveolar] or citcleue piss
2, Ddmal of •ormensrtion mi credit to Reforms Pavans Account as n(12/201)6 pwsuanl mite Nees Capital Anumulxrnn Plan for Senior Mourns Duracts (CAP Plan): catnip under Rale lob.
Remarks:
Is/ Spector, Warren J. 12/21/2006
Sian/aura of Repotting Person Dale
Reminder: Reporl on a separate Inc lot each class of securities benelicially owned d ect/jr r indrectly.
• If the term is tiled by more than one reportng person. see Instruclice 4 (b)(v).
" Intentional rrisstolorneres or omissions ol fans constouto Federal Crirrinal Violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 780(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form. ore of alich must be rrandally signed. ff space is insufficient. see Irotruction 6 tor procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgaddata/777001/000077700106000153/xs1F345X02/spe... 10/30/2008
EFTA00317056
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 344 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
washnson. 0.C. 20549 OM Humber: 32350287
bores February 28.
Omsk Pis be. dnalonger gutted Oa STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Settee le. Ferni4 a Fein 5
oblgeions maw ceramic, See
Febvelto Filed purs.uanl to Section 18(a) of the Securbes Exchange Act el 1934, Section 17(a) of the Public Utility
EsInoa avatar/ bugle.,
mum per
ressoree 0.5
Holdng Company Ad el 1935 or Section 30(h) of the Imestment Company Ad el 1940
1. Name and Address at Reporting Person a Issuer Name and Ticker or Tradrg Symbol 5. Relaticeshe of Reporting Person(s) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check all applCable)
SPECTOR WARREN 1 X Director 10% Orme,
I BSC I
Other (specify
x Mktg (give fide
below) below)
Man (Thal) (Middle)
3. Dale el Earliest Transaction (Month:Dee/ea) Co-Pres/Co-C1K)
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 12/21/2006
383 MADISON AVENUE
0 I( Amendment Dale of Original Filed (Morthit)ayoYea) 6. Individual or JeintGroup Fling (Check Applicable
Line)
(Skoog
X Fenn filer) by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Fenn filed by More than One Reporting
Person
(City) (Slate) PP)
Table I' Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed el. or Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3) 2. Transaction 2A. Deemed 3. 4. Securities Acquired IA) or 5. Amount el 4. 7. Nature
Dale fee:when Date, Tanya:don DisoOsed Ol (Dl (Instr. 3.4 Snakier Ownerible of Milked
Moollvesy.Vearl if any Cede (MM. and 5) Beneficially Form: Ramekin
iisamhOsynf earl I) Owned Direct (DI Gangrene
Folkaidno or geared emir. it
(Al Reported (I) Onsir. 41
Cede V AremuM or Price Transadients)
051 (Infer. 3 and II
M
Common Stock 12/21/2006 . I. 69.197 A 538.75 149.967 I)
Common Stock 12/21/2006 s 69.197 D 5164.12 80.770 I)
Table II -Derivative Securities Acq (red. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
(e.g.. puts. calls. warrants options. convertible securities)
I. Tide of 2. 3. Transacoon 3/1. Deemed A S. Humber G. Date Exercisable and 7. Tide and Amount 8. Prke of 9. Humber to. I I. Naive
Chirlealive Conversion Date Execution Dew. Transaction of Expiration Date of Segal*, Ihrlealive 44 Garnering of Marna
Security or Exercise dlenlhOsyNear) deny Cede (lose. Deevative tMcnthOmNearl UndenTio9 Security derivative Form: Ramekin
Omar. 3) Pico of naenaneartra40 4/ Seaumita Derivative Snurkly (nsir.5) Securities Wert (DI Gangrene
Derivative *roared limn. 3 and 4) Beneficially or bullied gnaw It
Security OA) el Garnid Mend,. 4)
le mh Following
of (D) Reporied
tins r. 3.4 TraniatlIOA
and 5) 4) (Instr. 4)
Amount
or
Number
Dale ExpliellOn ea
cods r (A) 10) IMordeAlm° Date TIM Sham
Sled
Stott SI
Option 433-75 12f210.006 , 69.'97 01/10:2001 01/10/2010 Common 69.197 to i
l, Stab
albs In
B.
Explanation of Responses:
I. Exerc,seM Ertglaym Swab Oeuan iltmlu uy) yarned 01/101:0 and duenbution a common stock to Reprung Noon einem to Imucr*Sfix Awaid Plan exempt under Auk lab.,
Remarks:
Al Spector, Warren J. 12/212006
• • Signature a Reporting Person Dale
Remeider: Report on a separate Inc. ter cad, class of securities beneficially owned d ectly or indirectly.
' If the loon a tiled by more than one reportng person. see Instruction 4 (b)(v).
" Intentional nisstalernents or omissions of facts constaute Federal Criminal Violations Sae 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: File three copies of this Form. one of which must be manually signed. II space is insulficient see Instruction ti ler procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of Information contained In this Conn are not required to respond unless the Corm displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700106000163/xs1F345X02Jspe... 10/30/2008
EFTA00317057
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 345 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE OMB APPROVAL
COMMISSION 0103Nonta: 32350287
WaOlingten. D C 20549 Expo: February 28,
3011
Cheek this box if ro longer ttutteel Lomond average burden
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
0 lo Sown. Form 4 Of Foml 5
obtparicra may Corona Soo
Int.truClian
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Saturant Exchange Act ol 1934. Section 17(a) of the Public Utility
haunt per
response 0.5
Holding Company Act of 1935 or Sedan 30(h) of the kwerstrnent Company Ad of 1940
2. Issuer Name and Tidier or Tradiig Symbol 5. Relationship ol Reporting Persofis) to Issuer
1. Name and Address d Reporting Peflogn•
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check id applicable)
SPECTOR WARREN J X Director 10% Owner
i BSC I
Officer (give title Other (specify
X below) below)
(Last) (Firs) (Mildn)
3. Date of Earliest Transaction (donthmaynear) Co-Prey/Co-COO
C/O BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 01/11/2007
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. II Arnentraoll. Dale of Original Filed (1.1orilhtlay/Year) 8. Individual or JoirtGroup Filing (check
(Sired)
Appteabie Line)
NEW YORK NY 10179 X Form Med by One Reporting Person
Form Ned by More ihan One Reposing
Person
(City) (Slate) (Zp)
Table I - Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. TIM Of Seturity (Instr. 3) 2. Transaction 2A- Deemed 3. I.Securities Acquired S. Mnounl of 6. 7. Nature
Date Execution Date. Trans, non (Mot despond 011D) Securities Ownership of Indirect
(montteDerwYon) If any Code (Instr. (Instr. 3,4 and 5) Beneficially Form: Beneficial
Parrifs'Iley•Yeall 8) Owned Creel (0) Ownership
F II p or indirect finite in
(Ai Reported (8 (insp. 4)
Code V Mating or Price Transaction(*)
ID) (inst.] and 4)
Common Stock 01/11/2007 G V 5.900 D 30 74.870 1.)
Table II - Derivative Securitie Acquired. Disp sad of. or Beneficially Owned
(e. .. puts, calls. warrants, options. c avertible se unties)
I. Tone Of 2. 3. Treenclion 3A. Deemed 4. S. 6. Date Exercisable and 7. Title end 8. Price of 9. Number 10. 11. Nature
Derivative Conversion Date Execution Date. Transaction number Expiration Date Amount of Derivative of Ownership windows
Security or Exorcise tdonthfiay vow) d any Code (Instr. or illontheen,Veari Securities Secunty derivative Conn: Benericial
(knit. 3) Priced (lonth.Day,Yeet) 8) Derivative Underlying (Inlet. 5) Securities Dino (D) Ownership
Derivative Seco-riles Derivative Benelicially or Indirect (Instr. 4)
Security Acq red Security Owned (II (Instr. 4)
IA) a (insp. 3 and 4) Following
Disposed Reported
of to Transaction
One/ 3.4 (e) (Instr. 4)
and )
Amount
or
Number
Dale Ezpiretion of
r Cede V (A) (0) Exercisable Date Title Shires
Explanation al Responses:
Remarks:
is/ Spector, Warren J. 01/16/2007
•• Signature of Reporting Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securllies beneficially owned directly or indireelly.
'II the norm is hied by more man one repotting person. see Instruction 4 (b)(v).
" Intentional missialements or omissions ol fads conikule Foloal Criminal viciasons See 18 U.S.C. l001 and 15 U.S.C. 7811(a).
Note: Fie three copies of Ut Form. one of which musl be manually signed. II space is nsufficient. see Instruction 6 ler procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000006/xs1F345X02Jspe... 10/30/2008
EFTA00317058
SEC FORM 4 Page. I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 346 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
washnson. 0.C. 20649 O1113 32350287
February 28.
betas
Cluck Pis tsar Frolona witted to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Seaton). Fame*, FoonS
(tlgelons may (creme. See
Peewit.. ii). Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securbes Exchange Ad of 1934. Section 17tal of the Public Uglily
8007%000 avwage Widen
tiC07570i
repose
0.5
Hold ng Company Ad el 1935 er Seaman 30(h) of the Investment Company Ad of 1940
2 Issuer Name and Ticker or Tradrg Symbol 5. Reagens/lip of Reporting Personts) to Issuer
I. Name and Address ol Reflecting Persen'
&lapel:sable)
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check
SPECTOR WARREN 1 X Director 10% Orme,
I BSC ]
Other {specify
x Officer (give title
baba) below)
M-ast) (First) (Middle)
3. Dale of Earliest Transaction (Mordh:DawYear) Co-Press/Co-COO
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 02114/2007
383 MADISON AVENUE
4. II Amendment. Dale of Original Filed (MortlattawYear) G. Individual or Jenttroup Fling (Check Applicable
Line)
(Street)
X Fenn tiled by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form tiled by More than One Reporting
Person
(Oily) (Slate) lip'
Table I - Non-Derivative Scour lies Acquired, Disposed 01.er Beneficially Owned
1. Title of Security (Instr. 3) 2 Trensaction 24. Deemed 1 4. Sectelleo Acquired (Al S. Amount of 6. 7. Nature
Date Execution Dale. Trans/Mice or Disposed 01(0)(Instr. Securities Ornweshp of Indirect
terontnnly Tear) if any Code( me. 3.4 and 5) Seriencially Form: Deed Bevelkin
SorithDay, Yeat) 6) Owned ail or Paunch,
F Ito I g Indirect II) (mar. It
(A) Reported (Instr.4)
Code V Amount ce Prior Trunmelion(M
I0) (melt. 3 and 4)
Table II . privative Securities Acq ired. Disposed of. or Beneficially Owned
(e g.. puts, calls, warrants options. convertible securities)
1. llect of 2. 3. Transaction 3A. Pearled I. 5. Number 6. Dale ExercIsable and 7.7100 and Amount 0. Price of 9.1emben 10. 11. Neve
Declvellve Conversion Dale Execution Dalt TlatIlliellOil of Expiration Date or Scombes Dernause or Ownership of Imbed
Security or Exercise PlonthDayTearl irony Code (Instr. Derivalive (MonleDarfraell Undtii7009 Sevens dein:lief Form: Beeeficbi
Omar. 3) Price el IlMotheatYrog I) Sicucilin Derivative Security (lose. 5) Securities Seen (1)) Genesee
Overate, Acquired Sinn 3 and 4) Beneicialty or Indirect (nstr. 41
Security IA) or Onnitcl (0 Owe. g
Disposed Following
O(D) Reported
Mee 3 4 Transaction
end 51 (1)0.15144)
Amount
Or
Number
Data Expiration a
Code V (A) OD Scannable Dam Teo Shares
CAP limb A Common
tiZT4.)... I: a 2.962 11/30:2006 11/30:20IM sws 2062 So :se, " r.
(Moo
CAP Una* A Common
(201/2) n1 02/14,2Mn 12t 10.2 8 11/30/2007 11/30/2007 10.238 SO 162.612
Stock
CAP Om* A Common
II. 02/14,2iXn 10.238 11/30/2008 11/30/3008 10.258 80 os2.91./.
(2003) I2t Stock
CAP limis A Common
111 01/1442007 6.253 11/30/2009 11/30/2009 6 .--
755 50 99.14a
(2004) 12 ) Stock
CAP Uses A Common
III 02/14,2iXn 3.620 It/JO/2010 I It30/2010 5.620 SO 89.21
120051
Stock
•it
Explanation of Respesses:
This Inv *Or alas so: my typically 1.30:1 tare aconrealon or exenase putt
2. CAP Vett meted to Ronnie; Pence's account las of :mum based on Puf al Year 2006 Net Parsons: Adjustment, annum to the bones Capital Accumulation Plan ter Scum Mangles I/mem,
CAP Plier. exempt under Rule lob.1
Remarks:
Is) Spector Warren J. 02/15/2007
Signature Of Reporting Person Dale
Pontine.: Report on a separate Inc. ler each class el securities beneficially owned drectly or indirectly.
If the form is tiled by more than one reporting person. see Instruction C (b)(v).
" Intentional rrnstalerneres or omissions of fads oansttute Federal Crimnal Violations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 780(a).
Note: File three cocks of this Form. one of which must be manually signed. II space is in:Olden,. see Instruction 8 fa procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid O11O Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000026/xs1F345X02Jspe... 10/30/2008
EFTA00317059
SEC FORM 4 Page I of I
Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 347 of 347
SEC Form 4
FORM 4 UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OMB APPROVAL
Washington. D.C. 20549
Ol.18Nwnow 3235.0207
Ecpros:
February 28.
Check this box V re longer subject to STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 2011
0 Section It Form 4 or Form6
aerations may continue. See
Insinxion lib) Filed pursuant le Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Ad 01 1934. Section 17(a) of the Pubic Unity
Esamaloci average Madge
hews ph
reopen* 0.5
Holding Company Ad of 1935 a Sedan 30(h) el me Investment Company Act el 1940
t. Name and Address of Reporting Person' 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading Symbol 5. Relationship of Repotting Persona) to Issuer
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC (Check all aoplicabb)
SPECTOR WARREN J X Metter 10% Corner
1 BSC ]
- X
°Meer (give title Other Weeny
(teal (Fast) (Middle) below) below)
3. Dale of Earliest Transaction (MoratuDayNear) Co-Pres/Co-COO
CO BEAR. STEARNS & CO. INC. 03122/2007
383 MADISON AVENUE
4.8 Amendment. Date of Original Filed (MonINDaytTeari 8. Individual or Jokiltioup Filing (Check Applicabie
Line)
(Sawa)
X Dam Mee by One Reporting Person
NEW YORK NY 10179
Form nee by More than One Reporting
Person
(CM (Slate) (ZIA
Table I • Non-Derivative Securities Acquired. Di posed of. or Beneficially Owned
1. Mtge of Security Unser. 3) 2. Transaction 2.. Deemed 1. 4. Securities Aci ted (A) S. Amount of A Y. Nature
Opt Execution Dale. Transit lion a Deposed Of (0) Onstr. 3. Securities Ownership of indirect
Olonthijayeear) • anY Cod (Inca. 4 and 5) Benetichay Form: Beneficial
(MOnlhOWSISW) 0) Owned Direct (D) Owners*
Following or Indirect (Ino!. 4,
(A) Reported 0) Omits 41
CO00 V Amos* c• Price TransactiOn(0)
(0) Ones 3 end 4)
M
Common Stock 03122/2007 2,962 A 80 77.832 I)
Common Stock 03/21/2007 s 2.962 D 3151.26 74.570 D
Table II • Derivative Se urlti a Acquired. Disposed e . or Beneficially Owned
(e.g.. puts. ea s. warrant . options. convert ble securities)
,. Title or 2. 3. Transaction 3A. Deemed 4. 5. Number E. Date Exercisable and 7. DIN and 4. Price of 9. Number 10. 11. Nature
Cybele* Conversion Date Execution Oaks Transaction of Expiration Dale Amount 01 Derivative of Ownership of indirect
Security or Exercise ilionlliDayetwO if any Cede Omit Derivative (Montlitlaylear) Securities Seem*, derivative Form: Beneficial
(In*. 3) Price of itfonth.Day.Yeari 8) Securities Under** (Instr. 5) Securilies Direct OM Ownership
Derivable Acquired Derivative Security Beneficially or indirect iinsis 4)
Security IA) r (In*. 3 see 4) Owned (I) (Instr. 4)
Disposed Following
of( ) Reported
(Instr. 3.4 Transaction
and 5) (s)gnet, 4)
Amount
of
Numbs
Date Itcaraslon ot
Coda V UU IDI Exercisable Data Tale snares
CAP limo NI Common
(2001i i 1i 2.962 I U.R.V2006 I UMV2COS *AL 2.962 So o
Explanatio of Responses:
I. Soot—. .1i. .ni ia L.' th s common stock to Rep. ions P non puttees toCAPPlan pi unite Rule IN,'
2 inn type a 4t.i..any w way typtall) dow. not haves onntena n nr name prim
Remarks:
/5/ Spector, Warren J. 03/212007
Signaiure of Reporting Person Dale
Reminder: Report on a separate line lor each class of securities beneficially owned directly or in:Beaty.
• If the loan is lied by more man one reportng person. see rot:ruction 4 (b)(v).
Intentional misstatements or omissions el facts constitute Federal Criminal %notations See 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 D.S.C.
Note: File three copies of ths Form. one of which must be manually signed. If space is insufficient. see Instruction 6 lor procedure.
Persons who respond to the collection of MIemotion contained In this form are not required to respond unless the lam displays a currently valid ORS Number.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/777001/000077700107000052/xs1F345X02Jspe... 12/16/2008
EFTA00317060