EFTA00955732Set 9
2013-03-0631p11,465w
much do we care about the views
and interests of other world leaders?
Dean Acheson, President Harry Truman's last secretary of state, explained
the need to bring decisions ... president: Staff, Acheson
wrote in his great memoir, Grapes from Thorns, is indispensable for
collecting information and implementing decisions, but should not be
permitted to substitute for executive decision-making ... efficient, is the 'agreed' staff paper sent up for 'action,' a euphemism for
'approval,"' Acheson wrote. "[A] chief who wants to perform his function
of knowing the issues
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00955732.pdf
EFTA01939256Set 10
2014-01-2233p8,187w
explicit strategies. The Bush-Scowcroft-Baker team
exemplified this approach, as did the Truman-Acheson team. A
President can have a disposition toward strategy without having
a formal strategy ... fashion
that would satisfy a Kissinger, a Brzezinski, an Acheson or even
a Scowcroft.
Some Presidents seem to have no use for strategy at all, are not
adept or comfortable
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01939256.pdf
EFTA01874719Set 10
2012-08-1429p6,713w
EFTA01874720
This is foreign policy trivialized. If Harry Truman's
secretary of state, Dean Acheson, was "present at the
creation" of the post-World War II order of states,
historians ... secretaries of state working in tandem
can bend historical outcomes. Think of Truman and
Acheson accepting the call of history when the British
could no longer assume their imperial role
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01874719.pdf
EFTA01928494Set 10
2013-04-1338p9,926w
economists say). In the early Cold War,
for example, Secretary of State Dean Acheson resolutely
rejected pressure from the U.S. left to negotiate with Moscow
until Washington was able ... from "a position of
strength." Acheson recognized that the conditions, timing and
scope of negotiations all involve complex strategic and tactical
considerations. None of it is cost or risk free
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01928494.pdf
EFTA00662852Set 9
2014-04-1327p9,890w
economists say). In the early Cold War, for
example, Secretary of State Dean Acheson resolutely rejected pressure
from the U.S. left to negotiate with Moscow until Washington was able ... from "a position of strength." Acheson recognized that the
conditions, timing and scope of negotiations all involve complex strategic
and tactical considerations. None of it is cost or risk free
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00662852.pdf
EFTA01180426Set 9
2012-08-1420p6,673w
party.
This is foreign policy trivialized. If Harry Truman's secretary of state,
Dean Acheson, was "present at the creation" of the post-World War II
order of states, historians ... secretaries of state working in tandem can bend historical
outcomes. Think of Truman and Acheson accepting the call of history
when the British could no longer assume their imperial role
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA01180426.pdf
EFTA01764344Set 10
2012-11-0914p7,633w
contrast, a Democratic secretary of state =an imagine himself (or herself) the new Dean Acheson, "present at
the cr=ation." Since the greater Middle East has so dominated US foreign ... vision for America's relationship wit= China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia etc that
Acheson, George Kenn=n and Harry Truman famously did vis a vis Europe in the late
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01764344.pdf
EFTA02028894Set 10
2012-08-1429p6,712w
party.
This is foreign policy trivialized. If Harry Truman's
secretary of state, Dean Acheson, was "present at the
creation" of the post-World War II order of states,
historians ... secretaries of state working in tandem
can bend historical outcomes. Think of Truman and
Acheson accepting the call of history when the British
could no longer assume their imperial role
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA02028894.pdf
EFTA00932995Set 9
2012-04-0833p11,571w
World War II, the country watched
events in China, Korea and Indochina that, Dean Acheson lamented, were
"beyond the control of the . . . United States." In 1952 Douglas
MacArthur warned
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00932995.pdf