EFTA00803978Set 9
2018-10-166p6,713w
unconditional
how they evaluate actions toward bad recipients. defectors who regard everyone as bad (ALLD). Depending on
the leading-eight strategy considered, the reputation dynamics
in these scenarios can differ ... different individuals may have tion of leading-eight players assigns a good reputation to ALLD
access to different kinds of information, and thus they might players. The average proportion ... ALLD players considered
disagree on how they assess others. Their opinions may well
be correlated, but they will not be correlated perfectly. Once
individuals disagree in their initial evaluation
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00803978.pdf
EFTA00632631Set 9
2014-09-306p6,200w
Here, we introduce a model that takes into account the defect" and "alums end" (ALLD) is always a Nash equilibrium: no
motive behind the action. A crucial question ... continue or end. If player 2 continues, there is another round with probability w.
ALLD, CWOL, and CWL are the only equilibria of the envelope type 1 can adopt ... many times and re-
this intuition by showing that this equilibrium, as well as ALLD cord the frequency of each strategy after the population
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00632631.pdf
EFTA01091492Set 9
22p5,709w
always defects, and player 2 always exits
(which we refer to as the ALLD equilibrium). It is a Nash Equilibrium for all parameter
values. The second is the strategy pair ... less than 1. Thus, we classify population
frequencies as being behaviorally equivalent to ALLD, CWL, and CWOL (see appendix
for details). We plot the frequencies of each of these ... always defects and player 2 always exits (bottom
row and rightmost column) as ALLD. ALLD is always an equilibrium of the envelope
game. CWOL is an equilibrium
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA01091492.pdf