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cannot determine the mean payoff of their peers any longer. 1101, WSLS is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the social dilemma 453
392 satisfies (6„_1 +b0)12sa ... which is always
393 plore which ZU strategies give rise to a Nash equilibrium with 455
394 fulfilled for r≥ 2. For social dilemmas that meet this condition, 456
stable ... analysis is based on the assumption that individuals act in- 460
399 a Nash equilibrium (27, 28), larger group sizes make it increasingly dependently. As a result, we observed that
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Sigmund 1988). For example, a stable equilibrium of the replicator
equation is a Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. Another approach to evolutionary
game theory is given by adaptive dynamics ... Lessard Sc Ladret 2007, Bomze & Pawlowitsch 2008). In this
new approach, the Nash equilibrium condition no longer implies evolutionary stability.
There has also been much interest in studying evolutionary games ... 2006b). There is
also a modified condition for what it means to be a Nash equilibrium for games on graphs
(Ohtsuki & Nowak 2008).
Spatial models have also a long history
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alliances.
4 Self-enforcing alliances
Let us next explore which ZD-strategies form a Nash equilibrium (i.e., which ZD strategies can be stably
maintained in a population, assuming that players ... Then the ZD-strategy is a Nash equilibrium if and only
if one of the following three cases holds:
I. sA = 0, i.e., if applied by it — 1 players ... Proposition 4. We already know that for a ZD-strategy to be a Nash equilibrium, one of the three
conditions need to be fulfilled (otherwise there would be a different
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